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Lotman’s semiosphere, 
Peirce’s categories, and cultural forms of life
Floyd M errell
The Department of Foreign Languages and Literatures,
Stanley Coulter Hall, Purdue University,
West Lafayette, Indiana, IN 47907, USA 
e-mail: fmerrell@purdue.edu
Abstract. This paper brings Lotman’s semiotic space to bear on Peirce’s 
categories of the universe’s processes. Particular manifestations of cultural 
semiotic space within the semiosphere are qualified as inconsistent and/or 
incomplete, depending upon the cultural context. Inconsistency and in­
completeness are of the nature of vagueness and generality respectively, that 
are themselves qualified in terms of overdetermination and underdeter­
mination, the first being of the nature of the category of Firstness and the 
second of the nature of Thirdness. The role of Secondness is unfolded by acts 
of distinguishing the possibilities of Firstness into this and that, here and there, 
there and then, and all the distinctions that follow. Secondness, then, with 
respect to cultural semiotic space, gives rise to hegemony, to dominance and 
subservience, superordination and subordination. Commensurate with this 
interpretation of Secondness, the realms of overdetermination and under- 
determination are labeled homogeny and heterogeny respectively. These 
theoretical assumptions will then be used as a modeling device providing an 
interpretation for various key aspects of Latin American cultures.
Beginnings
A few words on Peirce’s categories are in order, before we can 
proceed. Firstness is what it is, without any relationship whatsoever 
with any other. It is self-contained, self-reflexive, and self-sufficient. 
Secondness is what it is, insofar as it enters into relationship with 
something other, interacting with it in the sense of something here and 
something else there, the first something possibly acting as a sign and 
the second something acting as the object of the sign. Thirdness is 
what it is, in the respect that it brings Firstness and Secondness
2
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together by mediating between them, and hence it brings itself into 
interaction with them in the same way they are brought into inter­
action with each other.
We have the interrelations between the categories in Figure 1. 
Notice how they are “democratic”, since each category is interrelated 
the other two in the same way they are interrelated with each other. 
Notice that the model is not “triangular”, but rather, there are three 
lines meeting at a point in the form of a “tripod” such that there 
cannot be merely a binary relation between one category and another, 
for the relations between any two categories are possible solely by 
means of interrelations between all three categories. Notice also that 
the swirling lines illustrating the processual character of these inter­
relations make up a Borromean knot, well know in mathematical 
topology. The Borromean knot exercises a move from the two- 
dimensional sheet toward three-dimensionality with the overlapping 
lines. This is significant, I would respectfully submit. For, the three 
lines making up the categorical interrelations are not merely two- 
dimensional. They are more properly conceived as a triangle seen 
from above, that, as a result of the swirling lines of the Borromean 
knot, oscillate forward and backward. Thus the three-dimensionality 
of “semiotic space”. Speaking of “semiotic space”, let us turn to the 
work of Jurij Lotman for a moment.1
1 Lotman writes that the whole of culture is “immersed in a semiotic 
space”, and subjects within a given culture “can only function by 
interaction with that space” .2 This combination of signs and semiotic 
space he calls the “semiosphere” . “The semiosphere is the result and 
the condition for the development of culture; we justify our term by
1 In a few brief pages I can hardly hope to do justice to the rich thought either of 
Lotman or of Peirce. Consequently, 1 limit myself to a few remarks on Peirce’s 
categories and their import to some notions of cultural “logics” I have in mind, and 
with respect to Lotman I will not enter into a discussion of his rather controversial 
notion of artistic language as a “secondary modeling system” (Sebeok 1991), nor will I 
debate the pros and cons of Lotman’s “dual models” in the dynamics of culture 
(Lotman and Uspenskij 1984, Nakhimovsky and Nakhimovsky 1985), the problem of 
“coding” in semiotic inquiry (Shukman 1977, Merrell 2000a, 2000b), or that of 
“textuality” (Merrell 2000c). Rather, I will take up what I consider Lotman’s chief 
contribution to the semiotics of culture, his concept of the “semiosphere” .
2 Lotman has defined “semiotic space” in terms of mythology not as a “sign 
continuum”, but as a “totality of separate objects bearing proper names. It is as if space 
were interrupted by the intervals between objects and thus lacks from our viewpoint 
such a basic trait as continuity” (Lotman 1977b: 237). It is this discontinuous, even 
binary, aspect of “semiotic space” that will be under the spotlight in the pages that 
follow.
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analogy with the biosphere, as Vernadsky defined it, namely the tota­
lity and the organic whole of living matter and also the condition for 
the continuation of life” (Lotman 1990: 124-125). Lotman refers to 
V. I. Vernadsky, for whom all living organisms are intimately bound 
to one another and cannot exist as autonomous entities. The biosphere 
encompasses everything that happens within it with respect to 
interactions between the living organisms of all communities therein 
contained. In other words, if we bring Peirce’s categories to bear on 
Vernadsky’s biosphere and Lotman’s semiosphere, we have the 
makings of multiple Borromean knots of interrelations that are 
themselves in perpetual flowing movement in and out of each other 
while entering into and breaking from triadic interrelations. In other 
words, we have what we might call a triadically flowing “biosemio- 
sphere”.3
Figure I. The categories.
3 Lotman usually keeps the terms in separation, but I include them in one all- 
encompassing term.
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The nature of the biosemiosphere
We read from Lotman that the biosemiosphere is marked by “hetero­
geneity” . This is because the languages that “fill up the semiotic space 
are various, and they relate to each other along the spectrum which 
runs from complete mutual translatability to just as complete mutual 
untranslatability. Heterogeneity is defined both by the diversity of 
elements and by their different functions” . In this sense, if we imagine 
a model of a semiotic space where all the languages emerge into 
existence at one and the same moment, we “still would not have a 
single coding structure but a set of connected but different systems” 
(Lotman 1990: 125).
Lotman goes on to write that if we wish to elaborate a model, say, 
of European Romanticism, we run into problems if we expect to map 
out homogeneous interrelationships between various expressions of 
Romanticism from one area to another and from one time period to 
another. There will be differences not of kind, such as there would be 
between Romanticism and Neoclassicism, but of degree, of iconic 
variations or variations of Peirce’s Firstness emerging into Second­
ness, such that there can be no mutually complete translation between 
one expression of Romanticism and another. This is to say that the 
biosemiosphere is “asymmetrical”. Asymmetry finds expression in the 
process of internal translation between semiotic space and time from 
within the biosemiosphere. Translation, Lotman asserts, is “a primary 
mechanism of consciousness” . Expressing an idea in one language 
and then in another language is to rethink it and in the process to 
understand it anew and in a more profound way. Since in the majority 
of cases “the different languages” of the biosemiosphere are “semio- 
tically asymmetrical, i.e. they do not have mutual semantic correspon­
dences”, then the whole biosemiosphere “can be regarded as a 
generator of information” (Lotman 1990: 127).
Allow me, if I may, to put Lotman’s ideas in a different set of 
interrelationships in order to bring about a coalescence of his thought 
with that of Peirce. In Figure 2, notice that I have used the terms 
“heterogeny” and “homogeny” in place of “heterogeneity” and 
“homogeneity”. I do so, above all, in order to set these two terms of 
from “hegemony”, the Gramscian term having to do with conflict and 
negotiation between social groups and ideologies.4 “Hegemony” bears
4 I use the Gramscian term in much the sense of Florencia Mallon as: (1) a “set of 
nested, continuous processes through which power and meaning are contested,
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most particularly on a struggle of opposites. This is chiefly the domain 
of Peirce’s Secondness. If “hegemony” phases largely into category 
Secondness, then “heterogeny” phases into Thirdness and “homo- 
geny” into Firstness. How so? In order to qualify myself, I should 
briefly define Peirce’s sign. In a nutshell, Peirce’s sign is something 
that interrelates with something for someone in some respect or 
capacity. The first something is the representamen (the signifying 
entity that usually goes by the name “sign”). The second something is 
the object of the sign. Someone, some semiotic agent or other, must be 
around to make or take the sign in order that it may develop as a 
genuine sign. If there is no maker or taker around, then the sign is no 
more than possibly or potentially genuine. What renders the sign 
genuine, in addition to its maker or taker, is that which brings the 
representamen into interrelation with its object and with someone in 
some respect or capacity. This is the function of the third component 
of the sign, the interpretant.
The representamen provides initial Firstness, the representamen’s 
object, its other, introduces Secondness, and the interpretant provides 
the first stage of Thirdness. A sign that is similar to its object is an 
Icon (for example, a portrait). A sign with some natural or necessary 
connection to its object is an Index (a mercury column indicating 
temperature). A sign whose interrelation with its object is by way of 
social convention is a Symbol (the word ‘book’ as a sign of the 
physical entity, book). Notice, in this regard, the relative positions of 
Firstness-Secondness-Thirdness, iconicity-indexicality-symbolicity, 
and homogeny-hegemony-heterogeny in Figure 2.
Firstness takes on the characteristic of the sign, or representamen. 
The Firstness of the sign involves our immediately “experienced 
world” , the world of feelings and sensations before there is any 
conscious awareness of some other, something other “out there” and 
other than the experiencing subject. Secondness plays the role of the 
object of the representamen — its other, the object with which it 
interdependently interrelates. “Socio-cultural necessity” constitutes
legitimated, and redefined at all levels of society. According to this definition, 
hegemony is hegemonic process: it can and does exist everywhere at all times”, and (2) 
“an actual end point, the result of hegemonic process. An always dynamic or 
precarious balance, a contract or agreement, is reached among contesting forces” 
(Mallon 1995: 6). This definition of the term should render it adequately Peircean and 
processual; that is, non-binary. It should also demonstrate how Peircean triadic 
processes depart from the more dyadic framework Lotman customarily sets up (for 
example, Lotman, Uspenskij 1984: 3-35).
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the makings of the sign’s Thirdness, the interpretant, the other of the 
other (we must keep in mind, of course, that the thin membrane 
between the terms is hardly more than the dynamic frontier 
delineating a small, temporary whirlpool from the entire semiosic 
movement from within which it arose).
THIRDNESS
A Cognized world, 
socio-cuitural, 
necessity
SECONDNESS
A
Hegemcnyj
FIRSTNESS
INCOMPLETENESS,
UNDERDETERMINATION
Figure 2. Interdependent, interrelated, interaction.
Now, consider the sign and the semiotic maker and taker or the 
subject as sign to be (1) in a swimming embrace with all its possible 
others as a matter of contingent happenings; (2) in apparent (I really 
must highlight the term) opposition to some actualized other as a 
matter of intransigent combat, dynamic struggle, rough-and-tumble 
agonistics; and (3) in intermediate, interdependent interrelation with 
its other other as a matter of dialogic exchange, renegotiation, and at 
times of happy consensus. Consider the more general picture in Figure
2, including item (1) as homogeny, (2) as hegemony, and (3) as 
heterogeny. Homo- qualifies the sphere of Firstness as a union of 
complementary contradictories into a harmonious package in terms of 
sheer possibilities without any pair of opposite terms having emerged
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to begin their mortal combat. Hetero- qualifies the sphere of Thirdness 
as sets of actualized terms that have either become bored or exhausted 
as a result of their incessant warfare and are now beginning a potential 
reconciliation of their differences. The suffix, -geny, indicates a 
manner of emergence, origin, organic becoming without reaching the 
stage of already having become. (And consequently, we now become 
more aware of the “biosemio-” nature of Figure 2.)
All this might appear as a trivial taxonomic game. So I really must 
more adequately specify what I have schematically mapped out before 
going on, to wherever and whenever that may be. But first, if I may be 
so allowed, I would like to indulge a bit more by illustrating the 
Peircean importance of my scheme.
How better to qualify the social haves and the havenots
Assume a given culture follows a particular standard practice. Let us 
call it ‘A’. This practice is handed down by the people in power as a 
code that must be honored, come what may. If I have a tendency to 
acquiesce and place credibility in anything and everything handed 
down by Authority, I obediently follow the received code, ‘A’. As far 
as I am concerned, ‘A’ incorporates culture as it is and must be. 
Consequently, I follow customary practices stipulated by ‘A’, and 
since I assume the origin of ‘A’ is on the basis of those in Authority, 
whether in the hallowed halls of academic, the halls of legislature, or 
the workplace, I strive to follow it to the letter. In other words, my 
behavior evinces “hegemonic” affirmation. Peirce describes such 
acceptance of what one takes to be necessarily the case on Authority in 
his paper on “fixing of belief’.5 He discarded knowledge via Authority 
in his anti-Cartesian argument that there is no guarantee whatsoever 
that it will put us on the straight and narrow path toward knowing.
In contrast to ‘A’, that I follow rather blindly, I might rebel by 
denying the standard practice. This is tantamount to saying: ‘Not-A'. 
This is “hegemonic” denial. I may now be exercising Peirce’s 
tenacity, the method of the rebellious upstart who goes his own way 
without any regard for authority or the helpful suggestions of anyone
5 I refer to Peirce’s three articles on cognition in presenting his anti-Cartesian 
argument, where he presents the pitfalls of knowledge by way of authority, tenacity, 
and apriorism or introspection, and opts for knowledge by way of general agreement 
on the part of the entire community (CP: 5.213-357).
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else in her community. This, for obvious reasons, will rarely lead me 
to any legitimate answers, since my own idiosyncratic way has little 
chance of becoming general community practice, hence I remain 
isolated or I am ostracized in one form or another. If I take on 
unwarranted self-importance I may go so far as to espouse the 
Cartesian a priori method of introspection like some privileged 
individual who spreads the word about his having plumbed the depths 
of his consciousness, survived, and returned with the grounding bit of 
knowledge in hand. Peirce’s anti-Cartesianism simply will not let this 
concept fly, however. There is no knowing, ultimately knowing, who 
is to be trusted and who not. Why should we blindly trust anyone and 
abide by his counsel without questions or the opportunity for a good 
counterargument? Peirce’s prescribed road to the best of all possible 
worlds of knowing rests in amicable conversation, banter, debate, 
kibitzing, and even agonistics when it becomes necessary.
This is the dialogic way toward knowing. It entails neither 
necessarily ‘A’ nor necessarily ‘Not-А’, but most likely something 
else, something new, some “heterogenic” practice that has emerged 
from the erstwhile excluded-middle between ‘A’ and ‘Not-А’. This 
“something else” is what emerges within the community out of 
dialogic give-and-take. During the dialogue, what is accepted becomes 
caught between the horns of some dilemma or other, and something 
must give. But upon giving, something else emerges, which is then put 
to the dialogical or practical test, and hopefully some general opinion 
will ensue. And where did this “something else, something new” 
come from? From the range of possibilities, from within Firstness, or 
the sphere of “homogeny”, from which all the “heterogenic” alter­
natives between ‘A’ and ‘Not-А’ can emerge.
Now, I would invite you to take a wild flight of the imagination 
with me, a sort of “thought-experiment”, if you will. Thought experi­
ments can at the outset be considered either consistent or inconsistent, 
depending on the reigning theory, the perceptual and conceptual mode 
of the audience concerned, and the general temper of the time. 
According to an Aristotle-style thought experiment, a quarter should 
fall faster than a dime since it is heavier. Fine. The common sense of 
Aristotle’s time would in all likelihood tell most respectable citizens 
so much. So what if we attach a dime to a quarter and drop them. 
Would they fall faster than the solitary quarter since they make up a 
heavier package. Well, that is actually somewhat problematic. Since 
the unattached dime would fall more slowly than the quarter, when the 
two are connected, the dime should act as a drag on its partner and
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slow its ordinary progress down somewhat. So the combination of the 
two coins should fall slower than the isolated quarter. But the 
combined pair of objects is heavier than the quarter, so they should 
fall faster. But they don’t. Needless to say, Galileo demolished this 
theory with an alternative series of untested thought experiments (of 
course it is doubtful he ever actually carried out his experiment from 
the top of the Tower of Piza). And as a consequence of Galileo’s 
work, in our day we believe we have a relatively consistent theory, 
unlike those naive Greeks. So far, so good. An inconsistent theory was 
properly discarded and replaced by a more logically and rationally 
respectable alternative, and sober-minds managed to prevail. In 
another way of putting the matter, Galileo said ‘No!’ to authority, to 
‘A’. He said: ‘Not-А!’ Then he went about finding an alternative 
between the ‘A’ and the ‘Not-А’. Eventually, something other, some­
thing new, emerged from the semiosic soup of possibilities, Firstness, 
“homogeny”, and the entire scientific edifice become increasingly 
more “heterogenous” rather than merely Manicheistic, dualistic, and 
“hegemonic”.
In our century, physics in the form of quantum theory, especially 
when carrying the labels of Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle and 
Bohr’s complementary, became brazenly, and apparently without 
remorse or regrets, ambiguous, and even inconsistent, depending upon 
the perspective. At a given moment is a quantum “event” a “particle” 
or is it a “wave”? To put the matter quite baldly, the only possible 
responses to such questions is ‘Yes, but no’, ‘No, but yes’, ‘Yes and 
no’, ‘Neither yes nor no’. This is perplexing, to say the least. In 
Galileo’s “Dialogue”, Simplicio the Aristotelian disrespectfully asks 
Salviati: “So you have not made a hundred tests, or even one? And yet 
you so freely declare it to be certain?” Salviati responds: “Without 
experiment, I am sure that the effect will happen as I tell you, because 
it must happen that way” (Galileo 1967: 145; in Brown 1991: 2-3). 
This recalls Einstein’s remark regarding physicist-astronomer Arthur 
Eddington’s experiment designed either to verify or falsify Einstein’s 
general theory of relativity. When asked his opinion about the possible 
outcome of the event, Einstein responded that if it appeared to refute 
his theory, then he was sorry for the dear Lord, because the theory was 
correct. A marvel of arrogance? Y es... and no. Such declarations bear 
witness to the power of the mind and the confidence of she who 
dwells within it. It also testifies, I would respectfully submit, to the 
inextricable union of Firstness-Secondness-Thirdness, representamen- 
object-interpretant, iconicity-indexicality-symbolicity, and feeling- 
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sensing-interpreting. This union can hardly be put to the test, like 
Aristotle’s or Galileo’s thought experiments could have been had their 
authors been so disposed. Yet Hume, Locke, and others, including 
Peirce, bear witness to the impossibility of one’s observing oneself in 
the act of observing oneself in order to distinguish roughly between 
the equivalent of Peirce’s categories. It’s roughly tantamount to the 
quantum “event” just described.
It seems that, with respect to this mutual embrace of Peirce’s 
intriguing triads, and in light of his anti-Cartesian posture as outlined 
above, the counsel might be: never bow to authority unless it is 
deserving of your respect, do not blindly push forth come what may 
with paranoid tenacity, beware of those false prophets bearing tidings 
of their having been to the wilderness of their introspective mind 
where they saw the light of Truth, but pay your dues to the community 
of your choice, keep the dialogue open, and do the best you can. With 
respect to the triads themselves, we would have it that the imaginary 
thought-sign is the possibility of ‘A’, a might be from the 
“homogenic” sphere of ‘Both A and Not-А’. In this regard, the object 
of the sign would be an “anti-hegemonic” ‘Not-А’. And the inter­
pretant would be a “heterogenic” ‘'Neither A nor Not-А’, but since it 
brings ‘A’ and its respective other into a three-way mediation, it 
potentially gives rise to the emergence of something different, 
something even possibly new. We can construct Figure 3, with the 
“point” or “vortex” connecting each of the “sign” components, such 
that it can be mapped into Figure 1.
The “vortex” is the composite of all unactualized signs. It is, so to 
speak, the “emptiness”, the sheer possibility of anything and 
everything. It is as if we had ‘Both A and Not-А’ and ‘Neither A nor 
Not-A’ written on the two sides of a strip of paper and then we make 
of the two-dimensional sheet a Möbius-band in three-dimensional 
space to yield ‘Both of the propositions’, and ‘Neither of the propo­
sitions’. Moreover, the choice is not a choice between Aristotelian 
truth and falsity, between what is on no uncertain terms true and what 
is not true, between what exists and what does not exist, but rather, 
between what from some context or other might be possibly true and 
what might be possibly false, and what might possibly be neither true 
nor false because it not yet is. there is only something like what Peirce 
(CP: 6.512) calls a “cut” or G. Spencer-Brown (1972) a “mark of 
distinction”. There is no more than our “tripod” plus the “vortex”.
This “cut” or “mark of distinction” makes up what Gregory Bate­
son (1972) terms a “difference that makes a difference”. In the
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beginning, demarcating line is set down separating “this” from “that” , 
“inside” from “outside”. Then other distinctions are made, and then 
still others, and so on, toward ever increasing complexity. Lotman 
writes that every culture
begins by dividing the world into ‘its own’ internal space and ‘their’ external 
space [...] The boundary may separate the living from the dead, settled 
peoples from nomadic ones, the town from the plains; it may be a state 
frontier, or a social, national, confessional, or any other kind of frontier. 
(Lotman 1990: 131)
Lotman refers to this division as binary. I would beg to differ with him 
in this respect. It is, more appropriately, trinary or triadic, following 
the Peircean model of the sign depicted in Figures 1 and 3. How can 
this triadicity come about as a result of a binary division between 
“this” and “that”? As in Figure 4, I would suggest. The sign tripod 
collapses to a point, the original “vortex”, the “emptiness” giving rise 
to the emergence of the sign, of all signs, of all that is becoming. Then 
the point, by repeating itself over and over again, becomes a line, the 
“cut”, the “mark of distinction”. That is to say, two-dimensionality 
collapses into zero-dimensionality that becomes one-dimensionality 
that separates two semiotic spaces of two-dimensionality.
BOTH ’A’ 
AND OTHER
NEITHER ’A’ 
NOR OTHER
Figure 3. Always, alternatives.
Lotman writes that:
The asymmetry of the human body is the anthropological basis for its semio- 
ticization: the semiotics of right and left are found just as universal in all
human cultures as the opposition top and bottom. And the fundamental asym­
metries of male and female, living and dead, are just as widespread. The 
living/dead opposition involves the opposition of something moving, warm, 
breathing, to something immobile, cold, not breathing (the belief that cold and 
death are synonyms is supported by an enormous number of texts from diffe­
rent cultures, and jus as common is the identification of death with turning to 
stone/ see the numerous legends about the origins of mountains and rocks). 
(Lotman 1990: 133)
Lotman’s words might strike one as pure and adulterated binarism. 
Actually, in every case the binary implies the “vortex” of “emptiness” 
and meaning, that is, the point at the center of Peirce’s semiotic tripod 
(that which contains the possibility for all semiotization) and the inter­
pretant (meaning). Right and left imply existence of the body, male 
and female imply the notion of gender, living and dead imply the 
universal principle transcending life. And so on. The “vortex” there 
will always be, for if not there are no signs. And the third leg of the 
tripod, the interpretant. there will always be, for if not, if there are no 
sign makers and takers, then there is no genuine semiosis. Because 
semiotic space “is transected by numerous boundaries, each message 
that moves across it must be many times translated and transformed, 
and the process of generating new information thereby snowballs” 
(Lotman 1990: 140).
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Figure 4. How the semiotic tripod divides.
But, ... this is not very clear, I fear. But what more can be said if what 
is to be said cannot explicitly be said? It only lends itself to a sort of 
feeling for what is on the tenuous cultural track of semiosis. There is 
no Cartesian clarity to be had at this “nonlogocentric” , 
“nonlinguicentric” sphere of vague and overdetermined possible signs 
where nothing is distinct and where there are no sharp lines of 
demarcation.
Back to a few more concrete examples, then.
Lotm an’s semiosphere, P eirce’s categories 397
A picture puzzle of «-dimensions and uncountable pieces
Latin America cultures, it goes without saying, are a complex, virtual­
ly chaotic, “logic” of ethnicity and culture, conquest and postcolo­
nialism, virtual identity and radical difference, imitation and dis­
tortion, conflict and co-optation, antagonism and reciprocity. Whoever 
surfaces to the top of the gush of ongoing cultural becoming in the 
beginning might appear to have gained the upper hand. But not 
necessarily. That is, unless she might have been able simultaneously 
to perch on the shoulders of all those below and maintain a 
paternalism-patronizing hegemonic relationship with them. She who 
happens to be of the haves at the top depends upon those havenots 
below and they in turn depend upon her.
In the beginning, the forging of Latin America seemed to be the 
product of clear and distinct delineation. Answers were straight­
forward, and no further questions were asked. Or so it seemed to 
many. However, take the case of an imaginary Amerindian from the 
central plateau of Mexico. If when asked who “discovered” America 
he without hesitation says “Why, your ancestors, of course”, he is 
either consciously or tacitly giving a nod to the “superiority” of 
Europeans over pre-Hispanic civilizations. In other words, he is 
manifesting his co-optation into the colonizing system and turning his 
back on his own heritage. This is cultural awareness like it “should 
be” according to the hegemonically endowed haves of the conquest 
and colonization and the aftermath of independence. If, on the other 
hand, our Amerindian retorts: “Well, Patron, as I see it, according to 
your account, Columbus ‘discovery’ America, but actually, we had no 
need of anybody to ‘invent’ us and tell us who and where we were”, 
he questions the supremacy of the “discoverers” and subverts the very 
idea of “discovery” (to reveal, to be the first to know). His response is 
quite properly counterhegemonic. It is as if to say ‘No!’ to the coloni­
zing system, depending on whether we are taking strict classical logi­
cal principles into account or the pragmatics of human communica­
tion. As far as he is concerned, there was no “discovery”, for nothing 
was concealed so that it might be revealed. There was no unknown in 
waiting expectation of its being placed in the light of knowledge.
A response to a comparable question regarding the problem of 
identity might be exceedingly more complex for a mestiza woman (of 
mixed racial and ethnic heritage) from the same area of the country. 
Part of her heritage is native American, another part perhaps African
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American, and another part Castillian, which is itself streaked with 
Arabic cultural presuppositions and propensities, perhaps along with a 
little Roman, Celt, and so on, influence. The matter of her cultural 
heritage, her identity, her proper posture vis-ä-vis the pressures of 
today’s neoliberal, postmodern consumerism become a mixed and 
confusing bag of tricks. One might tell her that she really should 
choose. She should choose who she is, what her attitude is to be with 
respect to herself, her background, her political inclinations, her 
behavior and relations with others in society, her role in the economic 
life surrounding her — what she will purchase and what she will be 
willing to do in order to purchase more, and how she will use it — and 
so on. Indeed, the choices are hers, and to decline exercising her right 
to choose is itself also a choice that will have its own effect on her. 
Whichever choice or set of choices she arrives at, she will remain 
separated and at the same time integrated; she will adopt and she will 
reject; she will embrace and she will resist; she will interrelate and 
become part of an interlocked concoction of conflicts and contra­
dictions. Along these lines Maria Lugones writes:
I f  something or someone is neither/nor, but kind o f  both, not quite either.
I f something is in the middle o f either/or,
i f  it is ambiguous, given the available classification o f things,
it is mestiza,
i f  it threatens by its very’ ambiguity the orderliness o f  the system, o f 
schematized reality.
I f  given its ambiguity in the univocal ordering it is anomalous, deviant, can it 
be tamed through separation? Should it separate so as to avoid taming? 
Should it resist separation? Should it resist through separation? Separate as 
in the separation o f the white from  the yolk? (Lugones 1994: 459)
Yes, choice. We are condemned to the imperative of choosing, 
whether we know it or not and whether we like it or not. The choice 
exists between the either and the or, that is, between both the either 
and the or, or rather, what is between the either and the or. But... No. 
Not that, I’m afraid. Not really, for there is nothing between the either 
and the or. But ... that’s not right either. Not really. In a metaphorical 
manner of speaking, “emptiness” is “between” them: nothing and 
everything, as possibilia. The emerging mergence of both the one and 
the other is declaring 4Both A and Not-А’. Poking around in the 
interstices at the risk of falling into the very slightly, in fact infini- 
tesimally, parsed mouth of ‘emptiness’, and one might perchance enter 
that never-never land where ‘Neither A nor Not-А’ is the case, and
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there is a ray of hope that something novel might emerge — the self- 
organization of all things, all things as organism, as benign signs of 
ongoing resonance. It’s all a process, a marvelous process, and she, 
that is, our ‘enchanting’ and ‘enchanted’ mestiza, is in it, as are all of 
us. What she is, is not what she is, and she both is and is not what she 
is, and she is neither what she is nor what she is not', and she is all of 
the above and she is none of the above.
Riddles! Is there no way out? But who promised us a comfortable 
road to truth by means of binary either-or logic anyway? Who told us 
there must be either discovery and knowledge or eternal darkness? A 
matter of dominating or of subservience? Of raping nature or living a 
sordid animal existence? Of razor-sharp binary choices between 
eithers and orsl Of course Galileo and Bacon and Newton and Locke 
and Descartes, and later Thomas Edison and Henry Ford and Bill 
Gates and many others, and a host of celebrities of various sorts in 
their own way, all give us an image of that machine-oriented, materia­
listic, consumerist good life. From another direction, a concoction of 
religious saints, seers, and assorted sinners also promise milk and 
honey. As do those who “discovered, conquered, and colonized” 
America, and Hitler and Mussolini and Stalin and a few Latin 
American revolutionaries and visionaries and populists who belong to 
the same crowd. Where did it all get us? Within the last century we 
have been warned by Nietzsche and Heidegger and Wittgenstein and 
Foucault and Derrida, and their critics and disciples that the promised 
paradise is a sham. And we have the limitations on our knowledge by 
way of Heisenberg and Bohr and Gödel and their counterparts in 
science, logic and mathematics. Any and all answers to all questions 
eventually meet their others, and eventually there may be a happy 
meeting ground, or some alternative or other may pop up between the 
neither and the nor, and then it may be a matter of all of the 
preceding ... or none of it. Yes, riddles. Yet, in spite of it all, 
liberation, which, though at the outset it. may appear perverse, is over 
the long haul quite healthy.
What is for sure is that, with due respects to Lotman, binary 
thinking must go the way of the dinosaurs, for if not, it is most likely 
we who will follow them into oblivion. This is especially the case of 
the most complex processes the likes of cultural comings and goings. 
Cultures, “hot” and “cold” and modem and postmodern alike, are 
comparable to pervasive “strange attractors” . They are nonlinear, 
interrelated, unpredictable. Their virtual Brownian motion is the result 
of the dependency of every part on every other part, and if deter­
ministic laws there be, they are beyond the pale of human cerebral 
capacities. Cultures are processes, never products; they are codepen- 
dently arising becoming, not cause-and-effect sequences; they are 
events, not things moving along like trains on a track; they are 
perpetually self-organizing into unseen and unseeable wholes, rather 
than predictable wholes and their parts in terms of static and statistical 
averages. They are semiosis at its best, though, unfortunately, occasio­
nally at its worst.
Yet binaries continue to rule the roost in many quarters. Cultures 
are for some reason or other still seen as hardly more than oppositions 
between the powerful and the helpless. The idea generally has it that 
the powerful form a bloc; they are unified, quite stable, concordant, 
and allied toward common economic, social, political, legal, moral 
and aesthetic goals. The weak, in contrast, are diverse, dispersed, 
diasporic, discordant. The haves are into structure, control, domina­
tion, manipulation; the havenots are reduced to a diversity of interests, 
with no central organizing force (for example, Hall 1981). John Fiske 
(1989a) dubs the power-bloc homogeneous and the people hetero­
geneous. He compares the former to Mikhail Bakhtin’s centrifugal 
forces and the latter to centripetal forces, conceding that the oppo­
sition is actually more like the dynamic conflict between an occupying 
army and “cultural guerrilla” activity, following the work of Michel 
de Certeau (1984). The struggle, we read, is always a confrontation 
between legato or hegemonic forces of homogeneity and the unruly, 
staccato or heterogeneity of the people’s weak and usually futile hits 
and misses. Yet, distinctions cannot be so clearly demarcated. As we 
have noted and will note with greater emphasis, the havenots actually 
enjoy a “cultural guerrilla power” that invariably pushes new terms 
into the gaps between erstwhile opposites.
Those in power generally tend to put things in a straightforward 
way, simply providing the information in order to reap profits. The 
sober-minded somnambulistic folks tend to take what is ladled out to 
them with neither questions nor much creative input. The wily 
“cultural guerrilla-minded”, in contrast, nimbly catch the ambiguities 
of the system and use them to subvert it in the only way they are 
capable. The power-bloc, of course, uses a combination of methods. 
For example, jeans ads might have a rugged Western scene, or they 
might give the idea of frolicking young people having fun, with hardly 
a hint that the objective is to sell you a pair of pants. Ads can cross 
barriers, such as Bill Cosby convincing you you should eat more Jello 
pudding in a commercial break during The Cosby Show. Such ads also
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leave themselves open to “cultural guerrilla” activity. A giant bill­
board for Uniroyal tires once depicted a Latin American kid with a 
Walkman plugged into his ears and sitting on the desert floor next to a 
pair of tire tracks under the caption: “He only knows three words of 
English — Boy George and Uniroyal”. Some “cultural guerrilla- 
minded” subvert painted over “Boy George” and “Uniroyal” and 
replaced them with “Yankee go home”. The ad mixed otherwise 
discordant images for a specific purpose; the tables were turned in 
order to bring consonance to that same image. Examples are virtually 
uncountable, of course, and I trust I need not press the issue further. 
The upshot is that the powermongers strive to make everybody alike 
(homogenous) and to entice them into doing the right thing in 
conformity to their own motives. Those well-meaning citizens who 
are robotic of mind tend to play along with the game. The “cultural 
guerrilla” subverts, on the other hand, distort the system in whatever 
way than can and create (heterogenous) differences, which can give 
rise to alternatives that may then be assimilated into the system or not, 
however the possibility for the exploitation of these differences may 
be interpreted.
In short, according to one story, money talks, might makes right, 
and status is everything. That story is the power-bloc’s favorite. 
Everybody is there to fulfill his respective role, and with a few 
constables around, the ship’s order is maintained. But this is a binary 
view of things. I exists in contradiction with the Peircean triadic nature 
of semiosis. The other Peircean nonbinary story has it that the orderly 
phalanx marching in step to the beat of the big band is to a greater or 
lesser degree constantly thrown into disarray by the upstart subverts. 
The first story, the binary story, falls comfortably in line with the 
traditional hard-line view of science: what is of worth is that which is 
universal and unchanging, that which is solid and lasting; what 
changes is of ephemeral value and unworthy of serious attention. 
However, according to the recent view, originally pioneered by philo­
sopher Karl Popper, science is good precisely because it is open to 
change, because there are always a few “guerrilla” scientists lurking 
around. In fact, it is at its best when in constant war with itself, and it 
progress most effectively by revolutions and internal conflicts (Agassi 
1975).
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There are battlefields where we least expect them
Not only is science perpetually at war with itself, so also are many of 
our most cherished inductively derived beliefs. The real problem is 
that not only are these beliefs more often than not binary based, they 
also engage in either-or binary warfare among themselves.
Perhaps the most succinct way to put the issue is by evoking what 
is known as the “paradox of induction” , developed by Carl Hempel 
(1945). In a nutshell, the tale goes like this. We could assume “All 
swans are white” and attend to our daily affairs quite effectively 
without ever becoming aware of any anomalies or alternatives. It is 
simply true to say “All swans are white” and false to say that “Some 
swans are non white”, and that’s that: case closed. It is ideally an 
either/or binary matter. We have an ingrained feel (Firstness) for the 
whiteness of swans, and we could hardly feel otherwise, unless in 
some imaginary world.
However, a certain explorer down under, namely, Captain Cook, 
once found — that is, sensed (via Secondness) and interpreted (via 
Thirdness) — some swans as black. Henceforth the categorical 
borders suffered a change. It eventually became known that “Most 
swans, but not all, are white; those nonwhite, that is, black, swans can 
be found in a remote region of the globe, namely, Australia” . Instan­
ces like these led Popper to declare that if you look for positive 
evidence for a general proposition you will almost always be able to 
beat the world into submission and “discover” your evidence. So 
looking for positive evidence is no big deal. What is important is 
looking for negative evidence that will change customary ways of 
thinking and of looking. In other words, you should expect to be 
surprised by the unexpected, and then you can give a nod of acknow­
ledgment that you are not surprised that you are surprised when an 
expected unexpected event turns up. Consequently, you alter your 
expectations somewhat, and continue on your way expecting another 
surprise somewhere along the road that will thwart those newfound 
expectations. If you want to learn something, don’t just see everything 
and say everything as repeats of what presumably was, is, and will be, 
but look for mistakes, differences, events that weren’t supposed to 
happen.
In this manner, it should not be at all shocking that “All swans are 
white” did not withstand the test of time. In fact, it was to be expected. 
This goes to show that in the sphere of possibilities for all events,
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seeing and saying must imply the statement: “Swans are white and 
they are nonwhite” . One pole of this contradiction was held true 
during one period of human history, the other pole during another 
period. So if “Swans are white and they are nonwhite” is taken to be 
atemporal, then 11 Either swans are white or they are non white” is 
atemporal in another more limited sense, for, logically speaking — 
that is, in terms of classical logic — either one or the other is viewed 
as immutable, depending on the time and the place and the folks 
involved. However, we also have the implicit statement: “It is neither 
the case that all swans are white nor is it the case that no swans are 
nonwhite”. That is to say, previously “All swans are white” was the 
case, but it is now the case that “Most swans are white”. And it was 
previously the case that “No swans are nonwhite” but it is now the 
case that “Some swans are nonwhite, specifically, those that are 
black”. From this rather unkempt sphere where events, seeing, and 
saying, is neither timelessly one thing nor the other but potentially 
something else, something different, we have temporality. Given our 
temporality, we have one thing at one time and another thing at 
another time, with both things thrown into the same bag as part of a 
vast ocean in constant self-organizing movement wherein it is 
perpetually becoming something other than what it is.6
So we have, at one extreme, (1) “Both white swans and non white 
swans”, at the other extreme, (3) “Neither exclusively all white swans 
nor no non white swans” , and in the middle, (2) “Either white swans 
or nonwhite swans” (i.e. all from Figure 2). (1) is the sphere of 
unactualized possibilities in harmonious intermeshing, no matter how 
contradictory, (2) is the sphere of classical logic, and (3) is the sphere 
of emerging novelties between the either and the or. (1) is qualified as 
exceeding vaguenes; it is fraught with contradictions any number of 
which can over time be actualized, hence it is overdetermined (notice 
how the terms are used in Figure 2). (3) is marked by generalities 
arising from the particulars actualized from (1) and passing through 
(2); it is invariably incomplete, since there is no knowing when and 
where something new and different will emerge to take is place 
between two already actualized general conceptualizations, hence it is 
underdetermined. Given the above considerations, (2) is under most 
circumstances the dwelling place of binary practices as they are
6 The above is another way of putting Peirce scholar Charles Hartshorne’s (1970) 
view that temporality begins to emerge within Secondness and comes into full bloom 
within the sphere of Thirdness.
customarily articulated: there is either the haves or the havenots, 
locked in an apparently eternal, timeless, synchronic struggle. (1) may 
be labeled homogeny. (3), then, is heterogeny, since between any two 
general terms or statements there always exists the probability some­
where and somewhen of something else emerging, hence the system is 
perpetually moving toward the completion of its own continuity 
without ever realizing that goal.7 Focus obsessively on (2), and you 
have the makings of binary, “linguicentric” practices, the pathway of 
least resistance the somnambulistic yes sayers customarily trod.
Now, allow your attention nomadically to wander over (1) and (3), 
and you begin to “resonate” with the tossing, rolling, heaving tide of 
semiosis, which includes “cultural guerrilla” strategies. You are also 
coming to an awareness of the unspecifiability of this “resonance”. 
You can’t clearly and distinctly say what you think about the hege­
monic cultural milieu outright; at best, you can only feel it, empathize 
with it, bring it into rapport with your general understanding. Con­
sequently, you might find yourself on the path of “cultural guerrilla” 
activities. I wrote “find yourself’. That’s an overstatement, actually. 
From within your “cultural guerrilla” mode of bucking the waves, 
kicking at the pricks, swimming cross stream, you will engage in your 
somewhat subversive activity because of your gut feelings and 
proclivities. Your behavior will be what it is because that is how you 
feel, often without your ability precisely to articulate your actions and 
reactions. It is as if you were a natural bom “cultural guerrilla”.
Back to statements (1), (2), and (3) and their counterparts in Figure
2 for a moment.
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Little signs within the inconceivable big picture
Bringing about a happy emergence of (1) and (3), and of homogeny, 
hegemony, and heterogeny, we have either inconsistency or incomple­
teness, or perhaps both, by the good grace of Kurt Gödel’s proof that 
spelled the limitations of logic and mathematics, and by extension of 
the sciences, the humanities, and in general all human communication. 
The upshot is that we cannot help but spout out unexpected contra­
7 The goal can never the reached, for, as Peirce had it, it is an infinitely receding 
horizon that can be no more than approximated by asymptotic movement comparable 
to Zeno’s Achilles moving in on the tortoise in the race in an infinite series of 
successively smaller increments (however see Hesse [1980] for a critique of this view)
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dictions and occasional paradoxes, and no matter how much we 
manage to say about some particular aspect of our world, our saying 
will always be incomplete.
Sign processing within these limitations is a dialogical community 
affair. Peirce writes that whenever a sign is vague (inconsistent) it is 
up the to maker of the sign to render it a bit more precise and in the 
best of all worlds hopefully to clear up the inconsistencies. On the 
other hand, in order that the sign’s nature as a generality may become 
properly acknowledged, the sign’s taker must enter into the game, 
interacting with the sign, with its maker, and with the entire ambient, 
in order to bring the sign’s meaning a tad closer to its completion — 
but, as pointed out above, the sign’s meaning never stands a chance of 
completion in the genuine sense (CP: 5.505). Hegemony as a dualist 
practice of the sort we might expect to find in (2), could well 
culminate in the empowerment, the enfranchisement, of those who 
have the proper pull and know how to engage in the most advan­
tageous but ruthlessly aggressive practices. Within this sphere we 
might encounter the makings for paternalism, patriarchy, patronage, 
and such practices in this stark desert of dualistic cultural values.
This is a stringently limited view, however. Vagueness and gene­
rality from a broad cultural view paints another picture entirely. In 
order to put this picture in focus, consider, once again, Figure 2.8 In 
the first place, I use reversible arrows of various sorts to emphasize 
the fluid character of all the categories involved. This is no indication 
of linearity or isotropic timeless time, however. The categories, 
usually coming in threes rather than twos, are placed at various levels 
to depict their fuzzy codependent interrelationships and their non­
linear, time-bound, self-organizing nature, though, I must hasten to 
emphasize, no hierarchy of dichotomous terms is implied here. The 
general movement is from signs of vagueness toward acknowledge­
ment of classical logic and “styles of reasoning” and then to the 
construction of perpetually incomplete generalities, universals, taxo­
nomies, and hierarchies.9 Inconsistency below might be hopefully 
abandoned, and progression upward might hopefully be toward the 
fulfilment of those fond and familiar dreams of the good life, social
8 It bears mentioning at this juncture that I have availed myself of the over- 
determination-underdetermination and inconsistency-incompleteness and vagueness- 
generality scheme in various previous studies with respect to Peirce’s basic sign types, 
our sensory modes for perceiving signs, and our sign interpretation (Merrell 1995a, 
1996, 1997).
9 The idea of “styles of reasoning” is from Hacking (1985, see also Merrell 1995a).
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justice, emancipation for all, and complete and consistent knowledge. 
Given the underdetermination factor, however, there is no utopia to be 
had. In other words, the plenitude of all things is a pipe-dream, for 
there is no royal highway to the land of milk and honey. Homogeny- 
heterogeny are here to stay, whether we know it or not and whether 
we like or not.
All this has further bearing on Peirce’s categories. Firstness is the 
mode in which something is as it is irrespective of anything else, such 
that it would not make any difference if nary a thing else existed, for it 
is self-contained and self-sufficient. This mode is apprehended not by 
intellect or as a result of sensations received from the big wide world 
out there, for, simply put, there is no other mode that could be 
perceived or conceived in relation to Firstness. There is only Firstness. 
Firstness is also without parts, for if there were parts there would be 
something other than the whole of Firstness. The whole of the 
Firstness is a melding of everything that makes it up. It is without 
clearly delineable features; it is vagueness of the most vague sort. 
Imagine a combination of vibrations in the air that according to 
Fourier analysis produce in their composite high C# You hear the note 
and nothing else, you feel it, and this feeling is perpetuated, one 
second, two seconds, then many seconds and minutes, without its 
being related in any form or fashion to any other sounds. You simply 
feel it as it is, no more, no less. Now imagine you are the subject and 
the sound is the object, and by listening to the high C#, by sensing it 
and perceiving it, you enter into it as a result of many years of your 
own musical appreciation and actual practice. Your recognition of 
high C# as just that, high C#, is an act of reaction and interaction with 
something other than yourself. It is otherness, the otherness of 
Secondness, of indexicality. Everyday living is pervaded through and 
through with such action, reaction, and interaction with ephemeral 
items of our surroundings, with tokens, items as they pop up on the 
stage before us, the stage we are on. Thirdness, on the other hand, is a 
general matter. The high C# note is recognized as such in terms of its 
being related to and distinguished from any and all other notes in the 
repertory of your knowledge of music. It is now not merely this note 
here and now, but high C# as a type, a general category. The note as a 
type is a modification of its feeling and of its perception as such-and- 
such an item from among a range of other items to which it is related. 
It is acknowledgement that the sound belongs to a general category 
that gives it its character insofar as that character is susceptible to an 
account by means of symbolic signs, words, language.
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This hybrid view of knower and known is gradually coming into 
view. It is now taken for granted that Gramsci’s concept of hegemony 
made it possible to move beyond the dualistic idea of power brokers 
imposing their values on helpless and hapless common people. This 
switch has been a long time in coming, however. Amongst leftist 
writers the old fad had the dominant classes in control and the popular 
classes as victims. In later years, especially given hegemony theory, 
the popular classes were looked on positively as a group with virtually 
unlimited resources and capacities to manifest their defiance and in 
the process provide alternatives to the stolid, stultifying ways of the 
dominants. Such obsessive focus on extremes in order to erect 
dichotomies is discomforting. The problem is that, in anthropologist 
Nestor Garcia Canclini’s words:
there is so much insistence on the juxtaposition of the subaltern and hege­
monic culture and on the political necessity of defending the independence of 
the subaltern culture that the two come to be thought of as two quite separate 
entities. With the presupposition that the task of hegemonic culture is to 
dominate and that of the subaltern culture is to resist, much research has had 
no other aim than to inquire about the ways the two distinct roles were carried 
out. (Garcia Canclini 1984: 48)
In this sense, obsession with either one or the other of the horns of the 
presumed opposition is binary thinking, in spite of the concession that 
the subalterns might enjoy more power to alter the system than was 
previously thought. This Manichean tendency is certainly not vintage 
Gramsci; he resists facile dichotomies. There is not merely power, but 
also seduction, complicity, negotiation, subversion and covert, “cultu­
ral guerrilla” action.
Gramsci teaches that what meets the eye is often not as clear-cut as 
it appears. He ties the notion of popular culture to the subaltern 
condition and at the same time reveals the complexity of these ties. 
The dynamic interaction between subalterns and the dominant class, 
as pointed out above, makes for constant shifting of postures and 
strategies such that the interrelations are best qualified as process. 
There is no standing still; everything is in perpetual movement. 
Consequently, the subaltern’s admission of hegemonic power is not 
necessarily an act of submission, and her rejection of that power is not 
necessarily resistance. All expressions from the haves are not always 
the manifestation of irresistible hegemonic forces, and the passive 
response of the subalterns is not simply a bow of the weak to the 
strong. Nor is the exercise of hegemony merely a product of the
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inculcation of Pierre Bourdieu’s habitus in the people such that they 
respond the way they respond because they can’t really respond 
otherwise (Bourdieu 1990; Bourdieu, Passeron 1977). Creative 
responses on the part of the people, in de Certeau’s (1984) conception, 
keeps the social organism’s heart pounding and lungs heaving. In the 
final analysis, popular culture is above all creative.
Given their creativity, what the people believe, buy, and consume, 
cannot simply be subsumed within a binary logic of domination and 
subservience. The dominant rationality would have it, nonetheless, 
that the people behave and consume in such a way that they all 
become one homogenous soup (from homogeny, not homogeneity). 
The subalterns gravitate toward homogeny, while the dominants move 
up slightly toward the world of heterogeny, in order to highlight their 
distinction from those others and to refortify their power. Yet the 
subalterns, given their de Certeau role as “cultural guerrillas”, create 
differences of their own upon expressing their contempt for their lot in 
life. They sweet talk their superiors and play up to them; at the same 
time they cheat a little, mix things up in order to alter them, bring 
spice to life, and subvert the motives of the hegemonic haves. In so 
doing they are not simply liars, thieves, and rebels obsessed with 
overturning the system. They are engaged in practices on a small scale 
compared to the megalevels of lying, thieving, and subversion going 
on at the upper levels. They are simply doing the best with what they 
have. Hegemony is in this sense most proper to Secondness and 
heterogeny to Thirdness. But these categories did not simply spring 
out of a vacuum. They existed in interrelated, interactive, codepen­
dence within the sphere of homogeny, Firstness, wholeness. Within 
homogeny, there are parts, to be sure, but they are possibles, they are 
not (yet) actualized for a particular mind. The parts remain melded 
into one, that is, they make up a collection so vast that in terms of 
themselves as possibles there is no room for them to retain any form 
of distinction or individualism, so they are welded into one another, 
they are annealed. Firstness is the continuum of all that is possible. It 
is like a ring, with no conceivable beginning or ending and no middle. 
As Secondness emerges into the being of the becoming and the 
becoming of the being of signs, the ring is cut, severed, such that there 
is now one side and the other side and the border of borders in 
between. And the chain of Seconds has begun its becoming, the task 
of which then begets Thirds, and more Thirds. There is no conceivable 
end of semiosis, nor is there any conceivable beginning, or center.
Now, for an illustration of self-perpetuating semiosis, if I may.
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How subverting signs emerge
In 1977 in the historic Plaza de Mayo of Buenos Aires and site of the 
presidential Casa Rosada, the women’s sudden appearance was hardly 
noticed except by the secret police of the military government.
At first there was only a handful of women walking around in flat 
shoes and wearing kerchiefs over their heads. They appeared uncer­
tain, even frightened (after all, Argentina was ruled by a repressive 
dictatorship that lasted from 1976 to 1983 and ‘disappeared’ some 
30,000 citizens and tortured countless more). They wore photographs 
of missing family members on their dresses. They came from every 
social class to fight the Armed Forces, the politicians, the Clergy, the 
complacent press, everybody, in order to get some answers. The hand­
ful of women gradually grew to fifty, then hundreds, and then more 
than a thousand. Tourists began asking questions, that embarrassed the 
state. But the women went virtually ignored by government officials. 
Their visits to the Catholic Church in search of support yielded no 
results: its complicity was obvious. The government continued to pay 
the women hardly any mind. Yet, they persevered. As time went by, 
they became known as the Madres у Abuelas de la Plaza de Mayo 
(‘Mothers and Grandmothers of May Square’).10 While the 1978 
World Cup soccer championship team was honored, the women 
protested. When progovemment youths, whipped into a frenzy, spat 
insults at them, they asked questions. Eventually, moral outrage 
ensued. In 1980 the Argentine human rights movement became invol­
ved, especially after Adolfo Perez Esquivel was awarded the Nobel 
Peace Prize. In 1981, workers began protesting inadequate wages, 
working conditions, and housing. In 1982 they joined the protesting 
mothers, and in that same year the press took a more active role in 
criticizing the government. The humiliating Malvinas/Falkland war 
came and went. And finally, in 1983, the military brought out and 
dealt its last deck of cards. Elections were held, a civilian became 
president, and the military, as a final coup, granted itself amnesty from 
all human rights violations!
This train of events is perhaps one of the best examples of honest, 
sincere, patriotic subversion on the part of subalterns from among 
subalterns: women, as “cultural guerrillas”, taking on a role with few 
precedents. It is also living proof that the subalterns by peaceful 
means can create alternatives and impose them on the dominants.
10 See Agosfn (1992), Bouvard (1994).
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Subalterns interjected the homogeny of hegemony with a massive 
dose of heterogeny, and the system finally caved in. Iconicity raised 
itself to the level of indexicality by signs pointing toward the presence 
of absent individuals, and silent icons and indices proceeded in the 
direction of symbols, that were eventually forthcoming. Firstness 
engendered Thirdness, subversive Thirdness, and the erstwhile hege­
monic discourse of Thirdness suffered the consequences. Persistent 
women, makers of alternative signs, gave vent to their signs of vague­
ness, brought them to their most supreme expression, and they were 
eventually interpreted by their signs in terms of generalities, and 
found the interpretation to be the alternative that demanded the most 
serious attention. Signs from the overdetermined sphere took their 
place between the otherwise excluded middle between existent 
dichotomies of an intransigent polity.
The ‘Mothers and Grandmothers of May Square’ and related 
movements in Latin America bear perhaps the most striking illust­
ration in the world of what Roberto DaMatta (1991) calls ‘relational 
society’, where the whole follows a logic the parts can choose to 
ignore. The “and” of ‘Both A and Not-А’ fuses and confuses the man­
sions and the shanties, the powerful and the weak, the dominant and 
the subaltern. DaMatta’s concept of ‘relational society’ is perhaps no 
more strikingly exemplified than in Latin American mestizaje (racial 
and ethnic mixture). Mestizaje entails nonlinear interrelations. The 
mestizo of today, especially in countries like Mexico, Colombia, Peru, 
Venezuela, Northeastern Brazil, and the Caribbean, is no simple mix 
of European and Amerindian or African and European or Amerindian 
and African. The mix is virtually randomly variegated.11 Moreover, 
mestizaje is not merely a racial fact, but in addition, it is the incor­
poration of the Latin Americans’ way of life, their very existence, the 
becomingness of their being, the beingness of their becoming. Mesti­
zaje is more than an abstraction, it speaks, it perceives, conceives, 
narrates, becomes at once an actor and a spectator on the stage of 
everyday living. I we are to take some anthropolisists at their word, 
mestizaje also embodies an inner need to exercise control. Eric Wolf 
writes of the mestizo male as “power seeker” par excellence. The 
struggle in which he has been historically engaged was more than a 
means:
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" Magnus Mörner (1967) provides one of the best general studies of race mixture 
in colonial Latin America (see also Graham 1990).
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|A]s a validation of self and of one’s station in society, it became an end in 
itself. To the mestizo, the capacity to exercise power is ultimately sexual in 
character: a man succeeds because he is truly male (macho), possessed of 
sexual potency. While the Indian strives neither to control nor to exploit other 
men and women, the mestizo reaches for power over women as over men. As 
the urge for personal vindication through power is continuous and limitless, so 
the mestizo possesses “a limitless sexual deficit” which feeds merely upon 
past conquests. While the Indian man and the Indian woman achieve a mea­
sure of balance in their relationship, the mestizo male requires absolute ascen­
dance over women. Thus even familial and personal relationships become 
battlegrounds of emotion, subject to defeat and to victory. (Wolf 1959: 240)12
Mestizaje entails a different socio-politico-economic and cultural sen­
sibility. In tales from the U. S. by way of James Fenimore Cooper, 
Mark Twain and others we have a pretty dire image of the Afro- 
Americans, the Amerindians and the mestizos in the U. S. Harvard 
professor and scientist Louis Agassiz once painted a picture of the 
non-European ethnic groups and the mestizos of Latin America as 
physically and morally degraded people. The passing of time has 
unfortunately done little to temper the North American prejudice 
toward the mestizo. This is not surprising, given one of the basic diffe­
rences between Anglo American and Latin American policies on 
territorial expansion. The Anglo American policy was fundamentally 
one of exclusion. It fixed limits beyond which the Amerindian should 
not venture; in fact, the native was looked upon as an encumbrance 
and should be cleared off, like the forests, the buffalo, and the wolves. 
The Latin American policy, in contrast, was chiefly one of inclu­
sion — though, as one might expect, there are plenty of exceptions to 
the rule. Consequently, even though the mestizo'1 s place in society in 
the Latin American colonies left plenty to be desired, he fared con­
siderably better there than in the U. S. Quite ironically, given the 
distinction between exclusionary and inclusionary practices, during 
the nineteenth century, travelers, businessmen, and diplomats from the 
U. S. to Latin America generally enthused over the cultured oligarchy 
in Latin America. On the other hand, they had few kind words for the 
mestizo class, which was often assumed to be no more than a bastard
12 Wolf is admittedly overgeneralizing and exaggerating. But a grain of credence 
must be allowed him, for he does reveal some of the chief characteristics of the 
mestizo, though exceptions abound and as the mestizo becomes more numerous his 
characteristics become more heterogenous and less homogenous. Moreover, the 
mestizo must also be given due consideration, and she has been since the time of 
Wolf’s study.
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people (Pike 1992: 144-151). In the 1930s historian Herbert Eugene 
Bolton (1939: 98) saw the Spanish-Anglo borderlands as a “meeting 
place and fusing place of two streams of European civilization, one 
coming from the south, the other from the north” . Had Bolton been 
more keen on actual empirical studies of border cultures, however, he 
would have realized that long before development of his “border­
lands” thesis, North American racism had taken its toll.
Nevertheless, I repeat, mestizaje entails an entirely different socio- 
politico-economic and cultural sensibility, and until and unless that 
fact is acknowledged by peoples of non-mestizo cultures, whether 
inside our outside Latin America, there will be little hope of under­
standing this hybrid mix, let alone of coping with it and merging with 
it. This most complex hybrid mix is an openness to institutions and 
realities of everyday living, to the subjectivity of the social actors and 
the multiplicity of loyalties, to the relations of patronage, paternalism, 
and so on, that operate simultaneously in Latin America. It is a 
constant weaving, unraveling, and re-weaving of intricate ties and 
relations and encounters and elbow rubbing. There are continuities of 
relations broken by frequent discontinuities, and reconciliations and 
renew continuities (Garcia Canclini 1995).
In Latin America cultures, uncertainty is the tenuous rule, 
vagueness finds its way into every nook and cranny, and everything is 
always already in the incompletable process of becoming in the sense 
of semiosic process, in spite of the persistent hard-line view of Latin 
America that remains obstinately mired in bivalent logic, in a 
Manichean mind-set.
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Семносфера Лотмана, категории Пирса и 
жизненные формы культуры
В статье семиотическое пространство Лотмана соотносится с катего­
риями Пирса. Отдельные формы манифестации семиотического про­
странства культуры в семиосфере могут, в зависимости от контекста 
культуры, описываться как противоречивые и/или неполные. Противо­
речивость и неполнота соотносятся по своему характеру соответственно 
с сверхдетерминированностыо и недодетерминированностью, которые, 
в свою очередь, могут описываться соответственно посредством неопре­
деленности и общепризнанности. Первая из них по своему характеру 
связана с категорией Первичности, вторая с категорией Третичности. 
Роль Вторичности —  выделить возможности Первичности: определить 
это и то, тут и там, теперь и тогда и, исходя из этого, определить и все 
остальные различия. С точки зрения семиотического пространства куль­
туры Вторичность делает возможным возникновение гегемонии, отно­
шений доминирования и подчинения, суперординации и субординации. 
Интерпретируя Вторичность таким образом, мы можем сверхдетермини­
рованность и недодетерминированность характеризовать соответственно 
как гомогеничность и гетерогеничность. Исходя из этих теоретических 
предпосылок рассматриваются многие существенные моменты в куль­
турах Латинской Америки.
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Lotmani semiosfäär, Peirce’i kategooriad ja 
kultuuri eluvormid
Artiklis seostatakse Lotmani semiootiline ruum Peirce’i kategooriatega. Kul­
tuuri semiootilise ruumi teatud avaldumisvormid semiosfääris on, kultuuri­
kontekstist sõltuvalt, kirjeldatavad kui vastuolulised ja/või mittetäielikud. 
Vastuolulisus ja  mittetäielikkus sarnanevad oma iseloomult vastavalt üle- 
determineeritusele ja  aladetermineeritusele, need on omakorda kirjeldatavad 
vastavalt ebamäärasuse ja  üldkehtivuse kaudu. Esimene neist on oma iseloo­
mult seotud Esmasuse, teine aga Kolmasuse kategooriaga. Teisesuse roll on 
eristada Esmasuse võimalikkused: määratleda see ja  too, siin ja  seal, nüüd ja  
siis ning kõik ülejäänud nendest järelduvad eristused. Kultuuri semiootilise 
ruumi seisukohast teeb Teisesus seega võimalikuks hegemoonia tekke, 
domineerimis- ja  alluvussuhted, superordinatsiooni ja  subordinatsiooni. 
Teisesust niimoodi tõlgendades saame me üledetermineeritust ja  aladeter- 
mineeritust käsitleda vastavalt kui homogeensust ja  heterogeensust. Nendest 
teoreetilistest eeldustest lähtudes vaadeldakse seejärel mitmeid olulisi mo­
mente Ladina-Ameerika kultuurides.
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Семиотика культуры и 
феноменология страха 
(к постановке проблемы)
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A bstract. The semiotics of culture and the phenomenology of fear. In the
paper fear is treated as semiotical phenomenon. The semiotical speciality of 
fear is that while being a strong semiotical factor, its semiotical nature is often 
overshadowed and fear is treated proceeding from the scheme of stimulus- 
reaction. In the paper fear is analysed in the context of both Peirce’s semiotics 
and Saussure’s semiology and it will be demonstrated that these approaches 
allow to open up different aspects of fear: while in Peircean perspective 
frightful evokes fear, then proceeding from the Saussure’s approach we could 
say that fear creates the frightful, fear appears to be creative; we could even 
speak of fear as semiosis.
О.1 Опасности, подстерегающие исследователя, занимающегося 
проблемами семиотики страха в культуре, образуют широкий 
спектр, располагающийся между полюсами метафоризма и редук­
ционизма. Впрочем, нередко эти противопложности сходятся и 
метафорическая трактовка знаковых процессов в культуре соче­
тается с публицистической прямолинейностью выводов. Позволю 
себе воспоминание личного характера. После просмотра “Соля- 
риса” Тарковского, заканчивающегося сентенцией о том, что 
спасение не в страхе, а в стыде, не имеющей прямого аналога в
1 Настоящая публикация представляет собой вводные части исследования 
семиотических механизмов страха в русской культуре, первый вариант которого 
был зачитан на конференции “Sdmiotique de la peur dans la culture et la literarure 
russes”, в Сорбонне (Париж IV), 27.03.2001.
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повести С. Лема, но демонстрирующую несомненное знакомство 
с публикацией о семиотических механизмах стыда и страха 
(Лотман 1970), Ю. М. Лотман был одновременно и польщен, и 
смущен, поскольку интерпретация его концепции в качестве 
глобального проекта спасения человечества представлялась ему 
опасным упрощением.
Наиболее разработанные подходы к проблеме страха пред­
ложены в рамках философских и психологических (в первую 
очередь — психоаналитических2) исследований. Закономерные, 
по-видимому, в рамках соответствующих дисциплин, они с точки 
зрения семиотики культуры представляются одновременно и 
редукционистскими, и метафорическими, поскольку нередко 
основываются на механическом перенесении характеристик, 
приписываемых отдельным личностям, на всю систему культуры 
в целом. Существует очевидная опасность использования семио­
тической терминологии лишь для “декорации” соответствующих 
построений. Во всяком случае, автор настоящей работы не готов 
обсуждать проблемы соотношения страха бытия и страха небы­
тия в русской культуре (например, интересного, но никак не 
проверяемого мнения, что в отличие от “нормального” страха 
небытия, в русской культуре преобладает страх бытия), или 
рассуждать о кастратическом комплексе, якобы присущем русс­
ким в особой мере3. Хотя нельзя не отметить, что в страхе бытия 
и кастратическом комплексе может быть выявлено некое общее
2 Традиционный психоанализ связывает страх, в первую очередь, не с 
агрессией, а с неудачами и аномалиями в сексуальной сфере (характер связи при 
этом варьируется: в одних вариантах неудачи являются причинами страха, в 
других — его следствиями); страх противопоставлен удовольствию. Для целей 
культурологического анализа более продуктивным представляется юнгианский 
подход к страху как к результату неосознаваемого узнавания образов собствен­
ного или коллективного бессознательного.
3 В подтверждение этого мнения можно встретить ссылки на скопчество — 
явление, столь же в мировой культуре уникальное, сколь и характерное именно 
дая русской культуры. Представляется, однако, что типичность и распространен­
ность скопчества сильно преувеличивается — оно носило маргинальный харак­
тер. Когда же, например, русская революция и весь коммунистический проект 
трактуется в терминах коллективного самооскопления, то эту трактовку следует 
признать сугубо метафорической, причем предлагаемая метафора ничуть не 
лучше любых других. Кроме того, следует иметь ввиду, что скопчество не 
выводится непосредственно из кастратического комплекса (во всяком случае из 
его трактовок у классиков психоанализа). Скорее всего, здесь дело опять-таки 
идет лишь о манипуляциях со словами, а не о реальном анализе механизмов 
глубинной психологии.
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основание, совершенно непонятно, как такого рода утверждения 
могут быть эмпирически проверены — в отличие от человека, 
культуру нельзя уложить на кушетку психоаналитика.
1. Прежде чем говорить о семиотике страха вообще, не говоря 
уже о семиотике страха в какой-либо конкретной (например, 
русской) культуре, следует задасться вопросом, является ли страх 
знаковым образованием, или, по крайней мере, обладает ли он 
семиотической спецификой; иными словами, может ли страх 
считаться “законным” объектом семиотического рассмотрения4. 
Ответ на этот вопрос совсем не очевиден.
Поучительно в этом смысле обратиться к истории становления 
оппозиции смешное/страшное, в современных обществах, 
являющейся чуть ли не культурной универсалией, однако не­
известной многим архаическим культурам — трагедия всегда 
старше комедии. Оппозиция эта явно асимметрична, ее члены 
обладают принципиально различной природой. Если юмор 
присущ лишь человеку и может быть в какой-то мере некоторым 
высшим приматам, то страх является одной из базовых эмоций у 
животных всех видов, способных испытывать эмоции. Не 
вдаваясь в детали теории юмора, можно утверждать, что смешное 
возможно лишь на фоне страшного5, в то время как страшное в 
смешном не нуждается, оно, по-видимому, коренится в инстинк­
4 Хочется дистанцироваться от сравнительно распространенной точки 
зрения, высказывавшейся, например У.Эко и рядом французских исследовате­
лей, согласно которой семиотика (подобно, например, философии) характери­
зуется не особым предметом, но исключительно методами исследования, и 
поэтому она с равным успехом может рассматривать как знаковые, так и незна­
ковые по своей природе феномены: знаковость не дана а priori, но есть результат 
семиотического анализа.
Семиотика — эмпирическая дисциплина, занимающаяся рассмотрением 
структуры, семантики и условий функционирования различных знаковых образо­
ваний. Действительно, подобно тому, как любое взаимодействие физических тел 
может рассматриваться с точки зрения действия закона всемирного тяготения, и 
семиотический аспект можно выделить в каких угодно явлениях и процессах; 
тем не менее, в столкновении космических тел и соприкосновении танцоров 
балета соотношение гравитационных и знаковых механизмов является принци­
пиально различным. Если страх удастся свести лишь к комплексу психо-физио- 
логических факторов, то о культурологии или семиотике страха можно будет 
говорить лишь в метафорическом смысле.
Подчеркнем, что речь идет о смешном лишь в контексте оппозиции 
смешное/страшное', принципиально иной характер смешного обнаруживается в 
оппозиции смешное/серьезное.
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тах (например, в инстинкте самосохранения; по Хайдеггеру страх 
связан с самой основой бытия6). Далее, хотя юмор и не сводим к 
рациональным схемам, многие его формы “замешаны” на логике, 
другие же тесно связаны с языком и т.п.; на этом фоне особенно 
заметна внелогичность и бессловесность страха7. Показательно и 
то, как оппозиция смешное/страшное нейтрализуется. Наиболее 
распространенной схемой представляется редукция страшного в 
смешное, причем дело может идти как о нейтрализации страха 
юмором, так и о смехе как результате разрядки страха, причем 
сопровождается это всегда какой-либо формой рационализации 
последнего (по крайней мере его вербализацией и, как правило, 
также нарративизацией), прояснением ситуации (по принципу: 
“когда поняли, что это было на самом деле, долго смеялись”). 
Значительно реже наблюдается противоположный процесс пере­
хода смешного в страшное, причем в таких случаях дело всегда 
идет о дерационализации, примитивизации и автоматизации сме­
ха, отделении смеха от юмора (например, у Гоголя, Салтыкова- 
Щедрина или Леонида Андреева). Еще важнее то обстоятельство, 
что юмор имеет выраженную культурную окрашенность, 
часто — национальную специфику, в то время как о страхе этого 
сказать с такой же степенью определенности никак нельзя.
Итак, словосочетание ‘семиотика страха’ представляет собой 
по меньшей мере проблему, даже целую совокупность проблем: 
(*) Является ли страх знаком? Если да, то, во-первых, какова 
семиотическая специфика этого знака; во-вторых, что
6 В русском переводе говорится не о страхе, а ужасе (например, Хайдеггер 
1993: 20 и след.); для наших целей разграничение страха и ужаса не пред­
ставляется существенным, тем более, что хайдеггеровское противопоставление 
страха и ужаса может быть передано по-русски и используемой нами оппозицией 
испуг/страх. Следует также учитывать, что Хайдеггер выступает здесь в качестве 
последователя Кьеркегора, а в переводах последнего говорится именно о страхе; 
ср. хотя бы следующие пассажи, по духу весьма близкие Хайдеггеру: “Ничто. Но 
какое же воздействие имеет ничто? Оно порождает страх” (Кьеркегор 1998: 143). 
“Если мы теперь спросим, каков объект [...] страха, здесь как и прежде придется 
ответить, что таким объектом является Ничто. Страх и Ничто постоянно 
соответствуют друг другу” (Кьеркегор 1998: 191).
Ср: “Ужас перебивает в нас способность речи. Поскольку сущее в целом 
ускользает и надвигается прямое Ничто, перед его лицом умолкает всякое гово­
рение с его “есть” ’ (Хайдеггер 1993: 21). Т.о. по Хайдеггеру страх отностится к 
до- или внезнаковой сфере. Трактовка страха как тяги к изначальному Ничто 
близка Мандельштамовской формулировке: “Паденье — неизменный спутник 
страха, И самый страх есть чувство пустоты” (1912).
является его значением и, в третьих, какого рода объекты 
обозначаются этим знаком?
(*) Если же страх не знак, а значение, то, во-первых, что является 
знаком этого значения, а, во-вторых, обладает ли это значение 
какой-либо спецификой?
(*) Если страх не знак и не значение, а следствие некоторой 
знаковой деятельности8, то что это за деятельность и как страх 
связан с ней?
(*) Является ли страх кодом или сообщением? Можно ли гово­
рить, о языке, дискурсе и тексте страха?
Все эти вопросы должны быть если не разрешены, то по крайней 
мере осознаны и сформулированы, в противном случае все рас­
суждения о семиотике страха могут оказаться беспредметными. 
Прежде, чем пытаться ответить на поставленные вопросы, сле­
дует хотя бы самым поверхностным образом остановиться на 
некоторых проблемах семиотической теории.
2. Семиотика. Существует две основные семиотические тради­
ции, первая из них восходит к идеям Ч. С. Пирса, вторая — Ф. де 
Соссюра. Различия между этими традициями представляются 
столь значительными, что в настоящее время не приходится 
говорить не только о каких-либо перспективах синтеза между 
ними, но и о возможности простого взаимопонимания между 
исследователями, работающими в рамках соответствующих пара­
дигм. Недоразумения начинаются уже в сфере базовой терми­
нологии: Соссюр говорит не о семиотике, а семиологии. Мы 
будем считать эти термины синонимичными, несмотря на то, что 
рядом авторитетных авторов (назовем хотя бы Э. Бенвениста и П. 
Рикёра) предлагались различные варианты их содержательного 
разграничения. Еще хуже то, что различные явления обозна­
чаются одним термином. Наиболее разительный пример — поня­
тие знака: обычно не обращается внимание на то, что Пирс и 
Соссюр обозначают этим словом не просто различные, но даже 
несопоставимые вещи. Основная проблематика пирсовской 
семиотики не уловима для соссюрианского подхода; проблемы 
же, волновавшие Соссюра и его последователей, подчас бывает 
трудно даже сформулировать в пирсовских терминах (наиболее 
добросовестная попытка такого рода содержится в ряде работ
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8 Т.е. можно ли в духе теории речевых актов говорить о локутивности, 
иллокутивности и перлокутивности страха, рассматриваемого в качестве акта?
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Р О.Якобона, но и она в конечном счете сводится к низложению 
Соссюра и утверждению Пирса); основные семиотические тради­
ции оказываются взаимонепереводимыми. Поскольку в ходе 
дальнейшего изложения нам придется прибегать как к пирсовсой. 
так и соссюрианской терминологии, необходимо по этому поводу 
дать хотя бы самые краткие разъяснения.
2.1. Пирсовская традиция и проблематика страха. Для Пирса 
семиотика является новой логикой, включающей и новую 
систему универсальных категорий, и новую эпистемиологию, и 
новую методологию науки — вся система знаний имеет по Пирсу 
знаковый характер. Поэтому в знаках его интересовала в первую 
очередь их познавательная функция, природа значения, условия 
становления и функционирования знаков и знаковых образова­
ний. Из многочисленных определений знака, данных Пирсом, 
наиболее широкой известностью пользуется следующее:
Знак, или репрезентамен, это нечто, что обозначает что-либо для
кого-нибудь в определенном отношении или объеме (2.228;
курсив автора)9.
Семиотику Пирса можно назвать субститутивной: знак есть 
нечто, заменяющее и репрезентирующее нечто иное. При этом 
знак, взятый сам по себе, а priori не обладает никакими призна­
ками знаковости; знаком делает его лишь совокупность отно­
шений с остальными компонентами семиозиса. Семиозис есть 
система из четырех неизвестных: знак (первое нечто), репрезен­
тируемый им объект (второе нечто), интерпретанта (некий 
объем или отношение, в котором знак репрезентирует объект) и 
интерпретатор (кто-нибудь). Семиотика Пирса имеет открытый 
и экстенсивный характер: интерпретанта знака сама является 
знаком (знак “адресуется кому-то, то есть создает в уме человека 
равноценный знак или, возможно, более развитый знак” 2.228), 
этот созданный знаком знак, в свою очередь, сам обладает интер- 
претантой (которая опять-таки является знаком) и т.д. Любой 
объект может стать знаком, любой знак может быть объектом для
В формулировке оригинала репрезентативная сущность знака проступает 
еще более отчетливым образом (речь идет не об обозначении, а именно о 
замещении): “Sign [...] is something which stands to somebody for  something in 
some respect or capacity” (Peirce 1965-1967: 2.228; курсив мой — МЛ.').
некоторого иного знака, любой интерпретатор может выступать 
как в роли знака, так и объекта для какого-либо знака.
Вообще говоря, введение интерпретатора нарушает основы­
вающуюся на триадичности логику построений Пирса; в других 
определениях знака Пирс обходится без него (ср. 2, 274; 6, 177; 
ср. также 5.484, где Пирс определяет семиозис как систему взаи­
моотношений между репрезентаменом, объектом и интерпре- 
тантой). Сам термин ‘интерпретатор’ был предложен позже Ч. У. 
Моррисом, который существенно пересмотрел пирсовскую кон­
цепцию: ввел пятый параметр семиозиса — контекст, а объект 
заменил на значение (вероятно, не без влияния идей Г. Фреге10).
Семиозис (или знаковый процесс) рассматривается как пятичлен­
ное отношение — V, W, X, Y, Z, — в котором V вызывает в W 
предрасположенность к определенной реакции (X) на опреде­
ленный вид объекта (У) [...] при определенных условиях (Z). В 
случаях, где существует это отношение, V есть знак, W — 
интерпретатор, X  — интерпретанта, К — значение [...], a Z — 
контекст, в котором встречается знак. (Моррис 1983, 119)
Причины, побудившие Морриса пересмотреть определение Пир­
са, вполне очевидны: его интересовала не столько чистая теория 
знаков, сколько ее возможные приложения в сфере психоло­
гических и социальных наук; проигрывая в теоретическом плане 
пирсовскому, в практическом отношении для анализа культур­
ных феноменов его трактовка знака и семиозиса оказываются 
более удобными.
Каждый из компонентов семиозиса определяет точку зрения, с 
которой могут быть рассмотрены различные знаковые феномены; 
если обратиться к страху, то соответствующие аспекты могут 
быть выделены примерно следующим образом:
(*) в аспекте v страх может рассматриваться как совокупность 
различных его признаков, симптомов и обозначений (которые 
сами по себе могут вовсе и не быть страшными);
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10 Фреге различает знак, его смысл и значение: значение знака — это 
“определенный предмет”, в то время как его смысл — это способ представления 
значения в знаке. “Мы выражаем некоторым знаком его смысл и обозначаем им 
его значение” (Фреге 1997: 30). В пирсовской терминологии смыслу соответст­
вует интерпретанта, значение — объекту; с точки зрения де Соссюра и его 
последователей смыслу соответствует означаемое знака, значению — вещь (ср. 
ниже).
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(*) в аспекте w — субъект, испытывающий страх; если его 
“предрасположенность к определенной реакции”, является 
чрезмерной, то он имеет шанс быть названым трусом, если 
недостаточной — храбрецом или безумцем в зависимости от
z;
(*) в аспекте X — выявление и фиксация страшных сторон в Y, 
причем, сами рассматриваемые объекты совершенно необяза­
тельно должны быть опасными а priori, напротив они могут 
носить нейтральный характер (так, страх может быть интер- 
претантой не только хищника или бандита, который атакует 
интерпретатора, но и, например, результатом химического 
анализа состава почвы, воздуха или воды; именно такого рода 
страхами порождено экологическое мышление), или даже 
чем-то милым (распространенный сюжет в литературе и кине­
матографии ужаса: игрушка или любимое домашнее 
животное, становящиеся опасными врагами);
(*) в аспекте Y — объекты и действия, вызывающие страх; при 
этом не имеет значения, идет ли дело о рационально оцени­
ваемых реальных опасностях, или о фобиях, порождаемыми 
мнимыми опасностями;
(*) в аспекте Z предметом рассмотрения становятся условия, в 
которых имеет место страх; особый интерес представляют 
случаи, когда именно контекст определяет, что является 
страшным, а что нет (в одиночестве зарождаются одни страхи, 
в толпе — принципиально иные).
Очевидно, что с точки зрения семиотики культуры наибольший 
интерес представляют аспекты X и Z.
2.1.1. Пирс уделяет много внимания классификации знаков, 
особое значение имеет его “вторая трихотомия знаков”: знаки 
разделяются на иконы, индексы и символы (2, 247). Не будем 
воспроизводить логику пирсовской классификации — она 
довольно сложна и исследователями, чуждыми данной традиции, 
нередко оценивается с пренебрежительным непониманием11, — 
для наших целей достаточно упрощенной трактовки. Икон похож 
на объект, субститутом которого он является (2.276), следо­
вательно, вызывающий страх иконический знак сам должен быть
Ср. характерный вердикт Э.Бенвениста: “Эта трихотомия — почти все, что 
осталось сегодня от сложнейших логических построений” (Бенвенист 1974- 69-
70).
страшным в силу своего сходства со страшным объектом. Индекс 
основывается на реальной связи знака и объекта, в силу которой 
знак указывает на свой объект (2.285-288), так, например, вол­
чий вой указывает на близость волка. Наконец, символ является 
знаком в силу того, что “он является правилом, определяющим 
интерпретанту”, и далее: “Все слова, предложения, книги и 
другие конвенциональные знаки суть символы” (2.292; курсив 
мой — М.Л.). Символический знак может быть связан со страхом 
в силу условностей различного рода.
2.2. Соссюровская семиология и проблема страха. В отличие от 
Пирса, Соссюр не только не создает универсальной системы, но и 
какой-либо законченной системы вообще (дело не только в том, 
что он не успел прочитать объявленный курс лингвистики речи, а 
прочитанные части не готовил к печати, а в самом характере его 
Курса — даже наиболее разработанные его фрагменты пред­
ставляют собой теоретические конструкты, скорее иллюстри­
руемые, чем систематически разработанные). Если Пирс стре­
миться дать своим последователям готовый инструмент, и 
авторы, работающие в рамках пирсовской парадигмы, в основном 
заняты либо исследованиями его творчества, либо приложением 
его идей ко все новым объектам анализа, то Соссюр лишь указы­
вает направление дальнейших поисков, а наиболее значительные 
результаты, полученные в рамках соссюровского направления, 
были связаны как раз с полемикой и опровержением едва ли не 
всех основных положений, выдвинутых великим швейцарцем.
Соссюр разделяет языковую сферу (langage) на собственно 
язык (langue) и речь (parole). В этом разграничении наиболее 
существенными представляются два обстоятельства: во-первых, 
язык является абстрактной системой, воплощаемой в речи, 
причем в последней лингвистический интерес представляет лишь 
то, как и в какой мере она реализует структуру языка,12 во-вто- 
рых, только язык является системой знаков. Последнее кажется 
особенно парадоксальным: произносимые и воспринимаемые 
речевые сигналы (не только отдельные звуки, но и целые фразы) 
сами по себе знаками не являются, они лишь репрезентируют
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элементов речевой деятельности, то наука о языке <как раздел семиологии — 
М.Л> вполне может обойтись без них” (Соссюр 1977: 53).
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знаки языка. Сказанное может быть представлено в виде 
следующей схемы13:
(1) ЯЗЫК РЕЧЬ
Непосредственных связей между понятийной сферой и речевой 
субстанцией не существует, их связывает лишь то, что в них 
реализуется языковой знак. Мы еще вернемся к обсуждению 
этого положения, пока же отметим, что центральное место в этой 
схеме принадлежит отношению, связывающему означаемое и 
означающее знака (впоследствие Л. Ельмслев назовет его знако­
вой функцией). Хотя обычно в соссюровской традиции термин 
‘семиозис’ не употребляется, можно сказать, что именно знаковая 
функция составляет основу знакообразования, т.е. семиозиса. 
Такой семиозис может быть назван внутренним, в отличие от 
пирсовского внешнего.
По Соссюру, связь между означаемым и означающим носит 
исключительно произвольный (арбитрарный) характер, никакой 
естественной мотивировки у этой связи нет (Соссюр 1977: 100— 
102); с другой стороны, она обладает известной обязательностью, 
во всяком случае, когда дело идет о естественном языке, “человек 
не властен внести даже малейшее изменение в знак” (101); 
аналогичную обязательность Соссюр обнаруживает и в знаках 
других семиотических систем: в пантомиме, в этикете. Это поло­
жение даже у самых верных последователей Соссюра неодно­
кратно вызывало недоумение и не раз объявлялось просто
13 Любопытная деталь: хотя Пирс постоянно использует термины, имеющие 
визуальные коннотации (диаграммы как специальная разновидность знака и т.п.), 
сам он за редкими исключениями (например, в статье “Как сделать наши идеи 
ясными” (5.388-410)) иллюстрациями не пользуется, предпочитая обстоятель­
ные, постоянно уточняемые формулировки; напротив, Соссюр любит свои 
подчас расплывчатые рассуждения иллюстрировать схемами и рисунками. При 
этом, в теории Пирса важное место занимают иконические знаки, в то время как в 
центре внимания Соссюра находятся исключительно знаки арбитрарные.
ошибочным, поэтому важно разобраться в логике соссюровского 
построения.
Философской базой Соссюра — никогда не заявляемой и, 
вероятно, не осознаваемой, но вполне определенной — является 
платонизм, причем платонизм в строгом варианте14 (хотя и не 
всегда последовательно проводимый): язык — это идея, все его 
воплощения в речи — лишь бледные и аморфные тени. Странное 
утверждение Соссюра — между прочим, автора блестящих идей 
в области исторической лингвистики — о неизменности языка во 
времени и пространстве объясняется именно тем, что язык нахо­
дится вне времени и пространства. Всякие инновации, изменения 
в значении и/или звучании — суть факты не языка, но речи; если 
же они утверждаются в качестве нормы, следует говорить не об 
изменении знака, но о другом знаке (столь же произвольном и 
обязательном как и все прочие знаки), причем бессмысленно 
рассуждать о том, который из этих знаков старше — можно лишь 
зафиксировать факт, что в речи один из них был реализован 
раньше другого.
Традиционному понятию значения, выступающего по отно­
шению к знаку в роли чего-то внешнего и в той или иной степени 
навязанного, Соссюр противопоставляет понятие внутренней 
значимости (valeur), определяемое как совокупность внутри­
системных отношений, в которые вступает тот или иной элемент 
языка: каждый элемент языковой системы возможен лишь в силу 
того, что он отличается от всех прочих элементов. Совокупность 
этих различий и образует язык.
В языке нет ничего, кроме различий. [...] В языке имеются только 
различия без положительных членов системы. Хотя означаемое и 
означающее, взятые в отдельности, — величины чисто дифферен­
циальные и отрицательные, их сочетание есть факт положитель­
ный (Соссюр 1977: 152-153).
Языковой знак является частью языковой системы, он связан 
многочисленными отношениями с другими знаками, более того, 
именно совокупность этих связей и определяет его в качестве 
знака. Таким образом, Соссюр приходит к очередному парадоксу: 
означаемое языкового знака не мотивируется его означающим и
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vice versa, но языковой знак, взятый как целое, мотивируется всей 
структурой языка (Соссюр 1977: 146-148). Итак, с соссюриан- 
ской точки зрения атомарный анализ отдельных знаков — заня­
тие малопродуктивное, нужно анализировать всю знаковую сис­
тему в целом15.
Сказанное представляется особенно актуальным, когда дело 
идет о невербальных знаковых системах, или системах, надстраи­
вающихся над вербальным языком. Таковы, например, языки 
различных искусств, но также языки мифов, сновидений и т.п. 
Одной из важных заслуг психоанализа является трактовка снови­
дений в качестве сообщений на определенном языке, названном 
не вполне удачно (из-за возможных ассоциаций с пирсовской 
терминологией) символическим, а также сближение этого языка с 
языком мифов и некоторых неврозов (Фрейд 1991, Фромм 1994). 
Символический язык далек от естественного языка и от языка 
формальной логики, он не подчиняется законам причинности и 
пространственно-временных отношений; место внешней логики и 
основанного на здравом смысле правдоподобия занимает внут­
ренняя логика семантического развертывания концептуальных 
комплексов, место упорядоченности во времени и пространствен­
ной локализации — интенсивность связи (не обязательно 
смысловой, возможно и звуковой — ср. внимание Фрейда к ого­
воркам, каламбурам и т.п. — соссюровское понятие знака 
“работает” здесь явно лучше пирсовского): т.е. чем теснее связа­
ны между собой элементы этого языка, тем ближе друг к другу 
они располагаются в тексте16.
Теперь следует задасться вопросом, нет ли и у страха специ­
фического языкового измерения? В свете сказанного на этот 
вопрос, вероятно, следует ответить положительно: вопреки 
Хайдеггеру, страх не только лишает происходящее смысла, но и 
является исключительно интенсивным генератором смысловых 
связей; правильнее было бы сказать, что страх уничтожает рацио­
нальные связи, но тем более властными выступают иные, им 
самим и создаваемые. Язык страха ближе к языку сновидений, 
чем к естественному (вербальному) языку, не случайно, что
15 Позже аналогичные рассуждения приведут В. Проппа к созданию кон­
цепции внутрисистемных функций, инвариантных по отношению к их реали­
зациям в различных текстах.
1 Описанная Фрейдом логика сновидений оказывается близкой выявленным 
Л. Леви-Брюлем закономерностям “первобытного мышления”, основанном на 
принципе партиципации (Леви-Брюль 1930).
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скрытые страхи отчетливее проступает во сне, чем наяву; нередко 
страхи легче переводятся в визуальные образы, чем вербали­
зуются и, подобно сновидениям, страхи в результате вербали­
зации если не уничтожаются, то во всяком случае могут су­
щественно смягчаться (это не касается страхов, вызываемых 
конкретными объектами или ситуациями — страх высоты или 
пауков уговорам практически не поддается).
О страхе можно говорить не только как о языке, но и как 
специфическом механизме семиозиса, но не в пирсовском 
“субститутивном” смысле, а в духе соссюровской семиологии: 
страх может выполнять знаковую функцию, связывать между 
собой означаемое с означающим, соединять различные знаки в
17сложные комплексы .
2.3. Выводы. Итак, важнейшее различие в трактовке знака у 
Пирса и у Соссюра заключается в том, что у Пирса знак репрезен­
тирует нечто иное, в то время как у Соссюра сам знак репрезен­
тируется в принципиально от него отличной субстанции. Пред­
ставляется, что дело не сводится здесь лишь к концептуальным 
различиям, основоположники современной семиотики имеют 
ввиду не только различные подходы к знакам, но и различные 
знаки: с одной стороны, произвольные объекты, в силу обстоя­
тельств оказавшиеся знаками, и знаки par excellence, каковыми, к 
примеру, являются слова естественного языка.
В ряде других принципиальных отношений соссюровская 
семиотика также существенно отличается от пирсовской. В про­
тивоположность пирсовской субститутивной семиотике, семио­
тику Соссюра можно назвать билатеральной: (языковой) знак 
есть неразрывное единство означаемого с означающим, а не 
субститут чего-то вне него находящегося. Далее, в противо­
17 Разумеется, страх является лишь одним из многочисленных механизмов 
такого рода. Ср. публикации В. П. Руднева о травматическом характере смысло 
образования и его остроумные разработки (Руднев 1999а, 19996 и др.). Думается, 
однако, что сводя всю сферу смысла к травматизму, автор искусственно сужает 
проблему. Поэтому и заключительный вывод его статьи нуждается в опреде­
ленной корректировке. В. П. Руднев пишет:
Культура семиотична и с этой точки зрения она действительно “бесс­
мысленна”, но кроме нее никаких иных путей к смыслу мы не имеем (Руднев 
1999в: 168).
Если культура бессмысленна, а смысл травматичен, то культура должна быть 
признана атравматичной — вывод, с которым едва ли согласится и В. П. Руднев.
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положность пирсовской семиотике, соссюровская семиология 
носит замкнутый и интенсивный характер. Пирс пытается 
втянуть в семиотку как можно более широкий круг явлений, 
Соссюр же тщательно расчищает площадку будущей науки, его 
семиология носит принципиально минималистский и системный 
характер. Системны не только внутризнаковые отношения, еще 
важнее системность межзнаковых отношений, каждый знак 
характеризуется не только соотношением его означаемого с 
означающим, но и внутрисистемной значимостью, определяемой 
всей совокупностью его отношений с другими знаками языка.
С одной стороны, понятие представляется нам как то, что находится в 
отношении соответствия с акустическим образом внутри знака'8, а с 
другой стороны, сам этот знак, то есть связывающее оба его компонента 
отношение, также и в той же степени находится в свою очередь в 
отношении соответствия с другими знаками языка (Соссюр 1977: 147; 
ср. также с. 164-166).
Пирса интересует функционирование отдельных знаковых об­
разований (как отдельных знаков, так и целых текстов), в то 
время как в центре внимания Соссюра находится язык, как гене­
ратор таких образований. С точки зрения соссюровской семио­
логии почти все, чем занимается Пирс, лежит не в сфере языка, а 
в сфере речи. Высказывалось мнение (особенно энергично — 
Р. О. Якобсоном), что в то время как Пирс исследует знаки во 
всем их многообразии, Соссюр, пренебрегая иконами и индек­
сами, пытается все свести к символам. Дело, однако, в том, что и 
соссюровский конвенциональный знак не может быть идентифи­
цирован с пирсовским символом. Вся пирсовская типология 
знаков строится на базе соотношения знака с его объектом; его 
семиозис — это семиозис речевого акта. У Соссюра же языковой 
знак реализуется в речи. Характер этой реализации Соссюром не 
раскрыт, это сделали его ученики и последователи: IU. Балли и
|К Чтение Соссюра затрудняет аморфность его неустоявшейся терминологи­
ческой системы, особенно же употребление в его лекциях, в целом антипсихо- 
логических по своей направленности, терминов, заимствованных именно из 
психологии. Так, он неоднократно говорит о языковом знаке, как о единстве 
понятия и акустического образа и т.п. Вместе с тем, его концепция знака далека 
от какого бы то ни было психологизма: ср. хотя бы его рассуждения о том, что 
язык организует мыслительную деятельность, а не наоборот, что нет понятия вне 
акустического образа и vice versa (Соссюр 1977: 144-150); зато его термины 
‘означаемое’ и ‘означающее’ как нельзя лучше передают самое существо дела.
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Э. Бенвенист. Она заключается, грубо говоря, в следующем: если 
знаки языка строятся по принципу их исключительно внутриязы­
ковой мотивированности (и, следовательно, абсолютной немоти- 
вированности внешними обстоятельствами), то в речи знаки, 
напротив, постоянно соотносятся с самыми различными факто­
рами, характеризующими речевой акт: с его временными и 
пространственными параметрами, субъектом и предметом речи и 
т.п., — знаки речи являются (внешне) мотивированными: 
мотивированность кодом определяет их символизм, мотивиро­
ванность условиями речевого акта (“я”, “здесь”, “сейчас” Бенве- 
ниста) — индексальность, сходство с предметом речи — ико- 
низм. Именно поэтому в речи следует говорить не о иконических, 
индексальных и символических знаках в чистом виде, а о со­
ответствующих составляющих знака. Следует указать, что анало­
гичные результаты были получены не только в лингвистике; в 
рамках логико-философской аргументации к аналогичным выво­
дам пришел Е. Пельц, с точки зрения которого корректнее 
говорить не об иконическом знаке, а об иконическом употребле­
нии знака (Pele 1986), т.е. иконичность возникает в результате 
определенной реализации знака, который сам по себе иконом не 
является. Очевидно, что mutatis mutandis это же справедливо и 
относительно индекса и символа — все они являются знаками 
речи, а не языка.
Итак, принципиальное отличие пирсовской семиотики от 
соссюровской семиологии заключается в том, что в центре вни­
мания первой находятся явленные знаки, сфера семиотики куль­
туры предстает совокупностью так наз. “текстов культуры”, в то 
время как вторая занимается исключительно системами знаков, а 
семиотика культуры предстает системой культурных кодов. 
Принципиально различными представляются и возможные 
подходы к страху. Если в пирсовской перспективе страх может 
включаться в семиозис в качестве одного из компонентов, то 
соссюровский подход дает возможность говорить о креативности 
страха, о самом страхе как специфической форме семиозиса. 
Грубо говоря, если в пирсовской семиотике страх вызывается 
страшным, то в соссюровской — страшное создается страхом.
3. Ситуация страха. Как идущая от Кьеркегора и Хайдеггера 
философская традиция, так и психоанализ стремятся вывести 
страх за пределы сознания и логики, представить его порожде­
нием Ничто, глубин подсознания или коллективного бессозна­
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тельного. Страх страшен и, одновременно, притягателен, причем 
притягательность делает его, в свою очередь, еще страшнее . 
Нашей задачей является если не победа над страхом (“оконча­
тельная” победа над страхом невозможна в принципе), то прими­
рение с ним, поиск возможностей сосуществования со страхом в 
этом страшном мире. На этом захватывающем фоне предлагаемая 
нами трактовка выглядит сугубо прозаической и, если так можно 
выразиться, безопасной: анализ страха не обязан быть устра­
шающим.
Следует подчеркнуть, что представляется совершенно очевид­
ным, что страх обладает целым рядом положительных функций: 
предупредительной, сдерживающей, познавательной20 и даже 
успокаивающей (ср. любовь Розанова к страху “с моим страхом 
мне не страшно”), поэтому всякие попытки его априорной демо­
низации представляются не слишком продуктивными. Страх 
становится негативным фактором лишь в тех случаях, когда он 
перерастает сигнальную функцию и приобретает самодовлеющий 
характер, заслоняет собой опасность, затрудняет адекватно ее 
оценить и адекватно на нее реагировать; в таких случаях страх 
сам становится фактором, усиливающим опасность, а подчас и 
главной опасностью.
Предметом рассмотрения в данном параграфе является не сам 
страх, взятый как переживание, а лишь феномен страха, описы­
ваемый и классифицируемый извне как ситуация страха. Поэто­
му, например, мы предпочитаем говорить не о причинах страха, 
но лишь о его источниках; это позволяет нам абстрагироваться не 
только от обсуждения психологических механизмов, но и от 
проблемы причинности: порождает ли некий объект страх или же 
сам он является порождением страха.
Источником страха является опасность; в наиболее общем 
виде страх может быть определен в качестве реакции на 
опасность. Заметим, что заранее не накладывается никаких огра­
ничений на характер опасности, ее источник и т.п.: опасность 
может быть мнимая, результатом проекции внутренних характе­
ристик субьекта вовне и т.п.; опасность, наконец, может быть
Амбивалентность страха — осознаваемое отталкивание от предмета страха 
и подсознательное влечение к нему — была выявлена уже Фрейдом (Фрейд 
1991а. ср. также главы “О природе страха” и “Феноменология страха” в Левиц­
кий 1995: 220-238).
20 Ср., например, замечание Э.Фромма, что лишь благодаря смертельному 
страху герой Кафки смог увидеть подлинные ценности жизни (Фромм 1998: 470).
предположительной: “если я сделаю то-то, то может случиться 
то-то” и т.п.
3.1. Имперсональная опасность. Простейшая из связанных со 
страхом ситуаций состоит из трех компонентов: субъекта, 
воспринимаемой им опасности и собственно страха, как резуль­
тата этого восприятия:
(2) ОПАСНОСТЬ —> СУБЪЕКТ —*■ СТРАХ21
Несмотря на кажущуюся элементарность, эта схема предлагает 
ряд вариантов, обусловленных как природой субъекта (индивид 
или коллектив), природой опасности, так и возникающих 
страхов. Первое и, вероятно, с семиотической точки зрения 
наиболее существенное разграничение определяется временной 
соотнесенностью опасности и порождаемой ею страха:
(a) страх, как реакция на уже произошедшее событие;
(b) страх, предваряющий еще не произошедшее событие.
Думается, что различие это имеет фундаментальный характер; 
оно затрагивает не только временной фактор, но и субъективный: 
в случае (а) событие является, как правило, для субъекта неожи­
данным, в то время, как в случае (Ь) не только будущая опас­
ность, но и само ее ожидание является фактором, по крайней 
мере потенциально служащим умножению страха. Во многих 
языках различие этих форм страха закреплено терминологически; 
так по-русски в первом случае говорится, как правило, не о 
страхе, а испуге. Испуг — эмоция того же типа, что и ощущение 
холода при соприкосновении с холодным предметом, боли от 
удара и т.п. — это естественная реакция на определенный
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21 Может показаться, что существуют еще более элементарные ситуации: 
совершенно беспричинные страхи, страхи без опасности, например, страх 
ответственности и т.п. Представляется, что здесь следует различать структуру 
ситуации и ее вербальную формулировку. Так, страх ответственности может 
обозначать две принципиально различные вещи: страх перед последствиями за 
свои (конкретные) действия или бездеятельность и внутренний дискомфорт, 
испытываемый субьектом, принимающим решения, безотносительно к их 
результату. В первом случае мы имеем дело с обычной ситуацией типа (2), где 
последствия деятельности выступают в функции опасности; во втором случае 
сама ответственность выступает в роли опасности; возможно, что в таких 
случаях лучше говорить не о страхе, а о беспокойстве или тревоге. Впрочем, с 
точки зрения психоанализа вообще следует говорить не о беспричинных страхах, 
но лишь о страхах с невыявленными причинами.
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раздражитель, а не результат интерпретации. Принципиально 
иной является природа страха — это реакция не на само событие 
или объект, а на те или иные предваряющие его знаки, интер­
претируемые в качестве страшных или опасных. Очевидно, что 
семиотическая составляющая играет в механизмах страха гораздо 
более существенную роль, нежели в механизмах испуга; времен­
ной разрыв вообще является важным фактором в механизмах 
смыслообразования: “Между приращением смысла и грузом
времени должна иметься существенная связь” (Рикёр 1995: 39 и
\22след.) .
Тем не менее, различие между испугом и страхом не должно 
абсолютизироваться, нередко испуг перерастает в устойчивый 
синдром страха, а страх редуцируется в мимолетный испуг. 
Следушее разграничение связано с реальностью угрозы. Важность 
его для семиотики культуры подчеркивал Ю.М.Лотман:
Рассматривая общество, делающееся жертвой массового страха, мы 
различаем два случая: 1. Общество находится под угрозой некоторой 
очевидной для всех опасности (например, “черной смерти” — эпидемии 
чумы, или вторжения турок в Европу). В этом случае источник 
опасности ясен, страх имеет “реальный” адресат, и объект, его вызы­
вающий, один и тот же и для самой его жертвы, и для изучающего 
ситуацию историка. 2. Общество охвачено приступом страха, реальные 
причины которого от него самого скрыты (порой скрыты и от историка, 
который вынужден прибегать к специальным исследованиям для их 
выявления). В этой ситуации возникают мистифицированные, семиоти­
чески конструируемые адресаты — не угроза вызывает страх, а страх 
конструирует угрозу. Объект страха является социальной конструкцией, 
порождением семиотических кодов, с помощью которых данный социум 
кодирует самого себя и окружающий его мир (Лотман 1998: 63-64).
Таким образом, выделяются следующие разновидности ситуации 
страха:
(c) страх, как реакция на ясную и реальную опасность;
(d) страх, как реакция на скрытую или мнимую опасность.
Заметим, что и это различие имеет относительный характер: 
между страхом, так сказать, адекватным существующей угрозе, и 
страхами абсолютно беспричинными располагается основная 
масса случаев, когда источник опасности преувеличивается (по 
принципу “у страха глаза велики”) и мифологизируется.
Ср. также рассуждения М. Фуко о “полезности модуляции наказания во 
времени” для эффективности “знаков-препятствий” (Фуко 1999: 157-158).
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Немаловажное значение имеет и источник опасности. С этой 
точки зрения мы выделяем опять-таки два принципиально 
различных случая:
(e) источник опасности находится вовне;
(f) источник опасности находится внутри субъекта.
Если основная масса страхов, преследующая индивидуального 
субъекта относится к категории (е), то коллективные фобии часто 
тяготеют к типу (f). Важным частным случаем (f) является страх 
проникновения внешней опасности: микробофобия, боязнь 
(скрытых) чужаков и двуручников-перерожденцев, теория заго­
вора и т.п.
Обозначенные типы ситуаций нередко сочетаются; имеет 
смысл выделить две наиболее выраженные комбинации: с одной 
стороны, это (а), (с) и (е), с другой — (b), (d) и (f). Очевидно, что 
вторая комбинация во всех отношениях представляет больший 
интерес.
3.2. Персонифицированная опасность. Следующую степень 
сложности представляют ситуации, когда мы имеем дело с двумя 
субъектами и целью одного из них является запугивание другого; 
страх выполняет в таких случаях не только знаковую, но и 
коммуникативную функцию. Основное отличие от ситуаций типа
(2) заключается в том, что опасность здесь имеет определенный и 
обычно персонифицированный источник:
угроза
(3) СУБЪЕКТ,: ОПАСНОСТЬ --------------------► СУБЪЕКТ2 : СТРАХ
Приведенная схема варьируется в зависимости от характеристик 
субьектов, опасности, страха и параметров угрозы и различных 
форм взаимодействия этих факторов. Остановимся лишь на 
одной из многочисленных классификационных возможностей, 
она связана с соотношением угрозы и опасности. Мы выделяем 
здесь четыре принципиальных случая:
(A) Угроза предваряет реальную и ясную опасность; напри­
мер, рычание охотящегося хищника перед его нападением на 
жертву. Запугивание играет здесь вспомогательную роль, оно 
является дополнительным средством, призванным деморали­
зовать жертву, сломить ее возможное сопротивление.
(B) Угроза отделяется от опасности и выполняет предостере­
гающую функцию, например, рычание ср б ат . охоаыаюшей свою
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территорию и т.п. Однако пренебрегший предостережением 
подвергается реальной опасности.
(C) Угроза, которая не может быть адекватно подкреплена 
возможностями угрожающего. Здесь, в свою очередь, следует 
различать две ситуации: блеф, когда угрожающий пользуется 
тем, что угрожаемый не знает его реальных возможностей, и 
собственно пустая угроза. В определенном смысле именно такая 
угроза представляет собой наиболене чистый тип, поскольку 
здесь угрожающ сам акт угрозы. Ср. “Ужо тебе!..” Евгения; с 
другой стороны, такого рода угрозы быстро девальвируются и 
угрожающий рискует стать посмешищем: “Вы меня не знаете, вы 
меня узнаете!” подпоручика Дуба.
(D) Угроза ради забавы. По своим целям этот тип угрозы 
прямо противоположен типу пустой угрозы: угрожаемого подсте­
регает не та “реальная” опасность, о которой ему сообщается, а 
опасность стать посмешищем.
Схема (3) ясно демонстрирует, что ситуация страха является 
разновидностью коммуникативной ситуации. Поэтому ситуация 
страха может быть описана в терминах теории речевых актов. В 
наиболее простом случае СУБЪЕКТ) ставит перед собой цель 
вызвать страх у СУБЪЕКТА2 , для реализации которой он форми­
рует угрозу, следствием которой и является страх. В этом случае 
страх является перлокутивным актом, следствием иллокутивной 
силы, заложеной в угрозе. Следует особо подчеркнуть, что даже в 
этом примитивном примере (иллокутивная) сила угрозы вовсе не 
обязательно является автоматическим следствием силы (реаль­
ной) опасности; здесь важен целый ряд дополнительных факто­
ров: статус угрожающего, его репутация, формулировка угрозы и 
т.п. С другой стороны, возможен целый ряд более сложных 
случаев, когда угроза либо является нежелательным побочным 
продуктом высказывания, либо, напротив, носит скрытый харак­
тер (в таких случаях можно говорить об угрозе как о косвенном 
речевом акте) и т.п.
3.3. Передатчики страха. Число участников ситуации страха в 
принципе безгранично, особую роль играют посредники. Их 
значение особенно велико в тех ситуациях, когда они являются, 
одновременно, и напуганными адресатами угрозы, и средством ее 
распространения. Любопытно, что в философском подходе к 
страху преобладают индивидуалистические мотивы; интерактив­
ная сущность страха является предметом социологических шту­
дий (ср. Канетти 1990, Хоффер 2001 и др.). В массе страхи 
многократно усиливаются, возникает своего рода эффект слабого 
звена: монолитная толпа охвачена страхом в той мере, в какой 
боятся ее наиболее пугливые члены (это знают подлинные люби­
тели фильмов ужаса: их нужно смотреть в заполненном зале, где 
страх физически заполняет пространство — он проходит волнами 
по рядам и чей-то непроизвольно вырвавшийся крик запускает 
цепную реакцию восклицаний и взвизгов).
Важную роль играет коммуникативное пространство страха и 
используемые для его распространения каналы связи. Страх (как 
и ненависть) вовсе не безразличен к средствам, которыми он 
распространяется: то, что так действенно в слухах, графити, 
листовках и т.п., будучи помещенным в книгу теряет значитель­
ную часть своей эффективности. Так, социологические опросы в 
России 1990-х годов (до московских взрывов и начала второй 
чеченской войны) свидетельствуют, что свыше 50% респонден­
тов высказывали в той или иной мере негативное отношение к 
чеченцам, свыше 40% — к цыганам, порядка 30^4-0% — к другим 
народам Кавказа и лишь порядка 10% — к евреям (правда, среди 
респондентов из КПРФ этот показатель поднимается до 18%; 
Гудков 1999, табл. 2 и 6). Если отношение к чеченцам в какой-то 
мере объяснимо актами насилия и их освещением в средствах 
массовой информации, то фобии, вызываемые цыганами, азер­
байджанцами или армянами подпитываются исключительно 
слухами, распространяемыми преимущественно вокруг рынков. 
Никакой антицыганской, антиармянской или антидагестанской 
литературы в России нет. Напротив, постоянно растущая анти­
семитская литература не имеет практически никакого влияния на 
настроения масс (по социологическим данным сознательными 
антисемитами стабильно считает себя лишь около 6% населения).
В последнее время все более активной средой распростра­
нения фобий становится интернет; вероятно в скором времени он 
займет в этом смысле доминирующее положение.
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Kultuurisemiootika ja hirmu fenomenoloogia
Artiklis käsitletakse hirmu kui semiootilist fenomeni. Hirmu semiootiline 
eripära seisneb selles, et olles tugev semiootiline faktor, jääb selle semioo­
tiline loomus tihti varju ning hirmu käsitletakse lähtudes skeemist stiimul- 
reaktsioon. Artiklis analüüsitakse hirmu nii Peirce’i semiootika kui ka Saus- 
sure’i semioloogia kontekstis ning näidatakse, et need lähenemised lubavad 
hirmu puhul avada erinevaid tahke: kui Peirce’ ilikus perspektiivis hirmus 
tekitab hirmu, siis lähtudes Saussure’i lähenemisest võiks öelda, et hirm loob 
hirmsa, hirm osutub kreatiivseks, võiks isegi rääkida hirmust kui semioo- 
sisest.
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Abstract. The article draws parallels between Bakhtin’s literary theory and 
some of Peirce’s philosophical concepts. The comparisons with Bakhtin go 
beyond the theory of heteroglossia and reveal that related notions were 
implicitly originated by Dostoevsky. The elaboration of the concepts of 
dialogue, “self’ and “other” continue into the ideas of consciousness, iconic 
effects in literature, and the semiotic aspect of thought. Especially important 
in this chapter is the aspect of Peirce’s theory concerned with the endless 
growth of interpretation and sign building, or unlimited semiosis. Peirce’s 
discussion of unlimited semiosis is not among the less elaborated ones. Quite 
on the contrary, it is one of the most important of his ideas of sign. As a 
semiotic notion it is widely exploited in many related areas. However, it is not 
often used as an analytical tool to examine literature or to other works of art. 
Here, we will employ this notion in conjunction with Bakhtin’s doctrine of 
heteroglossia.
Iconicity and polyphony
In his Problems o f Dostoevsky's Art (1929), M. M. Bakhtin first 
popularized the theses of dialogism and polyphony, which deal with 
the harmonizing and autonomy of characters’ voices and emphasize 
contextual relations. These theses, along with carnivalization, derived 
from the work of Rabelais, became crucial for Bakhtin. (In fact, poly­
phony and carnivalization are manifestations of the broader pheno­
menon heteroglossia). Subsequently Bakhtin often clarified and rede­
fined these terms, rendering them more precisely. More and more he
9
442 Ivan Mladenov
delved into the plurality and independence of “many-language-ness” 
of artistic discourse.
Bakhtin’s preoccupation with Dostoevsky’s novels is understand­
able in that Dostoevsky is not only a novelist, but also a moralist and a 
great thinker. It is quite possible to talk about Dostoevsky’s philo­
sophy or even his literary criticism, although they are often 
unsystematic and sometimes self-contradictory. The same can be said 
of Bakhtin’s theses, the formulations of which can be identified in 
Dostoevsky as artistic principles. What Bakhtin actually did was to 
calibrate more systematically ideas about the different voices, 
otherness, and polyphony already inherent in the novels. Bakhtin, as a 
zealous reader of Dostoevsky, was engaged in a constant dialogue 
with the latter’s heroes. Like Bakhtin, Peirce defines and redefines his 
basic terms, elaborating the formulae of the sign, sign-process and 
other key theses.
Let us start with Bakhtin’s widely adopted term polyphony. For 
Bakhtin polyphony is an umbrella-term over all interactive processes 
among the characters in artistic discourse. The individual speeches, 
genres, and languages with their own voices in a literary work strive 
for harmony, which unites the structure of the whole. A more abstract 
term for this interaction, one that embraces the notion of harmony as 
well, is “heteroglossia” (literary: ‘different voices’). Sometimes dia­
logue is used in a comprehensive sense, but it will be more precise in 
taking heteroglossia as a theoretical model and dialogue as a practical 
manifestation. Among the numerous explanations of polyphony given 
by Bakhtin, is this one:
An idea here is indeed neither a principle of the representation (as in any 
ordinary novel), nor the leitmotif of representation, nor a conclusion drawn 
from it...it is rather the object of representation. As a principle for visualizing 
and understanding the world, for shaping the world in the perspective of a 
given idea, the idea is present only for the characters, and not for Dostoevsky 
himself as the author. (Bakhtin 1984: 24)
The semiotic aspect of this statement concerns the idea as represented 
by its iconic part, i.e., by its resemblance or similarity to other ideas. 
A set of iconic signs, like a system of mirrors, can reveal “the idea as 
an object of representation”. Iconicity in text will generally mean 
different viewpoints, unguided by the author. Dostoevsky’s novels, 
although deeply philosophic, are penetrated with iconicity. In every
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character’s speech, visions, hallucinations and nightmares dominate 
the narrated stories or thoughts.
If we carefully follow the plots, we will see that each monologue is 
preceded by something similar to the setting of a stage: a cascade of 
pictures prepares the reader for hearing a prophecy rather than a story. 
Then the same happens in the next chapter: the narrative continues 
like an endless preparation for something more important that will 
come later, but instead only a new stage has been set, or rather a new 
system of mirrors. The plot lines are split, the ideas are vague, 
although they seem like they will be clarified in the next paragraph. 
But this expectation remains unfulfilled until the last sentence. This 
method can be compared to the developing of a photographic 
negative. The process continues until the new image appears only the 
outcome looks different from what was expected. Seeking a final 
meaning of a story by Dostoevsky resembles opening a series of 
Chinese boxes (or, a “Matryoshka”-set).
For Bakhtin a sign can live as a sign only if it appears as something 
other than itself, only in a dialogue with another sign of the contextual 
relations. Bakhtin speaks for an interior dialogue that is micro­
dialogue in every sentence. Furthermore he finds a dialogue even at 
the level of the single word, a double-voiced word. As David K. 
Danow claims: “The word [...] is conceived as a sign not only bearing 
meaning, or having a referent, but as being potentially engaged in 
continuous dialogue” (Danow 1991: 24).
For Peirce too, there a sign exists only if it is mediated by its 
interpretant: i.e. there is no sign without the other sign, which 
interprets it. Each time this occurs, the interpretant in its turn becomes 
another sign. The identity of the sign (its meaning) lies in the field of 
mediation between the sign and its interpretant. It may be rather 
surprising to recognize in the following sentence Peirce’s (not 
Bakhtin’s) thoughts: “And the existence of a cognition is not some­
thing actual, but consists in the fact that under certain circumstances 
some other cognition will arise” (CP 7.357).
Seeing and listening
The roles that iconicity plays in dialogue can be best explicated from 
Peirce’s argument on this topic where he adopts the medieval 
scholastic view. According to Peirce, to recognize something as being 
“red” means to interpret actual cases of seeing the color as similar to
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other possible occurrences of the sighting of red, and hence as a sign 
of the quality of red in these other possible occurrences. Or, in 
Peirce’s words:
Two objects can only be regarded as similar if they can be compared and 
brought together in the mind [...] It is plain that the knowledge that one 
thought is similar to or in any way truly representative of another, cannot be 
derived from immediate perception, but must be a hypothesis. (CP 5.288)
The idea here is that seeing is not a kind of passive registration of sets 
of pictures. It is rather a process comparable to reading. To see some­
thing as red, green, gray does not mean that all occurrences of red, 
green, gray are equal each time we see them, but that our minds have 
produced series of comparisons (hypotheses, according to Peirce). 
Only the final result of this thought-like process could be named 
seeing something as green, which means recognizing the greenness. 
So, what we see as green depends, in fact, on our experience of green­
ness. Now, in order to stick closer to Peirce’s idea here, we have to 
take a step further and to conclude along with his hint that our per­
ception of “this green” relies on our thought. Or, as Murray G. 
Murphey argues:
For Peirce, then, color is a concept, which is applied to the manifold of 
impressions as an explaining hypothesis; it is not therefore an impression 
itself. The term ‘impression’ is thus restricted to the instantaneous neuro­
logical stimuli, which occasion the concept and are related by it. (Murphey 
1961: 71)
This means that color is similar to an expression, or even to a thought 
rather than being seen as a singular element. Murphey goes on to 
quote an unpublished draft of a Peirce’s manuscript where the same 
judgement is made. Peirce compares the simplest color to a piece of 
music — the perception of both depends on the relations between 
different parts of the impression. The impression of color is not 
repeatable each time we see the same color. Pierce saw differences 
between colors as differences between harmonies; a new impression 
has to be harmonized with a previous experience of the same per­
ception. To comprehend the differences between the colors we must 
be conscious of the elementary impressions whose relation creates the 
harmony. The conclusion is that the color is not an impression, but an 
inference.
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Such an understanding can explain why a particular human mood 
is expressible in music with relative accuracy, but a color is not. Why, 
for example, can a musical tone sound cheerful or, sad, but cannot 
depict redness, or blueness? If we follow Peirce, we may answer that 
the perceptions of color are complex and cannot be harmonized in 
only one tone. For Peirce perceptions or sensations are mental 
representations determined by a series of comparisons grounded in the 
previous experience. Those comparisons are represented in the mind, 
and with each subsequent appearance their details are less sharply 
defined. But how can one differentiate among the manifold 
sensations? What differentiates the perception of music from that of 
color, or of literature?
We are thus approaching the medieval question of the “images in 
the mind” , but from an unusual perspective. If comparison and 
reflection are the only mental tools for recognizing the impressions, 
how can we know which are the tools and which are the results? In 
this paper we will try to outline the process of transformation of the 
signs by which we recognize our thoughts. But how can we be sure 
that we are not confusing impression with perception and sensation?
We have seen that for Peirce color is an explaining concept, thus it 
is not inseparable from itself, but a result of a complicated process of 
comparison. What the color seems to contain is an element of 
generality that is found in all instances and in the final impression. 
According to Peirce, the universal conception that is “nearest to sense 
is that of the present in general” (CP 1.547). It is a conception, 
because it is universal. However, the present in general does not seem 
to be inseparable from itself. It is, rather, a general relation.
If we return to a more strict version of Peirce’s terminology as well 
as an “atomic” level of analysis, we could say that a quality is not just 
the sensory data of a particular thing, but a unit, separable and 
extractable from its occasional occurrence, which can be shared by 
more than one object. What follows is that every sign, conveying 
some information about the quality of its object, must involve, at least 
in part, a “qualisign” , or a sign of an iconic nature. As already 
mentioned, if the quality “redness” depends on our experience — in 
other words, is in our thoughts — it follows that it grows and changes, 
that is, the iconic is subject to interpretation. In a footnote Peirce says:
I am not so wild as to deny that my sensation of red today is like my sensation 
of red yesterday. I only say that the similarity can consist only in the physio­
logical force behind consciousness — which leads me to say, I recognize this
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feeling the same as the former one, and so does not consist in a community of 
sensations. (CP 5.289)
But how can the iconic sign be subject to interpretation, if iconicity 
means a full similarity? How can an iconic sign keep its generality, 
and hence, its interpretability, if it is absolutely equal to its object? 
Does it follow the same rules as any other sign-interpretation? Are 
these rules cognizable? If “yes” , can they be used by the authors 
purposely in varying artistic discourses?
Signs and silhouettes
That which gives rise to growth is the self-generative power inherently 
existing in the sign. Semiosis is a continuous process of interpretation. 
The infinity of the sign-interpretation results from the triadic 
definition of a sign. There is no other way for Peirce to define a pure 
icon, except as a “possibility” or a monadic quality. The quality has to 
be one and the same in both, sign and its object, in order to be 
recognized as a pure icon. If there were a monadic quality, it would 
act as a sign of itself while retaining its identity; in other words, it 
would become the same old Kantian “thing-in-itself” . Peirce 
overlooks this problem, accepting that even an idea, except in the 
sense of a possibility, or Firstness, cannot be an Icon. “A possibility 
alone is an Icon purely by virtue of its quality; and its object can only 
be a Firstness” (CP 2.276).
Furthermore he applied the same solution to words. In order to 
refer to an individual and still retain their generality, all words have to 
be legisigns. But at the same time, they are symbolically related to 
their objects, that is, they are interpreted as related to their objects. 
Only by conveying some information about the quality of its object, 
can any sign take part in semiosis, in communication and in extending 
of knowledge, in other words, can it be a sign. (A sign has to carry 
information and to be able to communicate this information). To do 
that, any sign, which contains some new code, has to convey a nucleus 
of something known, an iconic similarity, which will enable its 
understanding. This is the only reason why, when speaking about 
words and meaning, one must mention icons. Of course, words are not 
icons, but they are capable o f producing iconic effects. Words in 
literary texts can produce iconic effects, by virtue of which we 
recognize signs. When we read we do not see icons, indices or
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symbols before our eyes. What we read is a set of legisigns, as already 
mentioned; what we interpret is quite another thing. It is surprising to 
what great extent our readings are similar. We follow similar patterns 
to read and interpret signs, as if they were live pictures, a kind of 
coded “pay-per-view’'. In our consciousness we decode those pictures 
and classify (or store) them in different programs such as: “important 
to remember” , “less important”, “archive” , etc.). We lay these catego­
rizations down into the tracks of the effete mind.
All this is possible because the signs reproduced in consciousness, 
being only silhouettes of the virtual pictures from reality, have looser 
relations to their “grounds” , and similarly, to their objects. This is so 
because of the different way of establishing a meaning of the sign in 
each consciousness (seeing something as red depends on our indi­
vidual case of a first recognition of red, as very young children, and on 
the following generalization of this individual act). But the way of 
establishing meaning in the mind takes time. As already mentioned, 
each sign inherently possesses a kind of generality, which in its turn 
means that its interpretation demands continuity. Peirce understood 
continuity as a real generality, which should not to be reduced to a set 
of its actual instances. Seeing pictures from reality means recognizing 
the signs represented in consciousness, in other words, reading them. 
The latter is a process that occurs in time and occupies time.
As a next step, creating a meaning would mean establishing an 
inner dialogue in which a triadic relation is to be set. For Peirce, as for 
Bakhtin, meaning is essentially a three-term relation. A sign relates to 
a particular object but the latter can never exhaust its meaning, be­
cause this relation is “in-some-respect” only, that is, a sign is end­
lessly interpretable. This unlimited interpretation occurs in a dialogue, 
often an internalized one, when a person communicates with himself, 
taking on the part of the other.
In order that the fact should come to light that the method of graphs really 
accomplishes this marvelous result, it is first of all needful, or at least highly 
desirable, that the reader should have thoroughly assimilated, in all its parts, 
the truth that thinking always proceeds in the form of a dialogue —  a dialogue 
between different phases of the ego — so that, being dialogical, it is 
essentially composed of signs, as its matter, in the sense in which a game of 
chess has the chessmen for its matter. (CP 4.6)
At a higher level of abstraction, interpretation might be considered as 
a translation and a sign could be transposed to another level of iden­
tification not only by similarity, but also by hypothetical resemblance
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(for instance, pure icons). A sign may adopt another image and it will 
not be a result of necessary contiguity. In that case it will no longer be 
able to obtain its identity — it will be an invented or inspired sign like 
an invented image from a science-fiction movie or a computer-created 
graphic.
The logic of seeing
Thus the question about the identity of the sign arises again but as 
already mentioned, it is to be sought neither in the interpreted sign, 
nor in its object, nor in the interpretant. but in the circulation field 
between them. The represented object, i.e. the immediate object, is a 
construct of thought, a product of a sign process, and a part of 
semiosis. It is not the real object, or, it is always an incomplete object. 
No sign gives us facts from reality unchanged by interpretation. 
Hence, being only a part of a system of producing meaning, no sign 
can convey to us the whole meaning; consequently there is only a 
transitional meaning, which is, in other words, a set of viewpoints. 
The fact that seeing means making hypotheses has a solid base in 
language: for example, the expression point o f view is used both as a 
visual and mental concept. A different point of view is at the same 
time a different angle of seeing and of thinking. Bakhtin says: 
“Dostoevsky — to speak paradoxically — thought not in thoughts but 
in points of view, consciousness, voices” (Bakhtin 1984: 93).
We may further deepen our knowledge of seeing by exploring its 
purely biological sense. Thomas Sebeok writes:
The olfactory and gustatory senses are likewise semiochemical. Even in 
vision, the impact of photons on the retina differentially affects the capacity of 
the pigment rhodopsin, which fills the rods to absorb light of different wave 
lengths, the condition for univariance principle. Acoustic and tactile 
vibrations, and impulses delivered via the thermal senses, are, as well, finally 
transformed into electrochemical messages. (Sebeok 1991: 15)
It would seem that this account does not have much in common with 
the making of hypotheses, although it confirms the semiotic nature of 
seeing. Seen as such, it can be found that there are signals (or, 
“sinsigns”), which convey outside information and bring it to the mind 
for further consideration. The entire process starts by activating 
semiosis from pure iconic indeterminacy to forming hypotheses in the 
consciousness.
Unlimited semiosis and heteroglossia  449
Peirce considers the logic of seeing in “Some Consequences of 
Four Incapacities” . There he makes several remarkable suggestions, 
which are proofs for the creative role of the mind in vision. He claims: 
“We carry away absolutely nothing of the color except the conscious­
ness that we could recognize it” (CP 5.300). Then he goes a step 
further:
I will now go so far as to say that we have no images even in actual 
perception. It will be sufficient to prove this in the case of vision [...] If, then, 
we have a picture before us when we see, it is one constructed by the mind at 
the suggestion of previous sensations (CP 5.303).
We can move even deeper in our sensorial life, taking this time a 
contemporary thesis. In an article called “A modified concept of 
consciousness” , R. Sperry writes:
As we look around the room at different objects in various shapes, shades, and 
colors, the colors and shapes we experience, along with any associated smells 
and sounds, are not really out where they seem to be. They are not part of the 
physical qualities of the outside objects, but instead, like hallucinations or the 
sensations from an amputated phantom limb, they are entirely inside the brain 
itself. Perceived colors and sounds, etc. exist within the brain not as 
epiphenomena, but as real properties of the brain process. (Sperry 1969: 535)
Seeing defines a semiotic process, which takes only the “idea”, the 
pure indeterminate iconicity, from the outside world and brings it to 
the mind for further treatment and recognition. In other words, shapes, 
shades, colors, etc., can be considered as hypothetical devices of 
consciousness, which uses them as examples for comparisons it makes 
constantly. Perhaps our sensations could be taken as immediate 
objects. In other words, starting as rhematic-iconic-qualisigns, they 
attain their identity as sinsigns or legisigns in the mind.
In general, a sign is not a sign until it is interpreted, that is, until it 
becomes a part of a triad which includes an interpretant; consequently, 
the only way an iconic sign can refer to an individual is by being at 
the same time indexical. But Peirce also hints at the idea that “a sign 
may be iconic, that is, may represent its object mainly by its similarity 
no matter what its mode of being” (CP 2.276). (Here he speaks of 
hypoiconic, and further he proposed that the iconic to be divided into 
three types: images, diagrams and metaphors).
To recapitulate briefly, the formation of hypotheses by the iconic 
does not flow continuously as in the reading of words. We do not
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recognize ‘redness’ as continuity of syllogistic premises and con­
sequences, i.e. syntagmatically, but as a result of mosaic-like associa­
tions, paradigmatically. Something is red because our cognition of 
redness tells us so, and because another instance of red has been 
activated in our consciousness, which interprets what we have seen. 
What is meant here is that the identification of a sign does not flow as 
a chain of mechanical synonymous substitutions. It involves 
inferences of all three types: deduction, induction and abduction. The 
sign’s identity is attained not because it is recognizable as fixed and 
definite, but on the contrary, because of its instability, which forces it 
to appear as something other in order to be itself. This is similar to 
what our seeking Self does in order to merge with our personality.
Thirdness and otherness
Both Bakhtin’s and Peirce’s theses agree on this point. Bakhtin’s 
concept of dialogism, like Peirce’s, does not presuppose two, but three 
elements. Michael Holquist writes:
...it will be helpful to remember that dialogue is not, as is sometimes thought, 
a dyadic, much less a binary phenomenon. But for schematic purposes it can 
be reduced to a minimum of three elements having a structure very much like 
the triadic construction of the linguistic sign; a dialogue is composed of an 
utterance, a reply, and a relation between the two. It is the relation that is most 
important of the three, for without it the other two would have no meaning. 
(Holquist 1990: 28)
This sounds too Hegelian if not Marxist, with its unspecified emphasis 
on the relation only. In any case it is still a dyadic explanation, which 
precludes the dialogue between two elements that can be transformed 
into each other, but cannot interpret each other so that the result is 
something third. It would be more correct to say that in Bakhtin there 
is a creative “se lf’ which implies “other” as a replica of an “I-other” 
construction, called, at a higher level of abstraction, “otherness” . (Let 
us here recall Peirce’s internalized dialogue.)
Likewise, by reading a story, which is “other” to us, we are not 
outside of it as one element in dialogue with it. The story tells us its 
events as it tells them to all the other characters; it takes our emotion, 
anticipation, expectation, objection, vision; we become involved in the 
whole process of structuring the system of producing meaning. Our
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searching se lf’ becomes a sum of many “dialogue-oriented” rela­
tions. It becomes an ever changing-self. Here is Bakhtin again:
Meanwhile our underground hero recognizes all these perfectly well himself, 
and understands perfectly well the impossibility of escaping from that circle in 
which his attitude toward the other moves. Thanks to this attitude toward the 
other’s consciousness, a peculiar perpetuum mobile is achieved, made up of 
his internal polemic with another and with himself, an endless dialogue where 
one reply begets another, which begets a third, and so on to infinity, and all of 
this without any forward motion. (Bakhtin 1984: 230)
In Peirce one can find almost the same thought:
It should never be forgotten that our own thinking is carried on as a dialogue, 
and though mostly in a lesser degree, is subject to almost every imperfection 
of language. (CP 5.506)
Peirce’s term Thirdness corresponds to Bakhtin’s notion of dialogue. 
In Bakhtin’s philosophical system “dialogue” is not two-sided, but 
rather a polyphonic concept engaged in a potentially endless inquiry. 
Through dialogue we are questioning nature or another mind in order 
to acquire further knowledge. In this sense the dialogue relates to 
silent effects of the text, to the reader’s expectations, to the aesthetic 
values, or to yet unspoken words. For Bakhtin “dialogue” is the actual 
reality of the text, like Thirdness is the objective reality of sign-action 
(semiosis) for Peirce. This is a direct consequence of Bakhtin’s and 
Peirce’s general understanding of meaning as a three-term relation. But 
if our entire thinking is in signs, how does a sign become dialogized in 
the language? Some scholars equate a sign with a Third. However, this 
equation cannot be the whole truth. What Peirce calls “a sign in itself’ 
(or a qualisign), according to his ten-class division, is a shapeless flash of 
light before being embedded. A sign becomes meaningful by virtue of 
the Third, which fulfills its triadic structured relation. Thirdness is a 
category, which brings into life the process of growing and inter­
pretation.
Thus, Thirdness closely resembles the category of Otherness by 
Bakhtin. Let us start with the concept of “other” and then to approach 
the category of Otherness. In the already quoted “Problems of Dos­
toevsky’s Art” , Bakhtin speaks of “other” not simply as a counterpart 
of a dialogue, but as a substance of discourse. It is a necessary condi­
tion in starting the process of narration. “Other” may be embodied 
into another voice, another consciousness and even another discourse.
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This concept could be compared with Peirce’s concept of the 
“ground” : something, which is inside the sign and provides the essen­
tial quality of any sign.
Although not so specifically determined, “other” can be found at 
any level of the author’s own voice, from the single word to the whole 
story, as an inside substance of the narrative process. Without 
cognition of the “other” no cognition of the “se lf’ would be possible, 
but the relation between self and other is not binary. Both parts should 
not be considered as opposed to each other, but rather as including one 
another. Correspondingly, the category “Otherness” is not simply 
alien to, or a mirror of the self, but is rather a distant prospect from 
which the narrator’s “Г  approaches the fictional truth. It is not only a 
theory of the other’s presence in the author’s own vision, but also of 
the common vision in the author’s own presence. It is exactly that 
“perspective” which becomes a locus, or “a place of events” for the 
transforming and continuity of qualities. In other words, it is the 
context of a possible relationship. It is the category that furnishes 
meaning to the different points of view.
The perspective of “other” is the crucial idea of a theory of a 
dialogue. The category “Otherness” determines most of Bakhtin’s 
concepts, such as “chronotope”, “dialogue”, even “heteroglossia”, the 
last of which signifies the presence of more “voices” on the entire 
scale of the discourse. In turn, the explanation of the non-dyadic 
nature of dialogue can be found in the continuity, unfinished-ness and 
interpretability of “Otherness” . Bakhtin also considers the word as 
wholly dependent on the context: hence, it cannot convey a meaning 
other than a transitional one, a meaning determined by previous 
contextual usages of the particular word and by its further intentions 
to complete its ever-incomplete object. There must always be 
something else, an “other” sign, and an “otherness” to affect the chain 
of interpretation. There is no meaning unchanged by interpretation, 
hence the dialogue is also a process of inteipretation. However, 
interpretation is not a chain of continuous succession, like a domino 
effect. Better is to speak of a transitional discontinuity. It grows, 
covering and surrounding the interpreted object, affecting other signs 
and causing new sign-processes. The original sign can be reproduced 
in another sign-context, in another code, even in another “language” 
by iconic or hypothetic similarity.
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The frozen semiosis
Let us take an example from Dostoevsky’s work. At first sight the 
novel Poor Folk is narrated in a traditional manner, that is, descrip­
tively. The narrator is not the author, but a young woman; she writes a 
letter to another character, telling about an incident from her life. She 
tells about a young student who suffers from tuberculosis. He needs 
books for his studies and gives private lessons in order to earn money. 
His father is an alcoholic who loves his son and would very much like 
to help him. The father dreams of buying books for his son, but he 
himself desperately needs money for drinking. Throughout the story 
there are repeated appearances of one image: books. At the beginning 
and at the end books appear merging with another intrusive image, 
that of mud. The discourse is typical for Dostoevsky — expressive, 
breathless, rapidly building to a climax. Only when the narrator 
remembers a small episode, which occurred in the student’s room, 
does everything change. The beginning of the passage functions like 
the setting of a stage. The reader is, literally, seeing a small room; the 
eye casts about the room and focuses on the shelf with many books. In 
a brief scene, which follows shortly thereafter, the narrator 
accidentally pushes the shelf and the books fall down.
As the story continues, the student dies, the father cries in his son’s 
room. A few days before that, he had managed to buy several books 
for him and put them in his pockets. The funeral scene follows. Again, 
everything has disappeared: there are no houses, no people on the 
streets. There is only a hearse with the coffin, and the father running 
after it. They take up the whole field of vision. There is no speech, no 
author’s voice, no dialogue, only details: the running father, the 
raindrops pelting his face, his coattails, and the books falling from his 
pockets into the mud. There is a hint at the end of another impending 
death, that of the narrator’s mother.
What we have here is a play of iconic effects, produced in the 
reader’s consciousness by the iconic signs. This is a process of syste­
matic reduction of the dialogue by which heteroglossia and inter­
pretation have been minimized to a few words, unrelated to one 
another. A strong impact is achieved by increasing the role of details. 
The few remaining details persistently refer to some previous, vivid 
associations: for example, the books falling from the pockets of the 
father’s coat. This approach represents a total iconization of the 
narration, which turns back the process of interpretation, interrupts it,
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or stops it. Similar scenes exist in all Dostoevsky’s novels, for 
example, The Brothers Karamazov, Netochka Nezvanova, Double.
This technique could be described as an effect of frozen semiosis. 
Dostoevsky “freezes” the interpretation by tightening the chain of 
associations, calling our attention upon one, already familiar detail 
(the falling books). The few signs relate only to a few details, which, 
in turn, have already been components of a similar picture. At the end, 
the mud in which the books have fallen takes up the whole visual 
field. But, in fact, even this is not the end. The end of the scene is the 
wide white space, like a blind spot, with which the printer has set off 
the section. Again, what we see here blocks the associative inter­
pretation by augmenting the iconicity, which, in its turn, means 
creating different viewpoints.
The “many voices” have been gradually limited to a single one, 
which is, as much as possible, neutral. Well-orchestrated polyphony is 
silenced to a single tone like the silence in music that reigns when the 
conductor’s baton is raised, before a new theme explodes. This is 
meaningful silence. In the wholeness of the discourse it is of an iconic 
type; something certain, but “other”, something contrapuntal will 
occur when it lasts. It is an activated, loaded silence. More abstractly, 
it could be said that in the effort to liken reading to seeing, Dostoevs­
ky uses a method, which can also be named “intensification of 
nothingness”. “Nothingness” means the empty spaces of the pages, 
and the entire disturbance of the associative process. It can be 
described also as the opposite of polyphony, interpretative disconti­
nuity, or, as dialectic of a dialogue.
In this case semiosis flows like the process of seeing, from the 
indeterminate polyphony, where all sign-processes occur, to the 
organized silence of the blank space, which acts as a qualisign. As it 
has been mentioned above, Dostoevsky is trying here to compare the 
reading process with the visual one. Between the two there will 
always be a gap, which can be overlooked only imaginatively, like the 
small space a spark needs in order to jump to the other pole.
Dostoevsky tries to overcome this gap by augmenting iconicity, i.e. 
by multiplying the signs that act as icons. The empty spaces between 
paragraphs are the very gaps where the intensification of nothingness 
occurs. There are all the processes of freezing the flow of the 
semiosis: gravitation around the single detail, return to the similar 
association, the sudden beginning of a different story without any 
transition. M. Holquist writes:
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Dialogism begins by visualizing existence as an event, the event of being 
responsible for (and to) the particular situation existence assumes as it unfolds 
in the unique and constantly changing place I occupy in it. (Holquist 1990: 47)
After being classified in the consciousness, the qualisign attains a 
determined meaning. It begins to point to something, which is not a 
full analogue of its iconic origin. It becomes a sinsign. In the “in- 
between-space” of the blank page the sinsign has also made “a leap” 
into a new semiosis. In terms of literary theory, it has become 
metaphoric. The blank space (the shape of emptiness) acts like a more 
general Emptiness, that of a human life. A more precise comparison of 
this transition would be again a musical one, when the conductor’s 
baton serves as the sign of rhythm. And indeed, white spaces between 
sections are signs of the inner, ongoing rhythm of representation.
Moving silence
The sign of silence is of iconic nature. This might appear paradoxical, 
but because the written text is soundless, the “sound-effects” are 
achieved by virtue of the iconicity. This does not mean that there are 
icons or pictures in the text, which “resemble” sounds, although the 
hypothesis of synaesthesia was alien neither to Peirce nor to Bakhtin. 
Rather “the pictures of signs” in consciousness create sound/silence 
by combining many different signs. For instance, there is a silent 
effect when after a scene of a quarrel the narrator depicts a single 
detail. Silence is produced through icons. This is an evoked silence: it 
is produced as all voicing signs in polyphony fade away, so that from 
the indeterminate manifoldness only a few “tones” remain, only single 
details. The silence reigning immediately after is a mere feeling , that 
is, it may be seen as a rhematic-iconic qualisign (qualisign). But when 
we recognize (or, hear) it through intensification of icons, it becomes a 
rhematic-iconic sinsign (sinsign). Here we may recall Peirce’s remark 
that there are no actual iconic qualisigns. In other words, in the 
process of muting the polyphony, the rhematic-iconic qualisign (the 
feeling of a silence) becomes an iconic sinsign, that is, a sign of a 
silence, which points to both — the final chord of the previous 
polyphony and to an anticipated leap toward another discourse (see 
Fig. 1).
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Figure 1. Peirce’s ten-fold-division of signs — loading the silence.
The fading away of polyphony simultaneously acts as a process of 
loading the silence1. (To follow this process, just take a look at the 
solid line of the scheme). With the inclusion of all the additional 
effects, such as the play with the blank portions of the page, the 
sudden finishing of the chapter, reducing the heteroglotic narration to 
one or two voices, it might be considered as a process of completing 
the sign, that is, a movement to a complex sign, involving both an icon 
and an index. Further speculations can be made as to how the moving 
silence attains a symbolic character. In this case, according to Peirce, a 
sign must relate to its object by virtue of law, rule or habit, i.e., a word 
must be a sign of a class or a law.
Let us go back to the end of the scene from Dostoevsky discussed 
above. The whole field of vision is occupied by mud. In the blank spot 
of the page, mud, through which the pathetic funeral procession makes 
its difficult way, has been transformed into a sinsign; it points to itself 
and to desolation. The empty space is a locus where the semiosis 
flows and freezes at the same time, a moment when a new association 
is involved in the process of interpretation. It is a very complicated 
play of iconicity; the opposition “white space/mud” animates a whole 
chain of basic associations.
For the notion of “loading the silence” 1 am grateful to Professor Nathan Houser 
of the Peirce Edition Project at Indiana University — Purdue University at 
Indianapolis.
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As polyphony dies away to a single symbol, the process of loading 
the silence is achieved. Its sign has been related to its object by virtue 
of likeness (qualisign and sinsign), and then by virtue of its 
interpretant (symbol). We can now take a more general look at the 
same process, considering the entire phenomenon of “frozen se­
miosis” as a sign. When it becomes recognizable through its frequent 
appearance in the whole of the novel, or even in different novels, we 
can speak of dicent-indexical-legisign.
This new sign is accomplished by abduction, which means that the 
nature of the relation between premises and conclusion is of the 
“iconic type” , as mentioned by Augusto Ponzio ( 1985: 25). In fact, the 
sign (life-death) is invented ex novo. Concentration on a few details, 
the “mirror-play” with the previous associations, directing the sight to 
the mud, the emptiness of the space, all of these inevitably create an 
open connection to a new semiosis. We can carefully start to speak 
about dicent-symbolic legisign. (The whole process can be also 
represented by numbers of the signs: 1—>-2—>3—>7—*-9 .)
We need some examples to clarify the last claim. We know that 
ever since movies were screened they were accompanied by music. 
Why is this so? Music takes away tension, or builds suspense. Music 
gives hints about the next scene, or suppresses the development of the 
plot. On the other hand, why is an art exhibition only rarely ac­
companied by music? In some of their most frequently used clarifi­
cations musicologists would probably say that music is a condensed 
silence, a defrosted feeling or a drifting thought. We could further ask 
why film music as a rule is not intrusive? Why it is the exception 
rather than the rule that a person talks convincingly of music, without 
using practical examples?
By their mutual interaction both music and pictures borrow devices 
for increasing their effects from each other. Music and picture together 
carve deeper grooves in our past experience, both acting as seeking 
Selves. The purpose of such action is to awaken the “effete mind” (i.e. 
an explanatory text) as much as possible. When both drop onto the 
effete mind the process of drawing relations intensifies. The sound of 
music generates more iconicity from the memories where these 
combinations occur. The iconicity induces sharpness in the effete 
mind by shining brightness on any single representation. It is an effect 
comparable to an unexpected discovery of a bundle of old letters that 
brings to mind nostalgic memories. As time passes, the events from 
the letters, similar to the representations in mind, lose their freshness. 
What remains is the sentimental feeling that seizes us. (We confuse 
1 1
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these moments by saying that something is gone, when in fact, it has 
arrived. Now it is possible to store these feelings in a track of the 
effete mind, a sensation which serves as a relief from the de-actualized 
present that has until now accompanied us).
We have to keep in mind that we are talking about signs whose 
appearances are somewhere beside those evoked by the immediate 
reading of the text. The impact of the former is built up next to the 
images and pictures that emerged as a result of following the narrated 
signs. The signs we are discussing were silently layered in our mind, 
turning our emotional memory in a direction different than the one 
created by the events of the novel. Using the play of iconic effects, an 
author could make its reader feel inexplicable nostalgia while 
imagining, for example, a luxury ship heading somewhere deep in the 
night. Thus another paradox arises: the combination of music and 
pictures increases the effects of silence by which the implementation 
of signs is fulfilled. From the undefined mass of emotions to the 
sharpness of particular memories, the process continues until actual 
thoughts emerge. Such is the effect of loading the silence.
The turn of a kaleidoscope
The effect of unlimited semiosis and heteroglossia may be compared 
to playing with a kaleidoscope: with a turn of a tube, a very few 
elements create endless new figures. Or, in a more sophisticated view, 
to Tooking at a broken mirror: all pieces reflect the same object, but in 
a refracted way. And even if someone sums up all the pieces, they still 
show the object as a manifold of different images.
We can also describe the whole process from a reverse perspective, 
as a “visualization” (projection) of an idea into the realm of words 
(symbols), through the effect of the “broken-mirror-world” that occurs 
in the play of an “unfinished dialogical consciousness” . Bakhtin 
speaks of “an image of the idea” (Bakhtin 1984: 89); Peirce discovers 
its representation as a complex sign. Any time a picture of an idea 
arises in a consciousness, it interrupts the semiosis. But, on the other 
hand, this sharper image is refracted into many “broken pieces” and 
what we have before us is “just another sign”, requiring further inter­
pretation, which is essentially the technique of dialogue. The purpose 
is a “different-like” sign, established in semiosis, which slows down 
the interpretative process and guiding it to the effete mind. But instead
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of stopping it, it affects another interpretation chain in another 
meaning-spectrum.
Bakhtin believed in both the ingenuity of silence and its poten­
tiality for playing with sign-effects, as well as in the growth and 
inexhaustible creativity of dialogue. The last sentence of the essay 
“Discourse in the Novel” states:
For, we repeat, great novelistic images continue to grow and develop even 
after the moment of their creation; they are capable of being creatively trans­
formed in different eras, far distant from the day and hour of their original 
birth. (Bakhtin 1981: 422)
The two discussed ideas of C. S. Peirce and of M. M. Bakhtin both 
have strong potential of serving as analytical tools to explain many old 
phenomena. This has always fascinated artists: to create an image 
through the play of a broken mirror, a “live” product of consciousness. 
This image then would be centered, as by an illusion, somewhere 
before the mirror-pieces, outside of the mind. For a very brief moment 
it would represent the thought, the sign, or the searching Self
What characterizes Bakhtin’s efforts in his theory of heteroglossia 
is the constant attempt to explicate “inner speech” at any level of 
human communication, from the single word to philosophical dis­
course. One of his many definitions of heteroglossia states: “Another’s 
speech in another’s language, serving to express authorial intentions 
but in a refracted way” (Bakhtin 1981: 324).
Such speech constitutes a special type of double-voiced discourse. 
The special emphasis on dialogue always emerges when Bakhtin 
proclaims that language is the basis of all human communication and 
that language is always dialogic in its nature. Formulated repeatedly 
in an unequivocal manner, that view relates very closely to essentially 
similar thoughts of Peirce’s, for example, the frequent postulate that 
“All thinking is dialogic in form” (CP 6.338).
But that which links the philosophic efforts of the two thinkers is 
the demonstration of how the sign constantly escapes from its “final” 
meaning, striving for an “openness” and “unfinished-ness” , by which 
alone reality can be approached. The common perspective of both 
theories is to see the sign in one more meaning-dimension through an 
unlimited dialogue and a hetero-interpretation.
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Безграничный семиозис и многоголосие 
(Ч. С. Пирс и М. М. Бахтин)
В данной статье вводятся параллели между литературной теорией М. Бах­
тина и некоторыми философскими понятиями Пирса. Сопоставления с 
Бахтиным основываются на его теории многоголосия и выявляют тот 
факт, что аналогичные идеи имплицитно содержались уже у Дос­
тоевского. Выработка понятий диалога, “себя” и “другого” продол­
жается у Бахтина в идеях о сознании, иконических явлениях в литера­
туре, о семиотическом аспекте мышления. Из теории Пирса для нас осо­
бенно значима та часть, которая касается безграничного роста интерпре­
тации и знакопорождения —  безграничный семиозис. Понятие безгра­
ничного семиозиса одно из наиболее разработанных у Пирса и широко 
используется в настоящее время. Тем не менее это понятие не так часто 
применяется в качестве аналитического инструментария при изучении 
литературы и других произведений искусства. В нашей статье понятие 
безграничного семиозиса применяется вместе с учением М.Бахтина о 
многоголосии.
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Piiritu semioosis ja heteroglossia 
(C. S. Peirce ja M. M. Bahtin)
Artiklis tõmmatakse paralleele M. Bahtini kirjandusteooria ja mõnede 
Peirce’i filosoofiliste mõistete vahel. Võrdlus Bahtiniga toetub tema 
heteroglossia-teooriale ja toob välja ka fakti, et samased ideed sisaldusid 
implitsiitselt juba Dostojevski teostes. Mõistete dialoog, “mina” ja “teine” 
üksikasjalik väljatöötamine Bahtinil jätkub ideedes teadvusest, ikoonilistest 
efektidest kirjanduses, mõtlemise semiootilisest aspektist. Peirce’i teooriast 
on siin eriti oluline see osa, mis puudutab tõlgenduse ja märgiloome lõputut 
kasvu ehk piiritut semioosist. Peirce’i piiritu semioosise mõiste näol on meil 
tegu tema ühe olulisima märgiga seotud ideega, mis on leidnud laialdast 
kasutamist. Siiski ei kasutata seda kuigi sageli analüütilise tööriistana 
kirjandus- või kunstiteoste uurimisel. Käesolevas artiklis rakendatakse piiritu 
semioosise mõistet koos M. Bahtini heteroglossia doktriiniga.
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Projections: 
Semiotics of culture in Brazil
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Abstract Projection  is a dialogical mechanism that concerns the relation­
ship among things in the world or in various systems, both in nature and 
culture. Instead of isolating these systems, projection creates an ecosys­
tem without borderline. Projection is a way to comprehend how different 
cultures can link, enrich and develop one another by understanding the re­
lationship among different sign systems. From this central point of semi­
otics of culture, different cultural traditions can be related to one another 
by considering the nature of their sign systems. That is why it is that the 
object of semiotics of culture is not culture but its sign systems. That is 
why we understand the nature of relationship among sign systems as pro­
jection. In this article, we are interested in a particular kind of projection: 
that one in which the formulations of semiotics of culture of Slavic tradi­
tion project themselves onto the Brazilian culture. The conceptual field of 
Russian semiotics —  dialogism, carnivalization, hybridity, border, outsi- 
deness, heteroglossia, textuality and modelling semiotic sign systems —  
projects itself on the equally defining aspects of the semiotic identity of 
the Brazilian culture. I will refer here to two sets of projections: the con­
cept of textual history, as a possibility to reach internal displacement 
within the culture, and the notion of semiodiversity produced by the meet­
ing of different sign systems.
If it is true that semiotics of culture was born as an applied theory, the 
importance played by the cultures with long semiotics tradition in the 
consolidation of that approach cannot be less true. We know that, in 
the so-called semiotic cultures, the intensity of the expansion process 
of sign systems is related to their capacity to answer internally to the 
manifestations and impulses that come from the outside. The applied 
character, seen from this vantage point, can be understood thanks to
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the establishment of relations aiming at answering a cohesive set of 
questions: how do cultures link? how do they enrich each other? how 
do they expand?
If this type of relation is a characteristic of the cultures, the semiot­
ics of culture must systematize, theoretically, the approach the applied 
character of which stems from the interconnections of the lines of 
power located between systems. This is a systemic semiotics aspect.
What was mentioned above is far from being the preamble to a 
conceptual approach. In fact, it is just about a guideline that guaran­
tees the notion that the applied character of semiotics of culture is jus­
tified not only by the dynamism of the sign systems that constitute the 
cultures, but also by the largest process of semiotic reception. Such 
evidence appeared due to the need to understand the property of ele­
mentary conceptions of semiotics that, developed in the context of the 
Slavic tradition, elaborated theoretical instruments for the studies of 
cultures or, more specifically, of the internal responses that emerge 
when cultures meet. Although the proposed theoretical set has ap­
peared as an applied theory, it presents itself as basically operating 
with the same projection mechanism. Relations of convergence, dia­
logues, mutual elucidation are some of the manifestations through 
which it is possible to appreciate the interventionist movement of a 
culture in relation to another. The projection refers to the interrogative 
look that only the culture which is outside can address one to the 
other.
I owe Boris Schnaiderman the understanding of the so essential 
proximity in the exercise of the approach of semiotics of culture as it 
was formulated by Russian scholars long before the semiotic theory 
itself conquered its space as a specific field of knowledge or as a sci­
ence. In this way, I understand projection in the meaning given by 
Schnaiderman: projection is a term that denominates the movement of 
confluences among phenomena of a world “in which everything is 
projected against everything, where there are no exact limits between 
anything, the realm of the deliquescent and the unfinished, of the flu­
idity and the never ending” (Schnaiderman 1978: 7). In this way, the 
projection of elements of a culture on another one realigns limits and 
borders.
Despite the generic character of this formulation, I am interested 
here in a particular kind of projection: the one in which projected 
theoretical assumptions about cultures the semiotic character of which 
is impossible to deny, unchain an equally specific type of theoretical
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reply. This is the assumption that led me to examine the projection 
formulations of semiotics of culture concerning their Slavic origin in 
the Brazilian culture context. My hypothesis is that, since Brazilian 
culture develops semiotic systems founded in a dialogue with different 
cultural traditions, it seems to be presented not only as a potentially 
rich field of intercultural manifestations, but also as an important in­
terlocutor for theoretical reception. Therefore, Brazilian culture serves 
as a field for applying semiotic theses that were born in the Slavic cul­
tural context, and not only in the approach of the European semiology 
and socio-semiotics as is usually publicized. Once weighed out the 
linguistic, socio-historical, as well as spatial and temporal differences, 
there are many aspects that approximate Russian culture to that of 
Brazil. It is, however, an exclusively semiotic proximity. In no hy­
pothesis is it possible to assume that the mysteries of the Slavic soul, 
established in ancient times, can be similar to the exoticism of a 
young, distant and convulsive culture. What lies in the core of this 
hypothesis is the evidence of a fact: the defining conceptual basis of 
Russian semiotics — dialogism, carnivalization, hybridity, border, 
outsideness, heteroglossia, textuality and modelling sign systems — 
projects itself on the equally defining aspects of the semiotics of our 
cultural identity, creating an intense dialogue. Such formulations de­
fine the analytical instruments of the semiotic systems of Brazilian 
culture that become, thus, a field for experimenting with semiotic 
ideas that appeared in another place on the planet. Russia and Brazil 
become close. However, this is good to clarify: it is not about delimit­
ing the confluences across cultural manifestations, but on examining 
the theoretical striking among cultural practices the dialogue of which 
happens in the sphere of semiotic ideas. In order to carry out this task, 
I will refer here to two sets of projections only: the concept of textual 
history, as a possibility to reach internal movements within the cul­
ture; and the process of semiodiversity that calls attention to the semi­
otic character of the overlap among cultural species. In this way, I 
hope to clarify how the key-concepts of Russian semiotics were re­
ceived in the context of my culture.
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Textual history and 
the foundations of the semiotics 
of culture approach
There is no doubt that the projections of the tradition of the Slavic 
thought in Brazil were installed here thanks to the dialogue between 
some of our eminent intellectuals with Russian scholars who occupied 
the scene of thinking in the 20th century, Those among these theoreti­
cians, who deserve special prominence are Roman Jakobson, Mikhail 
Bakhtin, Juri Lotman, Vyacheslav Ivanov. Jakobson is a special case 
among them. Besides the long and intense conversation with the trans­
lator and essayist Boris Schnaiderman, the poet and critic Haroldo de 
Campos, the poets Augusto de Campos and Decio Pignatari, Jakobson 
guaranteed the spreading of his teachings when he had Joaquim Mat- 
toso Camera, one of the greatest linguists in our country, as a disciple. 
Mattoso Camera, as well as Claude Levi-Strauss, were Jakobson’s 
pupils when he conducted a course about the relations between sound 
and meaning in the United States. Later on, Mattoso could analyze 
with great success the invariant aspects of Portuguese language in 
Brazil on the basis of Jakobson’s concept of relation and invariation 
principle. A projection like this is an example of the relation that 
should be looked at with great interest. Jakobson’s accurate formula­
tions became mandatory in the field of semiotic and linguistic studies. 
According to Boris Schnaiderman,
Jakobson’s work is now inseparable from our culture, a lot o f what has 
been done and thought in these years has to do with the existence of this 
jovial and irreverent scholar, o f this scientist and artist, ‘the poet of lin­
guistics’, as Haroldo de Campos defined him. (Schnaiderman 1993: 3-4)
This confirms the hypothesis that Jakobson was the great landmark of 
basic concepts of semiotics of culture inside and outside Russia.
Jakobson’s contacts with his Brazilian interpreters consolidated 
due to the convergence of ideas and worries, like, for instance, his 
intense correspondence with the poet and professor Haroldo de Cam­
pos. Even before he became one of the most important translators of 
Russian poetry (with Boris Schnaiderman and Augusto de Campos), 
Haroldo de Campos was a scholar who shared many ideas with Jakob­
son, promoting a mutual enrichment for what they searched. Among 
these ideas, it is worthwhile highlighting the projection that the studies 
on synchrony had in the formation of the study of semiotics of culture
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in Brazil. I refer to the research on textual history that Haroldo de 
Campos carried out throughout his work, in an intense unfolding of 
the relation between synchrony-diachrony.
The study in which the Brazilian scholar demands the necessity of 
a textual history for the study of Brazilian literary culture dates from 
1975. In a slightly provocative tone, he affirms: “in what concerns 
literature, from time to time, it is always good to throw the diachrony 
into a state of confusion” (Campos, 1976: 10). If, on the one hand, the 
objective of textual history would be to cause panic in literary history, 
on the other hand, it would try to bring to the core of the study of lit­
erature the following defining criterion of the approach of semiotics of 
culture in modem world: the concept of text. In view of the concept of 
text, Campos noticed the possibility of seeing the literary culture in 
the dialogic movement of its texts, thanks to which all culture sys­
tems, as well as all cultures, correlate. When the text is the semiotic 
criterion, assures Campos, it is possible to reach those correlatives that 
are beyond the base culture. The textual history establishes itself, thus, 
as a “translatory” operation and, by translation, Campos understands 
“transcreation and transculturation, since not only the text but the cul­
tural series (Lotman’s ‘extra-text’) transtextualize themselves in the 
imbricate subtaneous ways of times and different literary spaces” 
(Campos 1976: 10).
Taken in a wider context, the concept of text given by the histori­
cal view is presented as an important clue to a systemic approach to 
culture that can be seen in the translation either among codes or 
among completely opposite systems, like those of messages produced 
by mass media and the new digital media. According to this, textual 
history can be taken as a strategy. As I have already stated, textual 
history deals with an approach to the historical question in literature 
that is not considered in manuals in which the dominant remark is the 
preservation of a canon and the cycles of the representation that they 
conjugate. On the contrary, the textual history allows for carrying out 
trans-temporal and outsideness approaches aiming at valuing the im­
plicit cultural dialogue in the texts. It is a circuit that sets text and his­
tory in movement, in an interactive dynamic, and enables the hearing 
of the dialogue that tradition establishes with the present. Nothing is 
considered in isolation, neither works, nor authors, nor periods. Every­
thing is focused on the tense process of its dialogic relations 
(Machado 1999: 31).
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Since I put in the horizon of my approach the necessity to look for 
projections of Russian formulations in the Brazilian context, I cannot 
fail to register that three great conceptual arteries exist, of Slavic roots, 
in the development of the theoretical foundations of textual history. 
Besides Jakobson’s synchronic cut, it is not possible to ignore Bak­
htin’s concept of great-time dialogic and Lotman’s notions of semio­
sphere and of text as informational content.
In 1969, Haroldo de Campos defined the synchronic poetics idea 
as an “aesthetic-creative criterion” for the approach of the literary 
phenomenon. It is about a critique subsidized by the formalists’ inter­
ventions, especially about what Jakobson wrote in his essay “Linguis­
tic and Poetics” when he postulated the notion of dialogics of cultural 
times and the reading of traditions in the light of contemporary para­
digms. For Campos,
the application of this criterion in a literature like the Brazilian one (of 
which real history is, strictly speaking, still going to be made) soon pro­
duces unobstructive and profanation effect” (...). Thus, the textual history 
“that takes the text, characterized by its “informative content” (its inven­
tive components), as the kernel, and privileges a synchronic envisage,” 
gets distant from the literary history “predominantly diachronic-cumula- 
tive, that considers literature in its conventional sense. (Campos 1976: 15)
In view of this envisage, it is possible to get another dimension of the 
semiotic character of literary culture in Brazil, in its foundational as­
pects: the carnivalization of the language, the thematic of profanation 
(in fact, the Brazilian term for profanation is desacralization), the 
iconic prose intersemiosis, among others. Thus, “between the ‘present 
time of creation’ and the ‘present time of culture’ there is a dialectic 
correlation: if the first is fed by the second, the second is re­
dimensioned by the first” (Campos 1976: 22).
If, on the one hand, the idea of textual history expresses the semi­
otic intervention in literary culture, on the other hand, the notion of 
text leads its search by the cultural dialogics that Campos exercises in 
innumerable translations of consecrated masterpieces into the Portu­
guese language. From the Homeric epos to the Biblical text; from 
modem Russian poetry to Chinese ideogram; from Dante’s Hell to the 
Goethe’s Faust; from medieval troubadours to hai-kais. The newness 
of these works is not the translation of the work within the limits of 
the code, but the recoding (the code switching or transmutation) that 
ultimately leads to the linguistic-semiotic reconstitution in the great 
time of cultures. In this bias, the rescue of the chronotopic dimension
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of culture is assured. Campos called “transcreation” the operation of 
transferring a linguistic sign system from a culture to another sign sys­
tem of a different culture. It is not only a simple translation. In the best 
tradition of Jakobson’s teachings, the poetical translation can only be 
considered inter-semiosis: it is necessary to consider two systems of 
different signs. This practice, denominated by Campos as text transla­
t o r  operation, dialogues theoretically with the concept of modelling 
of the Tartu-Moscow’s group, a conceptual key of which unfoldings 
in the tradition of semiotic studies have made its contribution to the 
vertiginous process of codes and language expansion in the culture. 
The translation fulfils a modelling textual function when it transfers 
the poetical structurality of a language to a completely different one. 
Think about, for instance, the Japanese, Russian, Italian, French, 
German, the Hebrew modelled in Portuguese. Evidently, translation 
carried out in this way creates new information. What is said here in 
relation to the verbal code is applied, of course, to other codifications 
outside that universe.
The concept of text as inventive informational content is a direct 
projection of the formulations discussed in the summer seminars of 
Tartu-Moscow’s school that Campos got in contact with just after his 
first essays were published in the Occident.
“The new Russian semiology of the Tartu group suggests a similar 
problem today”, said Campos in 1976. J. Lotman and A. M. Piati- 
gorski (‘Text and Function’, Tartu conference, May 1968) examine 
culture as a set of texts. They distinguish between ‘global linguistic 
message’ (significant in the sense of everyday communication) and 
‘textual message’ or ‘text’. They formulate the following axiom: ‘It is 
exactly the zero degree of global linguistic message that discloses the 
high degree of its semioticity as a text’. Or else: ‘To be noticed as a 
text, the message must be little or not at all understandable, and sus­
ceptible to an ulterior translation or interpretation [...] the art, where 
the plurality of senses is erected in principle, produces theoretically 
nothing but texts’. In accordance with this, the two authors study the 
text processes of becoming sacred ritualized (or sacralization and ritu- 
alization of texts as we say in Portuguese), as secondary modelling 
systems.
This is the theoretical-semiotic support from which Campos bases his 
translatory operation of Hölderlin’s text as a phenomenon of de- 
communication. This way, the theoretician shows his “translatory” prac­
tice as a pattern of the modellizing systems, revealing a subtle understand-
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ing of the Theses of semiotics of Tartu published in 1964. (Campos 1976: 
90-91)
With the conception of culture as a text formed by the gathering of 
modelling systems, the study of textual history opens another direc­
tion, embracing the intercultural dialogue, in which modelling results 
from the interventions across cultures. This is another projection of 
semiotics of culture that happens directly in the sphere of studies on 
multiculturalism. Instead of simply looking for the genesis of the hy­
phenated conjugations in culture, semiotics presents the basis of the 
interculturality, systemizing, theoretically, increasingly essential in­
struments for the understanding of culture as a set of diversified, dia­
logic semiotic systems in expansion. From the semiotic point of view, 
there are two basic unfoldings of this pattern: carnivalization and 
semiodiversity. If we owe the anthropologist Roberto da Matta the 
discovery of camivality as a founding feature of the contrasting social 
relations in our culture, we owe another anthropologist, Antonio Rise- 
rio, the perception that the proliferation of contrasts indicates the di­
versity that supports the semiotic character of our culture. Thanks to 
Riserio, the conceptual field of semiotics of culture can be read ac­
cording to the translatory process that interweaves cultures.
Semiotics of culture as a defence program 
of semiodiversity
The projection of the tradition of the Slavic thought in the field of in­
ter and multicultural studies cannot be seen straightforwardly. For 
this, I propose a route of ideas that is a little longer and, therefore, less 
exact. I could not speak in another way about a projection that has 
hardly been set into action.
One of the indisputable assumptions of the concept of culture is the 
one that refers to the symbolic production that serves as a living envi­
ronment for man’s exercise, exploitation and expansion of the most 
different relational processes, specially regarding behaviour control. In 
this concept, the idea that culture is woven by a string of codes which 
strengthens the premise that every culture is potentially semiotic, is 
assumed. Anthropologists like Clifford Geertz do not raise any doubts 
about this premise. On the contrary, they agree that culture and its 
signs are the most complex forms of relationships since diverse forms 
of meetings, crossings and interpretations permanently operate in the
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culture. On the basis of these relationships, the cultural identity is built 
and it can be thus understood due to its inclusive character rather than 
an exclusion, as it is usually stated. The specificity of the culture 
would be tne result of contacts, combinations, projections. Following 
this thought, every approach to culture could not do without a deep 
understanding of its signs and codes.
In fact, there is a long way between acknowledging the semiotic 
nature of culture and the available instruments to reach this under­
standing. What could be considered a legitimate and unquestioned 
premise becomes a source of mistakes. What could be obvious is a 
phenomenon waiting for understanding.
The conflicting aspect of this thought is the understanding of what 
a semiotic culture is. Considering the anthropo-sociological concep­
tions, we would say that cultures recognized as result of hyphenated 
conjugations (Shohat, Stam 1994) are hidden under such denomina­
tion, therefore that gives them a hybrid identity. Yet, in this concep­
tion there is no place for the definition that we intend to reach: in this 
concept there is no space to set the dynamism of the culture, or better, 
the actual movement of crossings, transformation, semiosis. For the 
understanding of the semiotic character of a culture it is not enough to 
point out its genesis. It is necessary above all not to lose sight of its 
movement because semiosis is bom in it. The semiotics approach, in 
this case, shows another way: instead of a weapon, the semiotics un­
derstanding of the cultural identity is a form of knowledge and, like 
that, the biggest source of cultural life and all the environment that 
supports it. It is about defending the diversity without taking the risk 
of falling into the incoherence of those who profess the diversity of 
the biological species on behalf of ecology, with the same grip they 
talk about identity as the elimination of one of the terms of hyphen- 
ated-composition, due to the undeniably violent power of political 
circumstances.
Perhaps such precariousness of the anthropologic approach has 
pushed the Brazilian anthropologist Antonio Riserio to field of Rus­
sian formulations, where the borderline concept was created as a se­
miotic space of confluences across different cultural systems. For 
Lotman, boundary is not the dividing edge, but the translatory filter 
inside space which was very properly called semiosphere. Although 
the semiospheric space has an abstract character, the mechanism that 
defines it — the translatory filter of the border — is endowed with 
concreteness. This is so because the notion of circle, as delimiting
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what belongs and what does not belong to a specific set, has nothing 
abstract. The elements of boundary are both inside and outside. How­
ever, it is necessary to be cautious not to confuse the semiotization 
process with a mixture where everything is annulled: time, space, par­
ticularities. In this particular sense, the semiotization process is far 
from syncretism.
How do two cultures meet dialogically, preserving their specifici­
ties and not allowing obstacles to its expansion? This is a question that 
was part of the theoretical inquiries of the Russians Lotman and Bak­
htin, as well as those of the Brazilian Riserio.
The necessity to value the boundary as semiotic space is not a 
theoretical tenet, but an alternative proposal to understand explosive 
moments of the culture without the feature of historical determinism. 
If it is true that culture is cumulative, it is necessary to foresee mo­
ments of bigger concentrations that, even though unpredictable, are 
not ruled by chance. This is the reality Lotman speaks about when he 
tries to examine the semiosphere of the contemporary world of which 
semiodiversity cannot be denied.
Although the concept of semiosphere stems from Lotman’s 
thought, “In defense of Semiodiversity” (1995), it is also found in the 
text-manifesto by the anthropologist and Brazilian poet Antonio 
Riserio, which highlights its great contribution to understand semiot­
ics of culture in Brazil. Presented as an intervention during a debate 
with Tzvetan Todorov about the intercultural dialogue in the context 
of the many international multiculturalisms of the last decades, it 
turned out to be a vigorously uttered speech to undo certainties, devi­
ate thought paths, shake positions, especially those that appear as great 
truths about homogenization foreseen by global order to dominate 
many places in the world. Its greatest virtue was to bring light to the 
heart of conflictuous debate by introducing a theoretical analysis in­
strument.
Committed to the complexity of the planetarization phenomenon of 
culture, not only as a direct result of the sophisticated performances 
linked to communication technologies, but also as a consequence of 
the westernization of the planet, this text has the power to add another 
route to the ecological discourse.
While theoreticians from different fields, mobilized by the emer­
gent ethnic conflicts in distant points of the world, defend a harmonic 
multiculturalism. Riserio chose the defence of diversity, understood in 
the wider sense of the anthropologic construction, and it does not
seem possible to discern the basis of the ethical condition without it. 
Thus, far beyond the rows that thicken the field of multiculturalism, 
Riserio reaches an apparently unexplored region. In it, he situates the 
discourse in defence of semiodiversity.
Semiodiversity is a concept to denominate the sphere of life that 
refers, particularly, to the realm of signs. Although it has been created 
in the context of biodiversity, it assigns a wider territory, which is al­
most unknown. Contrary to biodiversity, it is not a ‘trendy’ term, even 
though embedding a much wider scope. The most different kinds of 
message creating information produced by different languages, signs 
and cultural codes can be found in the domain of semiodiversity. In 
the light of this concept, it is possible to clarify, equally, the anthropo­
logic messages and those of genetic character. Finally, semiodiversity 
aims at accounting for the radicality that concerns the variety of signs. 
If biodiversity is the name of the biotic variations originated from the 
genes in the ecosystem, and, if by genes, we understand information, 
biodiversity is a rich subgroup that integrates semiodiversity. I think 
this is the hypothesis which enriches the research in the field of semi­
otics of culture.
Despite the many doubts, there is a certainty: defending the diver­
sity of the species as a common flag for the preservation of the bio­
sphere can be a useless task if there is not a similar effort to preserve 
the semiosphere. After all, life is the manifestation of the bio that, in 
its turn, is fed by information conveyed as semion. Nature and culture 
are so umbilically impregnated of each other that only such intercon­
nection can define “how much human we would like to remain” (Rise­
rio 1999) especially from the ethical point of view. This is the key 
argument in defence of semiodiversity.
If life is the interrelationship of networks, there is no reason to de­
fend a sphere (bio) in detriment of others (noosphere, sociosphere, 
semiosphere). Once again I quote Riserio’s words:
Amid the immense list of problems and planetary unbalance, with the 
whip of poverty burning the world body, I am going to permit myself the 
luxury to highlight three important questions here. Preserving a human 
being is one of them. Preserving the biosphere is another. But beyond 
biodiversity, we must also preserve semiodiversity. [...] Let us say the ob­
vious, freedom and ethics don’t exist outside the realm of signs. Every 
ethics brings, in its basis, an anthropologic construction. And it is exactly 
the semiodiversity, the neobabelic existence that makes the amplitude of 
the arc of questions and possible responses a basic thing at this moment of 
human adventure on Earth. (Riserio, 1999: 108)
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Although it seems to be an isolated claim, in fact, Riserio’s argument 
defends disturbing causes. He confirms the existence of another basic 
sphere in relation to the biosphere and the sociosphere. This is a very 
recent discovery. The Lotmanian notion of semiosphere dates from the 
beginning of the 1980s, as the place of thinking structures in the uni­
verse. If, on the one hand the defence of semiodiversity implies the 
defence of culture as an organism formed by different interactive sys­
tems, on the other hand it propagates the notion of semiosphere as an 
emergency of a new sphere of communication. This way, it constitutes 
another argument in defence of semiodiversity: the necessity of having 
a wider domain on the planetary expansion of the communication lan­
guages.
Since technology has become the basic perspective through which 
it is possible to produce any discourse about the world, we quit living 
in a natural environment to live in a technological environment that 
acquires, thus, the character of an autonomous phenomenon (Simmons 
1993: 6). Not only does the place of the human being in the planet 
seem definitely impossible to be established, also the severity of the 
polarity between nature and culture loosens and shelters the coexis­
tence of different spheres of life. If the existence of such a great diver­
sity of species on Earth remains a disturbing mystery, it is not possible 
to keep on attributing to biodiversity the sole guarantee of the good 
operation of the ecosystem. The discovery of a totally diversified 
world does not only lead to the necessity of knowing which forces and 
processes take to evolution and persistence of many species but, espe­
cially, the coexistence mechanism without which no kind of diversity 
would be possible.
The projection of the concept of semiosphere onto the semiodiver­
sity of Brazilian culture is a process that has already started, and it 
announces what it has come for. In the first place, its questioning 
character is clearly seen when it comes to what we understand by mul- 
ticulturalism. For this phenomenon it is necessary to focus on a similar 
viewpoint of those who take things from the world according to the 
reverse perspective. This is what it means: the cultural contacts are the 
clearest manifestation of semiosis. Instead of finally opening up, they 
reproduce the same autoregulating dynamism of life. Multiculturalism 
is not the root of a culture, but the dynamic principle of relations. This 
way, it is useless to reproduce it from a centre. In fact, if you want to 
use the analogy with the reverse perspective, multiculturalism will 
always be a polycentric envisage. In this sense, it will be very difficult
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not to take it as a synonym of semiodiversity. Also, in this sense, the 
analysis of polycentric multiculturalism is a problem for the semiotic 
analysis.
The accuracy of this look, which the Brazilian culture is enhancing 
towards a better understanding of its own qualities, is the richest con­
tribution of the projection of the principles of semiotics of culture 
under a Slavic tradition. The biggest source of this richness is its un­
leashing possibility that definitely moves the perspective of stigmas 
and sociological spectrum away. The challenge, therefore, gains a dif­
ferent proportion. The defence of semiodiversity is a commitment to 
the dynamics of changes. In this sense, it compels us to understand the 
cultural identity as a modellizing process because such is the condition 
of all systems of culture. This is the theoretical impulse that leads us 
to look inside of the culture, a focus that I tried to locate in the prop­
erty of the Russian semiotic ideas in the Brazilian context since the 
beginning of this projection.
The article ends here, but the projection continues since many 
points still need to be discussed. In order to assert a principle of the 
best bakhtinian tradition, there is no point in making a hasty conclu­
sion when the object of our discussion is an unfinished dialogue.
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Проекции: семиотика культуры в Бразилии
Проекция —  это диалогический механизм взаимоотношения вещей в 
мире или в разных системах, как в природе, так и в культуре. Вместо 
того, чтобы их изолировать, проекция помещает их в ту же систему. В 
этом смысле проекция создает экосистему без границ. В контексте 
культуры проекция дает нам возможность понять через взаимоотно­
шения разных знаковых систем, как разные культуры могут связываться, 
обогащать и развивать друг друга. Это основная цель семиотики 
культуры. С этой точки зрения, изучение природы знаковых систем 
позволяет связать различные культурные традиции. Поэтому объектом 
семиотики культуры считается не культура, а знаковые системы. 
Вследствие этого мы понимаем природу отношений между знаковыми 
системами как проекцию.
Здесь нас интересует только один вид проекции: проекция понятий 
славянской традиции семиотики культуры на бразильскую культуру. В 
этом смысле концептуальное поле русской семиотики —  диалогизм, 
карнавализация, гибридность, граница, экстрапозиция, гетероглоссия, 
текстуальность и моделирующие знаковые системы —  проецируется на 
такие же определяющие аспекты семиотики бразильской культурной 
идентичности. Анализируя эту проекцию, я буду ссылаться только на 
два элемента проекции: на концепт текстуальной истории как возмож­
ность достичь внутреннего перемещения в культуре, и семиодиверситет, 
порождаемый встречей разных знаковых систем. Таким образом я 
надеюсь прояснить, как ключевые понятия русской семиотики были 
приняты в контексте моей культуры.
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Projektsioonid: kultuurisemiootika Brasiilias
Projektsioon see on asjadevaheliste suhete dialoogiline mehhanism maa­
ilmas või eri süsteemides nii looduses kui kultuuris. Selle asemel, et neid 
isoleerida, asetab projektsioon nad samasse süsteemi. Selles mõttes loob 
projektsioon piirideta ökosüsteemi. Kultuurikontekstis annab projektsioon 
meile võimaluse mõista läbi erinevate märgisüsteemide seoste kuidas erine­
vad kultuurid võivad seostuda, rikastada ja arendada üksteist. See on kultuuri­
semiootika põhieesmärk. Sellest seisukohast võimaldab märgisüsteemide ole­
muse uurimine siduda erinevaid kultuuritraditsioone. Kultuurisemiootika 
objektiks loetakse seepärast mitte kultuuri, vaid märgisüsteeme ja märgisüs­
teemide vahelisi seoseid mõistame me kui projektsiooni.
Siin huvitab meid ainult üks projektsiooni liik: slaavi kultuurisemiootika 
traditsiooni mõistete projektsioon brasiilia kultuurile. Selles mõttes projit­
seerub vene semiootika kontseptuaalne väli —  dialogism, kamevaliseerimine, 
hübriidsus, piir, ekstrapositsioon, heteroglossia, tekstuaalsus ja modelleerivad 
märgisüsteemid -samadele brasiilia kultuuriidentiteedi määravatele aspekti­
dele. Analüüsides seda projektsiooni, viitan ma vaid selle kahele elemendile: 
tekstuaalse ajaloo  kontsept kui võimalus saavutada sisemist ümberpaigu­
tumist kultuuris ja semiomitmekesisus, mis mis sünnib erinevate märgisüstee­
mide kohtumise tulemusena. Sel viisil loodan ma selgitada, mil moel on vene 
semiootika võtmemõisteid vastu võetud minu kultuuri kontekstis.
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Abstract. There can be little doubt that human consciousness is now suffused 
with narrative. In the West, narrative is the focus of a number of lucrative 
industries and narratives proliferate as never before. The importance of 
popular genres in current narrative is an index of the demise of authorship in 
the face of new media and has necessitated the renewal of the term “genre" in 
narrative analysis over the last hundred years or so. However, this article 
attempts to make clear that the concept of genre and the notion of a textual 
formula in narrative are not the same thing. Genre, in contrast to formula, is 
concerned precisely with the issue of how audiences receive narrative 
conventions; however, much genre theory has treated genre as a purely textual 
entity. The current article argues that genre should properly be considered as 
an “idea” or an “expectation” harboured by readers and identifies in textual- 
based genre theory of the last two thousand years the perpetuation of 
ahistoricality and canonisation.
As a term in the analysis of all kinds of narrative discourse — from 
stories in everyday speech to classical drama, from painting to adverti­
sements — “genre” seems to have been omnipresent. Every consumer 
of narratives has a rough idea of what “genre” means: a shorthand 
classification, determining whether a particular text is expected to 
conform to previous experiences of texts on the part of the consumer. 
The analysis of genre, however, has tended to treat the concept as an 
objective entity which can be demonstrated to exist in concrete terms. 
One reason for this has been the need for analysis to be focused on 
phenomena which can be shown to be anchored in a text. Yet there are 
also other reasons for the development of genre’s “objective” status 
which are embedded in the history of the use of the term in theory.
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This essay will consider the use of “genre” and suggest, based on 
an overview of its past fortunes, an agenda for genre’s deployment in 
a “readerly”, multimedia environment of narrative production.
Twentieth century genre theory
One of the most common observations made about genre theory is that 
it stayed in a largely steady state for two thousand years after Aris­
totle’s death before accelerating into flux during the twentieth century. 
Undoubtedly, “genre” in the two millennia before 1900 was a 
prescriptive device which provided the means for guiding the act of 
composition or the terms of reference for post hoc evaluation. Yet 
while genre theory in the twentieth century came to embody new 
imperatives, it did not totally abandon the prescriptive impulse.
A number of factors muddied the water in twentieth century genre 
theory. Firstly, narratives proliferated. Whereas Aristotle and his 
descendants could rely on the fairly limited set of narrative genres 
denoted by tragedy and comedy in drama, and epic in poetry, print 
technology in Europe facilitated the growth of the romance and the 
novel, the latter of which, especially, had already fragmented into a 
multi-generic entity by the end of the nineteenth century. In the same 
way that print allowed narrative to spread through multiple copies of 
printed books, the new media of the twentieth century effected the 
dissemination of an unprecedented amount of narratives of all sorts. 
Raymond Williams, writing about dramatic narrative in the 1970s, 
suggests that
in societies like Britain or the United States more drama is watched in a week 
or weekend, by the majority of viewers, than would have been watched in a 
year or in some cases a lifetime in any previous historical period. It is not 
uncommon for the majority of viewers to see, regularly, as much as two or 
three hours of drama, of various kinds, every day ... It is clearly one of the 
unique characteristics of advanced industrial societies that drama as an 
experience is an intrinsic part of everyday life. (Williams 1974: 59)
On radio, in film, in print, television and cyberspace, narrative genres 
flourished. Amidst the diversity of narrative over the last hundred 
years readers might have been in danger of floundering as a result of 
their inability to choose what narrative is appropriate for them and 
what offers the potential of enjoyment.
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This signals another way in which genre theory in the twentieth 
century began to operate in muddy waters. Although it is argued that 
genre is so intriguing because it has always been a concept “related 
both to very specialized technical issues and to very broad human 
ones” (Dubrow 1982: 2), interest in genre has been dramatically 
bifurcated in recent years. It would be difficult to dispute that 
theatregoers or the audience for oral storytellers have always been 
interested to know in advance what type of narrative would be 
performed for them. Concomitantly, throughout the age of literacy and 
print, writers and scholars have been only too happy to extol the 
virtues and enumerate the features of specific genres. Yet, in the 
twentieth century, the divergence of these ways of knowing about 
genre became greater as “genre” came to embody both a common 
sense usage in which moviegoers, novel readers, TV viewers and 
others saw it as a shorthand for textual classification, and a purely 
academic usage where theorists searched for textual organization and 
patterns of (often social) meaning.
Each of these positions in the bifurcation of genre theory have 
interesting determinants. The academic usage of the term is embedded 
in the historic development of an analytic mentality in the humanities 
which is consonant with modernity. This perspective, which, broadly 
speaking, favours a synchronic investigation of phenomena and a 
theoretical approach to knowledge over a diachronic and empirical 
approach, can be seen in the work of Propp and the Formalists in 
Russia; Ogden, Richards, Empson and Leavis in Britain; the New 
Criticism, Innis, McLuhan and Frye in North America; the structura­
lists in France; the Prague Linguistic Circle in Czechoslovakia; and 
the Copenhagen School in Denmark. The common sense usage of 
“genre” which developed alongside, but divorced from, twentieth 
century academic discourse, is determined in a much more nebulous 
way. On the one hand, its determinants are what Bakhtin calls 
“primary genres”, “certain types of oral dialogue — of the salon, of 
one’s own circle, and other types as well, such as familiar, family- 
everyday, sociopolitical, philosophical, and so on” (1986: 65); on the 
other, its determinants are more akin to “secondary genres”, Bakhtin’s 
“literary” or “commentarial” modes, or, more pointedly, the dis­
courses promulgated by the industries responsible for producing 
narrative genres.
For the humanities in the first two thirds of the twentieth century 
especially, these latter were problematic. The “mass culture” paradigm 
posited from opposite ends of the political spectrum (Adorno, Hork-
1Л
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heimer 1973; Leavis 1930) found the version of genre offered by the 
“culture industry” both a curse and a gift. It constituted a curse 
because, in most cases, academic classifications of texts, particularly 
popular texts, were compelled to feed off prior classifications made by 
audiences, the industry responsible for the production of a given text, 
and the set of discourses associated with the publicity attached to texts 
(including reviews, interviews, film posters, press releases, publishers’ 
notices, etc). Yet it was a gift because it sometimes seemed that 
analysis would reveal how debased the genres of mass culture were.
It is true that other possibilities existed deriving from attempts to 
transcend the stalemate illustrated in my caricature of mass culture 
theory. Film Noir, for example, is one classification of popular texts 
which originated in academic circles and was then disseminated 
through a more popular discourse. A number of American films from 
the 1940s were taken to constitute a set by post-war French critics. 
These critics had quite cogent reasons based on textual analysis of 
style for creating their taxonomy, despite the fact that the original 
audience for these films, not to mention the industry that created them, 
had not put this body of films into a generic category (Krutnik 1991: 
15). Most frequently, though, academic analysis persevered in its 
dichotomous separation of all genres. Todorov (1973: 13-14), for 
example, suggests that a certain number of genres already exist and 
have existed in the past; but, for him, the role of the academic is also 
to study the fundamental principles of these, in a similar way to that of 
Frye (1957) and classical poetics envisioning in the process the 
possible developments of genres. Thus the normative complexion of 
genre persisted in the century by means of a generative existence, as a 
set of conditions to assist in the production of a text but not as 
conditions which must be met to prevent the text falling outside the 
genre category.
Genre since the 1970s
Major strides in genre theory were made when Anglophone academia 
began to embrace film as a legitimate object of study. The genre 
analysis carried out by film theory was initially based on the variable 
rigour of film critics’ observations: the seminal essay on film genre, 
for example, is often taken to be that of Warshow on the gangster film 
(Warshow 1962). As film theory matured, however, genre analysis 
became more circumspect and a fair amount of work published in the
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early 1970s came to have an important influence on contemporary 
theories of genre. For example, a series of articles appeared in 1970 in 
the British journal Screen; these interventions, by Ryall, Buscombe 
and Tudor, along with Kitses’ Horizons West (1969), explored some 
of the key issues still current in genre theory today. These included 
whether the Western, for example, was constituted by visual elements, 
or by stock situations, or by plot determinants; whether the industry 
repeated formulas by audience fiat, and whether “auteurs” were 
responsible for the construction of meaning in genre films. In a sense, 
these articles took up Todorov’s imperative of theoretically exploring 
genre, paying close attention to how genre texts function.
By laying out the issue of theoretical genres so baldly, these essays 
acted as the cue for other genre theorists who took up similar ques­
tions of genre in other areas beyond film. Thus, attempts were made to 
map out the structure of, for example, thrillers (Palmer 1978), 
Westerns (Wright 1975) and adventure, mystery and melodrama texts 
(Cawelti 1976). The attention to textual detail and the resolutely 
synchronic bearing of such genre studies indicates that they are, at 
least implicitly, indebted to Propp (1968) as well as to Todorov. The 
English translation of Propp’s Morphology o f the Folktale had been 
available since 1958 and appeared in book form ten years later. What 
Propp lent the genre theorists, in short, was the idea that some texts 
have a structure that can be repeated time and again with different 
contents while generally carrying the same meaning. Put another way, 
genre could be considered an empty vessel, a container into which 
different contents might be poured. As such, genre was assumed to be 
objectively “there”, a specimen with its own immanent and observable 
structures. Furthermore, the problem of change regarding the 
“content” of generic texts seemed to be resolved: that which was 
objectively “there” carried some meaning that ultimately shaped the 
“content” no matter what that “content” might be.
Palmer’s book on thrillers is probably the clearest example of this 
belief that the mutability of genres had been resolved. Paramount in 
his analysis is that genre, in its very organizing principles, carries 
meaning; and, as with Wright and others, it is argued that that 
meaning is constant, unchanged by the realm of the extra-textual and 
unmoved by a text’s content. Furthermore, there is excellent reason 
for such a contention. For Palmer, the genesis of the thriller, the key 
moment that provides the structure of this particular genre, becomes 
enshrined in its very principles. In an acute and persuasive analysis. 
Palmer shows that a set of economic and ideological conditions
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occurring at the moment that the thriller genre crystallized, in the 
early- to mid-nineteenth century West, resulted in the inscription of 
capitalist social relations into the genre itself. The fear of crime, the 
cementing of views about property and theft, coupled with the forging 
of a liberal hegemony of laissez-faire individualism and entrepre­
neurial industry all find their generic embodiment in the thriller’s 
hero, his flexible competitive individualism and the threat to the social 
order from the often “bureaucratic” villain. As such, the genre is 
constant in its complexion. Indeed, Palmer even refers to the 
possibility of thrillers with a Trotskyite hero and a multi-national 
corporation as a villain which, for all their radical rhetoric will remain 
replays of capitalist social relations simply by virtue of being thrillers 
(Palmer 1978: 67).
In such a formula, “generic innovation” becomes an oxymoron. 
The question of the transience of genres, why some genres die out or 
why certain genres experience revivals remains unanswered (cf. 
Bennett 1990: 78). This theoretical lacuna constitutes a relatively 
minor concern, however, in the face of certain dire consequences 
which can result when such a politically one-sided understanding of 
genres is espoused. In an essay which continues to be cited and 
anthologised, Judith Hess Wright offers her own strident interpretation 
of the “effects” of genre films: “Viewers are encouraged to cease 
examining themselves and their surroundings, and to take refuge in 
fantasy from their only real alternative — to rise up against the 
injustices perpetrated by the present system upon its members” (Hess 
Wright 1986: 49; anthologised Grant 1995, cited by Neale 2001: 2). 
The paucity of circumspection in Hess Wright’s tone might easily be 
attributed to the fact that her comments constitute part of an essay 
which appeared in 1978. However, the passage of twenty years has not 
been long enough to bury identical sentiments in different quarters: 
that generic texts have a very limited range of meanings, that the 
reader can discern only these, that they are meanings which paper over 
“reality” and, as a consequence, readers (apart from intrepid genre 
theorists, that is) either believe the unchanging version of the world 
that generic texts chum out or are distracted from a “proper” 
perspective on “reality”. Here is George Lipsitz, writing in 1998:
Generic conventions encourage the repetition, reconfiguration and renewal of
familiar forms in order to cultivate audience investment and engagement.
Created mostly for the convenience of marketers anxious to predict exact sales
figures by selling familiar products to identifiable audiences, genres also have
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ideological eflects. Their conventions contribute to an ahistorical view of the 
world as always the same; the pleasures of predictability encourage an 
investment in the status quo. (Lipsitz 1998: 209)
In each case, the simplistic prescriptions made in the service of de­
nouncing generic texts are based on a “monologic” version of genre.
Dialogism and genre
Although these last examples are extreme versions of the con­
sequences of one perspective on generic texts, they are nevertheless 
instructive in the way that they highlight the need to think through the 
dialogical nature of genre at all stages. Those narrative genres which 
do not die out are not necessarily “fooling the public” every time, nor 
are they necessarily stale replays of old formulas. Indeed, as Bakhtin 
(1986: 87) asserts, “speech genres submit fairly easily to re­
accentuation, the sad can be made jocular and gay, but as a result 
something new is achieved (for example, the genre of comical 
epitaphs)”. Re-accentuated genres partake of changed circumstances 
experienced by the participants in utterances. In a comment which can 
be found to apply broadly to all narrative genres, Jauss (1982: 79) 
asserts that “the literary work is conditioned by “alterity”, that is, in 
relation to another, an understanding consciousness”. For genre, this 
reader-orientated perspective is of immense importance.
The work of the Constanz School has made literary theory aware 
of the way that a given organization of textual elements does not 
necessarily have sovereignty over a reader’s interaction with it. 
Instead, the reader is at various degrees of liberty to make of texts 
what s/he will, and this includes making texts anew. In fact, following 
the work of Jauss, Iser and others, academic work on the complexity 
of the reading process and audience/text relations has flourished in the 
study of TV, film, written fiction and so on (for example Morley 
1980, 1986, 1992; Ang 1984, 1991, 1996; Radway 1984; Seiter et al. 
1989; Gray 1992; Liebes, Katz 1993; Lull 1990; Gillespie 1995; 
Hermes 1996; Nightingale 1996). In general, such work has argued 
that in order for a text to have any interaction with the reader, con­
siderable creative activity — rather than passivity — on the part of the 
latter is required. Even where there is an “implied reader”, a preferred 
way of reading a text constructed by intentional inscriptions on the 
part of the enunciator, the real reader can choose to read differently
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and this “different” reading or construction of meaning will derive 
from determinants outside texts, including aspects of people’s lives 
(Hermes 2002).
The fact that work on the reading process has been most as­
siduously pursued in relation to often highly formulaic media texts 
such as television soap operas or magazines is also crucial for genre 
theory. Literary-based work on readership has often betrayed its own 
impetus to valorize literature. Iser’s (1974) notion of the “implied 
reader”, for example, is clearly part of a project to delineate “proper” 
practices of reading as opposed to “aberrant decodings”. The same can 
be said of Eco’s (1989) writing on the “open” work or, perhaps to a 
lesser extent, Barthes’ (1978) distinctions in “From work to text”. In 
such cases it is assumed that literary works are, by definition, open to 
interpretation because they invite a disciplined and skilful reading. 
Implicitly, generic texts will not be open to interpretation because they 
invite a form of reading which is, to use Rick Altman’s (1987: 4) 
phrase, “short-circuited”. Yet, there is an important distinction here. 
As soon as the terms of the analysis are shifted to the dialogical 
relationship of readers and texts, it is difficult to maintain that the seat 
of genre is purely a textual issue, no matter how much one wishes to 
distinguish between “literary” and “generic” narratives.
Clearly, all texts carry a multiplicity of meaning or polysemy. A 
genre text is no different in this respect. It is therefore the potentially 
wide range of interpretations invited by a genre text o f the reader that 
is short-circuited rather than anything intrinsic to, or immanent in, the 
text. As Altman is keen to point out, there is a great deal outside the 
text which determines a genre, such that “genres look different to 
different audiences” (Altman 1999: 207). For Altman, a cultural 
commodity such as a genre is “made” through the action of readers 
who harbour expectations about it. Such expectations are not just 
created by publicity surrounding a narrative; nor are they, 
unproblematically, the products of existing belief. Instead, they are the 
products “also of knowledge, emotions and pleasure” (Jost 1998: 
106). Generic meaning is derived partly from competence in reading 
other narratives in the genre but also from a more diffuse set of 
knowledges, attitudes, values and experiences brought to the reading 
of a specific narrative, all of which are in a complex interplay. As 
such, then, genre is properly an “idea” or an “expectation” harboured 
by readers.
It is not difficult to see why genre theory has been, until recently, 
reluctant to make this inevitable move. The unavoidable conclusion
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that genre is a set of expectations rather than a thoroughly textual 
entity undermines the project of much literary and textual criticism. In 
a sense, the rise and rise of popular narrative genres in the twentieth 
century is an index of the demise of authorship and, in a way, this has 
offered an opportunity to analyse contemporary narrative as if it 
embodied the return of certain of the principles of pre-literate oral 
narrative. Following the work of scholars of oral culture such as Lord 
(2000) and Havelock (1963, 1986), these principles are, in short, that 
the formulaic quality of narrative has a mnemonic intent and that 
individual authorship as it is known in literate culture is irrelevant. For 
genre theorists taking their cue from Propp and Frye, it is axiomatic 
that formula and repetition in generic narrative are more important 
than the identification of an individual producer. Yet the analysis of 
formula in the face of the author’s death — or, to put it another way, 
pace auteurism, the “non-birth” of the author in the generic narratives 
of film, radio, TV and computers (see Cobley 2001a: 171-200) — is a 
stop-gap, or even retrograde, measure. The real issue is the re­
constitution of genre theory as a feature of the public sphere rather 
than a textual given.
Is it possible, then, to pursue a theory of genre without the pre­
eminence of the text? The work of Altman, Bennett and others 
suggests to me that it is and that the outstanding questions in such a 
reconstituted genre theory concern “reading formations”, “verisimi­
litude”, “syntactic/semantic aspects of genre”, the “dominant” and the 
foreshortening of generic production in history.
Reading formations
Indubitably, the key difficulty that faces the reconceptualized genre 
theory is that the breadth of any readerly knowledge or “horizon of 
expectations” is virtually unassimilable in a theoretical discourse. So 
much so that while various commentators have felt obliged to pay lip 
service to the issue most have not been able to incorporate it fully in 
their arguments. Dubrow, for instance, gives just two examples of 
generic expectations: readers’ knowledge of the age and (in conso­
nance with Hirsch 1967) expectations centred on knowledge about the 
author (Dubrow 1982: 108). Todorov is more reductive still: “Where 
do genres come from?’' he asks; “Quite simply from other genres” 
(Todorov 1990: 15). For Jauss, on the other hand, the
horizon of the expectable is constituted for the reader out of a tradition or 
series of previously known works, and from a specific attitude, mediated by 
one (or more) genre and dissolved through new works. Just as there is no act 
of verbal communication that is not related to a generally, socially or 
situationally conditioned norm or convention, it is also unimaginable that a 
literary work set itself in an informational vacuum, without indicating a 
specific situation of understanding. To this extent, every work belongs to a 
genre — whereby I mean neither more nor less than that for each work a 
preconstituted horizon of expectations must be ready at hand [...] to orient the 
reader’s (public’s) understanding and to enable a qualifying reception. (Jauss 
1982: 79)
Jauss, however, is reluctant to venture too far into such a problematic 
area and, like Dubrow and Todorov, insists on the primacy of 
aesthetic knowledge in the act of reading, stressing the centrality of 
taste, subjectivity and perception (Jauss 1982: 23). Broadly, the same 
can be said of other literary-derived concepts employed to understand 
readership. Fish’s idea of an “interpretive community” (his spelling, 
see Fish 1980) is more concerned with the forces acting on an 
audience at the very moment of their interaction with a text rather than 
with the knowledges, values and experiences which may be at work 
prior to, and determining, text/reader interactions. Even Altman 
(1987: 3-5), in his early use of Fish’s term in relation to the film 
musical, is guilty of giving primacy in the production of meanings not 
to the myriad forces acting on any reader, but to a genre text in its 
relation to a set of other genre texts.
The work of Tony Bennett (1987, 1990), though, considerably 
extends the concept of interpretive community by positing instead a 
space of reading which he calls a “reading formation”. He stresses the 
importance of a number of discursive practices that operate on readers 
before, and simultaneous with, a textual system, ordering the relations 
between texts in a definite way “such that their reading is always- 
already cued in specific directions that are not given by those 'texts 
themselves’ as entities separable from such relations” (Bennett, 
Woollacott 1987: 64). The reader’s knowledge of how texts are 
organized, and their relations with other texts is largely a knowledge 
of how various institutions work — the film industry, publishing, 
broadcasting, advertising. A low level of understanding of relations 
between these is required for an audience to realize, for example, that 
an actor is giving an interview on a chat-show at a given moment in 
time because his/her latest film is currently on general release. Such 
knowledge, in turn, might be built into a reading of the film.
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At the same time, that which seems wholly untouched by institu­
tional relations is often equally the result of similar determinations. 
For example, Bennett and Woollacott acknowledge Foucault’s insight 
into the author as “the principle of thrift in the proliferation of 
meaning” (Foucault 1986: 119), the way that a reader’s understanding 
of authorship might be built into the reading of a text. In their study of 
the James Bond phenomenon they show that Ian Fleming — the 
original, but merely one of a number of Bond authors — exists not as 
a real person but as the nodal point of biographical accounts. They 
conclude that commentaries have “Bondianised” Fleming’s life and 
thus “Flemingised” Bond as a figure for readers, providing one limit 
to the polysemous nature of Bond texts (Bennett, Woollacott 1987: 
89-90). Moreover, this is subject to change over time: as the output of 
the present Bond author, Raymond Benson, begins to exceed 
Fleming’s there is even the possibility that some future readers will 
pay little heed to the biography of Fleming.
This attention to the probabilities of change in considering the 
longevity of Bond after Fleming suggests that the concept of “reading 
formation” allows for a consideration of reading relations in different 
time periods. Strategies of reading the Bond texts in the 1950s, 
particularly national ones, are shown by Bennett and Woollacott to be 
important within the frameworks of other texts. One method of 
identifying these frameworks is through reviews: the review in the 
New York Times of the film version of Dr. No, according to Bennett 
and Woollacott, effectively sold Bond to the American public as a 
Mickey Spillane character (Bennett, Woollacott 1987: 83). In Britain, 
however, hard-boiled novels by Spillane and others, while popular in 
the late 1950s, did not become a point of reference for the reading of 
the Bond novels but were “eclipsed by the earlier traditions of the 
“imperialist spy-thriller” which provide by far and away the most 
influential textual backdrop against which the novels were initially 
read” (Bennett, Woollacott 1987: 83).
As is evident, then, the concept of reading formation promotes an 
understanding of reading as an activity which can no longer be 
considered merely as the realization of textual meanings but is more 
suitably viewed, instead, as highly determined by ideological and 
commercial imperatives. Acknowledgement of the work of a reading 
formation also permits the analyst to consider texts as “texts-in- 
history” and “texts-in-use” — that is, as texts that are subject to 
particular readings rather than as entities with immanent qualities 
(Bennett 1987). We might tend to commonsensically assume that the
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“meaning” of a text is “in there”; but the interrogation of a reading 
formation consistently demonstrates that a text’s meaning is 
constantly derived from factors outside of itself (in the past and the 
present).
In general, the task of a dialogical genre theory will be to establish 
the determinants of the text-reader relations which accrue to specific 
genres at specific times. Central to this, then, is the analysis of what 
readers consider to be decorous, appropriate and feasible in a given 
genre’s representation of the world — that is to say, a genre’s 
verisimilitude.
Verisimilitude
Todorov (1977) identifies two kinds of norms by which a work or set 
of statements is said to have verisimilitude: the “rules of the genre” 
and “public opinion” or doxa. When somebody bursts into song 
during a musical, this is not, according to the rules of the genre, an 
indecorous act at odds with the statements in the text: the song is part 
of a specific regime of verisimilitude and falls within a range of 
expectations on the part of the audience that such acts are legitimate 
within the bounds of the genre. Where “public opinion” is concerned, 
plainly this consists of a set of expectations and understandings of the 
world by readers rather than the world as a referent. In this way the 
doxa is a regime of verisimilitude in itself, constantly shifting 
according to a complex set of checks and balances which characterize 
the world of discourse in general.
As Todorov (1977: 87) explains, it is more accurate, therefore, to 
consider verisimilitude as a principle of textual coherence rather than 
an area in which there exists some relation between the fictional and 
the real world. What is fundamental to expectations about the thriller 
genre, for example, is the maintenance of a general level of “credi­
bility” which matches as closely as possible that which is held by the 
doxa. The thriller is characterized by its attempt to achieve harmony 
between the consistency of representation within the thriller narrative 
and what is believed to be credible — politically, socially, topically — 
at a given moment by public opinion. It is for this reason that 
commentators often make the mistake of believing that thrillers are 
more “realistic” than other texts or that being “true to life” is a specific 
and objective expectation harboured by thriller readers (Cobley 1997).
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The specific regime of verisimilitude inherent in particular genres 
cannot be stressed enough. In romances, the notion of a world beyond 
or without romantic love is unthinkable in the text-reader interaction. 
One of the most deft features of Radway’s investigation of romance 
reading, for example, was her request that the group of readers define 
"failed” or “near-miss” romances. In response, they identified a sub­
genre which contravened some of their expectations about romance 
novels but did not totally abandon the belief in romantic love (Radway 
1984: 157-185). Similarly, while the thriller genre maintains a 
specific regime of verisimilitude which gives the genre a close relation 
to history and non-fiction (Cobley 2000a: 5-14, 34-44) it is flexible in 
its tutelage and does not police other expectations in order to maintain 
them as strict rules. The “rules” of detective fiction, for example, were 
spectacularly contravened in 1926 by Agatha Christie in The Murder 
of Roger Ackroyd (cf. Dine 1974, Knox 1974); the rules of other 
genres have undergone similar contraventions (see Tudor 1976: 22 on 
the Western).
However, while it is true to say that the parameters of generic 
expectation under the aegis of verisimilitude may be fluid, they are 
frequently subject to what seem to be two kinds of textual anchoring 
process.
Semantic/syntactic aspects of genre
Altman considers two fundamental and inseparable constituents of 
genre: its “building blocks” and the “structure in which they are 
arranged”. He calls these, respectively, genre’s semantic and syntactic 
aspects (Altman 1986: 30), a distinction which, if as imperfect as it is 
in linguistics, at least allows for a consideration of print genres’ equi­
valent of filmic iconography. This is to say the semantic dimension 
does not just consist of the object depicted but includes the methods of 
realizing the object. In film this will comprise lighting, shots, set 
design and so on; in writing, this will incorporate all those narrative 
strategies, such as prose style, which are specific to a text. The 
syntactic dimension, on the other hand, refers to all those “structural” 
features identified by previous genre theorists; for example, eventual 
revelation of the murderer in the “whodunit”, a climactic gunfight in 
the Western, a marriage or consummation of a relationship in the 
romance.
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It is in the relation of the semantic and the syntactic dimensions 
that meaning is enacted; but as Altman insists, the semantic and 
syntactic should not be considered as discrete textual zones. Where 
genre theorists have defined genre in terms of the semantic realm 
(textual “contents”) or, as is more often the case, its syntactic realm 
(textual “structure”, etc.), Altman suggests that we could more 
profitably understand reader expectations in terms of an investment in 
the combined semantic/syntactic realm. As such, the role of the hero in 
the generic text — which is repeatedly considered a “syntactic” 
element by theorists after Propp —  should not be considered as 
separable from supposedly “semantic” aspects such as his/her good 
looks, his/her “goodness” or, if the text is a film, how the hero is shot 
or positioned in each scene.
Altman’s notion of “semantic/syntactic” as combined, it seems to 
me, pre-supposes the activity of the reader. The semantic/syntactic 
combination, of course, facilitates short-circuiting by making certain 
textual features seem naturally inseparable, a cliched example being, 
once more, the idea that the “hero” embodies “goodness”. But this 
does not mean that only the producer of a generic text is responsible 
for its meaning. Altman criticizes Neale and others for their excessive 
reliance on an understanding of genre expectations as largely created 
by the film producer’s publicity machine and, through an examination 
of film publicity, argues strongly that producers’ discourse contributes 
surprisingly little to the generic character of films (Altman 1998, 
1999). He also criticizes the “conservative” tendencies of theorists 
such as Hall and de Certeau who implicitly favour a producer-centred 
understanding of the generation of meaning in their models of 
“encoding/ decoding” and “poacher/nomad” respectively. Where they 
see the users of cultural artefacts as interacting with already produced 
material, Altman exhorts us to explore the use-orientation of readers. 
As such, there is a need to study the ways in which a cultural 
commodity such as genre is “made” through the action of readers who 
harbour expectations. Such expectations are not just created by 
publicity; nor are they unproblematically the products of existing 
belief. As we have noted, the reader’s knowledge of other texts’ 
semantic/syntactic functioning which s/he recognizes to belong in the 
same generic system as the text being read represents an important 
expectation, one which is bound up with questions of pleasures and 
knowledge.
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The generic dominant
Following on from these comments on a dialogical genre theory — 
that readers of generic texts operate in a reading formation, that they 
have expectations of verisimilitude, that they activate already existing 
knowledges in making sense of textual features in combination — the 
question no doubt remains as to what makes a generic text different 
from a non-generic text. The first answer to this question must accord 
with what has been argued above: the generic character of texts is 
imputed by a series of extra-textual cues. Yet, in response, it is likely 
to be asserted that genres still have definable features such as heroes, 
heroines and outcomes which in some way “dominate” proceedings 
and have precisely been the object of investigation for textual analysts 
in the past.
The most systematic formulation of the argument that texts betray 
a dominant procedure has been offered by work which grew out of 
Russian Formalism, was taken up by the Prague Linguistic Circle and 
continued to be a part of Jakobson’s theorising (see, for example, 
Jakobson 1960). Tynjanov’s theses on literary evolution survey the 
issue:
Since a system is not an equal interaction of all elements but places a group of 
elements in the foreground — ‘the dominant’ — and thus involves the 
deformation of the remaining elements, a work enters into the literature and 
takes on its literary function through this dominant. (Tynjanov 1971: 72)
So, for traditional genre theory, this provides the grounds for under­
standing any genre consisting of many elements as basically being 
reducible and subordinate to a dominant procedure, “that which 
specifically makes it what it is” (Easthope 1983: 24). Hence, Bennett 
notes, detective fiction is often defined in terms of what Barthes calls 
the hermeneutic code (Bennett 1990: 99); likewise, Cawelti (1976: 
especially 4 2 ^ 4 )  subsumes detective fiction under the procedure of 
finding out secrets; while Robin Wood, for example, therefore sees the 
horror film as consisting of one basic formula: “Normality is 
threatened by the Monster” (Wood 1985: 203).
Yet, as Neale points out
Exclusive definitions, list of exclusive characteristics, are particularly hard to 
produce. At what point do Westerns become musicals like Oklahoma! ( 1955) 
or Paint Your Wagon ( 1969) or Seven Brides for Seven Brothers ( 1954)? At 
what point do Singing Westerns become musicals? At what point do comedies
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with songs (like A Night at the Opera (1935)) become musical comedies. And
so on. (Neale 1990: 57)
Like Jameson (1982), Derrida (1981) and others, Neale is 
emphasizing what users of genre have known for years: that genres are 
continually overlapping (cf. Neale 2001: 2). But there are two further 
points to be made in relation to this observation. Firstly, identifying 
even the intersection of genres is fraught with problems, as evidenced 
by Neale’s own assessment of what constitutes the thriller genre being 
based, conveniently, on the findings of just two critics (Neale 1990: 
66). Secondly, the generic quality of a text will not be based on 
audience recognition of either a semantic or syntactic dominant but on 
an investment in the combined semantic/syntactic.
The latter point is made at some length in Radway’s now classic 
study of romance readers. Her group of real readers were very 
concerned with narrative resolution in their reading matter (Radway 
1984: 67) as might be expected in relation to interactions with a genre 
whose dominant seems to be consummation and a happy ending. Yet 
real readers cannot be relied upon to read strictly according to a 
dominant procedure. When considering why they read romances 
Radway’s readers predominantly gave reasons to do with relaxation 
and social life, but also, and third on the list, “To learn about far away 
places and times” (Radway 1984: 61). Scientifically inconclusive 
though this data is, it does indicate that any “syntactic” enjoyment of 
resolution is also inseparable from the supposedly “non-dominant” 
semantic elements which, in any narrative, are a necessary part of the 
movement towards resolution. It is significant, too, that none of the 
readers chose to articulate their preference for romance reading 
explicitly in terms of the generic dominant alone. Although audience 
ethnographies devoted to other genres have not always directly 
addressed the issue of generic dominants, it is still worth mentioning 
that Gillespie’s (1995) study of Asian residents in the South Eastern 
British town of Southall reports that soap operas provide an arena for 
discussing the quality of Punjabi family life, while the respective 
studies of Dallas audiences by Ang (1986) and by Liebes and Katz 
(1993) demonstrate that there is no such thing as purely syntactic 
dominance.
It is possible, as Neale (1990, 2001) suggests that the only really 
demonstrable dominant in the study of narrative genres is narrative 
itself. Elsewhere, I have argued that as a mode of enunciation, narra­
tive has memorialized and consolidated cultures and that the residue
Analysing narrative genres 495
of this function can be discerned in all the places where narrative is at 
play, including journalism, history, medical case histories, and not just 
fiction (Cobley 2001a). Narrative structure — at its simplest an 
inexorable movement towards an end which is punctuated by 
detours — is widespread and pervasive. Yet, in the case of individual 
genres, the notion of the dominant as a constant defining textual 
feature is difficult to sustain. So, given that genres should be 
considered as constituted by the expectations of readers, the only way 
that a dominant can be properly countenanced is as an element in a 
reading formation.
This approach seems to characterize contemporary analysis of 
generic texts. Recent writing on the crime or thriller genre, for 
example, has tackled the issue of the dominant but has avoided the 
tendency to treat it as a timeless textual phenomenon which marks 
genre forever. McCann’s analysis of the hard-boiled genre argues that 
a dramatic crisis and revision of American government during the 
period of the New Deal effectively heightened the innovation which 
constituted the new form of writing. By focusing precisely on the 
“public knowledge and civic solidarity” (McCann 2000: 4) which can 
be argued to be a dominant of classic detective fiction, the hard- 
boiled, he argues, became “a symbolic theater where the dilemmas of 
New Deal liberalism could be staged” (McCann 2000: 5). In my own 
The American Thriller: Generic Innovation and Social Change in the 
1970s (Cobley 2000a), I argue that the dominant paranoia and fear of 
conspiracy in the thriller genre as identified by Palmer (1978), Mandel 
(1984) and others, is not wholly inevitable at all times but is 
foregrounded because of the dominance of paranoia and conspiracy 
fears in that decade’s particular reading formation (not coincidentally, 
the same reading formation in which Palmer and Mandel’s analyses 
appeared). Most persuasive of all, perhaps, is Pepper’s (2000) The 
Contemporary American Crime Novel: Race, Ethnicity, Gender, Class 
which argues that “strategies of domination do not inevitably reduce 
subjects or agents to powerless ciphers” and that it is dubious to 
envisage a dominant procedure providing a vision which characterizes 
a canon of American crime novels because “the ‘best’ American crime 
fiction is messy, disturbing, ambiguous, violent, shocking” (Pepper 
2000: 18).
Indeed, it is possible that the notion of a textual dominant, even 
when merely implicit in genre theories, has been the main cause of a 
crippling problem in genre analysis which has maintained genre
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theory as one of the last bastions of unthinking ahistoricality. I refer, 
here, to the issue of generic canons and history.
Generic canons and history
It is clear that any historian of fictional texts has such an unmanage­
able wealth of material to wade through that constituting the corpus 
for study involves, necessarily, not considering a huge number of 
texts. Hence, one of the most influential histories of the thriller, Julian 
Symons’ Bloody Murder, avoids discussing an “enormous mass of 
more or less entertaining rubbish” (Symons 1974: 10). This occurs 
time and time again in the literature of genre criticism with a 
succession of writers accepting a consensus on a central corpus of 
texts and their relevance to the history of the genre. The reason for this 
kind of canon construction is clear. Rather than admitting huge sellers 
who might have made an impact on public consciousness, historians 
of genres wish to find some way of dealing with the formidable 
breadth of the popular fiction industry, to look at “representative” 
texts and, sometimes, to preserve “value”. The principle of critical 
exclusion, however, tends towards the treatment of the text “as if it 
were a hermetic and self-sufficient whole, one whose elements 
constitute a closed system presuming nothing beyond themselves, no 
other utterances” (Bakhtin 1981: 273). In short, the text is denied its 
place in history, its coexistence with other generic texts and its 
existence as the product of contemporary readings.
In any examination of genres in history which is grounded in 
principles of accuracy rather than evaluation there is a need to gain 
recognition of the breadth of a particular genre. In histories of the 
thriller and detective fiction, for example, there has developed a tacit 
acceptance of an “interregnum”, a period in which little or no detec­
tive fiction appeared which most critics believe to exist between 
Wilkie Collins and Arthur Conan Doyle in the nineteenth-century. 
Yet, as Stewart (1980: 40) argues, this characterization exists only 
because the precise, dominant, syntactic structure of detective fiction 
that critics are looking for is not evident at this time. The impulse to 
canonise according to “good” syntactic structure has the result, there­
fore, that a huge number of texts which have been popular and impor­
tant on their own terms are written out of history. As Stewart shows, 
the texts that appear in the “interregnum” are those that make up the
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popular literature of their age and, although bereft of the “classic” 
syntax, they do not stand divorced and aloof from the development of 
detective fiction (cf. Greene 1970, Bleiler 1978). Detective fiction in 
this period was one part of a more general cultural production which is 
now becoming an object of academic study in its own right: sensation 
fiction (Stewart 1980: 76).
The very history of a genre is thus constrained by its textually pre­
conceived basis. More recently, however, writers have almost 
abolished strict boundaries between genres by concentrating on popu­
lar reading as a broad phenomenon. Bloom (1996) and McCracken 
(1998) interrogate popular texts not so much in terms of specific 
genres but in terms of affiliations across genres. In their sophisticated 
analyses there is a notable emphasis on the “pulp mentality” of general 
popular reading as more than a collection of texts. For them, the way 
that readers in pulp culture partake of diversity is virtually an emblem 
of the fragmenting effects of modernity. What their work shows is that 
we need to be aware of the way in which readers can operate with 
“nomadic” tendencies (Radway 1988) rather than being confined to 
one generic preference in a reading formation.
A similar argument has also been put forward in a powerful essay 
by Gallagher (1986). He contends that, in addition to accounting for 
the breadth of a genre we need to be sensitive to — rather than 
patronising about — the historical period in which a generic text 
appeared. Against the critics who think that the Western film has 
grown progressively more widespread and sophisticated in its narra­
tive structure he demonstrates that the genre has a much more 
complicated history. In the period 1907-1915, he shows that there 
were probably more Westerns released each month than during the 
entire decade of the 1930s, and as a result, the Western and numerous 
plots associated with it, were very much in the contemporary cine- 
magoer’s consciousness (Gallagher 1986: 205). Early cinema 
audiences were not only generically literate, they also inhabited a 
social formation which, it could be argued, was every bit as complex 
as our own. For Gallagher, historians of the Western (and, by impli­
cation, other genres) tend to ignore the evidence of reading practices 
in preference for a blanket assumption about the period in which genre 
texts are located.
I have written about these issues elsewhere in relation to the 
thriller (Cobley 2000a, 2000b, 2001b) but also in relation to musical 
genres such as punk rock (Cobley 1999). Indeed, popular music pro­
vides a simple example of the problem in question. Older colleagues
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of mine with teenage children express amazement at the breadth of 
contemporary popular music production which their offspring 
consume, protesting that a comparable breadth simply did not exist in 
periods of their own youth such as the 1960s. However, if nothing 
else, the phenomenon of CD re-issues and re-mastering in the last 
decade, a practice which has superseded vinyl deletion, has 
demonstrated how untrue this perspective is. In genre theory, the issue 
is simply this: the foreshortening tendency inherent in histories of 
cultural artefacts carries with it a temptation to deny the breadth of the 
narrative consumption which has been a constant feature of the 
cultural landscape of industrial capitalism and mass production. Yet, 
while this is a difficulty for all histories of cultural artefacts, the 
problem is particularly acute where genre is concerned. The “short 
circuiting” process in reading genre can lend itself to a short-circuiting 
in the analysis of genre. Taking genre as a purely textual phenomenon 
can foster an understanding of generic texts as formulaic, repetitive, 
simplistic, unchanging and unproblematically reflective of the ideo­
logy of given historical periods rather than, in Bennett’s terms, as 
“texts-in-history”; it also goes hand-in-hand with a view of its readers 
as naive, limited, less sophisticated in the past than in the present, and 
not subject to history.
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Анализ нарративных жанров
Несомненно сознание современного человека погребено под нарра­
тивами. На Западе нарратив находится в центре многих прибыльных 
производств и нарративы распространяются быстрее и шире чем когда- 
либо раньше. Важность популярных жанров в современном нарративе 
является знаком смерти автора пред ликом новой медии и привела к 
необходимости обновления понятия “жанр” в анализе нарратива. Данная 
статья призвана доказать, что понятия “жанр” и “текстуальное вопло­
щение” не совпадают. В противоположность типу выражения понятие 
жанра связан с вопросом о том. насколько аудитория принимает нарра­
тивные условности. Все же во множестве жанровых теорий жанр 
рассматривался как чисто текстуальное явление, что привело к узакони­
ванию неисторичности и канонизированности в жанровой теории 
последних двух тысячелетий, опирающейся на примат текста. Мы 
считаем, что жанром следует скорее считать читательскую “идею” или 
“ожидание”.
Narratiivsete žanrite analüüs
Kahtlemata on inimteadvus tänapäeval narratiividega üle ujutatud. Läänes on 
narratiiv keskmeks hulgale kasumit tootvatele tööstustele ning narratiivid 
levivad kiiremini ja  laialdasemalt kui kunagi varem. Populaarsete žanrite 
tähtsus tänases narratiivis on märgiks autorluse surmast uue meedia palge ees 
ning on teinud vajalikuks “žanri” mõiste uuendamise narratiivi analüüsis. See 
artikkel püüab selgitada, et mõisted žanr ja  tekstuaalne väljendusviis ei ole 
üks ja  seesama. Vastupidiselt väljendusviisile puudutab žanr just nimelt küsi­
must, kuidas auditooriumid narratiivseid konventsioone vastu võtavad; siiski 
on paljud žanriteooriad käsitlenud žanrit kui puhtalt tekstuaalset entiteeti, mis 
on viinud ajalootuse ja  kanoniseerimise põlistamiseni viimase kahe tuhande 
aasta tekstipõhises žanriteoorias. Käesolevas artiklis tõendatakse, et žanrit on 
pigem kohasem pidada lugejates peituvaks “ideeks” või “ootuseks”.
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Abstract. The paper examines linguistic, cognitive, communicative ap­
proaches to metaphor and its functioning in the narrative text. Special atten­
tion is paid to the problem of iconicity and the Wittgensteinian notion of 
“aspect seeing” as relevant to the metaphor studies. It is shown that the 
extended understanding of metaphor as “trope” or “figure” in the post-structu­
ralist literary theory allows to see metaphor as a textual “interpretation 
machine”. In the process of interaction of narrative and figurative patterns, 
metaphor functions as a means of perspectivization, i.e. representation of 
consciousness. In the literary text, perspective changes permanently and the 
subsequent configurations have an impact on the previous ones: there occurs a 
permanent “feedback” and correlation.
For Viktor Shklovsky, metaphor was a device of “making strange” or 
“defamiliarization” (ostranenie) to be unfolded into the plot (.sjužet). 
For example, plots of certain erotic tales or Boccaccio’s novellas are 
erotic metaphors unfolded (Shklovsky 1929: 19-20, 69). Shklovsky’s 
thesis may be properly understood in the context of avant-garde, 
especially futurist poetics with its priority of the “self-sufficient word” 
(,samovitoe slovo) and linguistic experimentation: a sound combina­
tion or the realization of metaphor define the logic of textual unfolding 
(see Hansen-Löve 2000: 92-164). In his book Theory of Prose, 
Shklovsky expresses a typically futurist opinion: “the form creates the 
content for itself’ (Shklovsky 1929: 35). Shklovsky’s approach may 
be classified as linguistic reduction, i.e. projection of the linguistic 
principles on to the text structure. The linguistic reduction is also 
obvious in Roman Jakobson’s opposition of metaphor and metonymy 
(Jakobson 1971: 239-259) and in the literary analyses influenced by
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the Jakobsonian distinction: “[...] the study of tropes and figures [...] 
becomes a mere extension of grammatical models, a particular subset 
of syntactical relations” (de Man 1979: 6). For Jakobson, metaphor 
and metonymy are primarily a manifestation of the paradigmatic and 
syntagmatic principles in speech. He bases the distinction between the 
two rhetorical figures on the linguistic principles of selection and 
combination, substitution and contexture. As D. Lodge justly 
observes, “ ‘contexture’ is not an optional operation in quite the same 
way as ‘substitution’ — it is, rather, a law of language” (Lodge 1997: 
76). Yet “deletion”, suggested by Lodge instead of “contexture”, is 
still problematic since it supposes the pre-existence of the “literal”, 
non-metonymical sentences (“The keels of the ships crossed the deep 
sea”) to be transformed into the metonymical ones (“The keels crossed 
the deep”). The Jakobsonian scheme, however, proves to be rather 
powerful since even Paul de Man who criticizes the linguistic 
approach to tropes cannot avoid its influence while speaking of the 
interaction of the metaphorical and metonymical order which 
organizes the narrative. One of the most consistent linguistically- 
oriented literary scholars is Michael Riffaterre:
[...] every single word [...] contains a potential narrative and a potential 
diegesis [...]; each word is a sememe, a complex system of associated 
semantic features or semes [...] and these semes may in turn be actualized in 
the shape of lexical representations, of satellitic words gravitating around [...] 
the original sememe. The lexical actualizations themselves are organized by 
syntax [...]. These actualizations form what I call a descriptive system [...] a 
sememe can be seen as an inchoate or future text, and a story as an expanded 
sememe in which a temporal dimension has been added to spatial syntagms. 
(Riffaterre 1990: 5)
Along with structural-linguistic and semiotic approaches, certain 
cognitive theories oppose the traditional Aristotelian substitution and 
comparison view on metaphor. The interaction theory takes up I.
A. Richard’s critique of the traditional point of view, which “made 
metaphor seem to be a verbal matter, a shifting and displacement of 
words”, and his definition of metaphor as “a borrowing between and 
intercourse of thoughts, a transaction between contexts” (Richards 
1965: 94). According to Richards, there are always two thoughts co­
present in metaphor. In calling these two halves “the tenor” and “the 
vehicle”, he introduces the transfer process into the notion of 
metaphor. Following in Richards’ footsteps, the interactionists
Metaphor and narrative 505
criticized the traditional opinion of metaphor as an “ornament” of 
speech or a “supplement” being used in case the necessary word is 
absent in language. They regard metaphor as a conceptual shift or 
“redescription” (in M. Hesse’s terms) which has a heuristic value and 
therefore may function as a dynamic scientific model. I. A. Richards 
argues that within a single word a metaphorical collision and inter­
action of two thoughts occur. Likewise, Max Black discloses the 
interaction of the principal and subsidiary subject in metaphor: “We 
can say that the principal subject is ‘seen through’ the metaphorical 
expression — or, if we prefer, that the principal subject is ‘projected 
upon’ the field of the subsidiary subject” (Black 1962: 41). The 
interaction theory sees metaphor as a predicative structure dependent 
on the context and speaker’s intention. Metaphor involves a simulta­
neous manifestation of two ideas, interaction of two semantic fields 
and, as a result, a conceptual shift prompted by the new connotations 
acquired by the principal subject. Only dead or trivial metaphors are 
reducible to literal expressions: “Metaphorical statement is not a 
substitute for a formal comparison or any other literal statement, but 
has its own distinctive capacities and achievements” (Black 1962: 37). 
The cognitive approach has been further developed by George Lakoff 
(Lakoff, Johnson 1980) for whom metaphor is a cognitive schema 
which grounds the abstract target domain within the specific basis of 
the source domain and reflects the space- and world-orientations of 
the cognitive subject. Yet Lakoff deals mostly with conventional 
(“dead”) metaphors where the similarity and almost identity of the 
“source” and the “vehicle” are already fixed in language. New 
meanings are generated by the process of logical unfolding of the 
cognitive schemata as their natural “entailments”. Lakoff’s treatment 
of metaphor implies that metaphoric cognitive schemata may be 
developed into narratives that govern our social life:
Metaphors may create realities for us, especially social realities. A metaphor 
may thus be a guide for future action. Such actions will, of course, fit the 
metaphor. This will, in turn, reinforce the power of the metaphor to make 
experience coherent. In this sense metaphors can be self-fulfilling prophecies.
For example, faced with the energy crisis, President Carter declared ‘the 
moral equivalent of war’. The WAR metaphor generated a network of entail­
ments. There was an ‘enemy’, a ‘threat to national security’, which required 
‘setting targets’, ‘reorganizing priorities’, ‘establishing a new chain of com­
mand’, ‘plotting new strategy’, ‘gathering intelligence’, ‘marshalling forces’, 
‘imposing sanctions’, ‘calling for sacrifices’, and on and on. (Lakoff, Johnson 
1980:156)
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According to the conceptual integration theory, a recent outcome of 
interactionism enriched by Lakoffs elaborations, metaphor is a 
process of blending of two conceptual spaces. Blending is regarded as 
a topological operation which is guided by definite generic schemata 
and involves selective projection and fusion of two spaces. As a result 
a new space emerges with its own structure: the output is not equal to 
the sum of the inputs (Fauconnier, Turner 1998, 2000). T. Veale1 
draws a straight analogy between the metaphorical blending and the 
narrative blending of conceptual spaces. He examines the cinematic 
narrative from this point of view, e.g., “Star Wars” as blending of the 
Arthurian sagas and several cinematic narratives with science fiction; 
“Forrest Gump” as grounding of Voltaire’s “Candide”-type story in 
American history, etc. Veale’s computer-based approach retains only 
a quantitative difference between metaphor as a restricted two-space 
blending and the narrative as a multi-space blending.
The cognitive approach focuses on metaphor’s capacity to “re­
describe” reality. As Paul Ricoeur argues, the mimetic function of the 
narrative is analogous to the metaphoric reference. Although the 
former is related to the experience of time and the latter operates in the 
sphere of perception, emotion and evaluation, both re-figure the pre- 
textual cognitive experience. Likewise, M. Black supposes that a 
“system of associated implications” or “commonplaces” is essential 
for the rapid and effective activation of metaphor in consciousness: 
“[...] the important thing for the metaphor’s effectiveness is not that 
the commonplaces shall be true, but that they should be readily and 
freely evoked” (Black 1962: 40). Paul Ricoeur sees a common 
cognitive grounds for metaphor and the narrative: metaphor is a new 
predicative relation, the narrative is a new relation of events schema­
tized by creative imagination (Ricoeur 2000: 7-10). To summarize, 
the cognitive view on the relations of metaphor and the narrative 
involves conceptual reduction: it subordinates both metaphor and the 
narrative to certain cognitive schemata as the linguistic approach 
subordinates them to certain linguistic principles.
Finally, the communicatively oriented approaches subordinate 
metaphor and the narrative to a certain communicative teleology. 
Thus, J. Searle differentiates the language-meaning from the utterer- 
meaning: it is an utterer-meaning imposed on a literal meaning which
1 Veale, Tony 1996. Creativity as pastiche: A computational treatment of metaphoric 
blends with special regard to cinematic “borrowing”, http// www.compapp.dcu.ie/ 
~tonyv/Pastiche/Pastiche.html.
Metaphor and narrative  507
makes a metaphor (Searle 1979). The rhetorical value of metaphor is 
reduced to its power of persuasion. Richard Moran in his article 
“Metaphor, image, and force”, referring to D. Davidson’s paper “What 
metaphors mean” and W. Booth’s “Metaphor as rhetoric: The problem 
of evaluation” (both in the collection On Metaphor of 1979), suggests 
considering metaphor in terms of its effect. He attempts to unify 
developments of interactionism with the speech-act theory. Moran 
argues that a distinction should be made between the two dimensions 
of metaphor: its “content” or “initiating beliefs” together with their 
further implications, and its “framing effect”, i.e. framing one thing in 
terms of another or “the adoption of the perspective”. Citing Booth 
(“The speaker has performed a task by yoking what the hearer had not 
yoked before, and the hearer simply cannot resist joining him [...]”, 
Moran 1989: 91) and Davidson (“Joke or dream or metaphor can, like 
a picture or a bump on the head, make us appreciate some fact — but 
not by standing for, or expressing, the fact” — Moran 1989: 95), 
R. Moran observes that the framing-effect is responsible for this 
“compulsion and involuntary complicity” or the “force” of a good 
metaphor: “but in such cases what is forced, or can’t be undone, is not 
a believing of what is asserted”. “It is quite generally true for both 
philosophy and literature that much of what they aim at is not on the 
level of specifically altered beliefs but rather such things as changes in 
the associations and comparisons one makes, differences in the vivid 
or ‘felt’ appreciation of something already known, or changes in one’s 
habits of attention and sense of the important and the trifling” (Moran 
1989: 100). What is interesting in R. Moran’s paper, is an attempt to 
explain imagistic capacity of metaphor by the framing-effect “that 
functions cognitively in a manner which is importantly similar to that 
of an image” (Moran 1989: 112). It means there is no code to 
determine in advance which features will make part of the 
comparison. However, the metaphoric juxtaposition of two things is 
“directional”: one component is the “filter” or “subsidiary subject”, 
the other the “principal subject”. Therefore it differs from the pictorial 
juxtaposition where beholder’s attention is not strictly controlled or 
directed. Nevertheless, we would add, as painting always contains 
some interpretive signs pointing at the relations of things depicted, so 
the “live” figure of speech always leaves some freedom for the 
interpretation of its components. Thus, the “pictorial” analogy may be 
stimulating in the understanding of figurative speech.
The imagistic capacity of metaphor has been compared to the Witt- 
gensteinian notion of “aspect seeing”. Wittgenstein’s term “aspect”
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has been discussed as relevant to the study of artistic texts and his 
notion of “noticing an aspect” as identical to aesthetic perception. In 
his article “Pictorial meaning, picture thinking, and Wittgenstein’s 
theory of aspects” (Aldrich 1972: 93-103), V. C. Aldrich analyses the 
phenomenon of “seeing aspects” and draws some conclusions useful 
for the understanding of “poetic images” and metaphors. He refers to 
the Wittgensteinian description of “seeing aspects”: “It is as if an 
image came into contact, and for a time remained in contact, with the 
visual impression” (Aldrich 1972: 97), i. e. “aspect” is a half-percept 
(half-thought), a half-image. Aldrich supposes that a capacity of an 
expression to evoke or “conjure up” images depends “on the con­
textual control on the use” (Aldrich 1972: 94). Following in Witt­
genstein’s footsteps, he further distinguishes between the “pictorial” 
(image-exhibiting) and “cognitive” (object-describing) use of expres­
sions, the imaginative and observational mode of awareness, both 
present in the “plain talk” of non-special conversation and each to be 
separately developed into the aesthetic and the scientific mode of 
expression correspondingly (Aldrich 1972: 98-99). M. B. Hester 
(Hester 1972: 111-123) emphasizes that aspect seeing involves mental 
activity and imaginative skill and therefore differs from usual passive 
perception. However, the poetic “seeing as” has to do with the 
meaning of language, not with a perceivable (visual) form like the 
Gestalt picture in Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations. Hester 
uses the Wittgensteinian notion of “aspect seeing” in Aldrich’s sense 
of the “image-exhibiting” mode and focuses on the poetic metaphor as 
“aspect seeing” between the metaphorical subject and the meta­
phorical predicate: “Both parts of the metaphor retain their distincti­
veness, and thus we might say that in a metaphor type-boundaries are 
transgressed but not obliterated” (Hester 1972: 116-117). Linguistic 
and textual iconicity, although underrated by M. Hester, is probably 
the real hidden reason for the analogy between the visual and the 
poetic “seeing as”. Aldrich remarks that the image-exhibiting use of 
expressions “may be a formulation objectively grounded in, and 
developing, “experience” of things” (Aldrich 1972: 99). Hester, 
although more sceptical as regards the straight analogy between the 
pictorial and verbal “aspect seeing”, admits, nevertheless, its 
efficiency: both visual and metaphorical “seeing as” involve inherent 
duality, both are there for imaginative notice (an image in contact with 
a perception), both are tied or controlled by the context, both are 
“irreducible imaginative accomplishments” (Hester 1972: 119).
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The examination of metaphor as “aspect seeing” helps to estimate 
its temporality. The “aspect” is provisional: “image” and “thought” 
remain in contact for a time. The figure of speech is located within a 
certain historical or individual context, it depends on certain generic 
conventions or/and, within the text, on a lyric or narrative situation. 
Only a minor part of poetic tropes enter the “common language”. 
M. Epstein even proposes “the third trope” in addition to metaphor 
and metonymy — “metabole”, where the fusion of the “literal” and 
“figural” meaning is more close and persistent. Cf.: “Metaphor or 
comparison is just [...] a flash, of varying brightness but inescapably 
fading, since it is brought into reality from somewhere outside, to 
illuminate it for just an instant, in order to inscribe it” (Epstein 1995: 
43). An “aspect” is accessible only through a certain configuration of 
textual elements. It belongs not to the formal textual characteristics 
but to its elusive “content”: it is an image or a quality of the “viewed” 
as experienced by the “viewer”.
Increased attention to the iconic component and imagistic capacity 
of metaphor, comparative investigation of verbal and visual meta­
phors, interest in the intersemiotic translation open a new perspective 
in the metaphor studies:
In shifting from one semiotic system to another, a dead metaphor becomes an 
inventive one anew [...]. Investigation of the visual metaphor [...] have 
shown how a worn-out expression like /flexible/ (used to indicate openness of 
mind, lack of prejudice in decision making, sticking-to the facts) can reclaim a 
certain freshness when, instead of being uttered verbally, it is translated 
visually through the representation of a flexible object. (Eco 1983: 255)
On the other side, a remarkable development in the metaphor studies 
is defined by the extended understanding of metaphor as “figure” or 
“trope” in general and awareness that its nature is supralinguistic: 
“[...] metaphor is not a linguistic unit but a text-semantic pattern, and 
semantic patterns in texts cannot be identified with units of syntax” 
(Hrushovski 1984: 7). The Jakobsonian definition already ranks meta­
phor as a generic figure: “In the Jakobsonian “reworking” of the rheto­
rical heritage, metaphor and metonymy are kinds of super-figures, 
headings under which other things can be grouped together!... 1” 
(Metz 1983: 169). In the poststructuralist literary analyses metaphor 
acquires a new status of “figure” or “trope” and works as the textual 
machine of interpretation. As it seems, the structuralist Todorov falls 
into contradiction while basing his definition of “figure” upon the
510 Marina Grishakova
linguistic model and at the same time describing it as a semantic entity 
which gives to the text its “form of substance”. Thus, “Гessence est 
absent, la presence est inessentielle” is, according to Todorov, Henry 
James’ master figure which organizes his works both semantically and 
syntactically, arranges their composition and points of view. It re­
structures the hierarchy of the linguistic levels and assumes a unique 
textual form (Todorov 1971: 250). Further extension of the notion of 
“figure” occurs in J. Hillis Miller’s literary analyses. J. Hillis Miller 
focuses on the recurrent and repetitive patterns (tropes) in fiction and 
their interaction with narrative lines. For P. de Man, metaphor is a 
deceptive, mystifying semantic unity being permanently reconstructed 
and deconstructed in the grammatical networks and finally turned 
back upon itself as the basic metaphor of reading/writing.
In other words, text is seen as a process: chains of events, segments 
of description and commentary are permanently re-shaped by inter­
pretation. F. Kermode argues that narrative “may be crudely re­
presented as a dialogue between story and interpretation. This dia­
logue begins when the author puts pen to paper and it continues 
through every reading that is not merely submissive”. Therefore all 
narrative
has something in common with the continuous modification of text that takes 
place in a psychoanalytical process [...] we may like to think, for our 
purposes, of narrative as the product of two intertwined processes, the 
presentation of a fable and its progressive interpretation (which of course 
alters it). (Kermode 1980: 86).
The work of interpretation proceeds not from the superior point of 
view but from within textuality itself. The text is not an embodiment 
of certain linguistic or conceptual schemata or principles: the prin­
ciples themselves are created and transfigured by the double process 
of narrative production as described by Kermode. In the narrative text, 
figurative patterns, which fulfil the work of interpretation are guided 
by the narrative mode (point of view, distance, perspective). The 
narrative mode mediates between the discourse and the story: it both 
controls figurative patterns and is controlled and altered by them. As 
far as the fabula or the story is not an invariant prior to different 
variants of syuzhet, but a post-factum “mental construction that the 
reader derives from the syuzhef’ (the discourse) (Brooks 1984: 11), 
the narrative mode controls the reconstruction of the story from the 
discourse and the interpretative arrangement of narrative levels. Thus,
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the narrative mode plays a mediatory role in the process of textual 
interpretation (modification) resulting from interaction and conver­
gence of narrative and figurative patterns, i.e. from a correlation 
between the elements of the story and the discourse, the “world” and 
the “text”.
Due to the correlation of the narrative and figurative patterns 
metaphor can be seen as a way of perspectivization, i.e. a manifes­
tation of a point of view or a representation of individual conscious­
ness. Compound or mixed metaphor (figure) serves the convergence 
and mutual infiltration of different points of view (“frames of 
reference” in B. Hrushovski’s terms) or different consciousnesses. 
Thus, in E. Tarle’s example cited by B. Uspenskij (Uspenskij 1970: 
33) the change of distance is accompanied by the change of 
perspective achieved by the shift from the metaphorical to the literal 
language: Parisian newspapers call Napoleon as he is approaching 
Paris correspondingly “the Corsican monster”, “the cannibal”, “the 
usurper”, “Bonaparte”, “Napoleon”, and. finally “His Majesty”.
B. Gasparov in his analysis of O. Mandelshtam’s “Verses about an 
Unknown Soldier” demonstrates how the motif of the pilot’s death in 
air, extremely significant in the context of the early 20th century 
culture, is seen in different perspectives as the author’s own 
anticipation of a future catastrophe (Gasparov 1994: 214-223). The 
story is interpreted in the perspectives of the Apocalypse, romantic 
poetry and popular cosmology: the Apocalypse of the First World 
War, hopelessness and tragic beauty of the romantic outcast’s solitary 
death, death as the overcoming of human “time-lag” (in comparison 
with the speed of light).
By this means, a distinction should be made between the “point of 
view” and the “perspective”. The point of view is a restriction of the 
“field of vision”, a selection of the initial “frames” (cf. Henry James’ 
“the novelist is a particular window” — Miller 1962: 65). The 
adoption of the perspective is an interpretative operation, which brings 
about an extension of the field of vision.
In introducing the notions of “slant” and “filter”, Seymour Chat­
man makes an attempt to differentiate a conscious choice and a mere 
mediating perception or, otherwise, the “narration” (as “knowing” and 
“telling”) and “focalization” (as “seeing”). The “slant” amounts to 
“the narrator’s attitudes and other mental nuances appropriate to the 
report function of discourse”, to “the psychological, sociological, and 
ideological ramifications of the narrator’s attitudes, which may range 
from neutral to highly charged”, the “filter” embraces “the much
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wider range of mental activity experienced by characters in the story 
world — perceptions, cognitions, attitudes, emotions, memories, 
fantasies, and the like”. Thus, the “slant” “delimits the mental activity 
on this side of the discourse-story barrier” whereas the “filter” is “a 
good term for capturing something of the mediating function of a 
character’s consciousness [...] as events are experienced within the 
story world” since it “catches the nuance of the choice made by the 
implied author” (Chatman 1990: 143-144). Chatman’s classification 
proceeds from a strict “distribution of labour” between the narrator 
who “tells” the story and the character who only “sees” it: as soon as a 
character starts to “tell”, he at once turns into a narrator, and, vice 
versa, if the narrator limits himself by the passive perception, he does 
so in a character’s capacity within the fictional world. There is a 
confusion of narrative roles which belong to the story and discourse 
positions in Chatman’s argument. The narrator is involved in the 
“emplotment”, i.e. “goal-oriented and forward moving organization of 
narrative constituents” (Prince 1987: 72): his narrative role is more or 
less persistent, at least in a definite textual segment. The discourse 
position is much more unstable and changeable even within a single 
sentence (cf. Benveniste’s classical analysis of the “I”, the subject of 
speech, as a linguistic construction). If the terms “slant” and “filter” 
are identical to the roles of the narrator and the character, they just 
refer to the usual hierarchy of narrative levels: the “distribution of 
labour” is obvious. Yet it seems that Chatman attempts to combine the 
narrative roles with discourse positions and operations. It would 
probably be more fruitful to examine the difference between a 
conscious selection and mere perception on the level of discourse to 
see what forms it assumes and what impact it has on the narrative 
roles.
On the level of discourse manifestation, the perspective is a figura­
tive way of “showing” one thing by means of another thing, e.g., in 
painting, showing distance by means of color or size relations. It 
involves a framing effect, i.e. a significant correlation or configuration 
of heterogeneous intratextual or intertextual elements. Let us take the 
passage from D. Lodge’s “Changing Places” used by Mieke Bal as an 
example of the “interpretative” focalization:
In the sky the planes look very small. On the runways they look very big.
Therefore close up they should look even bigger — but in fact they don’t. His
own plane, for instance, just outside the window of the assembly lounge,
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doesn’t look quite big enough for all people who are going to get into it. (Bal 
1991: 134)
As Mieke Bal observes, “it is Swallow’s view of the airplanes rather 
than the airplanes themselves which almost completely constitutes the 
object presented” (Bal 1991: 135). Nevertheless, the description is 
built upon the realistic remarks on the relative size of planes. It is an 
insistent repetition of size-designations (“small”, “very big”, “even 
bigger”, “not big enough for all people who”, etc.) that evokes the 
image of Swallow’s “British” sensitivity and his concern with his own 
plane's reliability and acquires the metaphorical meaning as a 
manifestation of the novel’s general bi-polarity, i.e. the opposition of 
America (“big”) and Britain (“small”).
The syntactic-semantic configurations, as shown by Vinogradov in 
his analysis of The Queen o f Spades, are able to acquire a symbolical 
meaning and to serve as a figurative interpretation of the events or 
objects described and introduction of an individual angle of vision. 
Lizaveta Ivanovna’s impatient waiting is made manifest by the 
repetition of identical syntactic constructions and permanent time 
counting. The latter appears in the auctorial narration after the first 
Germann’s letter has been received by Lizaveta Ivanovna: “na drugoi 
den ’”, “tri dnja posle to go”, “Lizaveta Ivanovna kazhdyi den’ 
poluchala ot nego p is ’та” (Vinogradov 1980: 212). Poor Lizaveta 
Ivanovna is a passive character totally dependent on the countess’ 
power and Germann’s sinister game. Emotion is the main expression 
of her “narrative activity”. Nevertheless, it is precisely her emotion 
stirred up by the fashionable romantic stereotypes that permits 
Germann to get into the house. Thus, Lizaveta Ivanovna’s waiting 
introduces a perspective of the romantic secret story: she does not just 
wait for Germann, she is waiting for a solution of his secret and is 
sacrificed to this secret, as it happens to Romantic heroine. Within the 
frame of Romantic interpretation, the protagonist is either a 
metaphorical “savior” or a “criminal”, a Mephistopheles or a 
Napoleon. Germann’s agitation, fervour and avarice are made 
manifest by the repetition of the conjunctions and the inversion of the 
adverbs as compared to their “neutral” location in the Russian 
sentence: “On stavil kartu za kartoi, gnul ugly reshitel’no, vyigryval 
besprestanno, i zagrebal к sebe zoloto, i klal assignacii v karman” 
(Vinogradov 1980: 224). Strictly speaking, is not only the narrator’s 
or only Germann’s point of view what is presented: the perspective of 
the daemonic game of Fatum unifies the external evaluative descrip-
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tion of Germann’s resolute, quick, almost automatic action and the 
implied stream of his unconscious passions. Certain configurations of 
motifs metonymically or metaphorically related to a theme or a higher- 
order motif are also manifestations of a perspective. For instance, in 
Nabokov’s “Mary” the main axis is set by the parallel between 
shooting a film in the protagonist’s former “shadow life” and the 
house building in his new “real life”. The first: “the lazy workmen 
walking easily and nonchalantly like blue-clad angels from plank to 
plank high above”, and a mob of extras “acting in total ignorance of 
what the film is about” (Nabokov 1970: 21). The second: “The figures 
of the workmen on the frame showed blue against the morning sky. 
One was walking along the ridge-piece, as light and free  as though he 
were about to fly  away [...]. This lazy, regular process had a curiously 
calming effect [ ...]” (Nabokov 1970: 113-114). The metaphorical 
motives of easiness, nonchalance, freedom, flight, blue colour, height, 
sky create the image of an escape and aspiration for the otherworld 
fusing the horizons of the auctorial narrator and the character. The 
whole textual segments may be metonymically or metaphorically 
juxtaposed to each other, e.g. a “metonymical description” or 
landscape as part of character’s consciousness, as shown by S. 
Rimmon-Kenan (1983: 63-70). Another example is the often-cited 
fair episode in Madame Bovary. The critics repeatedly indicated the 
contrast of high romantic feelings and low agricultural details 
ironically juxtaposed in the scene that gave the idea of montage to 
Eisenstein. But the contrasting parts are also interrelated by 
metaphorical similarity: Rodolphe “emancipates” Emma to convince 
her that marriage is not an obstacle for love of chosen souls. Likewise, 
the politics “emancipate” the people convincing them to strive for 
further agricultural achievements. In both cases the emancipation 
involves corruption: the romantic phraseology conceals the sexual 
desire in the first case and the work of political machinery in the 
second case.
In Nabokov’s Pale Fire, old John Shade fails to see his house from 
Lake Road although he has seen it many times in his boyhood when 
his eyesight has been keener: “Maybe some quirk in space // Has 
caused a fold or furrow to displace // The fragile vista, the frame 
house between // Goldsworth and Wordsmith on its square of green” 
(Nabokov 1991: 30). Kinbote the commentator who rents Judge 
Goldsworth’s house contests the exactitude of the Shadean topo­
graphy:
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In seeming to suggest a midway situation between the two places, our poet is 
less concerned with spatial exactitude than with a witty exchange of syllables 
invoking the two masters of the heroic couplet, between whom he embodies 
his own muse. Actually, the “frame house on its square of green” was five 
miles west of the Wordsmith campus but only fifty yards or so distant from 
my east windows. (Nabokov 1991: 68)
We cannot fully rely on Kinbote’s “real” commentary since he is con­
cerned with reminding to the reader of his being the poet’s 
confidential friend close to him both spiritually and topographically. 
“Between” does not necessarily mean “a midway situation” and 
Wordsworth is not the “master of the heroic couplet”. Shade’s poor 
sight correlates with Kinbote’s psychological unreliability. As a result, 
a moving house emerges, the house which is sometimes visible, 
sometimes invisible, situated either in the real space between Golds- 
worth’s house and the Wordsmith campus or in the continued imagi­
nary space, an optical metaphor of miraculous poetical imagination 
which balances on the border between involuntary blindness and 
conscious self-deception.
In the literary text, as distinct from the historical or philosophical 
one, the perspective is changing constantly and a new configuration 
has a retroactive effect on the previous configurations: there is a 
permanent “feedback”. Trope as a means of perspectivization is 
comparable to the dual- or multiple-voice effect: it allows “to draw 
non-standard meaning lines” (Hintikka, Sandu 1994: 160) without a 
clear identification of the speaker.
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Метафора и нарратив
В статье дается обзор лингвистических, когнитивных и коммуника­
тивных подходов к метафоре и ее функционированию в нарративном 
тексте. Особое внимание уделяется проблеме иконичности и использо­
ванию витгенштейновского понятия “аспекта” в изучении метафоры. В 
работе указывается, что расширенное понимание метафоры как “фи­
гуры” или “тропа” в поструктуралистском дискурсе позволяет видеть в 
метафоре текстовую “машину интерпретации”. В процессе взаимо­
действия нарративных и фигуративных моделей (patterns) метафора 
является способом перспективизации, т.е. репрезентации сознания. 
Последующие конфигурации взаимодействуют с предшествующими: в 
тексте осуществляется постоянная “обратная связь” и корреляция.
Metafoor ja narratiiv
Artiklis antakse ülevaade lingvistilistest, kognitiivsetest ja  kommunikatiivse­
test lähenemistest metafoorile ja  tema funktsioneerimisest narratiivses tekstis. 
Erilist tähelepanu pööratakse ikoonilisuse probleemile ja  Wittgensteini mõiste 
“aspekt” kasutamisele metafoori uurimisel. Töös näidatakse, et metafoori kui 
“figuuri” või “troobi” laiendatud mõistmine postrukturalistlikus diskursuses 
võimaldab metafooris näha tekstilist “interpretatsiooni masinat” . Narratiivsete 
ja  figuratiivsete mudelite (patterns) vastastikuses mõjutusprotsessis on meta­
foor perspektiivi loomise, st teadvuse representeerimise viisiks. Järgnevad 
konfiguratsioonid on eelmiste mõjuväljas: tekstis toimub pidev “tagasiside” ja 
korrelatsioon.
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Abstract. The paper deals with the general peculiarities of numerals. Cases 
where the sense of numeral cannot simply be explained by the idea of 
counting, of number, or of order are considered. Special types of texts — 
folklore on the one hand, propaganda on the other hand — are analyzed. For 
the latter the examples from two Soviet central official newspapers — Pravda 
and Izvestija of May 1986 have been chosen. These texts partially reflect 
common stylistic features of Soviet propagandistic discourse of the “period of 
stagnation”; their specificity is caused by the special situation, which obtained 
in the country in those days — the catastrophe in the atomic power station in 
Chernobyl. It is claimed that all the considered examples reflect several 
aspects of meaning of numerals contained in their general semantics. Thus, 
the development of the evaluative meaning is explained by the semantics of 
degree contained in the numerals. These data contribute to Frege’s idea of 
relativity of number, but from another, purely linguistic, point of view.
1. General peculiarities of numerals
According to a common point of view that seems to be reasonable, 
numerals are a part of speech or at least a class of words 
demonstrating a certain grammatical, semantic, and pragmatic unity 
(Admoni 1968; Melchuk 1985). They form numeral systems in natural 
languages and are linguistic expressions of numbers. Numerals and 
numbers are connected with a very important, universal, and ancient 
human faculty, that of counting. The latter is interrelated with the
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development of the notion of number and of simple arithmetical 
operations. James R. Hurford, who investigated in his two funda­
mental monographs different aspects of numerals (Hurford 1975, 
1987), considered the cardinality principle, “the disposition to make 
the sizable inductive leap from a memorized sequence of words to the 
use of these words expressing the cardinality of collections” (Hurford 
1987: 305), an innate capability of man, as the faculty most important 
for the formation of numerals. Recent studies of numerals in Indo- 
European languages (Gvozdanovic 1992; 1999) reveal etymologies 
and several principles of ordering of Indo-European numeral systems 
(those based on “five”, on “ten”, on “twenty”, and on “hundred”), 
contributing to our understanding of these lexical units. As for the 
origin of numerals, several hypotheses have been proposed, the most 
popular of these being the referential/pragmatic, the conceptual/verbal, 
and the ritual. The latter one, also called “eeny, meeny, miny, mo”, is 
that numerals originated from rituals in which “sequences of words 
which have no referential, propositional, or conceptual meaning are 
recited while the human actor simultaneously points (in some way) to 
objects in a collection [...]” (Hurford 1987: 103-104). According to 
this hypothesis, the connection of numerals with ancient forms of 
folklore is evident.
Numbers and their linguistic representations, numerals, are based 
on a kind of abstraction (Frege 1980: 44—51): the objects being 
counted are considered as uniform, their differences being dis­
regarded. In saying “three apples” we disregard differences of these 
apples. Objects having nothing in common could be unified because 
of their number: three apples and three books are similar because of 
their “threeness”. Abstraction, being a general peculiarity of language, 
manifests itself already in working out a concept and in the nomi­
nation of objects. Frege wrote: “If, for example, in considering a white 
cat and a black, I disregard the properties which serve to distinguish 
them, then I get presumably the concept ‘cat’” (Frege 1980: 45). For 
Frege, numbers are principally different from properties of objects like 
colours. He writes:
Colour such as blue belongs to a surface independently of any choice of ours. 
The blue colour is a power of reflecting light of certain wavelength and of 
absorbing to varying extent lights of other wavelengths; to this, our way of 
regarding it cannot make the slightest difference. The Number 1, on the other 
hand, or 100 or any other Number, cannot be said to belong to the pile of its 
own right, but at most to belong to it in view of the way in which we have 
chosen to regard it [...]. (Frege 1980: 29)
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Frege’s concept of the subjectivity and the arbitrariness of numbers 
have been criticized by several philosophers (Resnik 1980: 153-199), 
especially by Armstrong. They introduced a concept of a single object 
having, according their point of view, a real basis (Hurford 1987: 
132-141). On the other hand, the linguistic relativity of concepts, e.g. 
this of colours, their dependence on languages, usually referred to as 
Sapir-Whorf hypothesis, has become a commonplace. In spite of 
several concepts that seem to show the similarity of numerals to other 
kinds of words, their specificity is evident. It is not by chance that 
they show certain closeness to morphological categories. The category 
of the number also expresses the opposition of one object to many 
objects. The difference between plural and numeral constructions (e.g. 
the plural of nouns in Indo-European languages) is that in the plural 
the quantity is not specified. But this difference is fluid: on the one 
hand, there exists in several languages dualis denoting two objects; on 
the other hand, such quantifiers as “several”, “many”, etc., are similar 
to numerals (Hurford 1987: 146-158) and may be considered as “un­
specified numerals” (Vater 1986: 15; several aspects of interrelations 
between numerals and quantifiers see also in Reinhart 1997).
Hurford assumed “the semantic representation of any positive 
whole number n to be n marks on whatever materials medium we can 
agree to talk about”. According to this concept, “the semantic 
representation of one is /, that of two is //, that of three is III, and so on 
ad infinitum” (Hurford 1975: 21; 1987: 142-143). He also considers 
“the semantics of constructions involving numerals in extensional, or 
denotational, terms”. Whereas “the denotation of cat is the set of all 
cats, the denotation of red is the set of all red things, [...] the denota­
tion of five cats will be taken to be the set of all collections of cats 
with just five (cat) numbers” (Hurford 1987: 145). ‘“ Cardinal 
meaning’ is that which concerns a class or set of objects and refers to 
a collection with the corresponding cardinality (in the sentence Those 
five students the cardinality is ‘five’)” (Hurford 1987: 168). Ordinals 
refer to cases with “a particular ordered sequence” (Hurford 1987: 
170).
In spite of common peculiarities of all numerals, several groups of 
them are known (Admoni 1968). Besides the common subdivision of 
them into cardinals and ordinals, there are also additional subgroups: 
such as collectives (Russ, “dvoe”, “troe”) (Gvozdanovic 1992: 807- 
811), distributives (Russ, “po dva”, Germ, “je zwei”, French “ils ont 
dix francs chacun” (Gvozdanovic 1992: 142-145, 418^421, 483), 
multiplicatives (Germ, “dreimal”, French “triple”) (Gvozdanovic
19
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1992: 93, 328-331, 483-484), proportionals (Germ, “zweifach”, Engl- 
“twice”), aggregatives (meaning “group of ‘n ’”) (Gvozdanovic 1992: 
236), partitives (into ‘n’ parts) (Gvozdanovic 1992: 237). All these 
subgroups are based on semantic, in most cases also on morphological 
and syntactical unity and form systems in corresponding languages. 
Their semantics seems to be simple, cases of polysemy, homonymy, 
semantic shifts, etc., seem to be excluded.
But let us consider examples usually neglected in the literature 
about numerals, cases where the sense of numeral cannot simply be 
explained by the idea of counting, of number, or of order. The 
examples are given in English, but they are close to universals, 
showing only slight differences depending on languages: in 1998; she 
is seventeen; Louis XIV; Fifteenth Street; the Ninth symphony by 
Beethoven; bus number nine, bus line (route) number nine (in 
Russian, expressions like “the ninth bus" correspond to the norm of 
pragmatic usage); one hundred dollars; second grade (it means in 
English, and in literal translation from Russian as well, a grade of 
quality of a product: Russian “vtoroj sort” = ‘a poor grade, not the 
best grade’; in American English it concerns also a school grade).
In all of these examples containing cardinals and ordinals, 
numerals are of course (more or less) connected with the idea of 
numbers, but only partially. Thus, in such examples as Louis XIV, 
Catherine II, etc. numbers are parts of names usual for Emperors, for 
kings, etc. Numbers here could be replaced by other conventional 
elements, e.g., adjectives and nouns, that are in these special cases 
synonymous with numerals, e.g., one and the same Russian Tsar is 
called Peter the First and also Peter the Great (in Russian: ‘Pjotr 
Pervyj’ and ‘Pjotr Velikij’). The meaning of a place in a sequence 
typical of ordinals is here not very important; e.g., the fact that 
Catherine П was preceded by Catherine I is crucial only from the 
“etymological point of view. Numerals are used in these names 
according to tradition and convention, their usage can be explained 
only on the basis of reasons of designations, by “etymology”. In the 
example of the title of a musical composition, the ninth symphony by 
Beethoven, the meaning of place in a sequence is probably more 
salient than in the former examples (the ninth symphony was com­
posed by Beethoven after the eighth), but the conventionality 0f 
number is here present as well. Whereas the fact of the sequence-order 
of composing music by a composer may be crucial for historians 0f 
music, for usual hearers the ordinal numeral “ninth” in this context is 
first of all a title, a name that in this case can be e.g. associated with
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the famous melody or with the choir singing a hymn. 1 would like to 
remind the reader of an anecdote that is current in Russia, where the 
comical effect is based on the ambiguity of the numeral. A man comes 
to a musical concert later; he asks what is being played. “The ninth 
symphony by Beethoven”, is the answer. “Terrible,” says the man, “I 
came ten minutes later and missed as many as eight”. The example 
with numbers denoting a bus line also demonstrates the conventio­
nality of numeral usage. In making a plan of bus lines in a city it is 
convenient to designate them by numbers. There is a different tradi­
tion for train schedules, probably because the railway traffic is not so 
regular during long-term periods. Interestingly, there are cases when 
several regular railway routes and the corresponding trains are 
designated by special “titles” similar to proper names. Once more, the 
conventionality of numerals in these cases is used in an anecdote well 
known in Russia. A man (usually it is Vasilij Ivanovich Chapaev, the 
famous hero of the Civil War, who became a central person of a series 
of anecdotes) has to take the bus number 25; he is standing at the bus 
station and waiting until 24 buses pass. As in the anecdote mentioned 
above, the humor of this story is based on a pun, on the homonymy of 
the meaning of numerals. The naive hero (the favorite one in 
anecdotes) does not understand the conventionality of nomination 
usual in tradition of Russian language.
These cases only partially correspond to the general meaning of 
numerals. Let us once more refer to Hurford who wrote: “the deno­
tation of the cardinal numeral five  is the set of all collections of five 
things. [...] the denotation of the ordinal fifth is the set of all objects 
that are in fifth position in some ordered sequence” (Hurford 1987: 
169). The semantics of ordinal as a number or a place in a “context- 
given sequence” as in the example given by Hurford ‘‘Ivan was the 
fifth Ukrainian in the queue” (Hurford 1987: 170) manifests itself in 
our examples rather in the “etymology” (in reasons for designation) 
than in the sense itself. The similarity of the cases of numeral usage 
mentioned above to the proper names consists in the fact that they 
both do not designate classes of objects having common features. 
Whereas the common feature of all five objects is their “fiveness”, and 
that of all the fifth objects is their place in the sequence, the fifth or 
ninth, etc., bus lines in different cities have only their names in 
common, as in the case of proper names (all men called Peter or 
Daniel have usually only their names in common). The same could be 
said of several other examples considered above: the Ninth symphony, 
Louis XIV. Numbers are here labels. As often in such cases, in spite of
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all this, additional associations and sememes can be developed. Inside 
a certain city, buses (or bus lines) possessing a certain number have 
common features: their route can evoke a lot of additional conno­
tations, e.g. monuments of architecture, passengers living in a certain 
neighborhood, other possible individual or collective memories, etc. 
Thus, the trolley bus number one (in Russian “pervyj trollejbus” — 
‘the first trolley bus’) associates in my mind with the central street and 
the Neva River in St.Petersburg and with the street leading to the 
University. The symbolism of numbers typical of several cultural 
traditions also connects numerals with meaning, often in a vague and 
rather qualificative way, creating oppositions like “lucky — unlucky”, 
“good — bad”, etc.
The other examples listed above demonstrate transitional cases 
(between the usage of numerals described by Hurford and special 
usage mentioned by us). Thus, a numeral denoting a year is, of course, 
connected with the notion of sequence, but the development of several 
additional sememes is possible. Such numerals as 1933, 1937, or 
1945, denote not only an order of a year in a sequence following a 
conventional term, each succeeding the preceding one, but mean for 
many speakers something more, evoking complicated associations. 
The usage of numerals in expressions denoting a sum of money, as in 
several others, is based on conventional units of measurement ac­
cepted in several societies. Nomination of age evokes additional con­
notations — e.g. the age of seventeen means also ‘youth’, etc. At the 
same time, a phone number reflects a pure conventional usage of bare 
numerals (if several numbers are not connected with the cor­
responding neighborhood), but can be additionally (individually) 
associated with a kind of rhythm.
The difference between numerals and other parts of speech (or 
word classes) can be observed in bilingual speakers or speakers using 
their second language in everyday life. It is known that people usually 
count in their mother tongue; but a phone number is, according to my 
observations, often first remembered in the language of everyday 
speech (even if it is not the original mother tongue). In any case, the 
acquisition of foreign language words denoting numbers differs from 
those of other words, reflecting, as can be supposed, differences of 
mental representation of these classes of lexemes. On the other hand, 
the similarity of numeral to several other parts of speech can be traced. 
As was stated above, numerals in several functions of these are close 
to other “labels”, e.g., personal names (as in a children’s poem where 
kittens were called “One, Two, Three, Four, Five”).
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Being connected with the semantics of a place in a sequence, of 
quantity, numerals develop additionally the meaning of degree. As 
noted above, such words as “many”, “few”, etc. are close to numerals 
and are included by several scholars in this group of words. The next 
step in the development of their semantics is the forming of evaluative 
sememes — one of the universal lexical processes. The trend to the 
expression of evaluation is an important peculiarity of language, 
especially salient in adjectives and in some kinds of adverbs. The 
lexical meaning of the lexeme can be in such cases partially preserved 
or entirely lost (cf. the history of such words as “very” in English 
meaning originally 'truly’; “sehr” in German, originally ‘painful’; 
“bol’no” ‘painful’ in Russian that may be used in the meaning ‘very’, 
etc.; to mention recent development — “cool” in modem English 
meaning a high degree of quality). The development of the additional 
meaning of high quantity and that of high evaluation (as E. M. Volf 
stated for the case of the adjective: “It could be added: “and this is 
good” — Volf 1978: 18-20) may be seen in the hyperbolic usage of 
such words as “millions”, “thousands”, “hundreds”, etc. In these 
examples, as in several mentioned above, numerals lose the exactness, 
which is their chief peculiarity. Special kinds of texts are important in 
this connection.
2. Numerals in several kinds of texts
It is evident that numerals are often used in scientific texts, e.g., where 
statistic data are concerned. The addressees of these texts are speci­
alists possessing the corresponding knowledge and capable of 
evaluating the information. The latter is very important in the case of 
numerals because they often have relative values, and their com­
prehension demands certain presuppositions (including the basic 
knowledge of other statistic data). But numerals are often met also in 
texts that are almost opposite to those mentioned above; e.g., in fairy­
tales, epics, and minor forms of folklore (proverbs, riddles). Let me 
just list a few instances to illustrate the usage of numerals in Russian 
proverbs:
“U semi njanek ditja bez glazu” — literally: ‘the child with seven nurses is in 
want of control’.
“Sem’ raz otmer’ — odin raz otrež’” — literally: 'measure seven 
times — cut one time’,
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“Odin s soškoj — semero s ložkoj” — literally: ‘one with a (wooden) 
plough — seven with a spoon’,
“Sem’ bed — odin otvet” — literally ‘seven desasters — one answer’.
“Ne imej sto rublej, a imej sto druzej” —  literally: ‘don’t have a hundred 
roubles, but do have a hundred friends’.
As in all utterances of this kind, proverbs listed above have figurative 
meaning; they often reflect directive, illocutionary speech acts. Thus, 
the first one concerns cases when the lack of success is caused by too 
many persons doing one and the same job, a type of proverb well 
known in different national traditions (in English: “Too many cooks 
spoil the broth”) and included in the international classification (Kuusi 
1972: 699-735, esp. 718; 1978). The directivity of these utterances 
manifests itself also in the meaning ‘many’ or ‘too many’ (evaluation 
of quantity) that the numerals possess. “Seven” used in these proverbs 
is a sacred number traditionally common in folklore and representing 
here “unspecified” numerals; the sense of utterance would not change 
if “seven” were replaced by another numeral or by “many”.
In epics of different national traditions, numerals denoting large 
quantities (“forty, hundred, thousand”) are often used, whereby the 
same “sacred” numbers (“three, seven, twelve”) are found (Toporov 
2000). Thus, in one of the Russian epic songs (bylinas) from Nov­
gorod a stone is described as being “thirty ells wide, forty ells long, 
and three ells high” (Novgorodskie byliny 1978: 105). In another 
bylina, the sacred book on the origin of the world is described as being 
“forty spans long, twenty spans wide, and thirty spans thick” (Evgen- 
jeva, Putilov 1958: 272,). In the “Nibelungenlied” the stone that 
Pruenhilde proposed to throw as a part of the competition for her hand 
is described by several epitheta concerning its dimensions and weight, 
then it is added that twelve bold and brave heroes could hardly carry it 
(Aventiure 7, 449 — Brackert 1993: 100). Several examples from the 
Old Icelandic Elder Edda (in literal prosaic translation): “We have 
seven chambers full of swords” (Atlaqvitha, 7 — Neckel 1983: 241); 
“Seven hundred men went to the hall” (Guthrunarqvitha III, 7 — 
Neckel 1983: 233), “We were thirty warriors of birth, eleven of us left 
alive” (Atlamal Gr. — 51; Neckel 1983: 255). In the majority of 
examples, numerals in epics are connected with epic heroism; they are 
used in texts where the strength, great abilities, the power, and the 
wealth of heroes have to be stressed. Thus, numerals in folklore texts 
are close to epitheta ornantia. The usage of numerals in proverbs can 
be connected with the general peculiarities of the latter as a genre of
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folklore and as a type of speech act having directive and figurative 
rather than direct character. Numerals in epic texts that could in 
principle be substituted by other ones are partially caused by the 
peculiarities of this kind of texts, on their formulaic structure based on 
the principle of “blocks” capable of being substituted in the process of 
the generation of the text. The “realism” of numerals in these folklore 
texts is doubtful, in spite of the general possibility of creating 
corresponding “realistic” images.
Several peculiarities of numerals — those manifesting themselves 
in folklore texts — cause the possibility of their usage in another 
genre of texts — in propaganda. Here also formulaic expressions like 
“millions of people” etc., can be found. The examples to be con­
sidered later are taken from two Soviet central official newspapers — 
“Pravda” and “Izvestija” of May 1986. They partially reflect common 
stylistic features of Soviet propagandistic discourse of the “period of 
stagnation”. Their specificity is caused by the special situation, which 
obtained in the country in those days — the catastrophe in the atomic 
power station in Chernobyl. The scale of the catastrophe was clear 
only to a few people. Journalists were evidently instructed to veil the 
real tragic events, and they used typical, well-known means to do it. I 
have chosen these texts to demonstrate the role of numerals in 
propaganda because the events became a turning point in the 
consciousness of many people in the Soviet Union. The whole story 
shows the change of text meaning caused by an extralinguistic 
situation: propagandistic texts close to mythological ones became 
suddenly realistic. Besides, in this special case the attitudes of the 
addressees can be reconstructed, because of the personal experience of 
the author of this article. The latter is of special importance as the 
perception of the text by the addressee is the element that is very 
quickly lost in most cases.
The accident in Chernobyl occurred immediately before the First 
of May, the official holiday in the USSR. Traditionally, newspapers 
published then report on the accomplishments of the Soviet people. 
May 2 the newspaper “Izvestija” wrote:
“Segodnja set’ avtodorog Tadžikskoj SSR sostavljaet 12728 km. Eto bol’se, 
cem rasstojanie ot Moskvy do centra Kamöatskoj oblasti.” — Today the 
highway network of Tajik SSR accounts for 12728 km. This is more than the 
distance from Moscow to the center of Kamchatka region’.
“Traktorostroiteli objazalis’ v dvenadcatoj pjatiletke dat’ 520 tysjac 
traktorov” — ‘Tractor constructors committed themselves to producing 520 
thousand tractors during the twelfth Five-Year Plan period.’
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“Kiev [...]. Zdes’ v nynešnem godu vypustjat 285 tysjac mikserov, 60 
tysjac kofemolok, 30 tysjaõ kuchonnych mašin” —  ‘Kiev [...]. Here 285 
thousand mixers, 60 thousand coffee mills, and 30 thousand kitchen units will 
be produced during this year’.
From the newspaper “Pravda” on the May 1:
“Nefteprochodõiki proburili 10792 m gomych porod vmesto 10500 po 
objazatel’stvu” — ‘ Miners bored 10792 M of rocks instead of the 10500 they 
had committed themselves to producing’.
The magic of high numbers was intended to evoke the corresponding 
sentiments. Because these texts were essentially addressed to readers 
not specialized in statistics, the numerals were predominantly per­
ceived as decorative and evaluative elements, like signs of heroic 
deeds in epics. On the other hand, they were known to be a part of 
texts of a certain genre — of Soviet propagandistic discourse. Many 
people skilled in reading these texts developed a specific under­
standing of them. It did not mean that they knew statistics and were 
interested in the length of highways and the quantities of produced 
materials, but they rather regarded all these texts as conventional ones. 
Numerals could be perceived as one of the elements of such texts, 
having not much in common with real life and even not destined to 
reflect the reality. It can be said that numerals in these texts, even in 
cases when they were true, became signs of lying.
The first information on the catastrophe, published in the lower 
comer of the newspaper’s page, was scanty; it did not contain 
numbers. On May 1 both “Pravda” and “Izvestija” published a short 
report, where it was mentioned that two persons had died, 197 persons 
had been brought to hospital, of which 49 had left after medical 
examination. On the May 2 it was reported that radioactivity on the 
territory of the Atomic Power Station and in the village had become 
1,5-2 times less, and that 18 persons were in a grave condition. At the 
same time several articles about incidents in power stations abroad 
appeared. On the May 4 “Pravda” (p. 5) wrote: “As is known, during 
the period of 1971-1984 in 14 countries of the world 151 accidents 
took place in the atomic power stations”. On the May 6 (p. 4): “Last 
year ca. 2300 ‘incidents’ were registered in the USA, according to 
available data”. “Izvestija” 5.05: “Accidents on the Atomic Power 
Stations. USA Washington. 4th of May. (TASS). Nearly 20 thousand 
different accidents and technical problems occurred in American 
atomic stations since 1979 [...] In 1979, 2310 incidents occurred in 68 
atomic power stations in the USA. [...]In 1980, the number of 
accidents increased to 3804, one year later to 4060. In 1983, there
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were more than 5 thousand”. As late as May 8, the first larger article 
about the events in Chernobyl containing numerical data on the level 
of radiation appeared. Whereas the journalists continued to use the 
Soviet political discourse, the perception of these texts by the 
addressees suddenly changed. The numbers ceased to be mythological 
ones. Many people consulted the corresponding reference literature 
and became well informed about the physical parameters connected 
with the catastrophe, first of all about different levels of radiation and 
their possible consequences. It was not mythology that they needed, it 
was realism.
The examples from newspapers listed above demonstrate the usage 
of numerals in propaganda. As is known, three types of propaganda 
may be singled out: “the white”, “the gray” and the “black” one 
(O’Donnell, Jowett 1989: 49-63; 1992: 8-19). “White” propaganda is 
based on “a source which is identified correctly and communicates 
accurate information”, but presented and evaluated in a corresponding 
manner. “Gray” propaganda is when the source of information is not 
always correctly identified; it may contain false data. “Black” 
propaganda is disinformation, containing lies, all types of deceit. 
Many interesting examples of the usage of statistics to deceive are 
collected in the book by Darrell Huff (1954) that is a kind of manual 
for self-defence against lie with numerals. It cannot be excluded that 
the examples cited above still remain within the bounds of the “white” 
propaganda or correspond to the “gray” one. As can be seen from the 
examples listed above, numerals provide substantial aid in compiling 
propagandistic texts. Their relativity makes the special manipulations 
possible, which are needed in propaganda. Thus, it could seem that 
one incident in Chernobyl is not substantial in comparison with 20 
thousand accidents in America (here the trick is based on the 
comparison of things incommensurable in their degrees). Besides, the 
numerals provide the illusion of exactness and of truth (e.g. the 
“exact” number 3804 cited above). The connection of numerals with 
the qualitative semantics and their magic is also important.
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Conclusions
Our considerations permit us to draw the following conclusions. 
Special types of texts — folklore on the one hand, propaganda on the 
other hand — are taken into account.
1. Numerals presuppose a certain generalization and unification of 
objects, differences being disregarded. Several examples from propa­
gandistic texts mentioned above are based on this peculiarity of 
numerals. In the sentence “The last year ca. 2300 ‘incidents’ were 
registered in the USA [...]” the propagandistic trick consists in 
equating of cases of different degrees. The subtext consists of the 
possibility of adding to this series another case — that of Chernobyl, 
to put it into a set of numerous other cases, i.e. to deny its unique 
character. In formulas like “millions of people” something similar 
occurs. People are considered as a mass, the differences of persona­
lities being disregarded. As was stated above, generalization is a 
common peculiarity of language, needed already in forming a notion; 
grammatical categories also presuppose generalization and unification. 
In the latter aspect, numerals are, as we have pointed out above, 
similar to grammatical number, but they are more “marked”, they 
switch attention from the difference of objects to their unity in a set. 
Leo Weisgerber showed in his classical article “Der Mensch im 
Akkusativ” the interrelation between several accusative constructions 
(those with the German transitive verbs like “erfassen”, “eingliedem”, 
“einsetzten”, “verpflegen”, etc.), and the dehumanization, spiritual 
subordination of the person (Weisgerber 1963). We could state 
something similar about “the human person in numeral construction”.
2. Numerals possess relativity, and this not only in terms of the 
general arbitrariness of linguistic sign; moreover they depend on scale, 
on point of view, etc. That is why special knowledge is needed for an 
evaluation of numerical constructions — the fact that is used in 
propaganda. Thus, the interpretation of information about the tremen­
dous quantity of produced tractors demands additional background 
data including other numerals, other kind of knowledge, e.g. if this 
tractors are needed, where and how they have to be used, etc.
3. Because of the latter, the exactness of numerals is often rather 
relative. In many texts they provide an illusion of exactness. In 
“white” and “gray” propaganda numbers help to create the imitation 
of objectivity. Numbers are also often used in folklore texts (fairy­
tales, epics) that are far from “realism in statistics”. The peculiarity of
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these texts consists in the combination of fantastic elements and 
(pseudo-) exactness. In all these cases of numeral usage the addressee 
is free to interpret it as a mythological or as a realistic element. 
Evidently, the specificity of the truth factor is well known here, e.g. in 
the case of fairytales.
4. Numerals often develop evaluative meaning, because they 
contain the semantics of degree. Words like “million”, “thousand”, 
etc. in singular and plural forms, and other lexemes denoting consider­
able quantities are often used in a hyperbolic sense and possess the 
additional sememe of high quantitative evaluation. They provide the 
impression of monumentality, something that is often used in pro­
paganda tending to monumentalism. Even such a numeral as “seven” 
(the traditional ritual number) can mean in folklore texts, as was 
shown above, ‘many’. The semantic shift ‘great quantity’ > ‘high 
evaluation’ or at least the connection of numerals denoting high 
quantity with stylistic “monumentalism” is evident and reflects the 
general trend to the development of evaluative semantics in languages.
5. The magic of numbers reflecting the ancient belief connected 
with different sides of life, e.g. with the systematicity of the world 
picture, manifests itself not only in folklore texts. The traces of such 
usage of numerals can be observed in several texts, especially those of 
propaganda containing other features of ritualized texts as well (e.g., 
epitheta omantia, epic retardation, repetitions, etc.).
6. It could be thought that all cases considered above concern the 
metaphoric usage of numerals. I would like to claim that all these 
examples reflect one of the aspects of meaning of numerals contained 
in their general semantics. These data contribute to Frege’s idea of 
relativity of numbers, but from another point of view.
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О семантических свойствах числительных и об 
использовании числительных в определенных текстах
В статье рассматриваются общие свойства числительных как части речи. 
Особо выделяются те случаи, когда семантика числительного не 
ограничивается идеей счета, порядка или числа объектов. В связи с этим 
анализируются примеры использования числительных, с одной стороны, 
в фольклорных, с другой —  в пропагандистских текстах. Так, рассмот­
рен ряд примеров из газет «Правда» и «Известия» за май 1986 года. 
Хотя эти тексты типичны для советского политического дискурса, они 
имеют специфическую особенность: манипуляция числительными 
должна была скрыть крупнейшую технологическую катастрофу —  ава­
рию на Чернобыльской АЭС. В статье показано, что все случаи исполь­
зование числительных в текстах отражают их общие частеречные 
семантические свойства. Так, развитие у числительных оценочной 
семантики связано со значением степени, входящим в их семантическое 
поле. Выводы, сделанные автором, соответствуют философской концеп­
ции Фреге об относительности цифр и чисел, но касаются лишь чисто 
лингвистического аспекта проблемы.
Arvsõnade semantilistest omadustest ja arvsõnade 
kasutamisest teatud tekstides
V aadeldakse arvsõnade kui sõnaliikide üldisi om adusi, pöörates erilist 
tähelepanu juhtudele, kui arvsõna sem antika ei piirdu objektide loenda­
mise, järjestuse või arvu ideega. Sellega seoses analüüsitakse arvsõnade 
kasutam ist (a) folklooritekstides ja  (b) propagandistlikes tekstides. On 
läbi töötatud hulk näiteid 1986. а . mais ilm unud ajalehtedest “P ravda” ja  
“Izvestija” . Kuigi need tekstid on tüüpilised nõukogude poliitilise diskur- 
suse jaoks, on neil siiski ka eripära: arvudega m anipuleerim ine pidi 
varjam a tõde suurim ast tehnoloogilisest katastroofist —  avariist Tšerno- 
bõli AEJs. N äidatakse, et kõik arvsõnade kasutam ise juhud neis tekstides 
peegeldavad nende üldisi sõnaliigilisi sem antilisi om adusi. N äiteks on 
arvsõnade hinnangulise sem antika areng seotud nende tähendusväljas 
sisalduva jä rgu  tähendusega. Autori poolt tehtud järeldused kattuvad 
Frege filosoofilise kontseptsiooniga num brite ja  arvude suhtelisusest, kuid 
siin käsitletakse vaid probleem i lingvistilist aspekti.
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Abstract. The aim of the present study is to describe the prosodic systems of 
the Greek and Latin languages and to find out the versification systems which 
have been realized in the poetical practice. The Greek language belongs 
typologically among the mora-counting languages and thus provides possibi­
lities for the emergence of purely quantitative verse, purely syllabic verse, 
quantitative-syllabic verse and syllabic-quantitative verse. There is no purely 
quantitative or purely syllabic verse in actual Greek poetry; however, the 
syllabic-quantitative versification systems (the Aeolian tradition) and 
quantitative-syllabic versification systems (the Ionian tradition) were in use. 
The Latin language, on the other hand, has a number of features, which cha­
racterize it as a stress-counting language. Since at the same time there exists 
also the opposition of short and long syllables, there are preconditions for the 
syllabic, accentual and quantitative principle, as well as for the combinations 
of these. The Roman literary heritage shows examples of purely accentual, 
syllabic-quantitative, quantitative-syllabic, as well as of several other combi­
natory versification systems.
0. Introduction
There are quite many studies which treat the prosody of ancient verse, 
but the opinions differ even in the most basic questions. Already the 
term ‘prosody’ has different meanings for different scholars. Roughly 
speaking, there are two main kinds of approaches. The first (so-called 
linguistic approach) treats prosody as certain elements which are 
superimposed on phonemes (typically, such elements are stress, force
and pitch; another term used for them is suprasegmentals)1. These 
elements are paradigmatically opposed to one another, e.g., high vs 
low pitch in identical environment (Allen 1973: 6), but they can also 
have secondary values which are defined syntagmadcally (Hogg, 
McCully 1987: 62). The object of the latter treatment (so-called lite­
rary prosody) is versification: verse forms, rhythms and patterns. E.g., 
James Graig La Driere (1943: 455) defines prosody as the general 
term for analysis of the rhythmic structure of sound in speech, espe­
cially in verse. W. S. Allen (1973: 12) offers a kind of synthesis of the 
above-mentioned treatments, claiming that force, pitch and duration 
are the most basic features of phonation, as well as the most important 
constituents of versification which function prosodically in the most 
languages.
The leading scholars on ancient verse, who usually proceed from 
the literary approach, generally discuss not the prosodic system, but 
only separate features of it. Thus, e.g., D. S. Raven in his study on 
Latin verse, describes in the chapter devoted to prosody the rules of 
stress and quantity, the law of iambic shortening, elision and hiatus 
(1965: 22-30), and Martin L. West in his monograph on Greek metre 
(1982: 7-17), in addition to the rules of quantity, pays also attention to 
a number of prosodic features. But there is no treatment of how these 
features join into a system and what is the typological place of the 
analysed languages among other languages. As for the versification 
systems of ancient verse, the leading treatments of ancient verse, as a 
rule, provide no special analysis of these; the Western scholars often 
regard them implicitly and as a part of prosody.
The present study proceeds from the typology of versification 
systems, where versification systems are treated as a correspondence 
between metre and prosody of natural languages, a correspondence 
that proceeds from metrics and creates the prosody of versification, 
transforming at the same time the prosody of natural language 
(Lotman 1998: 1858). The list of the main versification systems is as 
follows: ( 1) purely quantitative verse, where only the number of 
quantities is fixed, but not their positions (there have remained no 
examples of such verse, however, some of the Sanskrit verses 
resemble this type); (2) syllabic verse, where metrically relevant unit 
is the syllable (e.g. Indo-European verse); (3) accentual verse, where 
the accent is metrically relevant; (4) free verse, where metrically
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relevant unit is the phrase; (5) syllabic-quantitative verse, where the 
number of syllables is fixed; quantity is governed by syllables (e.g. the 
Aeolian verse, the Vedas); (6) quantitative-syllabic verse, where both 
the number and the position of quantities is regulated; (7) accentual- 
syllabic verse, where the versification is determined both by syllabics 
and accents, but accents dominate the syllabics; (8) syllabic-accentual 
verse, where the number of syllables is fixed and accents are subject to 
regulation; (9) accentual-syllabic-quantitative verse, where all the 
three principles are applied; ( 10) quantitative-accentual-syllabic verse, 
where regulation applies primarily to quantity, but also the configu­
ration of accents; the number of syllables is governed by quantity 
(Lotman 1998: 2074).
The aims of the present study are a) to describe the prosodic 
systems of the Greek and Latin languages; b) in accordance with the 
prosodic systems of given languages, to establish the versification 
systems for which Greek and Latin have a natural basis and determine 
which of these systems have been realized in the poetical practice.
1. Prosodic system of the Greek language
The most important features of the Greek language are the following.
(1) The elementary prosodic unit or prosodeme is not a syllable, 
but a durational unit — mora. Consequently, Greek is typologically a 
mora-counting language, where prosodemes are distinguished by pitch 
(cf. Trubetzkoy 2000: 211).
(2) In Greek, both vowels and consonants can be prosodically 
significant. Syllables can be unarrested (i.e. open syllables with short 
vowels, e.g. ae), as well as arrested, either orally (i.e. closed syllables 
with short vowels, e.g. Sog) or thoracically (i. e. syllables with long 
vowels or diphthongs, e.g. yif, cf. Stetson 1951, Allen 1973: 65, 203)2. 
There can also occur the so-called hypercharacterization, i.e. the 
syllable is arrested both thoracically and orally, cf. e.g. the subjunctive 
medio-passive form Tratöeixovrai.
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2 The author of the present study proceeds from one of the many interpretations of the 
syllabic structure, the so-called motor theory, according to which the syllabic pulse can be 
arrested by thoracic muscles or oral (consonantal) articular stroke, i.e. the syllables ~V 
and ~VC are both arrested, the former thoracically, the other orally (Stetson 1951). 
Mihhail Lotman points out that a phonological syllable does not necessarily coincide with 
a prosodic syllable, cf. the clauses (6c) and (6d) of the present chapter.
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(3) The syllable can be heavy, light or anceps. The syllable is 
heavy if it is orally or thoracically arrested, otherwise it is light. Quan­
tities are determined by subjective duration, since objectively e.g. the 
syllables Л77- and тгер- were not isochronous, but they were perceived 
as metrically equivalent heavy syllables, which were opposed to light 
syllables. Accordingly, the syllables Л77-, 7 t e v 7П)у- and керк- were 
equivalent to each other and opposed in quantity to the light syllable 
ЯЕ-; while at the same time there was no actual relationship 2 : 1 
between short and long durations (cf. also Kurytowicz 1960: 393).
(4) There is no reduction of unstressed syllables (when vowels 
meet, an elision of syllables can take place, but such phenomenon 
characterizes stressed syllables as well).
(5) The nature of accent is melodic, not dynamic, i.e. an accented 
syllable differs from unaccented ones not by force, but by pitch. There 
are three types of accent: (a) the so-called acutus (ö^vg) which can 
occur both on heavy and light syllables, but only on the last three 
syllables, and on the antepenultimate syllable it can occur only if the 
final syllable of the word is light, as in e.g. кo/xpoq (war)3; (b) gravis 
[ßapvg) which replaces acutus in the case when the word is followed 
by another word without a punctuation mark, cf. e.g. yecopyoq (farmer) 
and yecopyd; ccyaOoq (a good farmer); and (c) circumflexus 
(7Г£рктлсоц£Уод) which can occur on the last two syllables, but only on 
a syllable that contains a long vowel or diphthong, and it can occur on 
the penultimate syllable only if the final syllable is light, e.g. Scdpov 
(gift). Roman Jakobson formulates this rule more clearly: “The span 
between the accented and the final mora cannot exceed one syllable” 
(Jakobson 1962: 263).
(6) When vowels meet, several options are possible (West 1982: 
10-15):
a. elision, e.g. the disappearance of the short final vowel before the 
initial vowel of the following word, e.g. ovS ’a v  = ovSe av,
b. correption, where a long vowel or a diphthong at the word-end is 
shortened before the initial vowel of the next word; this pheno­
menon is characteristic, above all, to early epic and elegy;
c. synizesis or synecphonesis, i.e. two or more vowels which initially 
belong to separate syllables, are amalgamated into one heavy 
syllable;
3 There are som e exceptions to this rule, cf. e.g. A llen 1973: 237.
d. consonantalization of i and d between a consonant and another 
vowel in the same word, e.g., Арвцкхдесо in Arcilochos 29.2;
e. hiatus, in which case both vowels retain their initial values. Hiatus 
is usually avoided with elision, crasis or so-called movable v (v 
ёфеЛкххтпкох) which is added to the ending -cn of dat. pi., as well 
as to the affix -or, the endings -e ja -cn of 3. sg and pi. of verb, the 
form eon, adverb navxanacn and numeral eiKocn. Hiatus is 
occasionally admitted by epic and elegiac poets.
It is important to mention that in the early Middle Ages fundamental 
phonological changes took place, one of the most significant changes 
being the replacement of the melodic accent by the dynamic one. As a 
result, the distinction between long and short vowels ceased to exist 
(cf. Roman Jakobson’s law that if an independent co-existence of 
dynamic accent and quantity evolves, one of these elements disap­
pears from the phonological system; Jakobson 1969: 24).
2. Versification systems in Greek poetry
Prosodic features determine which versification systems may evolve 
on the basis of a given language. Thus, the above-mentioned features 
indicate that the Greek language which typologically belongs to the 
mora-counting languages, could meet the conditions for the evolve- 
ment of purely quantitative verse, where structure is determined only 
by the number of moras in a verse; the conditions for evolvement of 
purely syllabic verse, where the only determined factor is the number 
of syllables in a verse; and their combinations: quantitative-syllabic 
verse, where in addition to the number of moras also their configura­
tion is considered; and syllabic-quantitative verse, where the number 
of syllables is fixed and quantity is subject to the syllabics (Lotman 
1998: 2059-2062). The accentual principle has no role in versifica­
tion, since this kind of melodic accent that is characteristic to Greek, 
can not create rhythmical oppositions.
In actual Greek poetical practice the purely quantitative and the 
purely syllabic versification systems are not to be found, however, 
there do exist the syllabic-quantitative versification system (the 
Aeolian tradition) and quantitative-syllabic versification system (the 
Ionian and Dorian tradition).
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2.1. The syllabic-quantitative versification system
The Aeolian verse has some features obviously in common with the 
Indo-European verse: the strict number of syllables (a heavy syllable 
cannot be replaced by two light syllables, and vice versa); the longer 
verse is divided into shorter cola (cf. the caesura of the Indo-European 
verse); in the first two positions of a verse the quantity is irrelevant 
which is most probably a relic of the Indo-European verse. There are 
three possibilities for filling the positions: a heavy syllable, a light 
syllable or a syllable with irrelevant quantity or anceps. There are 
about 20 basic cola, which are joined into verses and strophes. The 
most important of these are the so-called glyconic ( x x - u u - u - )  and 
pherecratean ( x x -u u — ), the former of which we shall now consider 
in more detail.
In the case of this kind of structure we need to distinguish between 
two principles of versification: a) the syllabic principle which regu­
lates the number of syllables in a verse; b) the quantitative principle 
which regulates the configuration of durations and is governed by the 
syllabic principle (Lotman 1998: 2061-2062). When we mark heavy 
positions as A (the denotation of an abstract metrical element), light 
positions as В and metrical delimitators as &,4 we get the following 
structure: &AAABBABA&. Here, the following syllabic-quantitative 
correspondence rules apply:
(1) To the position A corresponds one heavy syllable.
A —> —
(la) To the position Ai corresponds one heavy or one light syllable, 
but the latter can occur only if the position A2 is filled with the heavy 
syllable (West 1982:30).
Ai—»—
Ai-> u  /...—
(lb) To the position A2 corresponds one heavy or one light syllable, 
but the latter can occur only if the position Ai is filled with the heavy 
syllable (West 1982:30).
A2—> —
A2—> u  / —  ...
(2) To the position В corresponds one light syllable.
В —> u
4 The hierarchy o f  metre w ill be marked with additional delimitators.
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E.g. Sappho, 94. 3ff:5
к о Х Х а  кос! тоб’ ё г т г  [jaot- 
ahu’ dx; Seiva 7i£7r[6vO]a|.iev,
'Parap’, rj jiav a ’ ocekoio arcvAtyirc&vco.7
2.2. Quantitative-syllabic versification system
The Ionian verse is characterized by the fixed number of moras and 
the regulated configuration of durations, but at the same time the 
number of syllables is variable. Namely, the Ionian quantitative-sylla­
bic verse tradition is governed by a principle according to which in 
certain positions a heavy (i.e. dimoraic) syllable can be replaced with 
two light (i.e. monomoraic) syllables. There are two kinds of replace­
ments: contraction which is the filling of two light positions with one 
heavy syllable (e.g. in dactylic measures), and resolution which is the 
filling of one heavy positions or princeps with two light syllables. At 
the same time, there exist not only positions allowing two variations, 
in which case the position is filled either with one heavy syllable or 
two light syllables, but also positions allowing three variations, the so- 
called ancipitia, which can be filled by a light syllable which can then 
be replaced by a heavy syllable, which, in its turn, can be resolved into 
two light syllables (~ ) .
There are also other major differences between the Aeolian and 
Ionian verse structure. While in Indo-European, as well as in the 
Aeolian versification, the smallest metrical unit was the whole line, in 
which light and heavy syllables alternated irregularly, then in the 
Ionian versification this alternation acquired a regularity, where the 
elementary metrical unit was a verse foot. There were feet consisting 
of three moras, (iambus u - ,  trochee - u ,  tribrach u u u ) ,  four moras 
(dactyl - u u ,  anapaest u u - ,  spondee — , prodeleusmaticus u u u u  
etc) and five moras (creticus - u - ,  bacchius и —  etc) — thus, almost 
all the combinations of syllables were taken into use. Shorter, 
trimoraic combinations formed metrons in twos and the name of a 
metre depended on the number of metrons used to form a verse. The
5 Verses can be formed also by the internal expansion of cola; usually it is done 
with choriambic or dactylic structures. Thus, in the case of 94.3-4 the metre is 
glyconic, but in 94.5 the glyconic has been expanded with a dactyl resulting in the 
structure x x - u u - u u - u -
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iambic verse with four feet was called, accordingly, iambic dimeter; 
the one with six feet was called iambic trimeter, etc. Although the 
number of verse feet was fixed, the number of syllables was not: it 
was bound to vary due to the equivalence of two light syllables with 
one heavy. Consequently, e.g. in a hexametrical verse there can occur 
12-17 syllables, depending on how many contractions have taken 
place in a given verse. The number of moras was, however, fixed.
The structure of hexameter can be presented in the form of the 
following scheme (Lotman 1998: 2059-2060)6: 
&&AB&AB&AB&AB&AB&AB&& 
whereby the following correspondence rules apply:
(1) One heavy syllable corresponds to position A.
A —»—
(2) One heavy syllable or the sequence consisting of two light 
syllables corresponds to position B.
В —
В —> u u
(2a) One syllable with an irrelevant quantity corresponds to position 
Вб.
Вб—> x
6 O f course, there exist other possib le w ays o f  description. E .g., Morris Halle has 
proposed the fo llow ing scheme: SW SW SW SW SW SS, where to sym bol S (strong) 
corresponds one heavy syllable, but to sym bol W (weak) one heavy or two light 
syllables. The substantial d ifference is here only in the last foot, which is presented 
with the structure SS. The main disadvantages o f  such description are: a) S does not 
signify the heavy syllab le only, but also the strong position, due to this, it is not a 
suitable sym bol, in principle, to signify the last position; b) the schem e does not reflect 
the quantitative irrelevance o f  the last syllable. On the other hand, it is possible to 
depict the structure o f hexameter with a fo llow in g  scheme: 
& & A B B & A B B & A B B & A B B & A B B & A B (B )" , 
where one heavy syllable corresponds to the sym bol A, w hile one light syllable 
corresponds to the sym bol B. But in such case the formulation o f  correspondence rules 
may cause certain problems (Lotman 1998: 2060). Martin L. W est (1982: 35) prefers
to describe hexameter as a metre consisting o f  tw o cola, the parts o f  which -------- —
(hem iepes, sym bol D ), x— - — ----- and -------(paroemiacus) can also occur
independently. Thus, M. W est presents the fo llow ing pattern o f  hexameter: 
D I D  -I . Although this pattern is based on the historical developm ent o f  
hexameter, it has several disadvantages. Nam ely, the formulation o f  correspondence 
rules is very difficult, and the rhythmical analysis is more com plicated as well: even in 
M. L W est’s own treatment it is only declarative and in actual analysis the units o f  
descriptions are still verse feet, not cola.
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Thus, the constancy of the metrical structure is determined by the 
quantitative principle' and the rhythmical variety depends on the sylla­
bic principle, whereby the latter is subject to the former. E.g., Home- 
ros, Iliad 2. 35-36:
X l q  apa cpcovrjaaq dTießfjo'eTo, xov 5’ t X i n  a m o b  
xa (ppovEovx ava 0i)|j,6v a  p oi) xeXe£ö6ai ецеАЛоу,
where the first line is composed of 16 syllables, the second one of 17 
syllables.
The Dorian verse tradition is even more interesting: here we can 
find both syllabic-quantitative and quantitative-syllabic verse feet, 
where resolutions and contractions take place. While in the case of the 
Ionian versification the smallest symmetrical unit is verse foot and 
verse line is a symmetrical chain of verse feet, then in the case of the 
Dorian verse the symmetry often appears only on the strophical and 
hyperstrophical level. Especially common are the triadic composi­
tions, where the metrically equivalent strophe and antistrophe 
(orpocpij, dvTKJtpcKpTj) are followed by a different metrical form, so- 
called epode (empSog, cf. also West 1982: 47). Typologically, how­
ever, this kind of versification should be defined as quantitative- 
syllabic, since due to the occurrences of resolutions, contractions, 
anaclasises, etc, the syllabics is governed by quantity.
E.g., Ibykos, 282. 10-22, where the strophe and antistrophe are 
metrically equivalent, but the structure of the epode is different:
vu]v 5e Ц01 o-uxE £Eivcxrcax[oc]v Ilfapiv strophe
f)vj E7110TJJ-IIOV o\)xe xavlfarpjupjov 
■b).i]vfjv Kocaoav5pav 
ripijdjaoio X£ rcatSac; a>AoD[q
Tpojtaq 0’ \)\|Д7г6Аою dtatxn[(-io]v antistrophe
ац ]ар  dvcov'uij.ov, 01)8’ Ети[ЕХ£ШО[да1 
f]p]ü)cov (xp£xav 
Ü7c]£pdcpavov oi)c; xe koiXoc[i
7 Since the final syllable is anceps, then, in strict sense, also the number of moras is 
subject to a slight variation, i.e. 23-24 moras per verse. However, most of the 
metricians treat the verse boundary as a potential prolongation of a syllable, and so, 
even a light syllable at the end of a line is dimoraic. Cf. also the example below (Horn.
II. 2. 35-36), where the first line ends with a heavy syllable, but the second with a light 
one.
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võ£<;] Tc0 \^>70|-icp0i  eX£\>aa[v epode
Tpol]ai koikõv, rpaxxq eo6 [A,ot><;- 
tcov] (j.žv Kpelcov ’AYa|a,£[jj,vcov 
äpxe nX£iGeevl6 aq « 7 ^  avSpcov
’Axpeoq ea[0 ^6 <; 7c]aiq ŠKy[o]voq.
3. The prosodic system of the Latin language
The prosodic system of Latin is considerably more problematic than 
the prosody of Greek. There is no general agreement on the nature of 
Latin accent. The basic question is: was it melodic, as that of Greek, 
or dynamic? There is a certain disagreement between verse re­
searchers and phonologists. There are many scholars (cf., e.g., 
Boldrini 1999: 3^1, but also most French metricians; Allen 1973: 
151), who have no doubt that the nature of Latin accent resembled that 
of Greek. At the same time the phonologists (cf., e.g., Palmer 1954: 
211; Niedermann 1945: 20-25; Allen 1973: 151-154) tend to think 
that at least during some periods Latin accent had to be dynamic, i.e. 
based on intensity. The latter viewpoint is grounded on copious 
evidence provided by historical phonology. Namely, the early literary 
Latin reflects certain changes which had to take place in prehistoric 
Latin. First, there are many words which show the change or loss of 
the vowel (syncope) in the second syllable. The timber of a vowel has 
changed in words sustineo (cf. teneo), conficio (cf.facio) etc; the loss 
of the vowel can be noticed in reppuli (*repepuli), quindecim 
(*quinquedecim), valde (valide) (Niedermann 1945: 22). Secondly, in 
certain short words (///’, nemp', quipp', satin ) the final -e disappeared 
in speech, enclitical forms like ’s, ’st pro es and est evolved, as well as 
the contractions percussust= percussus est, sis= si vis, malo, mavolo= 
magis volo -  all this gives evidence of the tendency to the reduction of 
unaccented syllables (West 1982: 186-187). Such features indicate 
that the prehistoric Latin had a dynamic accent, because the loss of 
unaccented syllables is not typical to languages with a melodic accent 
(cf. the prosodic system of Greek).
Presumably, the prehistoric accent was fixed on the first syllable. 
According to the belief of many scholars, the position of the accent on 
the first syllable as well as its dynamic nature changed in the course of 
language evolution. In longer words a secondary accent evolved 
which anticipated an accent on the first syllable of the following word, 
according to the formula ** x | x ... or ^ - x  | x ... By the historical times
such accent had become primary, and, in its turn, generated a 
secondary accent to longer words: commilitiönes, emdriebdtur (West 
1982: 186). The fact that there is no considerable reduction in classical 
Latin has sometimes led to the conclusion that during the classical 
period the melodic component may have become prevalent over the 
exspiratory (intensity) and thus, the nature of accent became melodic8 
(Niedermann 1945: 20-25) which is supported, e.g., by the statement 
of the grammarian Sergius, cited by Varro: “natura vero prosodiae in 
eo est, quod aut sursum aut deorsum; nam in vocis altitudine omnino 
spectatur adeo, ut si omnes syllabae pari fastigio vocis enuntietur, 
prosodia sit nulla9” (Grammatici Latini 4. 525. 21-22), but also 
Cicero: “ipsa enim natura, quasi modularetur hominum orationem, in 
omni verbo posuit acutam vocern °” (Orator 18. 57).
Nevertheless, such arguments in favour of a melodic accent are not 
irrefutable, because the influence of the Greek culture, incl. Greek 
philology, continued to be immense, and it is quite clear that the 
prosodic terms of Sergius, Cicero and others had been borrowed from 
Greek: accentus for Jtpoocpöia, acutum for o^v, grave for ßapu, more­
over, there were attempts to apply the whole complicated system of 
Greek accentuation to Latin (cf. e.g. Grammatici Latini 5. 126). But it 
is hard to believe that Latin would have developed a melodic accent 
that in detail corresponded to the Greek accent, thus, it would be more 
logical to assume that Latin grammarians only with great precision 
applied the Greek system to the description of Latin (Allen 1973: 151; 
Palmer 1954: 311-312). The fact that in popular Latin syncopes (e.g. 
pedicaut pro pedicavit, maldixit pro maledixit) can be found already in 
the 1st century AD, is also important: i.e., the accent in popular Latin 
was dynamic.
Consequently, although there are more arguments in favour of 
dynamic accent in classical Latin, we can not completely exclude the
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8 Such viewpoint is not supported by several scholars either. E.g., according to 
W. Sidney Allen (1973: 152) it is unlikely that Latin developed a melodic accent, 
which only after a few centuries was again replaced by a dynamic accent. Allen argues 
that dynamic accent does not always result in reduction (cf. syllable counting 
languages vs tact counting languages; Lotman 1998: 1859), and he also emphasizes the 
fact that reductions take much more time to develop than the period under discussion.
9 “The nature of the prosody, indeed, is that it raises or falls; generally, it can be 
observed in the pitch of the voice, so that if all the syllables would be pronounced with 
the same pitch, there would be no accent”.
10 “The nature itself, as if modulating human speech, placed an acute tone in every 
word”.
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popular language had dynamic accent, while educated classes spoke 
Latin with melodic accent. Such situation could be explained by the 
enormous influence of the Greek language and culture on Roman
intellectual elite.11
There is no doubt, however, that by the 5th century at the latest, 
Latin had developed dynamic accent: the phenomenon was then 
described also by the grammarians, e.g. Pompeius: “Ilia syllaba plus 
sonat in toto verbo, quae accentum habetu” (Grammatici Latini 5. 
126.31).
An important argument in favour of dynamic word-accent is pro­
vided also by Latin poetry which shows clear regularities in concur­
rences of strong positions and word-accents. E.g., for the Latin hexa­
meter it is characteristic that in the first half of the verse accents do 
not concur with strong positions, while in the second half they do. Cf. 
Table 1, where the frequencies of concurrences between strong 
positions and accents are presented.
Table 1. The concurrences of word-accents in the Latin hexameter (De Neubourg 
1986: 147).
I II III IV V VI
Ennius 78.3 33.2 18.5 33.8 79.6 85.8
Cicero 84.5 34.2 13.4 44.6 94.9 99.2
Lucretius 76.3 41.9 21.7 47.9 93.9 97.7
Catullus 73.5 28.2 11.0 61.5 91.2 99.5
Vergilius 68.0 33.2 24.6 37.7 99.1 99.4
Horatius 71.4 30.3 25.0 47.0 96.9 96.9
Ovidius 79.7 36.6 14.6 47.7 99.5 99.9
Hence, in hexameters, a strong accentual conflict evolved between the 
first and the second half (although it has to be pointed out, that the 
first foot has also a strong tendency towards accentual structure). Such 
phenomenon is usually explained by the Latin accentual rules. Since 
there is an obligatory word-end at the end of the verse line, the 
placement of accents is not incidental, but depends on the configu­
ration of heavy and light syllables before the word-end. The strong
C f., e.g ., the Sw edish language that has m elodic accent and the Fenno-Swedish  
language that has dynamic accent.
“  “The syllable, which carries an accent, is the most sonorous in the w hole word ”
position in the sixth foot had to be filled with the heavy penultimate 
syllable of a word which, according to the Latin accentual rules, 
always carried the stress. The accentuation of last two feet could have 
been avoided with a monosyllable at the end of a line, thus filling a 
strong position in a sixth foot with an unaccented ultimate syllable of 
a word, but monosyllabic words at the end of a line were avoided and 
even regarded as a serious error of versification (De Neubourg 1986: 
71). For example, Servius comments on the end of a Vergilian verse 
procumbit humi bos with harsh words: est hie pessimus versus in 
monosyllabum desinens.11
There exist also opinions according to which such rhythmical 
contrast was a deliberate artifice of hexametrical poets. Since this 
verse form was adapted from the language of different phonological 
basis, the quantitative rules had to be learned as well, and it is only 
natural that a poet was in such case also aware of the relationship 
between accent and quantity in his versification. The same applies also 
to his educated readers. However, more interesting is the reaction of 
the less educated hearers, who had not learned the quantitative rules: 
could they grasp the quantitative versification which, to a large extent, 
was not supported by the configuration of accent? Sidney W. Allen 
(1973: 339) assumes that a less sophisticated hearer might have 
perceived the quantity of orally arrested syllables only so far as they 
were directly connected with accent, and for him the quantity of final 
syllables was, thus, irrelevant: e.g. the reader may have not been 
aware of the opposition of final syllables in tange and tangent and the 
equivalence of the latter form with the form tanges (however, S. W. 
Allen admits that the length of thoracically arrested syllables that were 
often connected e.g. with morphological endings, were perceived also 
independently14; ibid.). The Roman anonymous epigrams (Carmina 
Epigraphica Latina, further CEL) include hexametrical poems which 
interpret both metrical and prosodical rules with great freedom: often
Prosody and versification systems o f ancient verse 547
13 It is the worst verse, ending with a monosyllable.
14 Extremely interesting evidence is here provided by the dialogue verses by 
Plautus and Terence, where heavy syllables occur freely in every position, incl. those 
where in Greek verse a light syllable was obligatory. A closer examination reveals 
there is a tendency for the weak position to be filled by not just any heavy syllable, but 
by an unaccented morphological ending. On the one hand, it could certainly be 
explained by the avoidance of the concurrences of word-ends and metrical boundaries, 
which results in a word-end usually occurring inside a feet. On the other hand, we 
could go even further than W. S. Allen and ask: were the independent thoracically 
arrested syllables perceived the same way as those thoracically arrested syllables that 
were directly connected with accent, or were they perceived somehow differently?
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the correct pattern characterizes only the end of a line —  if not quanti­
tatively, then at least accentually (Allen 1973: 346-347). We can 
assume that in such cases the authors were less educated poets who 
were not aware of Greek prosody. Such versification is well illustrated 
by the following fragment (CEL 470. 1-4):
Quat valeas abeas pascas, multos tu habebes amicos.
si haliquit casu alite[r] aduxerit aster,
aut ili Romai frater es aut tu peregre heris
et vocas acliva. quo si tu non nosti amicos...
Even more freedom is seen in the following example, where also the 
end pattern is often incorrect (CEL 331):
Conrigi vix tandem quod curvom est factum crede.
Credis quod deicunt? non sunt ita. ne fore stultu.
De incerto certa ne fiant, si sapis, caveas.
De vero falsa ne fiant iudice falso.
Est equos perpulcer, sed tu vehi non potes istoc.
Est vi [pjer [cjlivom. qua vi[s] sequi, non [datur ista.
Formidat omnes. quod metuit, id sequi satiust.
Hostis incertus de certo, nisi caveas.
Iubeo et is ei si fecerit, gaudebit semper...
There are numerous violations of both metrical and prosodical struc­
ture in this example. Thus, e.g. caveas at verse end, as well as a foot 
containing a cretic word-group (e.g. est equos in the fifth verse line) or 
a foot containing a tribrachic word-group (e.g. iubeo et in the last 
verse line) never would have been admitted in classical hexameter.
It has to be pointed out that there are no such examples in Greek 
hexametrical poetry: Greek poets follow the metrical rules exactly, 
admitting, occasionally, some prosodical licences (Allen 1973: 346- 
347).
The interference of accentual principle is seen even more clearly in 
early Latin drama, especially in iambic and trochaic verse. Namely, 
the unaccented syllables tend to fill the weak positions, while in strong 
positions prevail the accented syllables. Since in early iambic and 
trochaic verse heavy syllables are allowed also in weak positions,
accent plays often an important role in verse rhythm.1:1 Cf., e.g., 
Terence, Adelphoe 144ff:
Quom placo, advorsor sedulo et deterreo, 
tamen vix humane patitur; verum si augeam, 
aut etiam adiutor sim eius iracundiae, 
insaniam profecto cum illo. Etsi Aeschinus 
non nullam in hac re nobis facit inuriam.
Such tendency is characteristic to about 80% of Plautian and Terentian 
iambic and trochaic verse lines.
Let us analyse briefly the law of brevis brevians or correptio 
iambica which, while unfamiliar to Greek prosody, was quite common 
in Latin poetry, especially in early iambic and trochaic versification. 
Traditionally, it is interpreted as a shortening of an unaccented heavy 
syllable in the case when a neighbouring syllable carries an accent. 
Cf., e.g., Terence, Eunuchus 8:
ex Graecis bonis Latinas fecit non bonas
where in bonis the final heavy syllable has become shortened under 
the influence of the first accented syllable.
There have been extensive disputes about the actual meaning of 
this phenomenon. E.g. Sandro Boldrini (1999: 39-46) suggests that it 
did not mean an actual shortening of a syllable, instead, a syllabic 
group maintained its quantities, being in certain cases perceived as an 
iambic unit. The other possible explanation is that in certain cases the 
accentual principle may have started to dominate the quantitative one, 
becoming the primary factor in versification.
W. S. Allen (1973: 163-186) represents the viewpoint, according 
to which the iambic shortening is related not only to verse prosody, 
but characterizes the phonology of natural language as well16. In order 
to prove his opinion, he analyses the accentual matrices of the Latin 
language and draws some important conclusions. For one, he argues 
that most likely there was no actual basis in Latin phonology for the
15 The opposite viewpoint is supported by e.g. Kenneth M. Abbot (1944), 
according to whom  the concurrences o f  accents and strong positions can fully be 
explained by Latin accentual rules.
16 On the other hand, e.g. W. Bcare sees the reason for iambic shortening in the 
difficulty to provide an unaccented syllable, though quantitatively strong, with the 
necessary metrical force (Beare 1968: 324), i.e. for Beare, this phenomenon is 
exclusively related to versification.
Prosody and versification systems o f ancient verse 549
550 Maria-Kristiina Lotman
equivalence — = Traditionally, it has been stated that there is a 
tendency in Latin toward a binary rhythm in which light syllables 
occur in pairs: e.g. the formation of perfect of the II conjugation, 
where the form -ui is characteristic to verbs which have a root of a 
single light syllable, e.g. moneo > monui, deceo > decui, while the 
verbs which have a root with a heavy syllable, have other formations, 
e.g. augeo > auxi, mulceo > midsi etc. Similarly, the infinitive of the 
verbs of the IV conjugation which have a root consisting of one light 
syllable, is formed with a short i (which changes into e before r; 
traditional school grammar places such verbs in the III conjugation), 
e.g. capio , capere\ facio, facere\ while the verbs which have longer 
roots, i.e. consisting of one heavy or two light syllables, like audire, 
dormire, aperire, sepelire etc, have the infinitive form with long f. W.
S. Allen contends that there are also infinitives which can not be 
explained by the above-given logic. Namely, the IV conjugation 
includes also verbs like impedire, fulgurire which have infinitives 
with long F, but the final syllable of the root is short. S. W. Allen 
suggests that the form capere is a result of the light and accented final 
syllable of a root which is not typical to z>e-infinitives, cf. e.g. audire, 
aperire, impedire, etc.17 It means that this phenomenon has not only 
quantitative, but also accentual basis. Thus, in the case of Latin it is 
not correct to speak of the purely quantitative equivalence -  = 
which has no accentual basis, but rather of the equivalence -  = 
This viewpoint is rather strongly supported by the evidence of the 
early Latin scenic verse.
The explanation for iambic shortening could be provided namely 
by the accentual matrices preferred in the natural language. W. S. 
Allen states that words with the pattern of were in certain conflict 
with the accentual rules which had been established by the historical 
times (cf. e.g. egõ, mõdõ etc, which during the early literary period 
still had a heavy final syllable, and *mälš, *Ьёпё etc, the final vowels 
of which had been shortened in preliterary times). Thus, the tendency 
to shorten the second syllable occurred, and as a result its thoracic 
arrest disappeared and a normal disyllabic accentual matrix was 
established (while the words with a heavy penultimate syllable 
maintained the quantity of the final syllable, e.g. longe).
17 It must be noted that there are also different exam ples which are not discussed  
by W. S. Allen, cf. e.g. venio, venire', salio, satire etc.
The main features of the prosodic system of Latin can be sum­
marized as follows.
(1) As in Greek, both vowels and consonants can be prosodically 
significant. The syllables can be unarrested (i.e. open syllables 
containing short vowels, e.g. -que), but also arrested either orally (e.g. 
closed syllables containing short vowels, e.g. id), or thoracically (i.e. 
containing long vowels or diphthongs, e.g. тё\ Allen 1973: 129). As 
in Greek, the hypercharacterization occurs here as well.
The phonological opposition of arrested and unarrested syllables,
i.e. the distinction of quantities, is a very important feature of Latin 
versification.
(2) The reduction of unaccented syllables that was characteristic to 
the preliterary period, but also to the popular Latin and late classical 
Latin, e.g. officina < *opificina, auceps < *avicaps.
(3) The occurrences of enclitical and proclitical phenomena 
(typologically, this feature is relevant in the comparison with syllable- 
counting languages, where these phenomena, in general, do not 
occur).
(4) The dynamic accent which in the classical period may have 
been replaced with the melodic accent in the language of more 
educated classes.
(5) As is characteristic to languages that have reduction of unac­
cented syllables, the smallest prosodical unit was not a syllable, but a 
stress unit (tact). Consequently, Latin belongs typologically to the 
stress-counting languages (cf. Pike 1949: 34-36), and the dis­
tinguishing factor of prosodemes is force.
(6) Characteristic to Latin is also the gradation of accentual 
intensity, i.e. there developed secondary accentuation.
(7) When vowels meet, the following options are possible:
(a) elision, i.e. the final syllable of the word is not pronounced if it 
is followed by a word beginning with a vowel. In Latin the final m 
was weak (it may have been slightly nasal as in French), and the 
syllable ending with m was elided. If the second word in a hiatus was 
es or est, then the elision took place so-to-say “backwards” (so-called 
prodelision), i.e. the beginning of the second word was not pro­
nounced, e.g. dictum est = dictumsv,
(b) synizesis, i.e. two or more vowels belonging to different 
syllables could form one heavy syllable by amalgamation of vowels; 
this can happen with ea (e.g. eadem), eo (e.g. deorum), ei (e.g. 
deinde), eu (e.g. meum), ie (e.g. diebus), ua (e.g. tua), ue (e.g. fuere), 
ui (e.g.fuisti), uo (e.g. swo);
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(c) the consonantalization of / and u, e.g. the famous example from 
the beginning of the Aeneid'. Laviniaque venit (on the other hand, the 
opposite can occur as well, cf. in silvae [Horatius Od. I 23.4] v has 
been vocalized into и);
(d) hiatus, in which case both vowels retain their initial values. 
Generally, this is avoided, but exceptions may occur, usually at a 
caesura or diaeresis.
4. Versification systems in Latin poetry
The described prosodical system provides a basis for considerably 
more versification systems than in Greek. Both in Latin and in Greek 
the versification can be based on quantitative-syllabic principle (e.g. 
hexameter, pentameter, iambic trimeter etc) and the syllabic-quanti- 
tative principle (the Aeolian metrics has been widely exploited also in 
Roman lyrical poetry). In addition to these, there exist, at least in 
preliterary Latin, but most likely later as well, also possibilities for 
such versification systems that are based on accentual principle or its 
participation. The limited bulk of Satumian verses (a little more than 
120 verse lines), which may be the only original Latin verse form (i.e. 
it evolved before the Greek versification started to have major influen­
ce on the Latin versification), seems to prove that these possibilities 
have been realized in actual poetry — most of them make sense as 
accented verse. The so-called versus quadratus which is the Latin 
version of Greek trochaic tetrameter, also shows clear evidence of 
accentual component (Gasparov 1989: 70). Although in classical Latin 
a versification based primarily on accentual principle never really 
evolved, several peculiar versification systems developed, in which 
the principles of quantity, accent and syllabification were united. 
Thus, the Latin versification could be compared e.g. with versification 
systems which have been created to translate ancient poetry into 
Estonian (e.g., by Ervin Roos or Ain Kaalep) and which combine all 
the above-mentioned principles (Lotman 1998: 2064-2065).
In Roman poetry the following versification systems can be ob­
served.
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4.1. Purely quantitative versification system
This was most likely characteristic to the Saturnian verse (unfortuna­
tely, there have not remained enough verse lines to make any 
fundamental conclusions about its structure). In the case of the 
Saturnian verse neither the quantity nor the syllabics were relevant, 
but only the number of accent. Two main types of the Saturnian verse 
have been distinguished: the so-called maior which had five accents 
and minor which had four accents. The structure of the Saturnian 
verse is illustrated with the following schemes (Lotman 1998: 1869): 
&AAAA& 
and
&AAAAA&
where one stress unit or tact corresponds to position A.
Cf., e.g., CEL 6:
Hone oino / ploirume / cosentiont / R[omane 
duonoro / optumo / fuise / viro,
Luciom / Scipione. / filios / Barbati
consol / censor / aidilis / hie fuet / a[pud vos.
hec cepit / Corsica / Aleriaque / urbe,
dedet / Tempestatebus / aide / meretofd / votam
Theoretically also accentual-syllabic and syllabic-accentual versifi­
cation systems are possible, moreover, they might have been actually 
realized in popular poetry (cf. e.g. versus quadratus), but there have 
remained too few possible examples to draw any specific conclusions.
4.2. Syllabic-quantitative versification system
The Aeolian verse metres were quite popular among the classical 
Roman poets. Although here as well, as in most Latin verse forms, 
accents tended to occur in certain positions, it should not be con­
sidered metrical, but rather rhythmical regularity. Syllabic-quantitative 
are e.g. the glyconics in Seneca’s tragedy Medea (75ff)18:
18 The Aeolian metres in Latin poetry are not always syllabic-quantitative: 
occasionally, they allow resolutions or contractions, cf. the glyconic by Seneca (Oed. 
891): vita decurrens via, where two light syllables have been replaced by one heavy 
(Raven 1965: 141). It has to be noted that resolutions were admitted in Aeolian metres 
already by Sophocles and Euripides (West 1982: 116).
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vincit virgineus decor 
longe Cecropias nurus, 
et quas Taygeti iugis 
exercet iuvenum modo 
muris quod caret oppidum 
et quas Aeonius latex 
Alpheosque sacer lavat
where the natural word-accent often coincides with short positions, 
e.g., virgineus, iuvenum, etc.
4.3. Quantitative-syllabic versification system
This is typical to certain Ionian metres in Latin poetry, e.g., bacchiac 
and cretic metres which are quite common in early drama. Cf., e.g., 
the scheme of bacchiac tetrameter (Raven 1965: 123-124): 
&&ABB&ABB&ABB&ABB&& 
where the following quantitative-syllabic rules apply:
(1) To the position A corresponds one light syllable, one heavy 
syllable or the sequence of two light syllables, but the latter can occur 
only if the other positions of a foot have been filled with one syllable.
A —>u  
A—» —
A ^  u  u  /. . .-------
(2) To the position В corresponds one heavy syllable or the sequence 
of two light syllables, but the latter can occur only if the other 
positions of a foot have been filled with one syllable.
B^> —
В —> u  и  / x ...—
B - ^ u u / x  — ...
Cf. e.g. Plautus, Captivi 226ff:
Adcurate agatur, docte et diligenter.
Tanta incepta res est: hau somniculose hoc 
Agundumst. ТУ. Его ut me voles esse. PH. Spero.
TY. Nam tu nunc vides pro tuo caro capite 
carum offerre [me] meum caput vilitati.
There exists also a number of versification systems in Latin which 
combine quantity, accent and syllabics.
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4.4. Quantitative-syllabic-accentual versification system
In this system, the main organizer of verse structure is quantity, which 
determines the syllabics of a verse line. Certain positions are 
characterized by an accentual constant. Such versification is typical to,
e.g., Latin hexameter (its accentual regularities have already been 
discussed above). Cf. e.g. Vergilius, Aeneid 494ff:
Haec dum Dardanio Aeneae miranda videntur 
dum stupet obtutuque haeret defixus in uno, 
regina ad templum, forma pulcherrima Dido, 
incessit magna iuvenum stipante caterva.
4.5. Quantitative-accentual-syllabic versification system
This is, above all, typical to early scenic iambic and trochaic metres. 
E.g. the structure of Latin iambic trimeter (senarius) has been 
organised with quantitative, syllabic and accentual principle. 
&&&AB&AB&&AB&AB&&AB&AB&&&
I Syllabic principle.
The main syllabic rule (which is not violated in Greek verse) is the 
following: one syllable or a sequence of two syllables corresponds to 
each position, but the latter one can occur only if the other position of 
a foot is filled with one syllable.
A ->X
A—» XX /...X  
B ->X
B -> X X /X ...
In texts by Plautus and Terence this principle is occasionally violated 
and especially in the first feet proceleusmatics are allowed (Raven 
1965: 51-53). Still, in most cases this principle appears to be an 
important regulator of the syllabism in a verse line.
II Quantitative principle.
The quantitative rules are closely related to the syllabic rules, hence, 
the quantitative-syllabic correspondance rules are as follows:
(a) One heavy syllable, one light syllable or a sequence of two 
light syllables corresponds to position A, but the latter one can occur 
only if a strong position is filled with one syllable.
A—> u
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A—» U U / . . . X  
B-> —
B-> u u /X ...
(b) One heavy syllable or a sequence of two light syllables 
corresponds to position B, but the latter one can occur only if position 
A is filled with one syllable. The line which is organised by 
quantitative-syllabic rules, is e.g. Terence, Adelphoe 143:
Me aegre pati illi nolui. Nam itast homo.
The word-accent in this case is irrelevant, the number and the quantity 
of syllables are the only constituents of iambic structure.
Ш Accentual principle.
The third set of rules involves accentual rules:
(a) word-accents tend to occur in strong positions;
(b) word-accents tend to be avoided in weak positions;
(c) in resolved feet word-accent tends to occur in the first syllable 
of the resolved strong position, i.e. the most common form in iambic 
verse is xxx, but in trochaic verse xxx. About 80% of analysed iambic 
and trochaic verse lines are in correspondence with this rule, e.g. 
Terence, Adelphoe 804 ff:
Communia esse amicorum inter se omnia.
DE. Facete! nunc demum istaec nata oratiost.
MI. Ausculta paucis nisi molestumst Demea!
Principio, si id te mordet, sumptum filii 
quem faciunt, quaeso hoc facito tecum cogites...
IV Accentual-quantitative-syllabic rules.
And finally, the most complicated one is the accentual-quantitative- 
syllabic rule. Namely, on certain occasions, when the stressed syllable 
occurs in a strong position, the quantity of the rest of the syllables in a 
given foot may become irrelevant and the foot may become the 
subject to accentual rules. This rule causes e.g. the phenomenon which 
is traditionally treated as iambic shortening. Cf. e.g. the accentuation 
in the third foot of iambic verse in Ter. Adelph. 4:
Indicio de se ipse erit, vos eritis iudices.
or the accentuation in the first foot of trochaic verse in Plautus, 
Amphitruo 281:
Earn quoque edepol etiam multo haec vicit longitudine.
But the so-called iambic shortening is not the only case where the 
accentual structure prevails over quantity. There are numerous other 
examples, e.g., Ter. Adelph. 106:
Iniuriumst, nam si esset unde id fieret,
where in the fifth foot instead of iambus we find a trochee, but the 
accentual structure still remains iambic.
As in hexametrical verse, also in iambic trimeter the rhythmical 
regularities of the last two feet are different from the first half of the 
verse. However, here the situation occurs, actually, the other way 
round: the end of the line has a tendency to quantitative structure, 
while the middle part of a verse has clear accentual structure.
The situation where different parts of verse structure are subject to 
different mechanisms of versification, is not unique. The study of 
verse history reveals a number of analogical instances where verse 
structure is organised by several principles of versification, while 
some of them dominate at the beginning of the verse, others at the end 
of the verse.
First, such features are characteristic to the structure of Indo- 
European verse. It was an isosyllabic verse, i.e. the number of 
syllables was metrically relevant and the primary element of metrical 
structure was syllable. Thus, the verse was organised by the syllabic 
principle. Word-accent played no role whatsoever, i.e. there was no 
regularity in the arrangement of accented syllables. On the other hand, 
quantity was relevant to some degree: there was a certain regularity in 
the alternation of heavy and light syllables. This regularity occurred 
mainly at verse ending, thus creating the so-called quantitative caden­
ce, while the quantity of the first half of the verse was unregulated 
(West 1982:2-3).
The second instance of such type is the medieval Latin verse. 
Approximately in the third century AD important phonological 
changes took place in the Latin language. The distinction between 
heavy and light syllables disappeared and thus the main opposition, 
which until then had served as the basis of versification, ceased to 
exist. Instead, new principles of versification evolved. The first step 
was to organize the syllabism of verse lines, hence creating the 
medieval Latin syllabic verse, where the main constituent of versifi­
cation is the number of syllables. As a result, Latin verse starts to
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resemble its origin, the Indo-European verse. Next, its ending be­
comes regulated, but not quantitatively (as IE verse), but accentually. 
One of the earliest examples is St. Augustine’s psalm against Dona- 
tists. Here are present all the features which are characteristic to 
medieval verse: isosyllabism,19 the irrelevancy of quantity, accentual 
verse ending, the emergence of rhyme (cf. also Gasparov 1989: 87- 
90):
Honores vanos qui quaerit, / non vult cum Christo regnare,
Sicut princeps huius mali, / de cuius vocantur parte;
Nam Donatus tunc volebat /Africam totam obtinere;
Tunc iudices transmarinos / petiit ab imperatore...
There are several other examples, e.g., the Aeolian metres in ancient 
Greek versification or Estonian regisong — they both have 
quantitative-syllabic structure, but nevertheless, the first syllables in a 
line are quantitatively irrelevant. The closest example, of course, is the 
versification of early hexameter, where the accentual structure usually 
coincides with the quantitative structure of the fifth and sixth feet, but 
contradicts it at the beginning of a line.
Consequently, it can be said that in comparison with Greek verse, 
more rules participate in the organization of the early Latin verse. 
Although it is usually treated as a very liberated verse that is far 
simpler than its Greek model, we can not deny the complexity of its 
versification system which is the result of several combinatory 
versification principles.
5. Conclusion
1. The Greek language belongs typologically among the mora- 
counting languages and thus provides possibilities for the emergence 
of purely quantitative verse, where structure is determined only by the 
number of moras; of the purely syllabic verse, where only the number 
of syllables is relevant; quantitative-syllabic verse, where in addition 
to the number of moras also their configuration is considered, and the 
syllabic-quantitative versification system, where the number of 
syllables is fixed and the quantity is subject to syllabics. There is no
14 The isosyllab ic structure is accom plished in the 3rd line with elision  (totam 
obtinere) and in the 4th line with synizesis (petiit).
purely quantitative or purely syllabic verse in actual Greek poetry; 
however, the syllabic-quantitative versification systems (the Aeolian 
tradition) and quantitative-syllabic versification systems (the Ionian 
tradition) were in use.
2. The Latin language, on the other hand, has a number of features, 
which characterize it as a stress-counting language. Since at the same 
time there exists also the opposition of heavy and light syllables, there 
are preconditions for the syllabic, accentual and quantitative principle, 
as well as for the combinations of these. The Roman literary heritage 
shows examples of purely accentual, syllabic-quantitative, quantitative- 
syllabic, as well as of several other combinatory versification systems.
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Просодия и системы стихосложения античного стиха
Задачей работы является описание просодических систем древнегре­
ческого и латинского языков, а также анализ систем античного сти­
хосложения. Типологически древнегреческий язык принадлежит к язы­
кам моросчитаюшего типа, что создает естественные предпосылки для 
развития как чисто-квантитативного и чисто-силлабического, так и 
квантитативно-силлабического и силлабо-квантитативного стихосложе­
ния. В древнегреческой стихотворной практике чисто-квантитативный и 
чисто-силлабический стих не встречается, зато представлены силлабо- 
квантитативная система стихосложения (эолийская традиция) и 
квантитативно-силлабическая (ионийская и дорийская традиции). В ла­
тинском языке имеется ряд признаков, позволяющих отнести его к 
языкам тактосчитающего ритма. Поскольку в нем имеется и оппозиция 
долгих и кратких слогов, можно говорить о естественных предпосылках 
для развития как силлабического, квантитативного и акцентного стихо­
сложения, так и различных комбинированных вариантов. Сохра­
нившиеся тексты могут быть отнесены к акцентному (сатурнов стих), 
силлабо-квантитативному (лирические строфы), квантитативно-сил­
лабическому (гексаметр, ямбический триметр), а также к ряду пере­
ходных форм, сочетающих ударение, силлабику и квантитет.
Antiikvärsi prosoodia ja värsisüsteemid
Töö eesmärgiks on kirjeldada vanakreeka keele ja  ladina keele prosoodilist 
süsteemi ning analüüsida värsisüsteeme, mis on vanakreeka ja  ladina luule­
praktikas realiseeritud. Kreeka keel kuulub tüpoloogiliselt moorasid loendava 
rütmiga keelte hulka ning seega on selles keeles olemas eeldused puhtkvan-
titeeriva, puhtsiillaabilise, kvantiteeriv-stillaabilise ja  süllaabilis-kvantiteeriva 
värsi jaoks. Vana-kreeka luulepraktikas puhtkvantiteerivat ja  puhtsüllaabilist 
värssi ei leidu, seevastu on esindatud süllaabilis-kvantiteeriv värsisüsteem 
(aioolia luuletraditsioon) ning kvantiteeriv-siillaabiline värsisüsteem (joonia 
ja  dooria luuletraditsioon). Ladina keelel on aga rida tunnuseid, mis määravad 
selle kuulumise takte loendava rütmiga keelte hulka. Kuna samas eksisteerib 
ka pikkade ja  lühikeste silpide opositsioon, on ladina keeles olemas eeldused 
nii süllaabilise, kvantiteeriva, aktsendilise kui ka nendest kombineeritud 
värsisüsteemide tekkeks. Meie ajani on säilinud puhtaktsendilist, süllaabilis- 
kvantiteerivat, kvantiteeriv-süllaabilist värssi ning samuti rida vorme, milles 
värsiehituslikeks komponentideks on nii sõnarõhk, süllaabika kui ka kvanti­
teet.
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Abstract. The present paper focuses on the similarities and differences 
between the formal characteristics of the traditional Japanese haiku and the 
translated haiku, more specifically, on the relations between the 5-7-5 syllable 
pattern in the Japanese haiku, and the patterns of syllable arrangement 
employed in the translations. Due to the influence of the target culture context, 
there emerge certain conventions in rendering the haiku form, the appearance 
of which is observed in the body of 420 haiku translations, made by 7 
translators. On the basis of the overall frequency of appearance, as well as in 
respect to individual translators, tentative characterisation is proposed as to 
which types of syllable arrangement patterns can be considered more form- 
oriented than others in the context of the translated haiku, i.e., an attempt is 
made to mark the boundary between the “haiku-like” patterns and the “un- 
haiku-like” patterns.
Introduction
To start out with a cliche, translation of the haiku, it would seem, is 
indeed nearly impossible — its translatability is inhibited in several, it 
might even be said, countless ways, starting from the problems of 
language and ending with the nuances of meaning, such as the 
reverberations of kigo, the seasonal word, or hon ’i, “poetic essence” 
that refers to the “prescribed treatment of poetic themes and their 
pertaining lyric sentiments” (Kawamoto 2000: 60), or the implications 
of kireji, the “cutting word”, etc.
On the one hand, haiku has been described as “near to being a kind 
of cipher or code” (Kawamoto 2000: 48) — or, for that matter, Japa-
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nese classical poetry in general has been seen as resembling closely 
the workings of a code: “the code becomes one of the most important 
levels of interpretation of a poetic text” (Raud 1994: 18). On the other 
hand, it follows from the extreme suppressed form of the haiku that it 
is heavily dependent on context: “Japanese three-line poems cannot 
exist outside a context, and are not understood without one” 
(Azadovskij, Dyakonova 1991: 99).1 To bring an example from other 
similarly “compressed” artistic phenomena, one could parallel the 
haiku with minimalist music, which, presenting itself in a meagre 
form in praesentia, may contain sophisticated implications in absentia 
(Tarasti 1992: 274). A minimal(ist) form is oriented towards 
activating the recipient to supply the “missing” parts or context, 
instead of the relatively passive “skimming” through the explicitly 
presented text — the difference of which is well explained by 
Barthes’s (1975: 4) notions of writerly and readerly texts. The 
orientation towards activating the reader is observed also in the case of 
the haiku: “The experienced reader of the three-line poems [haiku], 
participating actively in the creational process, himself provides 
numerous senses, existing outside the written text” (Azadovskij, 
Dyakonova 1991: 99). The reliance on context is probably the main 
argument against the translatability of the haiku, for it means that the 
haiku needs a competent reader, that is, one who is capable of the 
associations the poem directs to: “Without the traditional reader, the 
haiku poem is dead, since the context, i.e. the whole layer of the poetic 
tradition, will not be “activated” [...] Transplanting the genre of the 
haiku from Japanese soil into any other context means the breaking 
off with the tradition and the destruction of the poem” (ibid.). 
However, the history and popularity of haiku translation seems to, in a 
sense, confirm the opposite: even if we concede that the translation of 
the haiku cannot take place without a loss (no translation can), it does 
not necessarily mean that it fails altogether.
The practical impossibility of providing the non-Japanese reci­
pient' with the whole accumulated context of the Japanese poetic 
tradition can, however, be seen also from a “brighter” perspective.
1 The quotations from languages other than English that appear in the present 
article have been translated by the author, unless otherwise indicated.
However, today even Japanese readers may need “translations” of classical 
Japanese texts or explanations of poetic traditions, cf Donald Keene’s opinion 
expressed in his preface to Bashö’s travel diary Oku no Hosomichi [The Narrow Road 
to Oku]: “The problem of translating Oku no Hosomichi into modern Japanese is 
almost as great as translating it into a European language” (Bashõ 1996: 9).
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Andrew Chesterman, reflecting upon what he calls the “supermemes 
of translation”, compares the viewpoints of equivalence and un- 
translatability in the following manner:
Translation is, after all, a form of language use; and from this point of view 
nothing is untranslatable: that is, everything can be translated somehow, to 
some extent, in some way —  even puns can be explained. Semiotically 
speaking, we could say that communication succeeds to the extent that the 
message decoded and interpreted by the receiver overlaps with that sent by the 
sender. Whereas the equivalence supermeme focuses on the overlap, the 
untranslatability supermeme focuses on the non-overlapping part of the 
message: each supermeme then assumes that the part it sees is actually the 
whole picture. (Chesterman 2000: 12)
For a practicing translator, the long-disputed idea of untranslatability is 
indeed of little help: therefore, instead of focusing upon what cannot be 
done, translators have often tried to draw the readers’ attention to what 
can. In our present context of haiku translations, where the parts of a 
message overlapping between the sender and the receiver indeed often 
seem a great deal smaller than those not overlapping, various translators, 
instead of “explaining” the original poems, have left this task quite 
explicitly to the readers. For example, Makoto Ueda in his work “Bashõ 
and His Interpreters” proposes the readers not to just read his translations, 
but to create their own interpretations:
Ideally, however, individual readers should attempt their own translations 
according to their own tastes and preferences. [...] I have refrained from 
making my own comments on the meaning of the poem, so that individual 
readers can, like spectators of an abstract painting, freely speculate on the 
implications of the work before them. (Ueda 1991: 11)
As the starting point for a reader’s journey towards the poem, Ueda 
provides him with “the original Japanese poem in roman letters and a 
word-for-word translation”, and, in addition, “when a Japanese word 
seems to call for an explanation, I have put a note in the section that 
follows” (ibid.). In other words, Ueda presents his reader only the pieces 
of a puzzle, but he leaves it to the reader to put the picture together— 
assuring at the same time that a large part of the pleasure of the game is in 
getting different pictures. Much the same is done also by Toshikaru 
Oseko, who, in the section about his method of translation, repeatedly 
conveys his intention to provide as “correct information” as possible, e.g.: 
“I have tried to translate the text as literally as possible”, “I have tried to 
stick to the original word order if possible”, “I have inserted many “kanji” 
(Chinese characters) to give you the correct information” (Oseko 1990:
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section 2). Thus, stressing his wish to be as “correct” about the original 
material as possible, he is trying not to impose his reading or his combi­
nation of the original elements on the reader.
As any artistic work, haiku is a complicated whole with different 
levels and elements, and therefore, in translating the haiku (similarly to 
any other translation), the question of dominant becomes important — 
that is, the question about the element a translator considers to be the 
most important to transfer. In analysing a translation, the discernment of 
the dominant helps us to explicate the method of translation, to provide 
explanation for the lost or added elements, for the functions of elements 
in the structure of the text, and their correspondence to the overall poetic 
model (see Torop 1995: 103).
Ideas about how one should translate a haiku vary enormously, 
depending on whether haiku is conceived of primarily as a poetic form, or 
as a Zen experience that is attached to its form rather accidentally, or as 
something third. In discussing the forms of verse translation and the trans­
lation of verse form, Holmes (1988: 26-27) discerns the following four 
traditional strategies in the translation of verse forms:
1. mimetic, where the original form is preserved
2. analogical, where a corresponding form of the target culture is 
employed
3. organic, where the semantic material of the original poem is taken as 
a starting point, which is then allowed “to take on its own unique 
poetic shape as the translation develops”
4. deviant or extraneous, where the resultant form is “in no way implicit 
in either the form or the content of the original”.
In the history of haiku translation, several strategies have been employed: 
for example, the beginnings of haiku translation into English saw abun­
dant cases of analogical strategy, the effect of which is the “natura­
lization” of a foreign form. Mimetic strategy, on the other hand, has been 
an issue of heated debates already for decades — both in the case of haiku 
translation and in the case of the original haiku composed in English. In 
respect to using 17 syllables3 also in haiku composed in English, 
however, there shows a tendency not to use the mimetic strategy: 
according to Swede (2000: 13), his studies carried out in the 1980 and
3 Although in d iscussing Japanese poetry, it would be more accurate to use the 
term ‘mora’ instead o f  ‘sy llab le’, in the context o f  this article this distinction is not of 
forem ost relevance: translations from a mora-counting language into languages that do 
not count moras inevitably have to change or adapt the source-text form. Very often, 
the unit ‘mora’ is substituted with the unit ‘sy llab le’ in translations. Thus, in order to 
avoid unnecessary com plications, our discussion w ill use the term ‘sy llab le’ also when 
referring to Japanese haiku.
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1996 reveal that, starting from the 1960s, 80% of the haiku published in 
anthologies and periodicals have less than seventeen syllables. On the 
other hand, in the case of original haiku composed in Estonian, it appears 
that the observance of the 5-7-5 syllable pattern is followed almost 
exclusively (Lindström 1999: 32). In respect to the translated haiku 
(although on a much smaller scale), the results of a study concerning 32 
translations into English of a single haiku by Matsuo Bashõ (Sütiste 2001) 
display a similar tendency: only four translations retained the original 
number of syllables (in this case, nineteen), the average number of 
syllables being 15.
The phenomenon of the translated haiku incorporates features that 
have originated in the source culture as well as in the target culture: 
for example, in the case where a translation retains the 5-7-5 syllable 
pattern (mimetic translation), due to the differences in language 
prosody, the result can only be similar, not identical in form with the 
Japanese haiku. Japanese poetry' counts, strictly speaking, moras (not 
syllables; see also footnote 3) that may contain no more than one 
consonant, whereas, for instance. English monosyllabic words include 
also such cases as bright or skirt. This difference results in English 
carrying more information per syllable than Japanese, which together 
with other factors indicates that “using the 5-7-5 form does not 
necessarily provide an analogous condition for writing haiku in 
English”. Similarly, Mart Mäger (1979: 130) observes that the first 
obstacle to the spreading of haiku as a form is the difference between 
languages: the information a syllable carries is not equal in different 
languages. Thus, English and Russian translations do not usually 
follow the number of syllables provided by the original haiku. 
Estonian, on the other hand, seems to accommodate the 17 syllables, 
corresponding to the haiku-like amount of content. This phenomenon 
is similar to the problems that arise in transplanting other poetic forms 
and metres into such cultural-linguistic contexts that are different from 
those of the source culture. For example, Mihhail Lotman and Maria- 
Kristiina Lotman (2000: 139-140) describe the problems related to the 
rendering of the classical versification systems: during the 19th 
century, Estonian poetry followed the German models, where 
quantitative verse was rendered according to accentual principles (i.e., 
long syllable was represented by an accented syllable, short syllable 
by an unaccented syllable). In the 20th century, it was found that
4 Imaoka, Keiko 1995. Forms in English Haiku, http://w w w .low places.net/ 
keiko_forms.htm l
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classical quantitative verse could, in principle, be rendered quantita­
tively also in Estonian; however, such attempts were not too 
successful as the poets, having started out following the quantitative 
principle, tended to “slip back” into the older and more natural 
syllabic-accentual patterns. Likewise, in the case of haiku, it is 
observable that in the translation, source culture features interfere with 
target culture features. For one, a translated haiku may strive to retain 
the original number of syllables, at the same time adding such target 
culture characteristics as word accent, or the translation may deviate 
from the original number of syllables since the translator finds that the 
source culture form is not suitable for transmitting the content — 
either because of the strategy adopted by the translator, or because the 
informational content of the seventeen syllables in Japanese is not 
comparable to that in another language, or because it is considered to 
be most important in haiku translation to transmit the “haiku spirit” or 
a Zen experience that need not retain the rigid 5-7-5 syllable 
structure", etc.
In the following, however, I will maintain the following position: 
disregarding what kind of experience it conveys, haiku will here be 
regarded as a poetic form with a certain structure.6 With this view of 
haiku in mind, it is held that to be regarded as a “haiku-like” 
translation, it has to possess some characteristics that would be 
perceived as "haiku-like”.' However, the boundary between a “haiku- 
like” translated haiku and an “un-haiku-like” translated haiku is not 
very clear. Although numerous studies have been carried out and 
heated debates have been held on the subject of haiku in languages 
other than Japanese (especially English), in the case of the translated 
haiku, main attention has been concentrated upon the question of 
correspondence between the content and the form adopted, not so 
much upon the degree of similarity/dissimilarity between the original 
form and the translation form. The following will be an attempt to find 
some clarity in this issue, and this will be done by considering once
C f Y. Y am ada-B ochynek (1985: 437): “Syllab le counting [ . . . ]  is one o f  the 
major concerns in establishing haiku in English. It seem s, however, more important to 
have a haiku cadence, which is not the product o f  a m echanical 5 -7-5  count but more 
necessarily the result o f  the expression o f  a “haiku-m oment”” .
h It should be noted that under “haiku” as a poetic form the traditional haiku is 
presupposed, not versions o f  modern haiku that may deviate from the classical 
structure.
In principle, the reverse is also possible: the translation may look like a haiku and 
count as one, even if  the source text has not been a haiku.
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more the long-debated subject of the number of syllables and lines in 
haiku translation. Thus, I will be dealing with the translation of haiku 
form  rather than content, and I will occupy myself only with the issue 
of the number of syllables and lines, and will not include the questions 
of kireji, the “cutting word” or kigo, the seasonal word, which could, 
at least to some degree, be categorised under form issues as well.
Syllables
While the 5-7-5 syllable pattern is, no doubt, one of the strongest 
markers of the form “haiku”, it is not always regarded as the most 
essential feature to be transmitted. This becomes evident when we 
look at the actual translations. For the purposes of the present work, I 
assembled a corpus of 420 haiku translations (all together 1260 lines) 
made by 7 different translators (including two non-English sets of 
translations, by Masing and Markova, into Estonian and Russian, 
respectively), 60 translations by each translator.8 The corpus was 
assembled with an idea to ensure a degree of variety, i.e. among the 
translators, there are scholars of Japanese literature (e.g., K. Yasuda), 
professional translators of Japanese literature (e.g., V. Markova), poets 
(e.g., P. Donegan), a scholar who translated haiku out of his personal 
interest, not so much for publishing (U. Masing), etc. The majority of 
translations are of Bashõ — the most renowned and the most 
translated haiku poet. However, also other poets are included, and the 
only translators, who are not represented by any of Bashö’s haiku, are 
P. Donegan and Y. Ishibashi — their texts are assembled from their 
volume of translations of a woman haiku-poet Chiyo-jo. The sets of 
translations have not been selected by any specific criteria: the texts 
were assembled by taking the first sixty translations from the 
beginning of their appearance in each respective book or selection. 
Within this corpus, some translators try to preserve the original 5-7-5 
syllable pattern, some try to retain occasionally the overall number of 
17 syllables, still others do not care much for neither — it appears that 
great differences exist in the preferences of individual translators: for 
example, while Masing retains the 5-7-5 syllable pattern in the fifty-
8 These sets o f  translations are assem bled from: Markova 1973: 4 5 -6 5 ;  M asing  
1997: 7 -3 9 ;  B ow nas, Thwaite 1972: 111-119; Yasuda 1985: 1 83 -195; Blyth 1984: 
106-130; K eene, in Bashõ 1996: 19-171; Donegan, Ishibashi, in Yam ane 1996: 2 7 -  
147.
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five translations out of sixty (an instance of the employment of the 
mimetic startegy), Donegan, Ishibashi, on the other hand, have no 
translations adhering to this type of syllable organization. The 
observance of the 5-7-5 syllable pattern is described in Table 1, with 
the middle column showing the number of translations following the 
5-7-5 syllable pattern (per the set of sixty translations by each trans­
lator), and the last column showing the same number in percentages:
Table I. The observance of 5-7-5 syllable pattern by individual translators.
5-7-5 % o f 5-7-5
M asing 55/60 92
Yasuda 31/60 52
Keene 18/60 30
Blyth 2/60 3
B ow nas, Thwaite 2/60 3
Markova 2/60 3
Donegan, Ishibashi 0/60 0
It might be thought that if translators in trying to adhere to the 5-7-5 
pattern cannot manage to organize the syllables exactly in this fashion, 
then they are still likely to group the syllables somehow differently to 
maintain at least the overall number of seventeen syllables. However, 
as we see from Table 2, the adding of other 17-syllable translations to 
the ones that follow the 5-7-5 syllable pattern, does not change much 
in the general picture.
Table 2. The observance o f the 17 syllables,
17 syl. % o f 17 syl.
M asing 56/60 93
Yasuda 31/60 52
Keene 22/60 37
Blyth 8/60 13
Bownas, Thwaite 4/60 7
Markova 3/60 5
Donegan, Ishibashi 1/60 2
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Tables 1 and 2 give us some general information in respect to the 
individual translators’ preferences: thus we can say that, for example, 
Masing is very much oriented towards retaining the original syllable 
pattern, while Donegan, Ishibashi and Markova are not, and while 
other translators are left somewhere in between. Also, when compared 
to the before-mentioned studies made by Swede (see above), it 
appears that, together, the translators into English display a similar 
percentage of not observing the number of seventeen syllables (78%) 
as the haiku poets of Northern America (80%).
However, the above tables fail to describe other formal features 
that may also be relevant in the case of translated haiku. Judging by 
the existing translations, it seems unreasonable to expect that each and 
every translation follow the exact syllable pattern of the original. What 
is often done instead is that translators try to follow a general idea of 
haiku as a short poem that is organized into three symmetrically 
balanced lines. I regard the above characterization as essentially 
pertaining to the approximation in form of a translated haiku to the 
Japanese original. “Symmetrically balanced” is an important keyword: 
there is no use in observing 17 syllables, if we organize them into 
lines of, say 9-5-3 (which is, incidentally, an actually existing 
example9) — the outcome will probably be perceived as an approxi­
mation of haiku form, but not a very close one. It follows then that it 
does not only matter how many syllables are there in one line or all 
together, but it is the relation between the number of syllables in one 
line and another that is important. Since there are translators who do 
not observe the exact 5-7-5 or the total of seventeen syllables very 
keenly and yet their translations can be regarded as “haiku-like”, it 
seems that there has to be left space for the “acceptable” deviations 
that do not affect the general perception of the translation form as that 
of a haiku. Thus, our next step will be to look into the matter of lines 
in haiku translations.
9
On the very day o f  Buddha’s birth,
A young deer is born:
How thrilling!
Haiku by Bashõ; translated by R. H. Blyth (Blyth 1984: 114).
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Lines
Whether rendering the form of haiku by following an exact number of 
syllables or not, it is true that the majority of haiku translations follow 
the pattern of three lines. However, this matter has not passed without 
disputes either: not all translators have seen the three lines as the main 
option in haiku translation. For example, there are translators who 
favour translating haiku into one line, mainly on the grounds that the 
original Japanese haiku were written in monolinear form. Besides 
monolinear form, attempts have been made to translate haiku into two 
and four, also five lines e.g.:
Nothing in the cicada’s voice 
Gives token of a speedy death.10
A black crow 
Has settled himself 
On a leafless tree 
Fall on an autumn day.11
Busy cicadas chirp and cry 
On brilliant August days,
Zzurr, zzurr—
In this ignorant haze 
They think they’ll never die.12
The choice to translate haiku into the form of one, three, or any other 
number of lines, is a matter of choosing a poetic model a translator 
wishes to employ (cf. Ueda 1991: 10): “each translator’s style seems 
to have been determined by two main factors: his conception of the 
basic nature of hokku and his choice of English poetic models”). In 
Gideon Toury’s words, it has to do with the striving towards the 
prospective acceptability of the translated text in the target culture:
Being members of the target culture, or tentatively assuming the role of ones, 
translators are more or less aware of the factors which govern the acceptability 
of texts and textual-linguistic features in that culture, or a certain sector 
thereof. To the extent that they choose to subject themselves to these factors 
and resort to the appropriate translation strategies, the act itself is executed
10 Haiku by Bashõ; translated by B. H. Chamberlain (U eda 1991: 10).
‘ Haiku by Bashõ; translated by N . Yuasa (Tour)' 1993: 24).
12 Haiku by Bashõ; translated by F. L. Huntley (U eda 1991: 11).
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under the in itia l norm  o f  acceptability; w hether the end-product w ill indeed be 
adm itted in to  the target system  or not. (Toury 1993: 16)
In the case of the first haiku translations into English at the end of the 
19th and the beginning of the 20th century, there were attempts 
namely to relate haiku to some literary forms already known in the 
target culture; thus, Japanese haiku was sometimes paralleled with 
epigram, as becomes evident already from such titles as В. H. 
Chamberlain's “Bashõ and the Japanese epigram”, or William Porter's 
anthology of translations A Year o f Japanese Epigrams, etc. (Kawa­
moto 2000: 47; Yasuda, Kuriyama 1983: 80). A similar tendency has 
been observed in the attempts to translate haiku also into other 
cultures, for example, Chinese: for Chinese readers, a traditional poem 
would minimally consist of at least four pentasyllabic lines, hence, 
“from the standpoint of this tradition, a haiku will no doubt seem like 
a bicycle with a missing wheel” (Kawamoto 2000: 164). Thus, the 
following haiku by Bashõ:
natsukusa ya  T he sum m er grasses—
tsuwamono domo ga  O f brave so ld iers’ dream
yume no ato  T he afterm ath .13
has been rendered into Chinese in the form of a pentasyllabic quatrain, 
the approximation of which is the following English translation:
T he lord ’s flour ish in g  lands
on ce  served  as the fie ld  for b lo o d y  battle;
L ook in g  on them  n ow , the sum m er grass is lush , 
and fam e is just a fleetin g  dream .14
Syllables in three lines
However, as mentioned before, the majority of haiku translations 
follow the three-line pattern nowadays. Similarly to other variants, 
this choice also has its justification: thus, for example, Oseko preferres 
translating the haiku into three lines “with the original 5-7-5 syllable 
count in mind” (Oseko 1990), and Ueda bases his translations on the
n Translated by D. Keene (Bashõ 1996: 87).
14 Original translation by Peng Enhua, here quoted from Kawamoto 2000: 165.
574 Elin Sütiste
interpretation of haiku as a “three-phrase poem” (Ueda 1991: 11) — 
both arguments rather naturally yield a three-line poem in English. On 
the other hand, while the preference in favour of three lines certainly 
reflects the attempt to follow the poetic devices of the source culture, 
it should be also remembered that, by now, haiku has become an 
acceptable poetic form also in the West, so that there is no need to 
“justify” its three-line form in the target culture’s terms anymore, and 
a large part of haiku translations take it as a natural model to rely on.
Also, in the corpus used in the present work,15 all translations 
follow namely the three-line model. However, the ways three lines are 
organized are rather diverse, and we could say the patterns used fall 
into two large groups, symmetrical and asymmetrical patterns.
Symmetrical patterns
Patterns of syllable organization are considered symmetrical in the 
following cases:
1. “Exact” symmetry
la. “Exact” symmetry A<B>A,
where A marks the equal number of syllables for the first and the last 
lines, and В marks the middle line, with В containing more syllables 
than A (e.g., 6-8-6; 4-7-4, etc.).
Example:
In its eye 3
the far-off hills are mirrored —  7
dragonfly!16 3
In the present corpus, this type of “exact symmetry” is used exten­
sively: not taking into account translations that follow the 5-7-5 
syllable pattern, 78 translations are organized according to this pattem.
1 Since it is the aim o f  the present work to explore the significance o f som e formal 
features in the translation o f  haiku, and since the use o f  5 -7-5  syllable pattern is by 
definition one o f the primary (form al) characteristics o f haiku so that a translation 
follow ing this pattern can be said to already observe the formal haiku structure, then in 
the fo llow ing section concerning syllable arrangement patterns those translations that 
follow  the 5-7-5 syllable pattern have been excluded from further observation as 
aheady representing the haiku form, and therefore not needing in further clarification  
(within the limits o f  the present discussion, o f  course).
Haiku by Issa; translated by H. G. Henderson (K eene 1996: 431).
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lb. “Exact” symmetry A>B<A.
which is the reverse of the previous type. A marks the equal number 
of syllables for the first and the last lines, and В marks the middle line, 
with В containing less syllables than A.
Example:
“C ountry b um pkin” 4
P eo p le  call m e, —  3
H o w  co ld  it i s ! 17 4
This type of symmetry is used much less than the previous one: there 
are only 15 translations that follow this model.
lc. “Exact” symmetry AAA,
where A marks the equal number of syllables in all three lines.18 
Example:
I w ill bind iris 5
B lo sso m s round m y feet —  5
Cords for m y sandal s !19 5
This type is not used extensively at all: there are only 6 examples of 
its use in the present corpus.
2. “Relative” symmetry
1 propose to see as belonging into this category such haiku translations 
which are not strictly symmetrical, but which nevertheless leave a 
general impression of symmetry.
2a. “Relative” symmetry A<B>C,
where A and С mark the first and the last line, respectively, and where 
A and С are of unequal length, and where В marks the middle line that 
contains more syllables than A and C.
Example:
T o bird and butterfly 6
it is unknow n, this flow er here: 8
the autum n sk y .20 4
17 Haiku by Issa; translated by R H. Blyth (Blyth 1984: 352).
18 O f course, it is debatable whether this type can be considered symmetrical at all, 
since the axis is not differentiated from the other two lines.
19 Haiku by Bashõ; translated by D. Keene (Bashõ 1996: 71).
20 Haiku by Bashõ; translated by H. G. Henderson (Keene 1996: 384).
576 Elin Sütiste
This is the type of “relative approximation” to the 5-7-5 syllable 
organization of the haiku, and one that is used the most extensively in 
the present corpus: there are 100 examples (almost one fourth of the 
entire corpus) of the usage of this model.
2h. “R elative” sym m etry A > B < C .
which is the reverse of the previous type. A and С mark the first and 
the last line, respectively, while A and С are of unequal length, and В 
marks the middle line that contains less syllables than A and C. 
Example:
the sandal maker 5
has come —  2
the first cherry blossoms21 6
This type is used rarely: only two translators of the present corpus 
have used it, 12 times all together.
Asym metrical patterns 
Among asymmetrical patterns belong the following groups:
1. Type AB
la. Asymmetry AAB,
where A marks the first two lines of equal length, and В marks the 
third line of different length than that of the first two lines.
Example:
A falling flower, thought I, 7
Fluttering back to the branch —  7
Was a butterfly.22 5
This type of asymmetry has been exploited rather extensively, by all 
translators, all together 39 times. However, within this type also 
variations occur: in the first subgroup, A is longer than В (e.g., 8-8-6), 
and in the second, В is longer than A (e.g., 6-6-8). Although the 
patterns of the first subgroup are used by six translators, and the
21 Haiku by Chiyo-ni; translated by P Donegan and Y. Ishibashi (Donegan and 
Ishibashi 1998: 111).
Haiku by Moritake; translated by K. Yasuda (Yasuda 1985: 183).
patterns of the second subgroup only by three of them, the translators 
who follow the patterns of the first subgroup most often, do the same 
also in the case of the second subgroup.
lb . Asym m etry A B B ,
where A marks the first line that is of different length than that of B, 
and where В marks the second and the third line that are of equal 
length.
Example:
On a bare branch 4
A  rook roosts: 3
A utum n du sk .23 3
Although a little less than the previous type, this one has been used 
also rather often, 27 times, and by the majority of translators. This 
type allows also two variants: one where A is longer than В (e.g., 7-6- 
6), and the other where В is longer than A (e.g., 6-7-7). The first type 
has been employed less, 8 times by 3 translators. The second type has 
been of more use: five translators have followed this pattern, all 
together 19 times.
2. Type ABC
2a. Type A >B >C ,
where A represents the first line, which is longer than B, the second 
line, which, in its turn, is longer than the third line, С 
Example:
M aking the uguisu  its spirit, 10
T he lo v e ly  w illow -tree  6
S leep s there.24 2
The type is not very popular with translators, although there are 
examples of this. In the present corpus, this syllable organization has 
been used by four translators, all together 13 times, to a large extent 
by Blyth and Donegan, Ishibashi.
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23 Haiku by Bashõ; translated by G. Bownas and A. Thwaite (Bow nas, Thwaite 
1972: 111).
24 Haiku by Bashõ; translated by R. H. Blyth (Blyth 1984: 111).
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2b. Т уре A < B < C ,
which is the reverse of the previous, and where A represents the first 
line that is shorter than the second line B, which, again, is shorter than 
C, the third line.
Example:
fortune straw —  3
even the dust 4
looks beautiful this moming2? 7
This type is used more often than the previous one, being employed 
by three translators, 19 times in total.
3. Marker of the 5-7-5 syllable pattern: 5-7-x or x-7-5,
where x marks the variable number of syllables in the first or in the 
last line, respectively. This is another significant element in a 
translated haiku to mark the “haiku-ness” of the translation: the 
retaining of a “part” of the prototypical 5-7-5 syllable pattern, in the 
form of 5-7 (in the first and the second line) or 7-5 syllables (in the 
second and the third line).26 
Examples:
5-7-x
If only we could 
Add a handle to the moon 
It would make a good fan!27
x-7-5
5 Spring rain: 2 
7 Telling a tale as they go, 7
6 Straw cape, umbrella.28 5
25 Haiku by Chiyo-jo; translated by P. Donegan and Y. Ishibashi (in Yamane 1996:
41)-
26 It could be argued that w hile the usage o f  either 5-7-x  or x-7-5 syllable 
com bination in a translation is regarded here as a device for marking the form o f the 
original haiku, the sam e could also be stated about the usage of, for example, 5-5 or, 
indeed, any instance o f  a 5- or a 7- syllable line. However, while in principle this may 
be true, it is considered here that the com bination o f  5-7 or 7-5 syllable lines in a 
translation is closer to the original haiku form than other possbile com binations with a 
5- or 7-syllab le line, since the former include two different markers (a 5-syllab le line 
and a 7-syllab le line) o f  the haiku form instead o f  one.
‘7 Haiku by Sõkan; translated by K. Yasuda (Yasuda 1985: 183).
28 Haiku by Buson; translated by G B ow nas and A. Thwaite (B ow nas, Thwaite 
1972: 119).
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This device is observable in the case of five translators, however, two 
of these are especially telling: while other translators’ use of the 
device is minimal, Yasuda and Keene both employ it 16 times.
All the types described above, together with the instances of 5-7-5 
syllable pattem, as well as the appearances of 5-7-x and x-7-5, are 
presented in Table 3. The table displays the number of instances an 
individual pattern is employed by a particular translator, within the 
body of sixty translations per each translator (if in the case of a 
particular translator there were no appearances of a pattern, the 
respective cell was left unfilled in order to convey its absence more 
conspicuously). The first row of patterns presents the number of 
appearances of the pattem 5-7-x or x-7-5, which forms a part of other 
patterns,29 and is therefore not characteristic of an entire translation. 
This row is marked in bold to avoid its confusion with other types that 
are characteristic of entire translations. It should also be noted that the 
type A<B>A includes all instances of “strict symmetry” of this type, 
except the instances of the prototypical pattern 5-7-5.
Table 3. Instances o f  sy llab le arrangem ent patterns in the translated haiku.
Patterns M asing Y  asuda K eene M arkova
B ow n as,
T hw aite
B lyth
D on egan ,
Ishibashi
Total
5-7-x/x-7-5 2 16 16 1 2 37
5-7-5 55 31 18 2 2 2 110
A <B >A 2 7 15 29 14 6 5 78
A <B>C 2 19 24 21 11 10 13 100
AAB 1 2 1 4 7 10 15 4 0
ABB 1 2 11 6 7 27
A A A 1 1 2 1 1 6
A >B >C 1 2 6 4 13
A >B <A 1 6 3 5 15
A <B <C 5 8 6 19
A >B <C 8 4 12
29 As the pattern 5-7-x  and x-7-5 may naturally form a part o f the 5-7-5  syllable  
pattern, the latter is excluded from the discussion here. Apart from 5-7-5 , the pattern 5- 
7-x and x-7-5  can, in principle, appear within all the types except A A A , A >B <A , 
A>B<C .
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The above-described discernment of types gives us a tentative over­
view of which kinds of syllable organization are preferred and which 
ones are avoided in haiku translations in general. Thus, we can say 
that, within the present corpus, the least followed pattern is AAA with 
the lines of equal length, and the next least used patterns are A>B<C 
and A>B>C. On the other hand, the most exploited syllable arrange­
ment model (apart from 5-7-5) is A<B>C, that is here named “relative 
asymmetry” (type 2a above), where the middle line is longer than the 
first and the last lines. Although this type does not follow the original 
haiku form exactly, it still transmits an impression of a “haiku-like” 
form.
The forms of syllable organization reveal significant information 
about the translation dominants of individual translators. The obser­
vance of the prototype model of haiku, i.e. the syllable pattern of 5-7-
5, of course gives us the first understanding about the degree a 
translator tries to retain the form of haiku: from the first glance it 
becomes obvious, for example, that Masing is extremely form- 
oriented,30 as fifty-five of his sixty translations follow the 5-7-5 
model. On the other hand, we can also see that, for example, Donegan, 
Ishibashi or Blyth or Markova are evidently not oriented primarily 
towards rendering the form of haiku, which means that their dominant 
lies somewhere else. However, the observance of neither the 5-7-5 
syllable pattern nor the overall number of seventeen syllables does not 
reveal the more specific degree to which individual translators try to 
convey the haiku form, while the possible patterns of syllable 
organization inform us, e.g. that while a translator may not follow the 
exact haiku form, he/she may try to approach it as frequently as 
possible by using the type of “relative symmetry” A<B>C. The 
frequency of appearance of different patterns explicates also which 
patterns are regarded by translators as more similar to haiku than 
others: from the above-given information, we can guess that the form 
ABB is considered more appropriate for rendering a haiku than, for 
instance, the form AAA. The study of this corpus also confirms one’s 
intuitions concerning translation strategies: for instance, we can infer 
that the more different types of pattern organization a translator uses, 
the less determined he/she is in the choice of a specific form in which 
to render a haiku.
C f U. M asing’s own opinion: “In Estonian, it [a haiku] could be written also as 
in 4+ 6+ 4, 3+5+3, if  there is no wish to write in 5+ 7+ 5, [but] all kinds o f  “free” forms 
are not haiku. A  sonnet in vers libre is not a sonnet!” (M asing 1989: 1000).
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Since the adherence to the 5-7-5 syllable pattern is the primary 
“key” to judging an individual translator’s orientation towards 
translating the form  of the haiku, it can also provide us with an 
imaginary axis or scale, with Masing occupying its one extreme end 
and Donegan, Ishibashi the other. Towards Masing’s end we can also 
place Yasuda and Keene who both show a strong tendency to follow 
the 5-7-5 pattern, as well as the combinations of 5-7-x and x-7-5.
Yasuda and Keene, who (next to Masing) follow the 5-7-5 syllable 
pattern more often than others, use almost exclusively the “relative 
symmetry” pattern A<B>C and the “strict symmetry” pattern A<B>A 
in their other translations. They also display a marked tendency to 
employ the combinations 5-7-x or x-7-5, e.g. in the patterns 5-7-6 or 
4-7-5: it appears then that although a large part of their translations 
does not follow the 5-7-5 syllable pattern or the overall number of 17 
syllables, many of their translations appear marked as “haiku”. The 
same feature may also be seen in the cases of some other translators, 
but then only minimally (1-2 times); however, with both Yasuda and 
Keene it is observable 16 times.
We could thus say that these three translators (Masing, Yasuda, 
Keene) constitute the more form-oriented group among the present 
corpus. However, the other end of the imaginary scale is “fuzzier”, 
mainly because the tendencies towards one or another type are not as 
clear-cut as with the more form-oriented group.
Next to the translators who display a strong tendency towards 
following the 5-7-5 pattern, there are others who do not display such 
tendency: Markova; Bownas, Thwaite; Blyth (all of them use this 
pattern two times), and Donegan, Ishibashi (do not use at all). Blyth 
and Donegan, Ishibashi use the “relative symmetry” pattern A<B>C to 
some extent (10 and 13 times, respectively), but to about the same 
degree they observe also the pattern AAB that is used less by other 
translators. Compared to these two types, their adherence to the “strict 
symmetry” type A<B>A is weaker, approximately the same as their 
observance of the types ABB, A>B>C, A<B<C, A>B<C, and also 
A>B<A — all of which appear rarely (or not at all) with Masing, 
Yasuda and Keene. It follows quite naturally that we can place Blyth 
rather safely together with Donegan, Ishibashi at the “liberal” end of 
the imaginary scale.
Now, while we have more or less cleared the issue with five of the 
translators, there are still translators who are left in-between: Markova 
and Bownas, Thwaite. Neither Markova nor Bownas, Thwaite follow 
the 5-7-5 syllable pattern very keenly: similarly to Blyth, they have
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only two translations that adhere to this model. However, differently 
from Blyth, their other translations display a tendency towards these 
models that are used by the more form-oriented translators, rather than 
those used by Blyth and Donegan, Ishibashi: both follow extensively 
the patterns of “strict symmetry” A<B>A and “relative symmetry” 
A<B>C. However, here also appear differences: for one, Bownas, 
Thwaite use the type ABB as many times as the type of “relative 
symmetry” A<B>C — this seems to bring him closer to the translation 
preferences of Blyth and Donegan, Ishibashi; besides, his translations 
feature all together eight types of syllable organization out of nine. 
Markova, on the other hand, follows the two types — “strict sym­
metry” A<B>A and “relative symmetry” A<B>C — almost to the 
exclusion of other types: while in the case of Bownas, Thwaite the 
relation of these two types to the other types used is 25 : 35, in the 
case of Markova the relation is 50 : 10. Since the variety of types that 
Markova uses is also smaller than that of Bownas, Thwaite, we may 
conclude that Markova is considerably closer to the form-oriented 
group, while Bownas, Thwaite are closer to Blyth and Donegan, 
Ishibashi.
When comparing the results obtained by simply looking at the 
observance of the 5-7-5 syllable pattern and the overall number of 17 
syllables, to the results of the analysis of syllable arrangement 
patterns, there appear some changes. While Masing, Yasuda and 
Keene have retained their positions as the most form-oriented 
translators, and Donegan, Ishibashi have retained the position of the 
most “liberal” translators, more clarity has been acquired in respect to 
the “in-between cases”, i.e. Bownas, Thwaite, Blyth and Markova. 
Judging by the analysis of syllable arrangement patterns, Blyth and 
Bownas, Thwaite tend to render the haiku form with about the same 
liberty as Donegan, Ishibashi. Markova, on the other hand, compared 
to the previous results, appears to “have become” more form- 
oriented — although, in general, she does not render haiku in their 
original 5-7-5 syllable pattern or in the overall number of 17 syllables, 
her translations are still rather form-oriented, which is the result of 
observing the patterns of “exact symmetry” A<B>A and “relative 
symmetry” A<B>C.
Thus, it could be tentatively suggested that a translation, in order to 
mark the haiku form , does not necessarily have to follow the 5-7-5 
syllable pattern or the overall number of 17 syllables. It might be 
enough for a translated haiku to prefer some type of syllable arrange­
ment over another to be considered haiku-like. It appears that the
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syllable patterns more suitable for marking the form of translation as 
that of a haiku (of course, besides the 5-7-5 syllable pattern) are the 
“relative symmetry” pattern A<B>C and the “exact symmetry” pattern 
A<B>A, and to a lesser extent also the patterns AAB and ABB — the 
latter could be regarded as the border-cases between the “haiku-like” 
and the “un-haiku-like” translations.
In the context of the present study, it may only be assumed that 
there exist specific reasons for the preferences towards some syllable 
arrangement patterns over the others: for instance, a haiku may be 
regarded as “something less” or “something more” than just a poem, 
and in both cases the retaining of the original form would not seem to 
be excessively important. For example, one of the translators who 
have regarded haiku as most likely something less than a poem, is B.
H. Chamberlain who is said to have referred to the haiku as nothing 
more than “a litter of bricks, half-bricks in fact” (see Ueda 1991: 9). 
On the other hand, among those who view haiku as essentially more 
than “just a poem” belongs R. H. Blyth, for whom the measure of any 
poetry, or in fact, of any human activity, is Zen.31 The same kind of 
understanding is characteristic, incidentally, also of many Western 
haiku poets. To bring an example, for an American haiku poet J. W. 
Hackett haiku is “fundamentally existential, rather than literary”, or, in 
other words, “primarily an experience, rather than a form of poetry”, 
as well as “ultimately more than a form (or even a kind) of poetry: it is 
a Way — one of living awareness” (quot. Blyth 1998: 351, 352). Most 
of the time, however, also the advocates of Zen in haiku proceed from 
an understanding of haiku as a “short poem”, generally also together 
with the articulation of the poem into three lines.32
Conclusion
In comparison to an original haiku, a translated haiku may allow itself 
some more freedom and still be acceptable as a (translated) haiku. 
However, the area within which a translated haiku can still be said to 
have retained the source text’s “image”, is rather difficult to define. 
The above has been an attempt to approach the formal boundary
" For B lyth’s interpretation of Zen (and poetry, including haiku), see e.g. Blyth 
1984, 1998; Franck 1978, Imamura 1995.
v  See, however, the previously quoted translation by F. L. Huntley o f  Basho’s 
cicada-haiku in which Huntley is said to have recognized “an arc o f Zen” (Ueda 1991 - 
11).
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between “haiku-like” and “un-haiku-like” translations: observing the 
use of different syllable arrangement patterns of individual translators, 
there appear to exist significant differences in the preferences of 
different translators, as well as in the frequency with which one or 
another pattern is used. Translators, who try to retain the form of the 
original, tend to use (besides the 5-7-5 syllable pattern) two symmetri­
cal patterns almost to the exclusion of others. More liberal translators, 
again, tend to use more different patterns and do not display as strong 
preferences towards any particular patterns as the more form-oriented 
translators do.
However, although the above attempt to understand the signifi­
cance for a translated haiku of using different syllable organization 
patterns has been quite revealing with respect to the general dominants 
individual translators observe in their work, there are many questions 
left that need further investigation. For one. the above study does not 
reveal anything particular as to the influence of other parameters of 
haiku upon the preferences in the choice of syllable organization 
patterns in translated haiku. Another aspect worth studying is the 
possible replacement of the syllabic principle with the accentual one 
in haiku translations. In addition, one might also be curious to learn 
what would be the outcome if some other non-English translators were 
also included; what would be the results if a similar experiment were 
conducted with respect to Estonian or Russian translators only, i.e. are 
Masing’s and Markova’s results dependent on their individual styles 
only, or are there involved any general linguistic-cultural factors, etc.
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Переводя семнадцать слогов
В статье рассматриваются изменения формы при переводе японского 
хокку в иной языковой и культурный контекст, когда на поэтическую  
форму начинают влиять особенности и традиции другой культуры. 
Поэтому при переводах хокку часто пользуются некоторыми конвенцио­
нальными формами, в которых не соблюдаются все характерные для 
оригинального хокку черты. В то же время, чтобы перевод был узна­
ваемым как хокку, он все же должен сохранить и определенные фор­
мальные черты хокку. Наши наблюдения основываются на 420 пере­
водах хокку. В центре внимания находится количество слогов и пара­
метры их распределения по строкам, на основе которых предлагаются 
разные модели упорядочивания слогов в переводах. Дается предвари­
тельная классификация типов переводных хокку по линии ориенти­
рованности на форму.
Tõlkides seitsetteist silpi
Käesolev artikkel käsitleb vormimuutusi, mis tekivad jaapani haiku tõlkimisel 
teise keelelis-kultuurilisse konteksti. Kuna tõlkimisel hakkavad luulevormi 
mõjutama teise kultuuri iseärasused ning traditsioonid, kasutatakse haiku 
edastamisel sageli teatud kokkuleppelisi vorme, mis ei järgi kõiki algupä­
rasele haikule iseloomulikke jooni. Samas, selleks et tõlkehaiku oleks käsitle­
tav sama vormina kui algupärane haiku, peab ta siiski säilitama teatud tunnu­
sed, mis on iseloomulikud ka algupärasele vormile. Artiklis tehtavad vaatlu­
sed põhinevad käesoleva töö tarbeks kogutud 420 tõlkehaikul. Tähelepanu 
keskmes on silpide arvu ja ridadesse paigutumise parameetrid, mille alusel 
pakutakse välja tõlkehaikude erinevaid silbikorrastusmudeleid. Mudelite 
üldise ja individuaalse esinem issageduse alusel esitatakse esialgne iseloom us­
tus, milliseid tõlgitud haikude tüüpe võiks pidada rohkem vormile orientee­
rituks kui teisi.
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Abstract. The workpractices associated with the use of an information system 
can be described using semiotic theories in terms o f patterns o f human 
communication. A model of workpractices has been created called the 
systemic semiotic workpractice framework that employs two compatible but 
distinct semiotic theories in order to explain the complexity o f information 
systems use in organisational contexts. One of these theories called social 
semiotics can be used to describe atypical workpractice realisations, where a 
user renegotiates one or more canonical sequences of activities typically 
associated with a specific system feature. In doing so the user may alter the 
staging of the workpractice, redefine the goal of the workpractice, or 
renegotiate the usual role they adopt within the workpractice. Central concepts 
in social semiotics are explained and applied to an actual atypical renegotiated 
workpractice associated with the loan of materials to students in a small 
operational level information system called ALABS.
1. Introduction
This paper describes the contribution provided by social semiotic 
concepts in the development of a systemic semiotic framework sui­
table for theorising workpractices in organisational contexts. In 
contrast to traditional approaches to workpractice analysis which 
utilise processes, business processes, or process modeling, systemic 
semiotics defines a workpractice as consisting of one or more text 
types and zero or more action types. We exclude action types from this 
discussion concentrating instead on text types in workpractices. The
term systemic semiotics, coined by Fawcett (1987), designates a 
composite of two related sets of theories. The first theory is called 
social semiotics (Lemke 1988; Hodge, Kress 1988; 1985; Thibault 
1991). A social semiotic description of texts associated with work- 
practices is provided in (2). The second theory is a semiotic model of 
language called systemic functional linguistics or SFL (Halliday 1985; 
Hasan 1985; Martin 1992). An SFL description of the texts associated 
with workpractices has been described elsewhere (Clarke 1996, 2000). 
Although these two theories are historically related to each other, they 
draw upon different theoretical traditions. As a consequence, a number 
of core concepts are defined differently. However, the framework 
described here can be used to analyse workpractices in organisations, 
including those associated with systems use, by identifying theoretical 
affinities between sets of concepts in social semiotics and SFL. These 
theoretical affinities are used as the basis for describing workpractice 
texts associated with information systems use in organisations. In (5), 
the framework is applied to the use of an actual systems feature in 
order to demonstrate how social semiotics can augment SFL descrip­
tions of workpractices under unusual or atypical situations.
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2. Social semiotic elements
Social semiotic concepts used in the systemic semiotic workpractice 
framework are based primarily on the work of Bakhtin. Interestingly, 
Bakhtin’s development of translinguistics was a result of his studies 
of the novel, which at the time was a relatively recent literary genre. 
He focused on developing a dynamic theory of language and meaning 
emphasising the interrelationship between three categories: (i) the 
active and productive capacity of language; (ii) the evaluative nature 
of meaning; and (iii) social subjectivity. According to Todorov’s 
(1984) reading of Bakhtin’s work, the first category involves dis­
course which is theorised in terms of the production of actualised 
meaning in a communicative event (text), as a responsive interaction 
between social beings. The second category involves the fact that an 
apparently initial utterance is never actually the first utterance in any 
sense. In effect, every word or utterance looks back to the word or 
utterance it is answering, while simultaneously looking forward to the 
anticipated word or utterance it will partly determine in advance. This 
is the dialogic property of language attributed to workpractices, see
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below. The third category involves the social basis of meanings since 
Bakhtin viewed language and thought as intertwined. For Bakhtin, 
language cannot exist without thought, nor can thought exist without 
language, consequently both are social not individual. The develop­
ment of social constitution of the individual (see Dore 1995: 151- 
176), referred to as social subjectivity, is having a profound impact on 
a range of disciplines, including psychoanalysis (Henriques et al. 
1984). Re-theorising communication using translinguistics means that 
the analytical emphasis is placed on understanding communicative 
processes operating as organisational practices in specific organisa­
tional contexts. Elements of the theory are described in turn, discourse 
in (2.1). texts and genre in (2.2), subject positions and reading position 
in (2.3), and social subjectivity in (2.4).
2.1. Discourse
The concept of discourse (Bakhtin 1981: 426, 428; Althusser 1971; 
Foucault 1972) was introduced as a way of thinking about how ideo­
logy functions in culture, institutions, and ourselves, although dis­
course has proved to be a much more flexible concept than ideology. 
A useful definition of discourse is provided by Kress (1985: 6-7):
Discourses are systematically-organised sets of statements which give 
expression to the meanings and values of an institution. Beyond that they 
define, describe and delimit what it is possible to say and not possible to say 
(and by extension-what it is possible to do or not to do) with respect to the 
area of concern of that institution, whether marginally or centrally. A dis­
course provides a set of possible statements about a given area, and organises 
and gives structure to the manner in which a particular topic, object, process is 
to be talked about. In that it provides descriptions, rules, permissions and 
prohibitions of social and individual actions.
In organisational settings, discourses dictate how members of orga­
nisations, objects or activities, are defined, what values are ascribed to 
them, and the particular sets of options that might apply to them in a 
specific situation. In part, discourse theory suggests that much of our 
experience of organisation has already been preordained. In effect, 
members of organisations will already be locked into specific courses 
of action, which are already in part predetermined if they comply with 
the available discourses.
As a consequence, members of organisations are actively involved 
in a kind of “collective” and unacknowledged blindness to entire 
courses of action. This collective blindness is inscribed in the 
discourses that circulate within organisations, predisposing but in no 
way determining, what constitutes appropriate organisational beha­
viour. It is important to note here, that discourses never directly 
operate on members of organisations or others. Discourses inform 
texts, which in turn are “read” by members of organisations or others 
in specific organisational contexts, that is discourses must have 
participants in order to function.
Discourse are inescapable, operating in organisations, institutions 
and society. Academic institutions and disciplines are no exception. In 
a large number of modem “scientific” disciplines, including modem 
management and its related disciplines of information systems and 
accounting. the psychological individual is viewed as the origin of 
meaning in social and cultural practices (Clarke 1992). An example of 
this in information systems discipline is the process model of commu­
nication, especially its interpretation by Weaver (1972), as having 
attained the status of “commonsense” (Belsey 1980). This is possible 
because a particular type of discourse, referred to as liberal-humanist 
discourse, operates throughout western culture, including the 
academy. The effect of this type of discourse is to naturalise, that is to 
allow to operate unchallenged, the view that individuals are single, 
unified, originators of meanings. In turn, liberal-humanist discourse 
has influenced academics and practitioners to uncritically reproduce 
these discourses as “commonsense” when creating theories about 
information systems. Theorising speakers as the originators of 
meanings favours those who can speak in specific circumstances, and 
issues of power and control in organisations are often discussed from 
just such an individualist standpoint. Power in organisations is treated 
as if it were a commodity: the possession of individuals. This 
individualism obscures the way organisations operate as product and 
process. Even the discipline of organisational behaviour, becomes 
reduced to a study of individuals compared to standards of behaviour 
against which dysfunctional characteristics can be treated and new 
functional behaviours reinforced. These standards are accepted as an 
objective reality, permitting the production and social use of these 
discourses to be left untheorised. As these traditional models pass into 
the literature and are adopted and enacted by practitioners, the 
"commonsense'’ nature of the individual producers and consumers of 
information is reproduced.
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Social semioticians view language as a social process. Following 
Kress (1985), the argument for this is that, (i) language derives 
meaning from the social activities in which it is embedded, that (ii) 
knowledge is communicated in social contexts, that (iii) activities 
have social agents and goals, and that (iv) language, knowledge and 
activities utilise relationships defined and inextricably bound to value 
systems in the specific cultures of social institutions. The operational 
semiotic “unit” of language that may be used to examine the 
complexity of a specific organisation, is the text. If language derives 
its meaning from social activities, text is language, which is functional 
to some extent within the social institution. Halliday (1978) clarifies 
the distinction between language and text:
[text] looks as though it is made of words and sentences, it is really made of 
meanings. Of course, the meanings have to be expressed, or coded, in words 
and [linguistic] structures [...] in order to be communicated; but as a thing in 
itself, a text is essentially a semantic unit. It is not something that can be defined 
as being just another kind of sentence, only bigger. (Halliday 1978: 10)
Texts operate in specific social contexts within organisations. Organi­
sations are constantly being reproduced and reconstituted in texts; 
without this process organisations would cease to exist. A text may be 
defined as “a structure of messages or message traces which has a 
socially ascribed unity” whilst discourse “refers to the social process 
in which texts are embedded [...] text is the material object produced 
in discourse” (Hodge, Kress 1988: 6). Texts can be critically exa­
mined to reveal discourses in operation and the contestation of 
meanings in institutions, see Halliday (1978), Belsey (1980), Kress 
(1985, 1988), and Hodge, Kress (1988).
Any utterance in a social setting is referred to as a text and always 
operates in specific social settings within organisations. The term 
“text” is used to indicate that organisational activity involves language 
or is reproduced in language. The plural form of the term is generally 
used to simultaneously signify two important aspects of the theory. 
First, organisational practices generally produce more than one text. If 
studying a specific workpractice a tape recording of what was said 
between the interactants would form one text, which might be then 
used to produce a transcript of what transpired during the enactment of 
the workpractice. Collecting associated written texts would also assist
2.2. Texts and genre
in understanding what took place (forms and documentation). All of 
these kinds of texts can be thought of as “products”. Second, meaning- 
making occasions are “processes”. Its constituent messages, and 
consequently the text itself, can never have a single, fixed meaning. 
This point requires further consideration. Belsey (1980: 26) states that 
whilst language provides the possibility of meaning, any text exhibits 
multiple meanings because meanings never remain static. However, 
the most significant factor determining the plurality of meaning is that 
a text’s possible set of meanings will vary according to the way 
discourses are recognised by readers. So it is possible to have a single 
position from which a text is intelligible, because, as Belsey (1980: 
19-20) puts it “texts are rooted in specific discourses”. Meanings are 
subjective only to the extent that the contradictions and the super­
imposition of discourses construct different sets of meaning in specific 
situations for each member of an organisation. These points are taken 
up more fully below.
Apart from being simultaneously a product and process, a text will 
also utilise genres and other social conventions to assist in the 
construction of meaning. Of particular interest here is the category of 
genre, the specific staging of a text. Examples of genres commonly 
found in organisations include memo, calendar, invoices, interviews, 
meetings and so on. Knowing, the purpose that a text serves in a 
particular social setting enables us to anticipate to a surprising degree 
of accuracy both the overall text structure and also its internal 
organisation of messages. As a part of our lived experience within 
institutions (Martin 1992), we learn to ascribe certain kinds of 
meaning to certain kinds of texts. Specific genres assist in con­
structing or reinforcing some of the meaning of the text, how it is to 
be “read”, identifying the agent(s) of the text, and specifying the 
audience. Members in organisations understand texts in social con­
texts because they have prior experience of them, since meanings are 
conventional, requiring familiarity not intuition (Belsey 1980: 26).
2.3. Subject positions and the reading position
Social subjects are positioned (with respect to themselves and others) 
in relation to particular discourses and practices. Because of social 
positioning, a member of an organisation will tend to assume specific 
roles in interactions and texts. Kress (1996: 311) refers to this as a
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“[...] habitual, though socially determined, conjunction of a certain 
subject position and certain textual and reading practices. That con­
junction determines the use of certain forms of language”. According­
ly, discourses and texts always address subjects. They will usually 
appear coherent since parts of the text work together to construct its 
meaning. Texts will appear meaningful to a reader who adopts the 
particular configuration of discourses which is negotiated in and by 
the text. Texts address and position social subjects by constructing a 
reading position which instructs the social subject “about who, what, 
and how to be in a given social situation, occasion, interaction [...]” 
(Kress 1985: 39). A reading position is the dominant position from 
which a specific text appears meaningful, and usually coherent. In 
adopting the reading position of the text, the subject gives tacit 
agreement to the negotiation of discourses constructed in the text, and 
is referred to as a compliant subject. Reading positions and subject 
positions are interrelated by the operation of discourses (Kress 1985: 
37). Occupying the reading position, the subject is defined and 
described by, and may identify with, the discourses of the text. The 
idea of social subjects is based on Althusser’s (1971) concept of the 
interpellated subject where subjects recognise themselves being called 
or interpellated in the text. Compliant subjects are actually positioned 
by the text so that they do not see any contradictions it may contain. 
Compliant subjects in organisations may be socially rewarded 
depending on the circumstances. However, subjects may resist the 
obvious reading position in the text. If the subject views the semiotic 
practices as operating from a different position then they are referred 
to as a resisting subject.
The term negotiation refers to the ways in which specific texts 
construct meanings. Negotiation commonly involves the textual con­
struction of (some of) the major discourses operating in the organi­
sation (and society). Various discourses in a text need not necessarily 
be in harmony with each other- they may be in conflict since texts are 
both the material realisation of sign systems, and also the site where 
this change constantly takes place (Hodge, Kress 1988: 6). All 
participants negotiate texts according to the specific discourses, which 
define and delimit permissible subject positions. In other words, 
discourses position social subjects/participants to comply with or to 
resist particular readings, that is, to see only some as “natural”. This 
process of negotiating specific subject positions may generate conflict 
and contradiction, a kind of social dissonance.
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2.4. Social subjectivity
Having defined the concept of discourse, and seen that members of 
organisations negotiate specific sets of meanings (discourses) in speci­
fic social occasions (texts), we turn our attention to the final major 
concept used in a social semiotic theory of workpractices, that of 
social subjects. Organisations are conventionally viewed as consisting 
of collections of individuals. By recognising that individualism is a 
commonsense category (Belsey 1980), our responsibility becomes one 
of questioning the prevailing assumptions implied by it. We will adopt 
the term social subject to replace “participants”.
Because subjects are socially and discursively formed, each will 
bring to organisations different sets of institutional and linguistic ex­
periences (Kress 1988). It is possible for those who share similar 
institutional experiences (for example, workplaces, schools, and 
churches) and similar linguistic experiences (nationality, class) to 
appear to comply with similar discourses. However, as no two sub­
jects will share identical discourses, it is unlikely that they will 
consistently share the same meanings. Kress notes:
[...] the individual participant in communication is significant [...] as both 
socially formed and socially agentive. Individuals are formed by and in their 
institutional and linguistic experiences and histories; in most or all encounters 
the meanings we encounter, produce, contest, and reshape are socially, 
culturally and institutionally given. Yet they are encountered, contested and 
reshaped, imposed perhaps by individuals as social agents in communication. 
(Kress 1988: 127)
Following Henriques et al. (1984), theories of the subject emphasise 
how the social domain constitutes “subjectivity”. Subjectivity refers 
simultaneously to the condition of “individuality” and self-awareness, 
which is continually formed and reformed under changing social, 
economic and historical circumstances. Furthermore, social subjects 
are considered dynamic and multiple- not as single, isolated indivi­
duals. For an illustration of this type of theorisation, see Urwin (1984), 
who applies certain ideas of Foucault with revised theories of Lacan. 
It is often the case that readers encountering this concept for the first 
time recoil in horror at the thought that they are socially constituted, 
not unified, individual free agents. This effect is discursively pro­
duced! It is the operation of liberal-humanist discourse that constructs 
the subject of psychology known as the “individual”. Dore (1995:
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151-176) provides an excellent description of social subjectivity and 
describes why we can never be outside of “discourse”. Rather than 
being determined by discourses, we are socially agentive because of 
them. This apparent contradiction is resolved by recalling that: (i) 
discourses never directly operate on social subjects but in turn are 
“read” by them in specific organisational contexts, and that (ii) 
discourses must have social subjects in order to exist. Bound up with 
the concepts of discourse, text and social subjectivity is the concept of 
positioning, see (2.3).
By using social semiotic concepts, a model has been produced 
based on Clarke (1991: 57) which addresses some of the issues 
identified in classical process models of communication readily used 
in the information systems literature, see Figure 1. In the following 
sections, these concepts will be applied to describing the atypical 
behaviour of an actual systems features, based on Clarke (1997).
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Figure I. Social semiotic relationships between discourse, text and social subject 
(based on Clarke 1991: 57).
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Having introduced the necessary concepts, these are then applied to 
the use of an information system in support of a workpractice. Gold- 
kuhl (1993) questions a prevailing assumption within the information 
systems (IS) discipline that designers should work to create a tight 
integration between workpractices or activities in organisations, and 
the information system features designed to support them. While 
current design practices assume integration, he notes that there have 
been periods throughout the history of IS design when a separation 
between workpractices and systems features has been assumed- a 
conclusion easily substantiated in the literature. Goldkuhl (1993) 
proposed that IS designers simultaneously consider each system 
feature from two positions. Integration assuming system features are 
tightly coupled to a workpractice, and separation — assuming system 
features are loosely coupled to a workpractice. In order for system 
designs to be evaluated simultaneously from these two standpoints, 
either distinct integration-oriented and separation-oriented design 
practices must be used, or alternative practices must be applied or 
developed which can facilitate this kind of design evaluation. 
Modelling the design of any given system feature twice using 
integration-oriented and separation-oriented design practices is 
generally impractical in terms of time and effort. However, Goldkuhl 
(1993) employs methods, originally developed in the IS AC systems 
development methodology, to demonstrate how several system 
features may be considered from both integrationist and separationist 
standpoints.
Goldkuhl’s (1993) work has important implications for the deve­
lopment of organisational semiotics, since the use of an information 
system could also be considered from integrationist and separationist 
standpoints. A movement from the domain of system design to that of 
systems use requires two steps. First, substitute the planned functio­
nality afforded by systems design with the actual functionality 
afforded by systems implementation of specific information systems 
features. Second, substitute the proposed organisational activity to be 
supported or created using the information system, with enacted 
workpractices in organisational contexts.
The only exception to a general agreement with Goldkuhl’s (1993) 
thesis, is that there is, or should be, a dialectical relationship between 
integration and separation in design and, by extension, systems use. 
Williams (1988: 106-108) defines “dialectic” in terms of the “conti-
3. Integration and separation in systems use
Social semiotic contributions 597
nual unification of opposites, in the complex relation of parts to 
wholes” [emphasis own]. As there appears to be no complex relation 
evident between Integration and Separation, there is cause to question 
the existence of a dialectical relationship between these concepts in 
systems design and by extension in system use. In the following sec­
tion, integration and separation will be reconsidered as a dichotomy to 
be deconstructed using Derrida’s reading tactics (Norris 1982).
4. Systems use as dialogic
In the previous section, Goldkuhl’s (1993) thesis was applied to 
systems use although doubts are raised about the dialectical relation­
ship presumed between these approaches. Here, this dialectic is 
deconstructed using Derrida’s reading tactics (Norris 1982) to reveal 
that the relationship between workpractices and systems features is 
actually a dialogic one. Integration and separation appear to be end­
points along a simple cline or grade- the degree of binding between a 
workpractice and a system feature. Consequently, in systems design 
and use, a “large” degree of integration presupposes a “small” degree 
of separation, and visa versa. In demonstrating that integration and 
separation are in an inversely proportional relationship rather than a 
dialectical relationship, the relationship between these entities appears 
to be a dichotomy. Dichotomies in social theory often function to 
suppress one of their terms, that is, dichotomies are not equally 
balanced. Derrida’s deconstruction provides a set of reading tactics 
for interrogating dichotomies (Norris 1982).
The first deconstructive tactic used to interrogate the integration/ 
separation dichotomy, is reversal, that is we reverse the relative 
positions of the two terms in privileging separation. Reversal enables 
us to demonstrate that integration and separation are not logically 
necessary or unalterable in their relationship to each other. As noted 
earlier, Goldkuhl (1993) uses the literature to disrupt the dominance of 
integration, while at the same time valuing the repressed term separa­
tion. However, such an operation still preserves the dichotomous 
relationship between the two terms. Derrida’s second deconstructive 
tactic is referred to as displacement. The repressed term separation 
must be displaced, not out of the dichotomy altogether but by posi­
tioning it within the core of the dominant term as its logical condition. 
This makes explicit the unacknowledged debt that the dominant term
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of integration owes to the secondary term of separation. By demon­
strating that the integration/separation dichotomy may not be logically 
necessary, the tactic of displacement foregrounds the fact that the 
dichotomy could be replaced by entirely different concepts.
The third reading tactic for interrogating dichotomies is the 
creation of a relevant hinge term which is “outside” the binary oppo­
sition between integration and separation but which participates in 
both terms. A hinge term may be derived from texts being examined 
or it might be a neologism devised to interrogate a specific dichotomy. 
The function of the hinge term is to provide a logical precondition 
from which the dichotomy is constructed. The hinge term is in effect 
that which is leftover, unrepresented and uncontained by the 
dichotomy. Parenthetically, we have used the term “reading tactics” as 
a way of avoiding using the term method since Derrida’s “reading 
tactics” do not suggest, for example, any candidates for the hinge 
term. The hinge term employed here to interrogate the dichotomy is 
negotiation. Negotiation is the logical precondition from which the 
integration/separation dichotomy is constructed in information sys­
tems theory. In using this term we foreground the fact that integration 
or separation between workpractices and information systems features 
is never historically fixed, but rather is always at risk. As a hinge term, 
negotiation is compatible with Goldkuhl’s (1993) aim of describing a 
“dynamic view” of the relationship between information system 
features and organisational activities. The choice of the term negotia­
tion is strategic because it enables the relationship between workprac­
tices and information systems to be theorised as dialogic according to 
Mikhail Bakhtin’s sense of the term (Todorov 1984), and as applied in 
Clarke (1992).
In applying Bakhtin’s concepts to information systems in organi­
sations, workpractices may be defined as texts that conform to 
Bakhtin’s notion of the dialogic. The characteristic of workpractices 
as “negotiated”, proposed above, accords with Bakhtin’s theories of 
text (Todorov 1984). This is demonstrated in the ways that relevant 
social subjects actively renegotiate workpractices, so that work­
practices may exhibit more than one preferred realisation. However, 
the imposition of information systems into workpractices often acts to 
create an opposite tendency toward what Bakhtin refers to as the 
monological, or “the reduction of potentially multiple ’voices’ (or 
characters) into a single authoritative voice [...][reducing the 
production of actualised meaning which] is sometimes inescapable” 
(Fowler 1987: 58-60).
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5. Application to workpractices
Translinguistics — the name Bakhtin coined for his investigations into 
language — is useful as a means for theorising how systems position 
users and others in organisations, and for providing a dynamic view of 
systems use. However, it does not provide methods for the analysis of 
actual work texts (for example transcripts) in specific situational and 
cultural contexts. Bakhtin was critical of the traditional linguistics of 
his day, developing substantial critiques of formalism and structu­
ralism in linguistics. Specifically, he viewed traditional linguistic 
theories as monologic in that they attempting to account for discourse 
as if it consisted of single meanings. Therefore, translinguistics resists 
the kind of operationalisation necessary in a design discipline such as 
information systems.
In order to study texts associated with workpractices, we need 
methods that can be applied to the task. As a consequence SFL is used 
to analyse transcripts associated with workpractices. The development 
of social semiotics, can be seen as a theoretical move to situate 
systemic functional linguistics within a broader critical framework 
using the work of Bakhtin as a foundation (in Todorov 1984), Althus­
ser (1971), and Foucault (1972). Given the historical relationship 
between them (Hodge, Kress 1988; Kress 1985, 1988) and the 
pragmatic importance of combining them (Fawcett 1987), the use of 
social semiotics together with systemic functional linguistics is a 
conservative pairing of theories compared to many multiple theory 
research strategies routinely employed in field research (Burgess 
1982: 163-167). Denzin (1970) cautions against the “theoretical 
incongruence” that results by attempting to use incompatible theories 
in conjunction with one another and advocates the use of theoretical 
triangulation. This is a commonly used approach in multiple theory 
research strategies in which researchers investigate how different 
theoretical approaches are linked to one another within individual 
studies, and evaluate the advantages and disadvantages of combining 
theories in the course of a particular study. In order to permit social 
semiotics and systemic functional linguistics to be used in conjunction 
with each other, various theoretical affinities or links between 
compatible theoretical entities, have been developed (Clarke 2000).
It is necessary to consider an example that reveals the advantages of 
combining these theories in organisational semiotic studies of 
workpractices in workplaces. SFL genre theory was used to extract from
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interviews the qualitative, typical arrangement of stages (shown as 
dashed circles) in the enactment of a student loan work practice 
associated with the ALABS system (Clarke 2000), forming the genre 
digraph in Figure 2a. Related realisations of this workpractice are 
shown using alternative paths above or below the typical so-called base 
line sequence that starts with the triangle on the left hand side of Figure 
2a and finishes on the right hand side with the upside down triangle. 
From a social semiotic perspective, negotiating the typical arrangement 
of stages in a workpractice corresponds to an adoption of the dominant 
reading position of the system feature. The reading position is adopted 
by users who comply with the dominant discourses informing the 
workpractice, that is, the discourses which produce the “coherence” of 
the workpractice. From this position, the system feature will appear to 
be the most obvious, natural, and uncontested negotiation of the 
workpractice. In adopting the dominant reading position, users comply 
with those discourses that produce centripetal forces tending to a 
monological or integrationist instance of systems use.
Figure 2. ALABS Student Qualitative Digraph, version 1 (a), and a qualitative 
sequence showing a negotiated separation between the workpractice and the 
ALABS Student Loan system feature (b). Codes for qualitative elements and their 
functions: Gq, Greeting —  phatic initiation; SRq, Service Request —  request for 
loan services; ISq, Identification Sought —  student-id or equivalent retained; REq, 
Regulations — student regulations; Eq, Enrolment —  enrolment of student 
requestor; MOq, Materials Out — items provided; Fq, Finish —  phatic 
conclusion.
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Current SFL genre theory emphasises a synoptic view of genre, and as 
a consequence it is not well suited to explaining divergences from the 
typical arrangement of stages in workpractice genres. One such 
departure from the typical staging of the workpractice is shown in 
Figure 2b. Usually students are required to provide a student 
identification card, which is subsequently retained at the point of 
borrowing. One student, who was known to the staff members 
responsible for the facility, had forgotten to bring their identification 
card. The card was necessary in order for the loan to be logged with 
the ALABS computer system. Normally students without cards are not 
loaned items. But in the case of a known student, the staff member in 
charge of the system might request some other form of identification. 
If available this would be retained and the loan would have to be 
recorded manually (offline). Unfortunately, this particular student did 
not have any other form of identification at all. The student provided 
their expensive watch as security against the loss or theft of the item. 
They renegotiated the Identification Sought stage into an entirely new 
element — the Value of the retained Item. Such a maneuver exceeds 
the descriptive capacities of SFL.
In contrast, translinguistics provides a dynamic view of text and 
genre that can be of use in theorising these atypical realisations of 
workpractice genres, as an adoption by users of a non-dominant, 
resisting subject position. At times users may: (i) re-negotiate one type 
of workpractice into a different form of workpractice, which still has 
the same overall purpose although realised by different means, or (ii) 
re-negotiate a workpractice into a completely different form. These 
new forms may not be organisationally sanctioned. As a consequence, 
resistant readings of a workpractice and its associated system features 
run the risk of failure in organisational contexts, in so far as the 
pragmatic goals of the workpractice may not be achieved. In some 
contexts, resistant readings may be viewed as an infringement of 
workplace regulations, best practice agreements or relevant acts of 
parliament. However, in some circumstances the adoption of a non­
dominant (resisting) subject position may lead to a successful renego­
tiation of the workpractice. By adopting a non-dominant subject 
position, users mobilise discourses, which produce centrifugal forces 
tending to a dialogic or separationist instance of systems use. Here, an 
associated information system may be used in an unorthodox way, or 
effectively bypassed using a manual work-around.
6. Conclusions
In order to theorise the relationship between workpractices and 
systems features in use, we take as a point of departure a view of 
systems design developed by Goldkuhl (1993). He proposed viewing 
systems design practices simultaneously from two dialectically 
opposite thought models he referred to as Integrationist and Separa­
tionist. The argument he provides can also be applied to the enactment 
of workpractices associated with information systems. By using the 
“reading tactics” formulated by Derrida (Norris 1982), the dialectical 
relationship between integrationist and separationist views proposed 
by Goldkuhl (1993) is retheorised in social semiotic terms as “nego­
tiation” or a dialogic relationship (Vološinov 1985). Despite deve­
loping a social semiotic theory of workpractices, Bakhtin’s trans­
linguistics purposefully resists efforts at operationalisation. As a 
consequence, relevant concepts from systemic functional linguistics 
(Martin 1992) — a semiotic model of language — were selected in 
order to be able to undertake applied studies in information system 
use. Although no simple mapping exists between concepts in 
Bakhtin’s Translinguistics and SFL, theoretical affinities have been 
tentatively established between a number of fundamental concepts, 
with the latter enabling workpractice texts to be analysed in detail 
(Clarke 2000). However, the contribution that social semiotics makes 
to the systemic semiotic workpractice model is that it provides a 
dynamic and discursive view of workpractices in organisational and 
institutional contexts.
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Социосемиотический вклад в системный 
семиотический анализ практики действия
Практики действия, привязанные к определенной инфосистеме, можно 
описывать при помощи семиотических теорий, изучающих образцы  
[patterns] человеческой коммуникации. Создается модель практик
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действий (системная семиотическая рам ка практик действия), которая 
пользуется двумя сравнимыми, но в то же время разными семиоти­
ческими теориями, чтобы демонстрировать сложность использования 
инфосистем в организационных контекстах. Одну из этих теорий можно 
назвать социосемиотикой и ее можно использовать при описании 
нетипичной практики действия, когда пользователь меняет один или два 
из тех канонических порядков действия, которые обычно связываются с 
каким-нибудь специфическим свойством системы. Таким образом  
пользователь может изменить исход какой-нибудь практики действия, 
переформулировать цель или варьировать путем переговоров свою роль 
в этой практике. Разъясняются центральные понятия социосемиотики, 
которые применяются и на таком нетипичном случае практики действия 
как выдача учебных матерьялов в малой инфосистеме оперативного 
уровня, называемую ALABS.
Sotsiosemiootiline panus tegevuspraktika 
süsteemsesse semiootilisse analüüsi
Vaadeldes infosüsteem e kasutavaid tegevuspraktikaid kui inimsuhtluse must­
reid saab neid kiijeldada sem iootilise teooria abil. On loodud tegevus- 
praktikate mudel, mida nimetatakse tegevuspraktikate süsteem seks sem iooti­
liseks raam istuks ning mis kasutab kaht võrreldavat, kuid samas eripärast 
sem iootilist teooriat, et selgitada infosüsteem ide kasutamise keerukust organi­
satsioonilistes kontekstides. Üht neist teooriaist võib nimetada sotsiosem ioo- 
tikaks, ning seda saab kasutada ebatüüpilise tegevuspraktika kirjeldamiseks, 
kus kasutaja muudab üht või mitut kanoonilist tegevusjäijekorda, mis on 
tavapäraselt seotud teatud kindla süsteemitunnusega. Seda tehes võib kasutaja 
kas muuta mingi tegevuspraktika realiseerimist, määratleda ümber teatud 
tegevuspraktika eesmärgi või läbirääkimise kaudu muuta oma tavapärast rolli 
tegevuspraktikas. Selgitatakse sotsiosem iootika keskseid mõisteid, mida 
ühtlasi rakendatakse ühele ebatüüpilise ümbermääratlemisega seotud tegevus- 
praktikale, mis käsitleb õppematerjalide laenamist õpilastele väikeses opera­
tiivse tasandi infosüsteemis nimega ALABS.
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Abstract, The article analyses the position of sociosemiotics in the paradigm 
of contemporary semiotics. Principles of studying sociocultural phenomena 
are discussed so as they have been set for analysing the inner mechanisms of 
sign systems in the semiology of F. de Saussure on the one hand, and for 
studying sign systems and semiotic units as related to referential reality in the 
semiotics of C. S. Peirce on the other hand. Three main issues are touched 
upon to define the scope of sociosemiotics: the general methodology of 
sociosemiotics, its particular methods, and possible objects of analysis. The 
relevance of the features of objects in different humanitarian disciplines 
(cultural unit, historical fact, social fact, institutional fact, social process, etc.) 
is surveyed to define the object of study in sociosemiotics. Also, the article 
comments on the description of social organisations via cultural processes and 
on relations between an individual and society as controllable by social action 
models.
Introduction: Semiotics and the logic 
of ‘subsemiotic’ disciplines
It has become a commonplace to distinguish between different areas 
of semiotics by the objects of those fields. Notions like ‘semiotics of 
literature’, ‘semiotics of advertising’, ‘semiotics of space’, ‘semiotics 
of music’, etc. are often used according to such logic that as if 
presumes that all of a sudden a new range of objects has appeared, or, 
vice versa, sociosemiotics has as if arrived belatedly at the Great 
Delivery of Objects, and thus must find something new to study in 
order to justify its existence. It seems necessary to explicate why these
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possible understandings are incorrect and to propose ideas concerning 
rescuing the currently fuzzy discipline of sociosemiotics from its 
present vagueness. The solution will probably influence the unwritten 
principles of dividing the general semiotic field as well.
To begin with, we should not constrain ourselves with the mere 
distinction between Saussurean semiology and Peircean semiotics. 
Rather, their influence on the emergence of e.g. cultural semiotics, 
biosemiotics, etc. should be observed. As mentioned above, in the 
contemporary semiotic discourse it has become common to 
distinguish between different ‘subsemiotic’ disciplines according to 
the objects dealt with (e.g. the general situation in semiotics as 
currently concerned with to three main fields labeled as cultural 
semiotics, biosemiotics and sociosemiotics). The structure of these 
fields is organized according to a more subtle differentiation between 
research objects (e.g. in the general area of cultural semiotics we can 
find literary semiotics, semiotics of theatre, semiotics of advertising, 
cinema, etc.). There are virtually no limitations to the branching of 
semiotics in this manner and therefore we can even come across such 
terms as semiotics of traffic signs or refrigerator semiotics (see, e.g., 
Vihma 1995). However, this seems confusing, especially at a time 
when semiotics is becoming more and more institutionalized (e.g., 
wide variation in organization of chairs in departments, programs and 
curricula), which presupposes at least some common understanding of 
semiotics as a unified discipline that should be comparable to areas 
with a longer history of institutionalization that is manifested on a 
scale ranging from relevant text-books to organizations. Furthermore, 
the ad hoc labeling of ‘subsemiotic’ disciplines according to their 
objects does not seem to be grounded due to their intrinsic inseparable 
nature (e.g., it would hardly be fruitful to study semiotics of theatre, 
not paying attention to, for example, the latter’s literary or artistic 
aspects). Unified understanding of the semiotic paradigm is thus 
essential already from the educational point of view.
Another way to create a division of the ‘subsemiotic’ branches of 
research would be to follow the logic of information channels (e.g., 
the optical channel; see Landwehr 1997, the acoustic channel; see 
Strube. Lazarus 1997. the tactile channel; see Heuer 1997, etc.). Also 
terms like ‘visual semiotics’, ‘semiotics of space’ and the like point at 
the possibility of differentiating between objects on the basis of the 
channels of human perception by which the world is turned into signs. 
However, it is doubtful that these channels can be actually studied 
separately (see, e.g., Krampen 1997). Also, different areas of semiosis
have been articulated that lead to, and are included in, the cultural 
processes of anthroposemiosis: microsemiosis, mycosemiosis, 
phytosemiosis, zoosemiosis (see Wuketis 1997).
Sociosemiotics — a term relatively frequently used in contempo­
rary semiotic discourse— is a recent development in semiotics. How­
ever, when we attempt to delimit its field, we meet a puzzling 
situation: there hardly exists either any clear-cut definition of the 
theoretical paradigm of sociosemiotics, or any outline of the range of 
its genuine objects. Amongst the very few existing definitions of 
sociosemiotics we can refer to the one by Alexandros Lagopoulos and 
Mark Gottdiener who state: “sociosemiotics is materialistic analysis of 
ideology in everyday life” (Gottdiener, Lagopoulos 1986: 14). This 
approach, however, seems to be both tautological as well as ‘too 
materialistic’. Since in semiotic analysis we cannot escape from the 
everyday life and consummation of signs already at the stage of 
collecting data (see, e.g., Danesi, Perron 1999: 293ff), nor from the 
necessarily pragmatic angle of semiotic studies. Furthermore, it is 
apparent that all sign systems are inevitably ideological by nature and 
that this is revealed in our everyday behavior through the transfor­
mational rules guiding overt behavior.
Sociosemiotics is a topic often considered with caution and left 
undefined, although at the same time the term appears in the titles of 
numerous publications (e.g., Halliday 1978; Hodge, Kress 1988; Alter 
1991; Flynn 1991; Riggins 1994a; Jensen 1995; etc.). Thus, if we use 
the notion at all, the first task to be completed is the clarification of 
the boundaries of sociosemiotics. To do this, the historical develop­
ments of the humanities are to be considered, especially as these 
converge, crisscross and diverge during the tense period at the turn of 
the 19th and 20th centuries. In this perspective special attention has to 
be paid to (cultural) anthropology, semiology and semiotics, early 
sociology and other social sciences. The next step would be exami­
nation of the contemporary state of semiotics and reasons for the 
activation of different ‘subsemiotic trends’ as related to the mentioned 
prevailing trends in semiotics, in order to distinguish the grounds for 
the (re)creation of a (new) field of sociosemiotics.
Jerzy Pelc (1997) approaches the topics listed above from a more 
general viewpoint, trying to vivisect semiotics from the larger to 
smaller parts. According to Pelc, there exist more general levels of 
semiotics, such as framework and metastructures, and applied semio­
tics that also includes the field of sociosemiotics (Pelc 1997: 636). 
Pelc’s argument follows the ideas of Morris (1946) in that “the
1 Л
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application of semiotics as an instrument may be called ‘applied 
semiotic’” and “applied semiotic utilizes knowledge about signs for 
the accomplishment of various purposes” (Pelc 1997: 636). Pelc 
mentions that:
one may also have in mind not only semiotic methods but also definitions and 
statements contained in theoretical semiotics which then becomes a common 
basis for various applied semiotics. (Pelc 1997: 636).
This again points at the impossibility of introducing different trends of 
applied semiotics without support from, and integration with, general 
theoretical semiotics. Likewise, there should always be a ground for 
creating the above-named subsemiotic disciplines. Thus, it may still 
be questionable to a degree, whether we can use the term ‘applied 
semiotics’ because of a necessary strong link with the theoretical 
aspect (otherwise, the applications obtain such an ad hoc nature that 
they start lacking common methods and principles). Hooking again up 
with Pelc’s discourse:
each individual applied semiotics has its own theoretical foundations. And 
since some o f the applied semiotics are humanistic disciplines (e.g. semiotics 
of theater), others are social (e.g. sociosemiotics), still others natural (e.g. 
zoosemiotics) or formal sciences (e.g. the study o f deductive formalized 
systems), their theories too differ as regards methodology. (Pelc 1997: 636).
It seems, however, that Pelc’s understanding of the general and the 
subsemiotic disciplines follows the realization of the need to pay 
attention to the intrinsically reflective nature of different semiotic 
trends with regard to the general semiotic paradigm. One must avoid 
distraction that may emerge if the sociosemiotic trend is considered as 
being theoretically “to a great extent characterized by features typical 
of theories in the social sciences” (Pelc 1997: 639). In addition to such 
a complementary aspect, it seems that it is exactly the theoretical 
connection with the general foundations of semiotics that should 
always be kept in mind. Other social sciences can offer the methodo­
logical aspects the principles of which are similar to those cor­
responding to old and basic semiotic presuppositions that have often 
been forgotten in actual studies (e.g. cultural semiotics and the 
pragmatic aspect of semiotics; see also Kavolis 1995: 8-9). So, if the 
realm of objects is, in the end, inseparable from the social realm due to 
their being semiotically conjoined and integrated, we may simply
conclude that sociosemiotics should straightforwardly study all socio­
cultural phenomena. Such research should include the methods of all 
disciplines that allow the study of the different levels of sign produc­
tion and exchange as presented by Bally and Sechehaye according to 
Ferdinand de Saussure. These levels include psychological, physiolo­
gical and physical processes (Saussure 1959: 11-12), and link up both 
with Charles Peirce’s discourse on logical and semiotic processes, as 
well as the above-mentioned areas and channels of semiosis. And 
regardless of difficulties in finding discussions of communication as a 
strict term in de Saussure’s and Peirce’s work, we can maintain that 
contemporary study of communication, together with different models 
and schemes of description, involves the above mentioned levels and 
processes of interaction in the same way as brought forward in sign 
creation and exchange. These aspects of communication also extend 
from the individual level up to general societal systems. The 
processual stages of sign exchange as communication have been more 
clearly articulated by Claude Shannon and Warren Weaver in their 
classical model of communication that is the source and basis for the 
majority of communication schemes today (Shannon, Weaver 1949). 
Other types of communication models center on the functions of 
interaction as presented by Roman Jakobson (Jakobson 1960).
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The scope of sociosemiotics
It is impossible to overlook the fact that the terminology extensively 
used in several traditions of semiotics contains a considerable number 
of controversies. Even if we have posed studying of meaningful units 
and artifacts in sociocultural settings and communication chains of 
different types of integrated sign systems as the broad task of socio­
semiotics, still the problem remains how to delimit both the units of 
study as well as the contexts of their emergence. Thus, an attempt 
should be made to find answers to three main sets of essential 
questions: (a) what are the principal starting points from which to find 
meanings and meaningful structures; (b) what are the methods of 
studying these meanings and meaningful structures; (c) what is or are 
the things to be studied.
In a way the last question has already been touched upon, when 
speaking in a broader perspective of how to distinguish between 
different objects of study. The methodological perspective concerns
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the question how to recognize semiotic, or rather sociosemiotic 
meaningfulness in the realms and units under inspection. In literature 
on semiotics we occasionally meet the term socialness. Among others 
a collection of articles edited by Steven H. Riggins (1994a) could be 
mentioned, that is based on the standpoint that “objects are a cause, a 
medium, and a consequence of social relationships” (Riggins 1994b: 
1). Things, objects of common life are social in their essence, and, 
accordingly, there must be a criterion in semiotics that can be called 
socialness. It is interesting to note the similarity of such reasoning 
with Russian Formalism and the idea of turning attention to ‘literari­
ness’ instead of ‘literature’. A central characteristic in discovering the 
socialness of objects is interaction. Interaction is not restricted to 
communication between objects and people or the usage of objects in 
communication, but involves a considerably wider range of pheno­
mena and aspects. Objects are often classified according to their 
pragmatic function and value of use, but they also serve as means of 
interaction between people. Objects are meaningful units and as such 
depend on their concrete communicative context and act of use. 
Objects may be involved in an individual’s ‘unilateral’ communi­
cation with the social, cultural and physical environment, and they 
may be used for exchange of messages between several persons. 
However, from the point of view of semiotics, differentiating between 
the situations of object use in terms of unilateral communication and 
interaction of more than one individuals does not seem to be 
productive. The formation of the semiotic subjects as counterparts in 
communication and thus in interaction both with and by objects is 
always social, linking the individual to the societal, since objects have 
gained their ‘starting-point meaning’ due to sociocultural circumstan­
ces. For example, even when looking at furniture in private rooms or 
viewing intimate things that are special tokens for an individual 
person only or for a very limited group of individuals, we confront 
items that may be just ordinary commodities for the rest of the 
community, while the particularized meanings ascribed to them still 
derive from social experience, memories, cultural values or the 
similar. With the Saussurean term to describe distinct elements (and 
distinctiveness of elements) of a semiotic system in mind, value, 
indeed, derives from interaction with other elements of the system, 
and this interaction is activated and dynamically directed by the users 
of the system. This becomes obvious in such examples as symbols of 
the nation kept in a wallet, the national flag kept on the top of a desk 
at home, etc. Culture, cultural phenomena, human sign systems are
indeed social in this sense; artifacts are social in their meaning (and 
dynamic in this meaning) by virtue of integrated use of all cultural 
semiotic systems. Socialness always derives from social interaction 
that leaves objects behind also as tokens of itself. Thus ‘the socialness 
of things’ may at first seem a trivial expression, but it serves to 
indicate that human beings have charged most artifacts with such a 
burden of cultural and individual history and meanings that it has 
become difficult to identify oneself without those objects. Therefore a 
description of the socialness of things should involve an analysis of 
the identity discourse of both individuals and larger sociocultural 
groups in various dimensions of the criteria possibly used for deter­
mination of social units (language, social order, artifacts, chronotope, 
ethnic structure, etc). The connection of artifacts and social structures 
in all possible types of communication further leads to the theme of 
identity, socialness and cultural fetishism in the widest sense that 
seems to be already an independent sociosemiotic theme.
An idea of the semiotic power of objects is widespread, one may 
recognise it in Karl Marx’s notion of ‘material communication of 
men’ (derived from Freud), and often also in (cultural) anthropo­
logy— e.g. exchange systems of goods, tokens and commodities. 
(Some instances in cultural anthropology demonstrate also semioti­
cally especially interesting cases of people, mostly women, being ‘ob­
jectified’ as units of communication in exchange systems.) Separation 
of such ‘material communication’ from Freud’s communicational- 
semiotic dimension of interaction seems too artificial, for artifacts are 
but one form of sign-vehicles. Artifacts are subject to social facts that, 
in Emile Durkheim’s expression, are characterized as: “Every way of 
acting which is general throughout a given society, while at the same 
time existing in its own right independent of its individual 
manifestations” (Durkheim 1938: 13). It is a separate question where 
exactly those meaning-loaded realities external to the individual exist, 
and it has been discussed at length in that branch of cultural 
anthropology that looks upon cultures as symbolic systems. This trend 
is represented by, e.g., Clifford Geertz (Geertz 1973) and David 
Schneider (Schneider 1968), the main idea being that meanings do not 
exist in the ‘heads of social actors’, but ‘in-between their heads’; i.e., 
meanings are not personal, but social. Considering Durkheim’s social 
fact and semiological studies of approximately the same period, we 
can refer to a relevant comparison presented by Roy Harris (Harris 
1991). Harris compares the notion of social fact to issues connected 
with Saussure’s langage. A question may be posed as to the possible
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mutual influence of both authors on each other in terms of these two 
concepts. Langage and social fact may seem similar as they point at 
approximately same level of abstraction in comparison with the 
individual use of sign systems. However, it is to be borne in mind that 
according to Saussure language can be examined through parole, in 
the same way as the fundamental level of all sign systems can be 
reconstructed through case analyses of individual usage acts. Dürk­
heim’s social fact, on the other hand, cannot be ultimately clarified, 
because individual uses of social facts are, for him, far too imperfect 
to provide data regarding sociocultural superstructures. Harris claims 
that:
[ ...]  there is no basic difference between the Durkheim of Les regies de la 
methode sociologique and the Saussure of the Cours, granted the inter­
pretation o f Saussurean langage as something ‘universal to the human nature’ 
and of langue as a social production in the sense that every language presup­
poses a particular culture or community whose purposes it serves. Moreover, 
the implication is that for Durkheim such facts as are ‘universal to human 
nature’, even though they clearly affect people’s social behavior, lie outside 
the scope o f sociology (Harris 1991: 225-226).
However, for contemporary semiotics which is an interdisciplinary 
science in its perspectives on studying sociocultural phenomena, these 
differences need not be important any more and seem to have merged 
with new units of study. On the one hand, it has been proposed that 
the means and ends of cultural analysis are cultural units (Schneider), 
on the other hand, we can refer to historical facts  (Uspenskij) that 
constitute sociocultural contexts and influence the functioning of 
semiotic systems in a constructed semiotic reality. Schneider defines 
cultural units in the following way:
A unit f...] is simply anything that is culturally defined and distinguished as an 
entity. It may be a person, place, thing, feeling, state of affairs, sense of 
foreboding, fantasy, hallucination, hope or idea. (Schneider, 1968: 2)
Therefore cultural units that exist in semiotic reality include both 
concrete and abstract reference and they need not necessarily be 
connected with referential realities. Cultural units are constructs that 
make up culture and have been created in a sociocultural system. 
Sociocultural contexts are not constructed only in terms of cultural 
objects and artifacts (Riggins 1994a), institutions (Berger, Luckmann 
1972) and language (Halliday 1978, Searle 1995), but also as reflec­
tive systems that continually make and remake their identity discourse 
in terms of historical facts (Uspenskij 1988). Historical facts represent 
the ‘game between the present and the past’ in which:
from the viewpoint of the present there is executed a choice and 
understanding of the past events —  inasmuch as memory o f them is preserved 
in collective consciousness. By this the past is organized as text readable from 
the perspective of the present. [ ...]  Correspondingly reception of history turns 
into one of the main facts of the evolution of the ‘language’ of history, i.e. of 
that language in which communication is enacted in the historical process. 
(Uspenskij 1988: 73-74).
Umberto Eco seconds the anthropological view in a semiotic perspec­
tive by defining the cultural unit semiotically as a semantic unit 
inserted into a system (Eco 1976: 66-68). This implies the social 
nature of any semiotic study and any semiotic unit, inasmuch as there 
would be no objects of study for semiotics outside the sociocultural 
context of use of a cultural unit in a (semiotic) system. One could 
agree with John Searle in calling socioculturally meaningful units 
institutional facts in contrast to noninstitutional or brute facts in the 
sense that the first are “dependent on human agreement” and “require 
human institutions for their existence” (Searle 1995: 2). Maybe the 
Sapir-Whorf hypothesis of linguistic relativity would indicate low 
attention of Searle to segmentation of external contexts into meaning­
ful segments. However, Searle dwells on such an argument himself 
and admits that “in order to state a brute fact we require the institution 
of language, but the fact stated needs to be distinguished from the 
statement of it” (Searle 1995: 2).
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Culture as a (socio)semiotic system
If we do not want each study to end with the conclusion that know­
ledge of the conscruction of the sociocultural reality cannot be 
obtained from the disintegrated nature of the appearances of the 
integrated, yet ungraspable whole, we should accept the standpoint 
that through strict analysis of — preferrably reflective — outcome of 
sociocultural semiotic conceptions about the semiotic reality of a 
socium through different types of behavior, we can make inferences 
about the regularities of behavior and about the Weltanschauung, 
semiotic systems and the similar, of the given sociocultural group.
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When trying to define the content of culture for contemporary 
semiotic analysis, we cannot overlook the development of cultural 
anthropology during the 20th century. It is interesting to notice that 
European cultural anthropology has had such roots in early sociology 
and Saussurean semiology that are revealed in structural anthropo­
logy. Furthermore, principles of semiology, structuralism and forma­
lism are evident in the parallel development of cultural semiotics. 
Semiology is important both as regards structural anthropology as 
well as cultural semiotics, being a factor directing such trends of 
culture studies toward analyzing sign systems as cognitive social 
systems. A gradual increase in emphasizing the description of cultural 
phenomena as an outcome of individually (or communally) articulated 
social sign systems essentially meant approaching those schools in 
cultural analysis that are associated with the cognitive trends in 
cultural anthropology. Those trends expose a steady movement from 
the late 19th century description of cultures as sets of artifacts 
organized according to cultural patterns toward the interpretation of 
cultures as ideational systems. This means that cultures were not 
‘made’ any more only on the metalevel through organizing relations 
between cultural phenomena in scientific discourse. While cultures 
can be viewed as ‘theories’ in Kluckhohn’s sense (Kluckhohn 1961) 
throughout the development of the humanities, an increased attention 
to them as abstractions existing already on the level of the cultural 
object has been characteristic of schools analyzing cultures as 
ideational or semiotic systems. Sociocultural systems are reflective 
systems and the overt behavior revealed in culture traits depends on 
the covert behavior directed by cognitive structures such as image 
schemata, values, behavioral schemes, etc. Thus, the aim of under­
standing cultures is to describe them as systems of knowledge, inter- 
semiotic sign systems, reflective systems. To interpret the ideas of the 
cognitive anthropologist Ward H. Goodenough (see, e.g., Goodenough 
1961, 1980, 1981), cultures are sets of decision standards, intellectual 
forms, perception models, models of relating, interpretation models, 
preference ratings and organizational patterns. For a unified cultural 
anthropology these cognitive structures converge into sociocultural 
systems that have been defined by Roger M. Keesing as systems that 
“represent the social realizations or enactments of ideational designs- 
for-living in particular environments” (Keesing 1974: 82).
If we take the object of sociosemiotics and semiotic study of 
culture in general to be sociocultural systems in the above-defined 
sense, we have established a broad principle according to which to
understand the aim of analyzing similar systems. We have determined 
that artifacts and overt behavior are mediated by sign systems that 
have been built on the communal agreement behind which lie 
sociocultural values, socially constructed cultural tradition, etc. 
Logically, the next step would be to determine the units of concrete 
study; i.e., to select the ‘adequate’, the ‘representative’, ‘valuable’ 
sign systems that would enable us to reconstruct in a reliable way the 
semiotic reality of a social unit on the basis of data collected by 
observation. But before that the most crucial and painstaking task is to 
explicate the definition of a relevant social unit. When talking about 
‘cultural semiotics’, ‘sociosemiotics’ or other subsemiotic trends, we 
by default assume analyzing sociocultural phenomena in a certain 
semiotic community. In cultural semiotics the rather useful term 
‘socium’ has often been used to refer to a concrete community that 
can be described as a coherent unit in terms of social organization, 
location in time and space, distinct culture, and often an individual 
natural language. How to determine a sociocultural system is a most 
troublesome problem: which criteria are to considered as distinc­
tive — language, culture, territory, social organization, nationality or 
some other possible category? It is a difficult task to find suitable 
definitions to each of them, but it is fairly obvious that all of them are 
in fact socioculturally constructed categories. Solutions can be wide- 
ranging, from analyzing cultural phenomena as texts representing 
cultural epochs defined in terms of coherence between cultural texts to 
actual determination of social groups. Social congregations can and 
have been distinguished in most general terms as social organizations 
coherent in membership sentiment that is due to shared visions of 
culture and cultural well-being. Ideal culture and cultural ideals have 
been considered as defining features in understanding society as a 
community whose members share the vision of Good Life (see, e.g., 
Redfield 1960) that also determines the perspective of norms as 
standardized mass habits of behavior according to the imagination of 
‘how things ought to be’ (see Hoebel 1960). In spite of their essence 
seeming vague at first glance, it can still be maintained that socio­
cultural visions that influence everyday behavior form a basis on 
which the members of a sociocultural community can actually be quite 
exactly delimited and counted: according to Kluckhohn (1961), 
society refers to a group of people in which individuals interact with 
one another more than with other individuals; it consists of people 
who cooperate in order to achieve certain goals.
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Defining the aims of a social organization, we again come to the 
crossroads of cultural anthropology, psychology and semiotics: the 
dynamism between humans as biological organisms and humans as 
cultural beings is revealed in the tasks of the social organization. In 
terms of Jurgen Ruesch, “social organization is designed to achieve a 
designated purpose and to prevent conflict” (Ruesch 1972: 25). 
Ruesch maintains that:
The purpose of social organization is to: define group tasks; delineate 
boundaries in time and space (to each his own); establish priority systems 
(value systems); provide for emergencies (protective services); make new rules 
(legislature); interpret the rules (judiciary); reinforce the rules (law enforcement); 
allot positions within the organization (civil service); make decisions (executive); 
initiate and implement group action (exploration of outer space); and regulate 
exchange with other groups (competition, cooperation). (Ruesch 1972:25-26)
The build-up and the relevant tasks of a social organization also 
reveals in general principles the latter’s connection to the cultural 
processes that can be witnessed in both intra- and intercultural 
interaction. On the one hand it is clear that the social organization is 
structured to meet the various needs of an individual; on the other 
hand, it is obvious that an individual is connected to a certain social 
reality via socialization. The following question might concern the 
relation between the individual and a social organization in terms of 
their possible influence on the behavior of each other. How an indivi­
dual can influence the social organization (s)he belongs to is quite a 
specific question already, and today we can more often speak about 
how a social organization communicates with its individual members. 
A further specific problem is added by the media that represents a 
third party in shaping the relationships between a social organization 
and its members. But first: a social organization can communicate and 
operate with its members by certain social actions. These engagements 
can be called social operation or action models (see e.g. Ruesch 1972: 
401), and their features depend on how a given sociocultural system 
sees its social organization in terms of categories. In turn, success in 
guaranteeing the totality and coherence of a social organization 
depends on the explicit determination of the constituents of a society 
(e.g. native, labor, ethnic, linguistic, kinship or other elementary 
groups) and application of the relevant social operational action 
models. If operational models are applied to irrelevant societal cate­
gories or used in inadequate manner as regards the sociopsychological
needs of an individual, they rather disintegrate the society than 
congregate one (see Figure 1). Individual sociopsychologial needs 
ought to be understood as dynamism between the needs of an indi­
vidual (in A. Maslow’s terms) and her/his understanding of his/her 
obligations to the social whole.
The connection between a social organization, its sign systems and 
individual variations in uses of semiotic tools offered by a socio­
cultural system can be studied, based on culture and its semiotic 
mechanisms. In other words, the coherence of a social organization 
can be measured by the integration of its members’ cultural behavior. 
This is a topic originating already from Noam Chomsky’s linguistic 
competence and leading to the current notion of semiotic competence; 
nevertheless, it indicates the structure of social organizations as based 
on cultural processes. Cultural processes that influence the structure of 
society and semiotic reality include, for example, acculturation, 
accommodation, integration, adjustment and integration with their 
several specific variations. Cultural processes may be influenced by 
social action models that finally determine cultural distances between 
different sociocultural groups. Cultural distance, in its turn, is mea­
surable by comparing different features of both overt and covert 
behavior (see an example in Ruesch 1972: 186). These features are 
connected with the above discussed cultural units and institutional 
facts and sociocultural deep structures with and by which individuals 
operate with the various dimensions of environment. And inasmuch as 
such semiotic entities are revealed in the output of different semiotic 
systems, their analysis should focus on the specific instants of 
variability in the distinctive features by which concrete enunciations 
bring forward the possible meanings of semiotic entities, in order then 
to reach their conditionally middled meanings. It is then possible to 
describe the grounds for and norms of the formation of paradigmatic 
groupings of meaningful units as valid for individuals in a particular 
social, cultural, temporal, geographic, linguistic environment. The 
alike analytic operations concern the rules of possible syntagmatic 
combinations and is connected with both the extent and the boundaries 
of a particular semiosphere as linked with sign systems. Here we must 
keep in mind the principle of arbitrariness governing the relation of 
sign systems and (semiotic) reality that, however, is limited by a given 
sociocultural context; therefore this arbitrariness, as described by de 
Saussure, is restricted for individuals and their use of semiotic systems 
in concrete referential realities is socioculturally regulated.
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The idea of culture as an abstraction existing already on the object 
level, together with the principle of controllable data and analysis that 
would insure congruence between ‘culture’ as a metalevel theoretical 
construct and the understanding of semiotic phenomena by the users 
of a given semiotic community, points at another perspective in 
sociosemiotics. This perspective is concerned with the development of 
semiotic vocabulary and discourse in the reflective discourse of a 
given sociocultural group. This topic involves the usage of explicitly 
semiotic vocabulary in natural languages in everyday communication 
(see, e.g., Voigt 1998; Randviir et al. 1998), but also in the reflective 
output of culture. The latter aspect points at difficulties that often 
emerge when an attempt is made to draw a line between the scholarly 
viewpoint and the object level. Yet treatment of behavioral norms, 
culturally ‘adequate’ communication patterns, image schemata and the 
like is present in the majority of cultural texts, starting with myths, 
epics, lyrics, etc. Probably it would even be unfair to label some of 
such texts as ‘scholarly pertinent’, while letting others fall into the 
category of mere cultural phenomena. All reflective praxis is meta- 
communicative and thus, following E. Durkheim’s logic, we can 
simply talk about different forms of reflective practices. Reflectivity is 
evident in religious practices, science, the institutional structure of a 
society, educational system, socialization process, instructions for the 
latter etc. Reflectivity is essential for the formation of social groupings 
and societies, inasmuch as it concerns the factor of sentiment binding 
individuals into a sociocultural system. In discussing formation of 
social organizations, we are to keep in mind several possibilities or 
criteria on the basis of which these can be founded: language, culture, 
statehood, territory, nationality, etc. All these categories are clearly 
conditional and follow Kluckhohn’s logic of culture as an abstraction. 
Perhaps the only possibility to identify the membership of an indivi­
dual is his/her subjective understanding as proposed by Ernest 
Gellner:
1. Two men are of the same nation if and only if  they share the same culture, 
where culture in turn means a system o f ideas and signs and associations and 
ways of behaving and communicating.
2. Two men are of the same nation if and only if  they recognize each other as 
belonging to the same nation. In other words, nations maketh man; nations 
are the artifacts o f men’s convictions and loyalties and solidarities 
(Gellner 1983: 7)
Thus, on the one hand, people make up social organizations in order to 
support their identity discourse and satisfy their needs, and on the 
other hand social organizations ought to make up such a system that 
would provide individuals with tools to handle both infrastuctural, 
social and purely semiotic environments. Sociocultural organizations 
offer their members meaningful past and future visions, determining 
thereby also respected behavioral patterns for everyday interaction. 
Sociocultural organizations are by nature reflective organizations, 
both in respect to presenting sociocultural systems to other similar 
ones, and representing themselves in the course of formation of 
cultural traditions (as revealed, e.g., in education). The degree of 
reflectivity may increase and decrease, and this is often connected 
with some type of culture change. Cultural change, being a result of 
the situation of stark contrast between the existing cultural patterns 
and changed environmental (natural, technical, social, political, etc.) 
conditions, demands higher reflection upon the cultural core and 
mainstream in order to keep the identity discourse stable or to re­
establish it according to an alternative principle (e.g., to replace the 
territorial or political principle for the national or linguistic one). 
However, this reflection must be again a social process in the sense of 
demanding close cooperation between different social groupings of a 
society. In the opposite case, national sentiment and social integration 
will decrease and society as a totality of subsystems will disintegrate 
(e.g., the case of several post-Soviet republics, including Estonia, in 
the new sociocultural and political world structure). The success of an 
identity discourse and cultural reflection as a social representation 
process depends on the clarity of understanding the structure of 
society in terms of partnership existing social organizations and 
groupings. This is the case concerning cultural change in the situation 
of overlapping boundaries in national, territorial and political terms.
The situation is different when we inspect the development of 
cultural or linguistic organizations of diaspora, as connected with the 
core cultures of both the new cultural space and the territory of origin. 
Such sensitive situation of cultural change also evokes the reflective 
praxises of immigrants and their intense search for identity. Emigra­
tion, especially forced emigration, amplifies the topic of acculturation 
and individual involvement in new sociocultural groups. Cultural and 
national identities obtain heightened importance, and it is representa­
tives of such emigrants who often produce enunciations of under­
standing cultural and national identity. For example, a well-known 
Estonian cultural thinker Oskar Loorits has stated that it is most
Sociosemiotic perspectives on studying culture and society  621
622 Anti Randviir
important to preserve ‘Estonian behavior’ and ‘Estonian thinking’ in 
diaspora, paying attention to the ‘national characteristics of Esto­
nians’, listing among them “diligence or ‘assiduity’, durability or 
‘persistence’ and 'tenacity’, self-control or ‘fortitude’ and being con­
tent with little or ‘modesty’” (Loorits 1953: 88). These gain especially 
great importance in comparison with the foreign others and awareness 
of them becomes more acute. Regarding the process of acculturation 
and national identity in diaspora, we can again refer to Loorits as a 
cultural critic disclosing features of Estonian-Hess with his reference 
to the ‘negative sides’ of the Estonian national character that pale 
beside those of foreign communities:
in the character of foreigners (who have developed in much better conditions!) 
we can find much more egoistic stubbomess and malicious glances, much 
more insidious spitefulness and more sly pulling legs, much more urging 
intriguing [...] (Loorits 1953: 88-89)
If cases are viewed in which its is the cultural or linguistic identity 
that is crucial for the identity of a social group, we can witness the 
very formation of European cultural, social and political landscape as 
based on the principle of nation states. According to E. Gellner’s 
statement, “nationalism is primarily a political principle, which holds 
that the political and the national unit should be congruent” (Gellner 
1983:1). However, like all possible criteria of defining social groups 
or communities, the sentiment determining membership feeling 
depends on social communication and is thus fundamentally con­
nected with the ways in which available sign systems are used. Iden- 
ties are constructed largely by the medium, and we can agree with 
Gellner in that:
The most important and persistent message is generated by the medium itself 
[ ...]  That core message is that the language and the style of the transmissions 
is important, that only he who can understand them, or can acquire such 
comprehension, is included in a moral and economic community, and that he 
who does not and cannot, is excluded. (Gellner 1983: 127)
Thus all sociocultural communication, whether we inspect face-to- 
face interaction, mass media, communication through objects or other 
media, is also metacommunicative and therefore provides socio­
semiotic analysis of a community’s semiotic reality with valuable 
information. Semiosis as a mediation process is social, and in fact it 
comprises syntactic, semantic and pragmatic analysis already on the
object level. In this sense the object of social semiotics includes 
reflective practices that are social by virtue of cognitive processes and 
also because of the sign systems that can be used to articulate those 
processes. Thus, the field of sociosemiotics involves analysis of using 
culture and sign systems, and also sociosemiotic reflective thought 
through which bearers of a culture become aware of their sociocultural 
reality and sign systems. Sociosemiotics should treat the use of sign 
systems and meanings in sociocultural contexts, just as it should 
inspect the evolution of semiotic vocabulary and thought in society. 
This points at possibilities of control of descriptive discourse and the 
nature of sociosemiotic research as representing features of both 
general semiotics theoretically, and other social sciences in methodo­
logical perspective.
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Социосемиотические перспективы 
при изучении культуры и общества
Рассматриваются разделы семиотики и, соответственно, позиция социо­
семиотики в парадигме современной семиотики. Дается обзор принци­
пов исследования социокультурных знаковых систем в том виде, как 
они даны, с одной стороны, в семиологии Ф. де Соссюра (анализ меха­
низмов внутри знаковой системы) и, с другой стороны, в семиотике
Ч. С. Пирса (изучение знаковых систем и знаковых единиц по отно­
шению к означиваемой действительности). При определении предмета 
социосемиотики важны три главных вопроса: общая методология социо­
семиотики, ее методы и возможные конкретные объекты анализа. Про­
слеживаются признаки (единица культуры, социальность, исторический 
факт, социальный факт, институционный факт, социальный процесс и 
т.д.) возможных объектов разных наук о культуре с целью выяснения 
возможности их применения к определению объекта социосемиотики. 
Рассматривается и описание социальных организаций посредством куль­
турных процессов и соотношений индивида и общества так, как эти 
соотношения можно регулировать социальными моделями действия.
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Sotsiosemiootilised perspektiivid kultuuri ja 
ühiskonna uurimisel
Artiklis vaadeldakse sem iootika alajaotusi ja  sotsiosem iootika vastavat posit­
siooni kaasaja semiootika paradigmas. Vaadeldakse sotsiokultuuriliste märgi­
süsteemide uurimise põhimõtteid nii, nagu need on sätestatud ühelt poolt 
märgisüsteemisiseste mehhanismide analüüsimiseks F. de Saussure’i semio- 
loogias ning teiselt poolt C. S. Peirce’i sem iootikas märgisüsteemide ja 
märgiliste üksuste uurimiseks suhestatuna viidatava reaalsusega. Käsitletakse 
kolm e peamist küsimust sotsiosem iootika määratlemiseks: sotsiosem iootika  
üldine m etodoloogia, m eetodid ja  võim alikud konkreetsed analüüsiobjektid. 
Jälgitakse eri kultuuriteaduste võim alike objektide tunnuste (kultuuriühik, sot­
siaalsus, ajalooline fakt, sotsiaalne fakt, institutsiooniline fakt, sotsiaalne 
protsess jne) asjakohasust sotsiosem iootika objekti määratlemisel. Käsitlemist 
leiab ka sotsiaalsete organisatsioonide kirjeldamine kultuuriliste protsesside 
kaudu ning indiviidi ja ühiskonna seoste reguleeritavus sotsiaalsete tegelus- 
mudelitega.
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Abstract. The first issue raised by this paper is whether semiotics can bring 
any added value to ecology. A brief examination of the epistemological status 
of semiotics in its current forms suggests that semiotics’ phenomenological 
macroconcepts (which are inherited from various theological and philosophi­
cal traditions) are incommensurate with the complexity of the sciences com­
prising ecology and are too reductive to usefully map the microprocesses 
through which organisms evolve and interact. However, there are at least two 
grounds on which interfacing semiotics with ecology may prove to be 
scientifically productive: (a) the very looseness of semiotic discourse can be 
an important catalyser for multidisciplinary interactions, an important condi­
tion for the emergence of truly holistic ecology; (b) the present semiotic con­
ceptual apparatus is not carved in stone. All its notions, frames o f reference 
and types of reasoning can evolve in contact with the problems encountered in 
evolutionary ecological research. Semiotics, as an open-ended epistemological 
project, remains a proactive intellectual resource. The second issue raised by 
this paper is precisely to call attention to the opportunity provided by recent 
developments for rethinking and furthering semiotic inquiry. An attempt is 
made to show that counterintuitive theories such as memetics and new fron­
tiers in technology such as nanotechnology, could help recast ecosemiotics 
along more intellectually exciting lines of inquiry than the mere rewriting of 
ecological discourse in terms o f the traditional semiotic macroconcepts. It 
goes without saying that memetics and nanotechnology are not presented here 
as definitive solutions but simply as indicative o f possible directions toward a 
comprehensive evolutionary ecosemiotics that would radically transform the 
basis o f the 20th century semiotic discourse and its ideological agenda.
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[ ...]  ecolog ica l relations are based  on 
meaning; they are sem iotic.
Ecosystem s, no less than cultures, are  
contingent upon comm unication.
A lf Hom borg (1996: 53)
The introduction of semiotic models and terminology into the dis­
course of various disciplines has given rise to compound names on the 
model x-semiotics such as zoosemiotics (Sebeok 1970), neuro­
semiotics (Ivanov 1979), and socio-semiotics (McKellar 1987), to 
mention only a few. Far from referring to corresponding disciplinary 
institutions, such labels indicate on the part of their proponents a 
sensibility to the communication dimension of the domains investi­
gated respectively by zoology, neurology and sociology rather than an 
epistemological reliance on a specified methodology aimed at new 
scientific discoveries. It mostly consists of interpreting or reinter­
preting acquired knowledge through rephrasing propositions in terms 
of signs, sign categories and other notions used by some semiotic 
schools. Typically, these hybrid lexicons indicate the interests of some 
individual semioticians in a variety of scientific discourses in which 
they perceive some potentially sign-relevant information which they 
work into their own philosophical arguments (e.g., Koch 1986). More 
rarely, some individual scientists attempt to integrate their compart­
mentalized research within the more comprehensive perspective that 
various brands of semiotics seem to afford (e.g., Deacon 1997, Hoff- 
meyer 1996). Both sides usually lack a sense of the historical 
complexity of the “other culture” and interface with a limited subset of 
information resources. However, these partial and biased recontex- 
tualisations appear to play a significant part in constructing over­
lapping domains which may prove mutually beneficial through a 
process of “cross-fertilization”, although it is sometimes difficult to 
pinpoint actual results either in the way of changes brought about in 
the semiotic conceptual apparatus or in the form of experimental 
strategies that would be inspired by some semiotic notions or models. 
By and large, semioticians delve in speculative discourse rife with 
thought experiments and anecdotal examples and only occasionally 
engage in serious meta-analyses of some sectors of scientific literature 
in order to gamer critical evidence in support of their arguments (e.g 
Sebeok 1968). Conversely, some scientists who aspire to break free
1. Is ecosemiotics a paper discipline?
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from the intellectual constraints of their methods find in semiotics a 
basis, or an alibi, for their philosophical or religious speculations (e.g., 
Hoffmeyer 1996). These general strategies provide, nevertheless, 
opportunities for interactions. But the dialogues that are thus prompted 
most often remain on the level of inconsequential mutual interpreta­
tions and, in some cases, are simply used as mutual status reinforce­
ment strategies. If these characterisations accurately reflect the nature 
of these disciplinary interfacings, they lead one to wonder whether the 
many “hyphenated disciplines” are mere sociological or epistemo- 
logical chimera that exist only on paper, or whether they actually 
designate agenda that offer promising avenues of inquiry based on 
new premisses.
However, so much is still to be known that intellectual skepticism 
and epistemological despondency in this regard should not be in order. 
The potential for cross-fertilisation should not be discouraged but 
cannot be taken for granted either. It seems that chances of progress 
can be assessed on several grounds.
First, the forces o f inertia o f disciplinary cultures must be taken 
into account. These forces of resistance have no relevance to the 
epistemological value of the merging of disciplines. They apply 
equally within the sciences and within the humanities. For example, 
the obstacles encountered in the 1990s by attempts to fuse evolutio­
nary biology and developmental biology, a movement known as “evo- 
devo” (Pennisi, Roush 1997), bear witness to the sociological strength 
of disciplinary incommensurability and resilience, often masking 
deeper ideological rifts (Kull 2000). It seems at times that 
institutionalisation of cross-disciplinary domains requires no less than 
a scientific revolution and the creation of a new scientific paradigm 
following the pattern elucidated by Thomas Kuhn and aptly sum­
marized in the obituary written by David Hull (1996).
Secondly, the disciplines brought together must meet compatible 
standards in terms o f methodology and level o f resolution. For 
instance, while “neurosemiotics” may sound like a good idea, there is 
no compatibility between the macrolevel of current semiotic categori­
sations which are based on phenomenological intuitions and logical 
reasoning, and the microlevel of description and analysis found in the 
contemporary brain sciences, even in the branches devoted to the 
neurological understanding of well-defined cognitive processes (e.g., 
Calder et al. 2001). Bridged disciplines must have an equivalent capa­
city for producing counter-intuitive knowledge rather than common- 
sensical and redundant propositions (Kestenbaum 1998).
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T hird ly , th ere  m u s t b e  a  g n o s e o lo g ic a l o r  p r a g m a tic  u rg e n c y  th a t 
re q u ire s  e p is te m o lo g ic a l in te g ra tio n  a n d  m e th o d o lo g ic a l h a rm o n i­
sa tio n  between disciplines that initially emerged as separate social 
entities. When it becomes obvious that some major problems con­
fronting human societies, locally or globally, cannot be solved with 
the resources of a single discipline, a powerful pressure develops to 
create at least partial integration of research in the form of a task force 
for short-term solutions and long-term research and development 
programs for strategic responses. Among the most obvious cases of 
this process are the functional, albeit partial, merging of sociology and 
medicine, history and climatology, and neurology and linguistics. The 
recent apparition of the word “ecosemiotics” raises the issue of 
whether it is a symptom of such an urgency or merely an opportunistic 
phantasy. Is ecosemiotics a paper discipline or does it have episte­
mological teeth? Does rewriting ecological interactions as communi­
cation make a difference or is it a futile stylistic exercise?
2. Philosophy, science or politics?
It is by languaging that the act of 
knowing [...] brings forth a world.
H. R. Maturana, F. J. Varela (1987: 234)
The emergence of ecology as a domain of specialised research con­
cerned with the understanding of interactions both among organisms 
and between organisms and their environments was in part a response 
to the inability of individual disciplines to come to grips with the 
complexity of problems generated by industrialisation. The unsustain­
able exploitation of “nature” which had been perceived at first as an 
unlimited source of riches, drove home the idea that animal, vegetal 
and mineral resources formed delicately balanced webs of interrelated 
food chains. These resources were perceived, on the one hand, as 
controlling each other in a way that prevented extreme variations in 
the absence of major cataclysms and, on the other hand, as having a 
conservative impact on the climate, the chemistry of soil, water and 
atmosphere, and the reproductive rate of species that were deemed 
relevant to human interests. Monitoring and controlling these re­
sources required the synergy of a vast array of experts from biologists 
and ethologists to chemists and physicists. For instance, the Depart­
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ments of Ecology and Evolution at the University of Chicago has a 
faculty comprising specialists in molecular evolution, population 
genetics, quantitative genetics, animal behavior, plant and animal 
ecology, evolutionary theory, systematics, paleontology, and relies 
also for its curriculum on courses offered in the departments of Orga- 
nismal and Cell Biology, Biochemistry and Molecular Biology, 
Molecular Genetics and Cell Biology, Statistics, Geophysical Scien­
ces, Anthropology and Chemistry.
The daunting program of a holistic ecological science — which is 
still in progress — encountered the resistance of economic and 
political agencies whose immediate interests are not compatible with 
the policies inspired by ecological knowledge, which they occasio­
nally label as “bad science”. As a result, ecological awareness has 
taken the form of militancy and has generated a critical discourse and 
a political agenda aimed at advancing the cause of the preservation of 
the planet’s environment and its biodiversity while often advocating at 
the same time various forms of social and cultural conservatism. It is 
therefore important to distinguish scientific ecology as a curriculum 
and a multidisciplinary research program from political ecology as a 
set of ideologies and activist movements. It has been shown that both 
the scientific endeavor and the political agenda have deep roots in 
19th century intellectual and political history, reaching into the 
sources of Romanticism for the latter and holistic approaches to 
knowledge construction for the former (Nöth 1998).
In this complex and somewhat confusing context, the recent appa­
rition of the notion of “ecosemiotics” (with or without hyphenation) 
raises the issue of whether semiotics can indeed be justifiably added to 
the specialties of an ecological curriculum or whether semioticians 
should look towards the ecological sciences as a source of relevant 
data, models and methods in order to update their worldview and 
renew their philosophical arguments. It is the contention of this paper 
that the second option is a prerequisite for the first one, simply be­
cause there is too much discrepancy between semiotics as it stands 
now and the scientific disciplines upon which current ecological 
research relies for its advancement. At most, semiotics can provide a 
flexible epistemological framework for integrating various streams of 
specialised knowledge as long as its concepts reach an optimal level of 
resolution and do not remain at the macroperceptual level that charac­
terizes its phenomenology. The first task of semioticians would then 
be to apprise themselves of today’s rathe: than yesterday’s ecological 
and related knowledge, and see whether they can go beyond the
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simplistic reduction of all processes to communication arcs or triadic 
relations so as to realize that what they call signs and semiosis is the 
problem rather than the solution.
3. Is semiotics an archaic mode of thought, 
a mythical discourse or a metalanguage?
How far will semiology go? It is difficult
to predict.
Ferdinand de Saussure (1989: 154)
The main notional currency of semiotic discourse has remained 
basically unchanged since Augustin of Hippo (Deely 1998). There has 
been reshuffling and reconfiguring within this basic frame. Debates 
and controversies have spawned new7 words. Fringe terminologies 
have been added, notably from information technologies, but they 
have often been redefined to suit the earlier conceptual apparatus of 
the philosophy or “doctrine” of signs. While the generalisation of a 
basic terminology can be a factor of progress in as much as it con­
tributes, like metaphors do, to the heuristic generalisation of models 
across various domains of experience, it also carries the risk of 
“freezing” their perception and interpretation at a particular degree of 
conceptual resolution. It is symptomatic that by and large the 
mainstream semiotic discourse has remained, on the one hand, rather 
impenetrable to evolutionary theory, viz. its fascination for Jakob von 
Uexkiill and his anti-Darwinian stance as Konrad Lorenz (1981) 
pointed out and, on the other hand, fairly indifferent to the advances of 
the neurosciences, viz. its continuing obsession with Sigmund Freud 
and his Gallic epigones in spite of compelling criticisms (Clare 1985). 
Moreover, semiotics has maintained a level of phenomenological 
reasoning defined at its lower end by 17th century microscope 
technology. This is probably why the nascent ecosemiotic discourse is 
evoking renewed visions of the “great chain of beings”, sometimes 
reworked into the rhetoric of Gaian “greenspeak” (Harre et al. 1999) 
rather than articulating a stimulating theoretical and empirical agenda 
that would command the attention of researchers across disciplinary 
borders. With its implicit representations of biology, psychology, 
physics and so on, mostly in folk- or popularised versions, semiotics 
forms an academic sub-culture which generally finds it difficult to
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interface with other disciplines which consider that basic semiotic 
terminology and conceptual apparatus lack consistent, operational 
definitions. Its discourse appears to describe a communication utopia 
which has little appeal to those minds used to wrestling with complex 
problems in their daily research practice and the “small change” truths 
they treasure.
The central notions of “sign” and “communication”, for instance, 
are notions “by default”, so to speak, in as much as “something” had 
to be hypothesized in order to account for phenomena that appeared to 
be intransitive such as causation at a distance, otherwise unexplainable 
events, or seemingly disproportionate relations between inputs and 
outputs. These sorts of virtual objects, the sign or the communication 
act, were conceptually elaborated in a phenomenological world strictly 
constrained by the power of resolution of human vision that has been 
finetuned by evolutionary forces. Hominids have evolved as diurnal 
organisms who heavily depend on close- and medium-range vision for 
their survival and reproduction. But eventhough the natural human 
visual apparatus is obviously adaptive, it is so with respect to a limited 
set of environmental and social conditions, as are the other perceptual 
hominid adaptations that define the human “umwelt”. Ecological 
sciences are based on controlled representations that so vastly expand 
the limits of this “umwelt” and increase so much the level of 
resolution of its phenomenology that it seems legitimate to wonder 
whether the present conceptual apparatus of semiotics, including its 
pivotal notions, can preserve the relative relevance it might indeed 
have had until the recent past for mapping a meaningful integrative 
perspective onto the information that is now available. Even in its 
most restricted definitions, the notion of “sign” is a macro-concept 
that indiscriminately covers a large number of heterogeneous local 
processes which now are not only becoming visible and describable 
but can also be simulated through nanotechnologies below the thres­
hold of natural human perception. Can the virtual universe that has 
been blindly constructed over the past centuries by the discourse of 
semiotics be anything more than a sort of epistemological mythology? 
Or do the general questions this semiotic discourse has raised still 
constitute a credible ground for further elaborations in view of the 
expanded knowledge brought forth by extreme technologies and 
counter-intuitive theories? The argument of this paper is that the latter 
is probable as long as semiotics discards its obsolete models and 
transforms itself into an evolutionary ecosemiotics in the most radical 
sense of these terms.
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All organisms develop and reproduce within a set of environmental 
constraints of which other organisms, including conspecifics, form an 
essential component. The prerequisite for the maintenance of life is 
the constant processing of information that is relevant to the particular 
conditions which have shaped specific biological profiles. This 
shaping through adaptation by natural selection never ceases as the 
environment, both organic and inorganic, is in constant flow and is 
prone to irregular catastrophic changes. Evolution is a wasteful 
process. In some species, for instance Felis leo, only approximately 
2% of the cubs reach reproductive age. Drought and floods, predators, 
parasites, infanticides, epizooties, disruptions of the social group, 
accidents and the like take their toll. The lucky Serengeti lioness who 
survives until she comes in estrus is equipped with reliable sensors 
that allow her to pick up information that matters and to behave 
efficiently in accordance with the complementary information she 
garnered from the related group of females within which she has 
grown up and with which she will later raise her first litter. Whatever 
the development of this individual may have been, what matters is 
whether or not she eventually reproduces successfully or contributes 
to the reproductive success of her siblings. Suppose that, while this 
lioness is nursing her first litter, a new male happens to displace the 
resident male and take over the pride. The newcomer will kill the cubs 
and mate with the lioness who, in such cases, comes quickly in estrus 
and initiates the courtship ritual. The new litter may have better 
chance of survival, although it is by no means certain.
The proponents of biosemiotics claim that the whole biological 
cycle that has been outlined above is a complex semiosic process that 
takes place both within the organism as it develops and matures, and 
externally through its interactions with its physical and social environ­
ments. They hypothesize that signs necessarily mediate all these 
processes while they characterize signs in terms of a few abstract 
relationships. However, the identification of appropriate preys, the 
coordinated hunting strategies that are characteristic of Felis leo, the 
monitoring and defense of the pride’s territory, the selection of mates, 
the maintenance of the social bond and the establishment of the 
ranking order within the group, the collective raising of the young and 
their assimilating some specific environment-relevant knowledge that 
has accrued in the group such as the mapping of water holes or the 
behavior of the local prey, the role of carnivorous predation in the 
balance and fitness of the herbivorous population and the counter­
strategies of the prey species — all these aspects of a successful life
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cycle have been analysed, described and often manipulated in terms of 
perceptual processes, visuo-motor integrative circuits, hormonal 
functions and pheromones broadcasting, ritualised interactive beha­
vior, genetic inclusive fitness and so on. One may legitimately wonder 
what kind of epistemological advantage is yielded through the 
translating of extremely complex representations of biological 
microprocesses into a discourse made of approximately a dozen words 
whose definition is so problematic that semantic debates are still 
raging among semioticians. Any consistent sub-set of semiotic 
concepts conceivably may provide an embryonic meta-language, a 
rare commodity in a context marked by disciplinary gaps which are 
generally considered a liability for the advancement of knowledge. 
But this translating does not seem to have any explanatory or heuristic 
value for biologists, still less so for physicists. It certainly blurs 
important differences and smooths rough edges. In so doing, it reduces 
information to a few semantic categories through which a redundant 
meaning is constructed. It brings a virtual closure to the counterintui­
tive discourse of scientific knowledge that keeps generating anxiety by 
upsetting long-held certainties that form the basis of the self. Perhaps 
the relative success of contemporary semiotics can be accounted for 
by its capacity to provide a virtual holistic perspective. In certain 
contexts, fallacies may indeed be temporarily adaptive, perhaps for 
their own sake. Some, now, would call “memes” such fallacies, a 
move that has not failed to challenge semioticians.
4. Theories by default?
The Idea is an organism, is born, grow s  
and dies like organisms, renews itse lf 
ceaselessly. [ ...]  Action is the servant o f  
the Idea.
Jean Piaget (1915: 1)
“Meme”, like “sign”, is a notion by default. The intriguing consta- 
tation that the power of “ideas” or “habits” does not always serve the 
best biological interest of the organisms who hold them has haunted 
the human psyche for a long time. Memes and signs are posited 
because better explanations are lacking. The above quotation, from 
one of the very first writings by the young Piaget at the beginning of
World War I, The mission o f the Idea, bears witness to the frustration 
of rational minds confronted to the power of myths and slogans. There 
has been a consistent discourse of alienation that construed the world 
of ideas as belonging to another order: divine interventions, spirits’ 
influence, transcendant principles, inspirational or irrational causation, 
cultural norms, structural laws, emergent and evolving algorithms, and 
the like. Habits, on the other hand, have been sometimes refered to as 
forming a “second nature”, thus indicating a quasi distinct ontology. 
From the Vedic texts and Plato, to modem reflections on myths, ritual 
and language, these seemingly unaccountable forces have been 
described as agencies that spread among humans and control their 
behavior. Traditionally explained in terms of supernatural interven­
tions through evil possession or divine inspiration, these phenomena 
were bound to be recast in the context of evolutionism. Early formu­
lations focused on language whose origin has always puzzled huma­
nity. From Charles Darwin’s tentative remarks on the evolutionary 
characteristics of languages and August Schleicher’s explicit attempt 
to construe languages as evolving and developing organisms, there has 
been undercurrents among linguists who were not entirely satisfied by 
strictly functionalist view of language. In this respect, Saussure’s 
notion of “langue” and Chomsky early positing of an “innate gram­
matical competence” were the result of inferring from linguistic 
behavior the necessary, but hypothetical condition that must be 
assumed if this behavior is to be understood. It is in this respect that 
these notions are “notions by default” since they are proposed because 
no better explanation can be found rather than because compelling 
evidence of their presence and action is available. They become 
objects of belief. The ontological status of both “langue” and 
“linguistic competence”, and their Platonician overtone, have been 
hotly debated. Saussure himself struggled in notes he never wanted to 
publish with the contradictions implied in his notion of “langue” in 
which time was of essence while stability had to be assumed, and 
Chomsky progressively displaced the ontological locus of “compe­
tence” from the Cartesian to the Darwinian paradigm. In recent years, 
Terrence Deacon attempted a reactualisation of earlier evolutionary 
theory of language, using, somewhat defensively, the notion of 
“meme” as parasitic agencies and proposing a counter-intuitive 
perspective on the relation of language (and other behavioral algo­
rithms) to brain characterized as being co-evolutionary. The “meme” 
is obviously for Deacon still a notion by default, and he has articulated
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his scepticism through examining the conceptual interface between 
“memes” and “signs” (Deacon 1999: 1-2).
The meme “meme” has caught the attention of popularisers and 
there has been a constant stream of books which cash on the “outra­
geous” claim that humans are infected and manipulated by “invisible 
parasitic agencies” and that cultures are nothing but the symptoms of 
such infectious algorithms. In spite of these scientifically unsound 
speculations, some researchers have endeavored to use this general 
view as a source of algorithmic and epidemiological models aimed at 
investigating various aspects of animal and human copying behavior. 
Such on-going research will provide some grounds for assessing the 
validity and fertility of the meme hypothesis. If compelling scientific 
evidence emerged to meet the nagging age-long suspicion that human 
brains may be “invaded” by “ideas” that determine behavior which 
may or may not be adaptive from the point of view of human orga­
nisms, this new understanding would at the same time transform our 
views on signs and semiosis. These latter two notions were indeed 
devised to account by default for at least some of the phenomena the 
meme notion is meant to explain. Since semiotics is still a speculative 
and interpretative discipline, let us heuristically consider that memes 
and signs designate subsets of the populations that comprise the planet 
earth’s ecosystem.
The lion pride which was evoked above does not have to contend 
only with preys, predators, diseases, droughts and the like. The 
various symbolic representations of their species and the behaviours 
they command among human populations have also an impact which 
can prove as deadly or as beneficial as anything else. In this respect, 
ideas and their ritualistic consequences, for instance, are agencies 
which are participants in the ecosystem dynamic of Felis leo as much 
as Tse tse flies or floods are. The fact that humans carry those ideas 
does not make any more difference than the fact that some preys may 
carry parasites which are lethal for the lions feeding on them. Lions, 
on the other hand, can at times be fatal to the ideas or memes that 
haunt their niches by destroying their carriers, in particular those who 
hold the belief that they are immune to feline attacks because of magic 
or because of utopian worldviews.
Indeed, the memetic hypothesis, which holds that cultures consist 
of populations of parasitic algorithms able to control their hosts’ 
behavior so as to secure their own replication, does not suggest that 
memes are immune to the evolutionary constraints which apply to all 
other organisms and account for their diversity. Actually, as parasites,
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the constraints that limit their survival and replication are com­
pounded by the fact that the survival and reproduction of their hosts 
are prerequisites for their own success. In addition, following the logic 
of evolution, memes are bound to compete with each other, as well as, 
in some circumstances, develop forms of mutualism and symbiosis. It 
is likely that the consideration of memes as individual entities is a 
mere theoretical abstraction since there is more biological plausibility 
that memes always operate in complex micro-ecological combinations 
that show various degrees of resistance to the evolutionary pressures 
that come from the changing constraints of their hosts’ environment.
Similarly sign processes must be assumed to be limited not only by 
each other’s requirements for transmission capacity, redundancy cost 
and energy consumption, but also by the absolute thresholds of the 
organisms’ available channels and behavioral resources budget. For 
instance, the cost of signalling must be carefully monitored from 
several points of view: energetic expense, time constraints, increased 
degree of vulnerability coming from the disclosing of the source of the 
signals and the status of the organism which produces it. Evolution 
has scooped out, so to speak, by elimination most blurred and ambi­
guous signalling processes. Early memetic speculations have gene­
rated some paranoid images inspired by science fiction rather than 
rational considerations. This can be expected when a notion emerges 
by default without any means for representation because of its elusive 
nature. Human imagination processes the trauma of new information, 
even if it is purely virtual, through available narratives which are often 
the only way to formalize a problem in terms of familiar data. Memes. 
like signs, are theoretical fictions extracted by abductive reasoning 
from reflective experience. They are Mendelian notions because the 
macro-level of resolution through which they are conceptualized does 
not make it possible to assess their genotypic structures visually or by 
any other measurable means. They are however both intellectually 
compelling and counterintuitive. The history of human knowledge 
provides countless examples of processes that were deemed immate­
rial simply because they were invisible. Memetic speculations should 
be seen as a step toward defining a new frontier of investigation rather 
than a theory that is either true or false. If memes are heuristically 
conceived as parasitic or symbiotic algorithms, they must be repre­
sented on the same level of resolution as biological signalling pro­
cesses because it is at this level that they operate, possibly to exploit at 
their own advantage complex organisms’ evolved adaptive signalling 
and motivational apparatuses. Then, the risk of being thus exploited
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could be considered as one of the liabilities of these complex sig­
nalling systems. However, it is important to keep in mind that, as 
often occurs in evolution, some exploitations turn out to be adaptive 
through mutualism and symbiosis. Semioticians have produced 
detailed categorisations of signs without distinguishing with sufficient 
clarity those sign processes that are biologically adaptive from those 
that are culturally adaptive. There has been a tendency to understand 
the latter as a continuation of the former, as if they were genealogi­
cally related along an axis of evolutionary “progress”. At the same 
time, such “progress” has been consistently assessed as a mixed 
blessing since the destructions (even self-destructions) committed on 
behalf of cultural imperatives appear to be out of step with any 
conceivable logic of survival or inclusive fitness. Memetic conside­
rations offer an epochal conceptual opportunity to question these long- 
held certainties based on the simplistic notions of mimesis and 
semiosis. But this epistemological agenda will remain a mere virtua­
lly  until appropriate technological means and conceptual models 
enable the observation and representation of these evolutionary and 
ecological processes at their relevant level of resolution, that is, on the 
level on which natural selection operates. This is a necessary condition 
for evolutionary ecosemiotics to come of age.
5. Memes and MEMS: The new frontier
This fa c t  — that enorm ous amounts o f  
information can be carried  in an 
exceedingly sm all space  — is, o f  course, 
well known to the biologists, and  
resolves the m ystery which existed  
before we understood a ll this clearly, o f  
how it cou ld  be that, in the tiniest cell, 
all the information fo r  the organization  
o f  a com plex creature such as ourselves 
can be stored.
Richard Feynman (1999 [1959]: 123)
Besides an intriguing paronymy between memes and MEMS — an 
acronym that stands for Microelectromechanical Systems — no 
attempt will be made here to relate these cwo notions with each other 
in any functional way. Naturally, technological ideas and their appl­
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ications belong to the putative realm of memes and their presence m 
ecosystems’ dynamic is all too obvious through their dramatic 
impacts, sometimes called the Baldwin effect. What will be simply 
suggested here is that MEMS first provide a powerful technological 
metaphor for the appreciation of the scale of resolution on which 
evolutionary ecosemiotic processes can be observed, represented and 
simulated, thus opening the way to a scientific revolution. 1965 Nobel 
prize Richard Feynman outlined in the 1950s a vision that merged the 
defining tool-making abilities of humans with their newly acquired 
knowledge of atomic and sub-atomic representations. His landmark 
lecture of 1959 to the American Physical Society, entitled “There is 
plenty of room at the bottom”, initiated a movement toward extreme 
technological miniaturisation. While nanotechnological applications 
have started to revolutionize contemporary industry, medicine and 
information technologies, their potential for simulating neurological 
processes on a commensurate scale will undoubtedly open the way to 
forms of artificial semiotics in which the ecology of these processes 
will cease to be a purely speculative exercise but will address actual 
pressing problems the solution of which is bound to shed light on, and 
profoundly transform, traditional notions of communication and 
semiosis. All technological innovations have profoundly impacted the 
human perception, conception and manipulation of the environment 
and have altered its ecosystems’ communication webs. Since Feyn­
man’s days, MEMS have come of age. They are mass constructed on 
micrometers scales. They can sense, control and actuate. They can 
operate individually or in arrays and generate effects on the macro 
scale.
All the interactive processes which are phenomenoiogically de­
scribed or simply grossly categorized as signs in the semiotic literature 
are grounded on the perceptual and cognitive apparatus of organisms 
who have evolved under a great variety of constraints. Some of these 
constraints have evolved at the same pace, thus creating the conditions 
for co-evolutionary processes. The factorisation of all these conditions 
tor understanding a single organism at a given time is a daunting task 
that mostly eludes human cognitive capacities, which have been 
shaped by the necessity of handling only those factors that were 
relevant to immediate survival. Beyond a certain level of complexity 
humans must rely on their ability to simplify phenomenological data 
and to conceptually manipulate these simplifications so as to 
extrapolate from limited experience predictive models and pragmatic 
algorithms. This evolved competence itself is the object of intense
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speculations and no compelling explanatory theory has emerged yet. 
However, a few assumptions can be reasonably made: the human 
organism relies mostly on visual information for its physical and 
social survival; the degree of resolution of its perceptual apparatus 
constitutes an absolute threshold for the information it can process; 
awareness (both perceptive and proprioceptive) applies only to a 
limited subset of this information; tool-making is a determining asset 
that evolution continues to select, as world wide conflicts between 
technology and demography tend to show.
All the main concepts of semiotics come from natural philosophy 
which is dependent on natural perception and awareness. Natural 
ecology factorises all the “objects” that have a perceptual or proprio­
ceptive definition, that is, they are viewed or imagined as disconti­
nuous representations in space and time, and their transformations 
usually appear as sudden rather than progressive and continuous 
because of the way in which adaptive biological clocks determine the 
phenomenology of time processes. In semiotic discourse, interactions 
at a distance are causally ascribed to the action of signs emitted from 
an “object” toward another. These “objects” are foregrounded with 
respect to a background of gases, waves, radiations, and possibly other 
forms of matter, that are invisible to the human perceptive apparatus 
because the latter has evolved within a range of niches in which this 
background can be treated as a constant, at least during the span of 
time involved in terrestrial mammalian evolution. In the theorising of 
organismic interactions, signs and their “parts” and “varieties” have 
been conceived as a virtual ecology that models and parallels the 
natural ecology which is accessible to human awareness. Actually, in 
its popularised forms, semiotics has variously created visions of the 
world in which natural and artificial “objects” are mixed with natural 
and artificial “signs” that fill the gaps, so to speak, of human per­
ception. In some extreme cases, these virtual ecologies generate 
virtual ontologies that extend to the whole universe for the best or the 
worst of the populations which foster them. Naturally, most of these 
intellectual appropriations, while being adaptive to a degree at least in 
the short term, remain virtual and may be totally inconsequential in 
the sense that such narratives do not generate the conditions for new 
counterintuitive knowledge since they amount to presupposing that the 
“problems” are solved. Some brands of contemporary ecosemiotics 
simply implement such programs with conceptual and terminological 
adjustments to take into account the parallel discourse of utopian 
scientific ecology.
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But some of these virtual constructs happen to be consequential on 
the scale of evolutionary time. The dialectic of modelling and 
observing coupled with tool-making abilities has lead humans beyond 
the naturally evolved limits of their visual system. This is a very 
recent event whose consequences have not yet fully impacted human 
worldviews and awareness. Humans have evolved as mostly visual 
organisms, that is, at least some individuals have survived long 
enough to reproduce and natural selection has streamlined well- 
adapted visual systems which provide sufficient vital information 
regarding kin recognition, prey identification and predator avoidance. 
These adaptations apply equally well to the identification of edible 
vegetables in a forest and to canned vegetables in a grocery store. The 
same avoidance behaviors apply to a charging elephant and to a 
speeding car, with appropriate adjustments. But they do not apply to 
sorting out bacteria and viruses, nor to avoiding bullets. In addition to 
such limitations, this visual system’s complexity and its sensitivity to 
extreme conditions and to aging is an important source of vulnerabi­
lity. It is far from optimal and its shortcomings have prompted 
remedial strategies in the form of optical knowledge and technology. 
Seeing better, further and beyond the natural threshold of resolution 
has been a powerful motivation for tool-making organisms who come 
to understand the liabilities of their natural vision. The microscope 
opened up a realm of experience on a scale that had not been available 
to humans during the evolutionary process. Of course, scale is a 
relative notion. What may be non-perceptible for a visual system is a 
whole rich and diverse environment for another. The non-visible has 
been consistently construed as immaterial by human efforts to account 
for causes that elude observation. It would seem that, fundamentally, a 
notion by default is one that fills a visual gap. The semiotic discourse 
speaks of the actions of signs as agents whose ontological status is 
ambiguous, to say the least. The root metaphors of this discourse are 
relating to ballistic or to the logistics of traffic regulation and 
cybernetic communication. In the semiotics of communication, the 
medium is not a marked dimension of the models. But the medium is 
considered a “less-interesting” component. In the semiotics of 
signification, the medium is taken for granted. Signs and systems of 
signs, said to be made of relations”, circulate in a virtual universe, a 
sort of semiotic “ether”, a signifying utopia. But all the processes 
described as biological sign processes are physical events necessarily 
involving energy consumption, occupation of determined space and 
time, and evolutionary risks in as much as organisms who signal
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spend energy and disclose by the same token their location and current 
status. Furthermore, signalling apparatuses carry also a cost that has 
driven them toward extreme miniaturisation. Packing the maximum 
number of circuits in a minimum of space, preferably well protected 
without being too cumbersome, is an evolutionary imperative, a 
natural nanotechnology, that has shaped the semiotic organs and 
pushed their dimensions below the threshold of human visual and 
conceptual resolutions. The cost and potential pay-off of extreme 
signalling has been well theorized in the framework of the “handicap 
principle” (Zahavi, Zahavi 1997), but it is likely that this theoretical 
understanding is not limited to the most obvious cases observed in 
courtship behavior and mate selection.
In view of advances in the visualisation and understanding of 
neuronal processes, and in the parallel developments of nanotechno­
logy (which, as it was pointed out above ultimately could enable the 
observation, representation and simulation of the former), it can be 
anticipated that the macro concepts of semiotic phenomenology will 
become obsolete and will be replaced by counterintuitive theories with 
unpredictable consequences. This is where lies, in my opinion, the 
contemporary excitement caused by the emerging notion of ecosemio- 
tics. Semiotic algorithms are physically embodied or are nothing. As 
sets of instructions, they are endowed with a form of dynamism which 
is able to mobilise or exploit the motivational systems of the human 
brain with whose structures they are commensurate. Thus, they are 
bound to compete for space and energy, for survival and reproduction. 
Only within the conceptual framework of evolutionary ecology, in­
cluding naturally these elusive but determining organisms that our 
current ignorance calls signs, symbols or memes, can ecosemiotics be 
properly established as a comprehensive science.
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О знаках, мемах и микроэлектромеханических системах: 
в направлении к эволюционной экосемиотике
В данной статье поднимается вопрос: может ли семиотика придать 
какую-либо ценность экологии. Короткий обзор эпистемологического 
статуса семиотики в ее нынешних формах показывает, что феноменоло­
гические макроконцепции семиотики (которые исходят из разных 
теологических и философских традиций) не отвечают в своем объеме 
комплексности наук, составляющих экологию, и слишком редуктивны, 
чтоб успешно охарактеризовать те микропроцессы, посредством кото­
рых организмы развиваются и взаимодействуют. Тем не менее, имеются 
по меньшей мере две причины, позволяющие соединению семиотики и 
экологии быть научно продуктивным: а) именно свобода семиоти­
ческого дискурса может быть существенным катализатором мульти- 
дисциплинарного взаимовлияния, —  что является существенным 
условием для возникновения истинно холистической экологии; б) ны­
нешний понятийный аппарат семиотики не “высечен на камне”. Все ее 
концепты, теоретическое обрамление и модусы доказательств могут 
развиваться в соприкосновении с проблемами, которыми занимаются в 
эволюционно-экологических исследованиях. Семиотика как открытый 
эпистемологический проект остается интеллектуальной сокровищницей, 
открытой для множества возможностей. Вторая тема статьи имеет 
целью привлечение внимания к возможности переосмысления и разви­
тия семиотического исследования благодаря недавним научным откры­
тиями. Предпринимается попытка показать, что антиинтуитивистские 
теории (такие, как меметика) и новый уровень технологии (как 
нанотехнология) позволяют экосемиотике подойти вплотную к решению 
разных задач, а не просто пересказывать экологический дискурс с 
помощью семиотических макроконцепций. Меметика и нанотехнология 
тут приведены не в качестве окончательных решений, а лишь как пока­
затели возможных направлений в движении к всесторонней эволюцион­
ной экосемиотике, которая бы радикально изменила семиотический 
дискурс XX века и его идеологическую программу.
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Märkidest, meemidest ja m ikroelektromehhaanilistest 
süsteemidest: evolutsioonilise ökosemiootika suunas
Esmalt tõstatatakse käesolevas artiklis küsimus, kas sem iootika võib lisada 
mingit väärtust ökoloogiale. Lühike ülevaade sem iootika epistem oloogilisest 
staatusest tema praegustes vormides näitab, et sem iootika fenom enoloogilised  
makrokontseptsioonid (mis pärinevad mitm esugustest teoloogilistest ja  filo­
soofilistest traditsioonidest) ei vasta oma ulatuselt nende teaduste kompleks­
susele, mis moodustavad ökoloogia, ning on liialt reduktiivsed kaardistamaks 
edukalt mikroprotsesse, mille kaudu organismid arenevad ning on vastas­
mõjus. On siiski vähemalt kaks põhjust, miks sem iootika ja ökoloogia ühen­
dus võib olla teaduslikult produktiivne: (a) just sem iootilise diskursuse vaba­
dus saab olla multidistiplinaarsete vastasmõjude oluline katalüsaator, oluline 
tingimus tõeliselt holistliku ökoloogia tekkimiseks; (b) semiootika praegune 
mõisteaparatuur ei ole kivisse raiutud. Kõik selle mõisted, teoreetiline raamis­
tik ja põhjendusviisid võivad areneda kokkupuutes probleemidega, millega 
tegeletakse tänapäevases evolutsioonilis-ökoloogilises uurimistöös. Semioo­
tika kui avatud epistem oloogiline projekt jääb võmalusterohkeks intellek­
tuaalseks varamuks. Artikli teine teema on tõstatatud tähelepanu juhtimiseks 
hiljutiste teadusarengute poolt pakutavatele võim alustele sem iootilise uuri­
m ise ümbermõtestamiseks ja edasiarendamiseks. Püütakse näidata, et vasrn- 
intuitiivsed teooriad (nagu memeetika) ning uus tase tehnoloogias (nagu 
nanotehnoloogia) võivad tuua ökosem iootika intellektuaalselt enam huvi 
pakkuvate uurimisteemade juurde kui seda on ökoloogilise diskursuse pelk 
ümberkirjutamine traditsiooniliste sem iootiliste makrokontseptsioonide abil. 
M emeetika ja nanotehnoloogia ei ole siin muidugi esile toodud kui mingid 
kindlad lahendused, vaid lihtsalt kui suunaviited laiahaardelise evolutsioo­
nilise ökosem iootika poole, mis muudaks radikaalselt 20. sajandi semiootilise 
diskursuse aluseid ning selle ideoloogilist kava.
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Abstract. Naming, according to Sebeok, constitutes the first stage of zoo- 
semiotics. This special but common use of language actually inaugurates more 
complicated procedures o f human discourse on non-human kingdom, in­
cluding classification of its members. Because of language’s double articula­
tion in sound and sense, as well as the grapheme’s pleremic (meaning-full) 
rather than cenemic (meaning-empty) characteristic (according to Hjelmslev), 
Chinese script is capable of naming and grouping animals randomly but 
effectively. This paper attempts to describe the said scriptorial “necessity of 
naming” (Kripke) in classical Chinese by citing all the creatures, real or 
fabulous, with а /т а / (horse) radical.
Name, according to Thomas A. Sebeok (1975), is one of the six types 
of sign, and naming constitutes the first stage of zoosemiotics. This 
first stage is a logical and semiotic necessity that mediates culture and 
nature because whatever life species and form one sets to describe, he 
needs naming to encode it in the first place. Here “encoding” runs the 
pragmatic gamut of designating, referring to, and describing, as well 
as covering the semantic area of sense (Sinn) and meaning (Bedeu­
tung). While zoosemiotics serves to mediate ethology and semiotics 
(Sebeok 1975: 87), naming, one could argue, links zoosemiotics and 
biosemiotics in terms of language function, and more precisely, 
linguistic pragmatics.
In fact, the four areas of study of biosemiotics outlined by Claus 
Emmeche (1992): (1) the emergence of semiosis in nature, (2) the 
natural history of signs, (3) the horizontal aspects of semiosis, and (4) 
the semiotics of cognition and language, have to be accounted for by a
natural language which, in Emile Benveniste s words,^ is at once an 
interpreting and interpreted system (Benveniste 1981). Furthermore, 
to be an interpreting system, this natural language has to develop for 
itself a descriptive apparatus capable of mapping onto its object of 
study though it remains controversial whether or not there is a meta­
language and object-language distinction in biosemiotics. One could 
even assert, following Hjelmslev, that area (4) suggested by Em- 
meche, “the semiotics of cognition and language”, serves as a meta­
semiotics to encode the previous three areas which are its object- 
semiotics (Hjelmslev 1969: 121 ).2 As Hoffmeyer and Emmeche 
(1991: 118) rightly observe, “Biological information is expressed 
through signs and should be studied as such, i.e. as a special case of 
semiotics, which we shall term semiotics of nature”. The distinct but 
inseparable relationship between substance and form suggests the 
epistemological rupture between traditional versions of biology and 
their “informational” counterpart. Our co-authors allude (Hoffmeyer, 
Emmeche 1991: 117) to the etymological distinction between morpho­
logy and information to see how the idea of bringing something into 
form in the Latin verb informare already implies an explanatory meta­
semiotics in biosemiotics.
This meta-semiotics, or meta-language, if one wishes, according to 
our co-authors, is code-duality, i.e., “the ability of a system to re­
present itself in two different codes, one digital and one analog”. 
(ibid.: 126). The hasty equation of the special feature of living orga­
nisms to a meta-language may need an explanation, but this formu­
lation lies at the core of Hoffmeyer and Emmeche’s model which has 
the explanatory power for both nature and culture, life and language.3 
Witness how they describe culture in the same language: “Thus, 
culture may be seen as built on the code-duality of digital language 
and analog ‘reality’” (ibid.: 128).
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1 Note that in Emmeche (1994: 126) the author leaves out language when he 
asserts that biosemiotics “concerns itself with signs in biological systems, ranging from 
communication among animals to the individual cell’s genetic code as a sign system of 
its own”.
: Hjelmslev (1969: 121) points out that “the semiologist who describes semiotics 
that are not languages will be able to make that description in a language”, and that 
“should this not be the case, the semiotic that is used will in any event always be 
translatable into a language”.
3 Elsewhere Emmeche and Hoffmeyer (1991: 6) define semiotics of nature the 
“construction of the analogy between language and the living nature”.
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This code-duality serves as a model, a master code that manifests 
itself in both nature and culture, as succinctly represented in the 
diagram showing the digitalisation of DNA and language (Figure 1).
Figure 1. The double digital system of nature (modified from Hoffmeyer, 
Emmeche 1991: 155).
Elsewhere Emmeche and Hoffmeyer observe,
Life has its own ‘language’. This language, furthermore, resembles human 
language in one very essential characteristic: it is built upon a digital code, the 
code of DNA. Now the Saussurean distinction of parole and langue is a 
distinction inside language —  i.e., both parole and langue belong to the 
linguistic sphere of the digital code of words. Yet, the phenotype—  like the 
species —  is of blood and flesh, and as such its eventual communication 
belongs to the universe of the analog code. (Emmeche, Hoffmeyer 1991: 31)
In talking about naming animals, I would like to take a cue from this 
observation of self-reference and code-duality, but freely appropriate 
them with an anthropo-semiotic transposition. The animal I shall be 
talking about is the horse, and the code-duality phenomenon I shall be 
introducing is classical Chinese writing.4 Hoffmeyer and Emmeche
4 Humans receive information with their senses: sounds through hearing; images 
and text through sight; shape, temperature, and affection through touch; and odours 
through smell. To interpret the signals received from the senses, humans have 
developed and learned complex systems of languages consisting of alphabets’ of 
symbols and stimuli and the associated rules of usage. This has enabled them to
assert that self-reference is a fundamental of life, and any system 
“must be able to construct a description of itself’ (Hoffmeyer, 
Emmeche 1991: 126). However, I shall transpose this to the opposite 
cognitive realm, i.e., how human beings refer to the horse rather than 
how it refers to itself. In fact, insofar as scientific meta-language is 
concerned, and insofar as the observer and the observed are homo­
geneous, self-reference and other-reference make little distinction in 
my paper.
Not a biologist, I have chosen to pick up the written form rather 
than the biological substance of “horse” for reasons that are discursive 
rather than scientific. I should like to register my paper in a critical 
discourse which draws on heterogeneous sources, all of which, 
however, fall under the heading of a general semiotics. Let me begin 
with an interesting anecdote, the Russian film theoretician Sergei 
Eisenstein (1949) was once fascinated by the hieroglyph of horse. 
Although he believed, rightly, that the original features of hieroglyph 
can no longer be recognised today, they are crystalised in the present 
form of writing, i.e., the ideogram (Chang, 1988, 1996). Eisenstein’s 
compromise is to leave that poor little horse alone, sagging its lovely 
hind legs pathetically. Witticism notwithstanding, the anecdote calls 
our attention to the process of symbolisation of iconic signs and 
possibly suggests a special kind of the interaction of analogical and 
digital forms of language information processing.
The second source that serves as an intertext is Claude Levi- 
Strauss’s discussion of the naming of four domesticated animals that 
mediate nature and culture, non-human and human, namely, the birds, 
the cattle, the dogs, and the horses. In his curious argument, Levi- 
Strauss christens birds as “metaphorical human beings” dogs 
“metonymical human beings” cattle “metonymical inhuman beings” 
and racehorses “metaphorical inhuman beings” (Levi-Strauss 1966: 
207). Their psycho-sociological differences can be found on the plane 
of naming: names of birds and dogs are derived from language
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recognize the objects they see, understand the messages they read or hear, and 
comprehend the signs received through the tactile and olfactory senses. The carriers of 
information-conveying signs received by the senses are energy phenomena — audio 
waves, light waves, and chemical and electrochemical stimuli. In engineering parlance, 
humans are receptors of analog signals; and, by a somewhat loose convention, the 
messages conveyed via these carriers are called analog-form information, or simply 
analog information. Until the development of the digital computer, cognitive 
information was stored and processed only in analog form, basically through the 
technologies of printing, photography, and telephony.
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[langue] and thus of paradigmatic character; those of cattle and horses 
from speech [parole], being taken from the syntagmatic chain. Levi- 
Strauss then neatly situates the four animals in a semiotic square 
(Figure 2), showing their contradictions and contrarieties.
------j birds
human
(paradigmatic)
------ [dogs
П
Figure 2. A system of naming animals (from Levi-Strauss 1966: 208, modified).
It is obvious that Levi-Strauss’s conceptualisation is based on a rather 
rigid dichotomies between language and speech, syntagmata and 
paradigmata, metonymy and metaphor, because the roles of mediation 
of the four domestic animals can be easily transposed and exchanged 
in different socio-cultural contexts. There are several implications in 
the structural anthropologist’s finding. First, the appellation of animals 
by proper names can only be an extreme form of domestication and by 
no means of the concern of zoosemiotics or biosemiotics. Second, the 
act of naming has extended from common names of animals to proper 
names and thus put into question the necessity of naming (Kripke 
1972). But Saul Kripke has argued, “[C]ertain general terms, those of 
natural kinds, have a greater kinship with proper names than is 
generally realized.” These include “various species names, whether 
they are count nouns, such as ‘cat’, ‘tiger’, ‘chunk of gold’, or mass 
terms such as ‘gold’, ‘water’, etc.” (Kripke 1972: 327). Strikingly, all 
the four animals cited by Levi-Strauss have entered classical Chinese 
script via the identical function of iconicity and have become cardinal 
morphemes for an infinite process of grammaticalisation and semanti- 
cisation. At least in ancient China, the domestication of real animals 
by writing witnesses an important transition of cultural history and the 
birth and sophistication of literacy. This phenomenon is complicated 
by the totemic trace that /т а /  or [horse] has become a common family 
name, and quite a large of number of men have horses, mostly 
stallions and thoroughbreds, as their first names.
metaphorical
— I horses m —
> < :
inhuman
(syntagmatic)
{cattle
metonymic
Finally, this prolonged digression brings us back to co-authors 
Hoffmeyer and Emmeche. Earlier I mentioned their code-duality 
principle of life and language. It may not be a coincidence that they 
have touched upon the non-alphabetical writing system. “The dis­
tinction between analog and digital codes is certainly not a simple one, 
as is illustrated for instance by the hieroglyphs. While a single 
hieroglyph may be taken as an analog representation, it becomes digital 
when presented in written text” (Hoffmeyer, Emmeche 1991: 130).
Let me then begin with a single hieroglyph, that representing [horse] 
/таЗ/. This is an instance of one of the most primitive categories of 
ancient script called pictograph, in Peircean terms, iconic sign. This 
single sign is already a self-contained unit, consisting of a graphic 
signifier which closes on the signified concept, or more precisely, which 
directly maps onto the semantic level without the mediation of a 
phonetic signifier. A sign like this is motivated and, according to Louis 
Hjelmslev (1959), “pleremic”, i.e., semantically-full, as opposed to the 
alphabetical script based on the phonemic or syllabic level which is 
“cenemic”, i.e., semantically-empty. The connection of the horse’s 
signific <ma> to its phonetic /таЗ / may have been a historical accident 
or marriage of convenience. The phonetic aspect, to be sure, can be 
segmentalised into smaller units, an initial and an ending, as well as the 
suprasegmental tone, so can be the graphic aspect segmentalised into 
graphemic components. But neither of these smaller units has a sign- 
function. The iconicity of simple pictographs conforms to what Hoff­
meyer and Emmeche have termed “analog representation”.
Then the next problem would be how a single hieroglyph can 
become or will become digital in the written text. Our authors are 
obscure at this point. It may refer to the computerised conversion of 
analog to digital in processing written text which actually is some kind 
of transcription of speech, as suggested by the popular term of 
“written language”. The assumption is, of course, the much-abused 
logocentrism which suggests the tyranny of speech. In fact, one of the 
most popular forms of written Chinese processing usually begins by
(1) alphabetising the non-alphabetical script; (2) parsing and tagging 
the alphabetised script as if it were English. Other than this, 
processing Chinese script is extremely puzzling and its input problem 
is entirely different from that of English and any other alphabetical 
script. For one thing, the pictographic aspect is made complicated by 
large numbers of homophones and homonyms. The 40,000 strong 
words (or characters) in the imperial dictionary compiled in the early 
18th century and the 50,000 modem words in use today have only some
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400 sounds.5 Recent advances have witnessed the digitalisation of the 
analog script by means of algorithm and other techniques. Unfortu­
nately, achievements so far have been limited to the cognition and 
processing of individual characters or images, and have not been able to 
deal with issues of syntax and discourse without alphabetisation. Rather 
than getting into these, I shall try to tackle the problem of signification 
by analysing the horse icon. One may recall that Peirce already 
introduces the concept of interpretant to mediate the sign and its object. 
The interpretant attributes an “imputed quality” (semantics) to the 
object which is realised in the sign via the latter’s “material quality” 
(Peirce 1982, 3: 66). The idea of interpretant suggests, among other 
things, that it requires shared knowledge among users who accept the 
sign to be used as such. This enables the pictograph to lend itself as 
morphographeme to form a more complex sign, such as an ideograph, 
or is loaned to represent visually a morphophoneme. morpheme, or 
lexia which does not have a grapheme and graphic sign of its own. In 
both cases, the iconic sign either transforms into an indexical sign or is 
appropriated as a symbolic sign.
Thus the original iconic sign <ma> is appropriated as a morpho­
grapheme and added to another loaned morpho-grapheme which no 
longer has any semantic function but serves as a morphophoneme. 
Now an infinite number of horse family members, so to speak, are 
engendered. These are almost always ideographic, composed by a 
morphographme of horse <ma>, and a morphophoneme, which is 
taken randomly from the paradigmatic category, to differentiate one 
horse from another in pronunciation. They can be classified into at 
least four groups (Figure 3).
Group 1 consists of some dozen words referring to different kinds of 
horses, such as the cluster of liu, hua, jun, ji, qi, jiao  all denoting 
thoroughbreds; and the cluster of horses in different Umwelts, such 
as can [left horse of a war chariot], and fe i [right horse of a war 
chariot], yi [stagecoach horse].
Group 2 include words which “refer” to animals which are perceived, 
perhaps mistakenly, as belonging to the horse family, such as luo 
[mule], lyu [donkey], luo [camel] or [llama].
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Chinese Language. Computer Society to dedicate itself to Chinese information pro­
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Group 3 contains verbs with a horse morpheme but transformed into 
verbs, such as tuo [carry {on horseback}], qu [drive], jia  [steer], 
shi [drive], qi [ride]. The transposition of nominal system to verbal 
system is made possible by metonymical contiguity.
Group 4  comprises of some curious instances where a morpho- 
phoneme added to the [horse] totally erases both the denotation 
and connotation of horse. An example is pian, meaning [cheat].
Щ morpho grapheme 
Group 1: (1) <liu> fjig
(2) <hua> Щ
(3) < jun> i?
Group 2: (1) <luo> Щ ти 1 е]
(2) <lyu> Щ [donkey]
(3) <luo> Щ са те1 ] or [llama]
Group 3: (1) <tuo> ВДсаггу on horseback]
(2) <qu> £ § [drive]
(3) <jia> Щ [steer]
Group 4: (1) <pian> Щ [cheat]
Figure 3. Classes o f words with a <ma> /т а З / [horse] morphographeme.
Now these four clusters are all generated from two steps. The first step 
is the transformation of the horse icon from the graphemic level to the 
morphographemic level; and the second step, paradigmatic substitu­
tions from within the existing language, in particular, lexical system. 
The principle of differentiation is arbitrary and таке-shift. One could 
say that it is both necessary and contingent; in other words, it is 
arbitrary a priori, but conventional a posteriori.
Words in Group 4 indicate the script’s tendency towards arbitrary 
symbolisation. It is made possible by the generation of new graphic 
signs, either through addition or through loan. This category now 
constitutes the largest group of Chinese words. They can be called 
hypographs. The hypograph is governed by the principle of appro­
priation, which allows individual graphic signs to bear secondary 
meanings. Sometimes, the “signific” of a graph is loaned to coin new 
graphs; other times, the “phonetic” is loaned. There are also occasions
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when the w'hole graphic sign is loaned by virtue of homophonicity. 
This multiplication of characters and usages is acclerated by grapho- 
and phono-syntaxisation. Grammatically, most deictics, anaphoras, 
prepositions, postpositions, and conjunctions that contribute to 
characters’ distribution on the axis of syntax fall into this category. 
Today the expression which consists of two reduplications of the 
horse and tiger icons, /т а /  /т а / /hu/ /hu/, literally [horse] [horse] 
[tiger] [tiger], means, however, “floppy”. And the expression /т а /  
/shang/, literally [horse] [up], means “immediately”. Such expressions 
are extremely popular in spoken Chinese. Their generative-trans­
formational process can be certainly approximated by digitalisation, 
but the mystery of their etymology cannot be explained by any 
method known to us.
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Называние животных в китайском письме
Согласно Себеоку, называние составляет первый этап зоосемиотики. 
Это специальное, но в то же время обычное употребление языка ведет к 
более сложным процедурам (в том числе и классификации) челове­
ческого дискурса, касающегося внеположенного человеку мира. По­
скольку язык артикулирован вдвойне (в звуке и в мысли) и по причине 
скорее плерематического чем кенематического (в терминах Ельмслева) 
характера графемы, в китайском письме имеется возможность называть 
и группировать животных случайно, но в то же время эффективно. 
Данная статье пытается описать скрипториальную “необходимость 
называния” (Крипке) на классическом китайском языке, рассматривая 
всех животных, как реальных, так и сказочных, в названии которых 
встречается основа /ма/ (лошадь).
Loomade nimetamine Hiina kirjas
Nimetamine, nagu ütleb Sebeok, moodustab zoosemiootika esimese etapi. 
See erakordne, kuid levinud keelekasutus juhatab tegelikult sisse inim- 
riigist väljapoole jäävat puudutava inimdiskursuse keerukamad toimin­
gud, sealhulgas ka sellesse kuuluva klassifitseerimise. Keele topeltartiku- 
leerituse tõttu helis ja mõttes ning ka grafeemi pigem plereemilise (tähen­
dusliku) kui keneemilise (tähendustühja) iseloomu tõttu (nagu väidab 
Hjelmslev) on Hiina kirjas võimalik loomi nimetada ja rühmitada juhusli­
kult, kuid samas tõhusalt. See artikkel teeb katse kirjeldada eespool­
mainitud skriptoriaalset “nimetamise paratamatust” (Kripke) klassikalises 
hiina keeles, käsitledes kõiki olendeid, nii tegelikke kui ka muinasjutulisi, 
kelle nimes esineb morfografeem /ma/ (hobune).
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Abstract. Metaphors o f nature and organism play a central role in the episte- 
mes of the Western culture and arts. The entire project o f the ‘modern’ meant 
a separation of man from the cosmos and its laws. Signs and symbols are 
thought to be arbitrary and conventional social constructions. However, there 
are many returns to iconic imitations o f nature and biological principles —  
also in such an esoteric art as music. One o f the highest aesthetic categories in 
Western art music is the so-called ‘organic growth’ which particularly mani­
fests in symphony. The concepts o f ‘organic/inorganic’ can be used as 
analytic terms, whereby one might even compare such composers as Jean 
Sibelius and Gustav Mahler. Music is said to be ‘organic’ when (1) its theme 
actors live in their proper Umwelt (or isotopy); (2) all music material stems 
from the same themes (it is innerly iconic); (3) all musical events follow each 
other coherently (inner indexicality or the principle o f Growth); (4) music 
strives for some goal (temporality). Moreover the Uexkiill idea of a particular 
Ich-Топ of every organism can be turned back to music. Hence we can say 
that every musical piece is like an ‘organism’ which has its Ich-Ton 
determining which signs it accepts and how it acts in the musical environment 
of its own and formed by other musical works.
1. On the musically “organic’’
A crucial part of the aesthetics of Western art music deals with the 
concepts of the organic and organicism. In a still broader context,
music is connected to the episteme of “nature”. According to Claude 
Levi-Strauss, by music we become conscious of the physiological 
roots of our being. In learned music, a special “pastoral” style was 
developed to portray nature. For example, many of the so-called topics 
of the classical style relate to nature and the outdoor life, such as the 
horn signals in Weber and at the opening of Beethoven’s Les adieux. 
When Adorno said that “Sibelius’ music is all Nature” (Es ist alles 
Natur), this statement referred to many things, but for him it was 
overall a negative aesthetic category in the musico-social situation in 
1937. Closer inspection shows, however, that Jean Sibelius’ work 
ranks alongside the “Nature music” of Beethoven’s Pastoral Symp­
hony and the overture to Mendelssohn’s A Midsummer Night’s 
Dream. The inconsistency in Adorno’s thinking was that, when 
Sibelius evoked nature it was doomed immediately, but if Mahler did 
it, then it represented the progressive Hegelian Weltlauf.
Nature appears in so many ways in the aesthetics of Western art 
music that only Arthur Lovejoy, in his classic Nature as Aesthetic 
Norm (1948), has attempted to list them all. Nature can mean human 
nature, the cosmic order, imitation of nature, truthfulness, objective 
beauty, simplicity, symmetry, balance, the primacy of emotion, 
spontaneity, naivety, primitivism, irregularity, avoidance of symmet­
ry, the expression of artist’s voice, the fullness of human life, the 
savage, the fecundity, evolution, and so on. All of these categories 
obtain in music.
Along with the development of the idea of absolute music — 
which meant instrumental music — there emerged the idea of the 
symphony and symphonism. This notion was in turn intimately related 
to the idea of organic growth. This aesthetic norm took hold, 
becoming an influential value in the entire tradition of symphonic 
music. In some countries, such as Finland, to write a symphony is still 
considered the high-mark of a career, whereas in France people shrug 
their shoulders and remark, “Symphonie, c ’est lourd, c’est nordique”. 
As is known, Debussy once left a concert hall in the middle of a 
Beethoven symphony, complaining “Oh no, now he starts to develop”.
According to Ernst Kurth there were two important lines of 
development in the history of Western art music. One was the periodic 
formal principle, based on the lied and the march and developed by 
Viennese classicism. It is characterized by clear-cut two-, four-, and 
eight-bar units, out of which more expansive musical forms could be 
composed. The other principle was linear art, independent of any strict 
measures and bar lines, which started with Palestrina’s polyphony and
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culminated in J. S. Bach’s melodies, an example being the freely 
undulating line of the Chromatic Fantasy. These two principles were 
the basic forces of musical formation. In addition, for Kurth music 
was kinetic energy. The aural, manifest form (signifier) of music was 
not essential; music only appeared by means of or was represented by 
it. Thus, all of music approaches the status of “nature” if one interprets 
the latter in a Bergsonian way as elan vital, or living energy. For 
Kurth music was “organic” when it followed a free motor impulse. 
Quadrangular, periodic rhythm was for him something artificial, a 
kind of “cultural” filter overlaid upon nature, even though it was based 
on corporeality in the sense of singing and marching.
At approximately the same time as Kurth, another music theore­
tician in the German field, Heinrich Schenker, developed his own 
conception of tonal music, which was also based on “nature”. Nature 
was for Schenker the triad, produced by the natural overtone series, 
which he called the “chord of nature” (Urklang), whose intervals were 
filled by a primal melodic line plus a bass, together forming the 
Ursatz. Prolongation of the latter by means of artistic improvisation 
produced the only “good” music. Good music — that is, the only 
music worth analyzing and listening to — was of course tonal music 
and particularly German tonal music. Schenker drew his concept of 
organicism from Goethe and the latter’s doctrine of the meta­
morphosis of plants.
Kurth and Schenker represent two different views of organicism in 
music. According to Kurth, organicity or “kinetic energy” arises pri­
marily in the ebb and flow of the linear, horizontal movement of 
music, or in semiotic language, in its syntagmatic structure. By 
contrast, for Schenker the organic appears in the vertical movement 
from a deep structure towards the surface, from Hintergrund to 
Vordergrund, that is to say, in music’s paradigmatic structure. From 
the syntagmatic perspective, the organic nature of music obtains by a 
certain arabesque movement, L ’art nouveau, for instance, would be an 
ideally “organic” style period, with its twining arabesques in leaf-like 
shapes. From the paradigmatic view, organicism is seen as the inner 
growth and unfolding of music. Stefan Kostka, in his Materials and 
Techniques of Twentieth-Century Music, defines what the organic is in 
music, as opposed to the inorganic. In a sub-chapter called “Non- 
organic approaches to musical form”, he writes the following:
A traditional painting depicts something, and if the painting is a good one,
every part of the canvas contributes to the effectiveness of the visual message
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that the artist is trying to convey. In traditional literature every passage has its 
purpose —  fleshing out a character, setting the mood, developing the plot, and 
so on. The same is generally true o f music in the European tradition: the 
composition is considered to be greater than the sum of its parts, a work of art 
in which each passage has a function that is vital to the overall plan of a work. 
Think of any tonal work that you know well, and imagine what it would be 
like if its parts, themes, transitions and so forth were randomly rearranged. It 
might be interesting to see how it would turn out, but the piece would almost 
certainly not be as effective as a whole. (Kostka 1999: 152-153)
Kostka goes on to emphasize that twentieth-century music evidenced a 
widespread reaction against the traditional organic view, that is to say, 
against the idea of a composition as a teleological process. He singles 
out the so-called “moment” form of Stockhausen as the antithesis of 
organicity.
In a broader sense, however, the organicism of music can be 
connected with the general problem of the arbitrary, conventional 
articulation of a sign system versus the iconic or indexical articulation 
of same: all grammars, including musical ones, are in Saussurean 
theory arbitrary and constructed, based on a set of particular rules. 
These rules can further be made explicit and thereby artificially 
generate music endlessly, according to the model, or langue.
Contrary to this approach — which exemplifies the idea of 
nonorganic form — is the view of music as a design or Gestalt, terms 
used by the Canadian composer and music semiotician, David Lidov. 
Grammar, as a set of static rules, can of course never be organic. Only 
can design or gestalt be related to something living. In support of this 
view, we can note that reformers and inventors of musical grammars, 
such as Schoenberg, rarely number among “organic”-sounding com­
posers. Nevertheless, in some cases even music written according to 
serial techniques can sound “organic”, as do symphonies by Eino- 
juhani Rautavaara.
This leads us to ask, At what point do we experience music as 
being organic? Is it the case that organicity, when experienced con­
sciously, no longer seems as organic as it did before? In other words, 
is the organic an unconscious category, such that we should return to 
Rudolph Reti’s ideas on the thematic process? In some cases it seems 
that organicity is the consequence of a certain activity of the musical 
enunciator, whether composer or interpreter. If too much deliberation 
goes into the composition, then the resulting music is no longer 
organic. Only when composition takes place in a trance or under 
inspiration is the result organic. Such a case would involve a special
dialogical relationship between the utterance and the act of uttering, 
between the text and its producer.
Yet even this definition does not help us to clarify what “organic” 
means as a quality of a musical text. Why is one composition organic 
and another one not? One explanation is that all mechanical repetition 
and potpourri-like formations are inorganic. This idea is advanced by 
Boris Asafiev in his intonation theory. As late as in Beethoven’s 
symphonies “a composition became an organically and psychologi­
cally motivated whole, which unfolds as growth and development” 
(Asafiev 1977, vol. 2: 489). As a an example Asafiev points to the 
overture to Wagner’s Die Meistersinger. It is a hidden symphony, 
whose parts — sonata allegro, andante, scherzo, and finale — have 
been blended together in such a way as to follow each other logically. 
They occur, one after the other, as various phases of a cycle, as a 
single line of development (Asafiev 1977, vol. 2: 490). Asafiev also 
calls such an organic form “dialectic”.
If such a fusion is to be taken as particularly “organic”, then it is 
exemplified by such pieces as Liszt’s В-minor Sonata, Schubert’s 
Wanderer Fantasy, Sibelius’ Seventh Symphony, as well as the 
blending together of the first movement and scherzo in the latter’s 
Fifth Symphony. Reminiscent of Asafiev’s view is Carl Dahlhaus’ 
interpretation of Beethoven’s symphonic form, when he insists that 
musical form is not like a scheme that can simply be filled with 
individual themes (Dahlhaus 1985: 369). Beethoven did not compose 
“in” form but “with” form. He may, for example, shift transitional 
material or aspects of the main theme into a subordinate theme. The 
difference between Schubert and Beethoven is thus clear. In Schubert 
the form is associative, potpourri-like, but in Beethoven it is 
“developing variation” (which term Dahlhaus borrows from Schoen­
berg): the idea of connecting certain motivic passages to each other, is 
experienced by the listener as a musical logic and as a counterpart to 
mere association.
In semiotic terms, syntagmatic linearity alone is not sufficient — 
neither inner iconic similarity nor mere inner indexicality. The musi­
cal form has to be experienced as somehow goal-directed, or in Kan­
tian terms, als zweckmässig, otherwise the music is not organic. Asa­
fiev, too, pays attention to the goal-directedness of music, distin­
guishing between two types of telos or finalities in the symphonic 
literature: either the cheerful and free fusion of the personality with 
the cosmos (Beethoven) or spiritual pain and isolation amidst the 
crowd, oblivion, and tragic destruction. For Asafiev, musical finality
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is achieved when some leading idea is revealed, which captures 
attention and out of which the growing waves of development emerge 
(Asafiev 1977, vol. 2: 483). This Asafievian ideal is almost literally 
realized in Sibelius. In the Fifth Symphony, for example, there is a 
struggle to the end between these two forms of finality, and the 
listener remains unaware of which solution the composer has chosen.
Thus, in order for music to be organic, it is not enough that there 
be motivic and thematic unity, i.e., that the music consist of more than 
fortuitous variation. Nor is it enough that these variations follow each 
other indexically and smoothly. Music has to progress towards some 
goal or telos\ music must be directional. But is not all music as a 
temporal art directed towards something? Here we do not mean the 
primary temporality of music but temporality as “marked”, as Robert 
Hatten (1994) might put it. In organic music, musical time is orga­
nized towards a certain goal.
How is this goal created? That is, How does a listener know that 
the music has a goal and a direction? Leonard B. Meyer, in his 
Explaining Music (1978), presents a theory of melody that emphasizes 
well-formed melodic shapes. There are certain musico-cognitive 
archetypes, the breaking or deficient fulfilment of which causes the 
listener to remain waiting for the right solution, the correct design. 
(On this view, Lidov’s theory of design would be sufficient to explain 
the organic nature of music.) For instance, if we hear at the beginning 
a “gap-fill” type of melody, then a telos of music is created by the 
unfilled gap, which may not be completed until the very end of the 
piece. This tension keeps the music in motion and produces the kinetic 
energy, the catalysing impulse. An example is the opening of Sibelius’ 
Fifth Symphony, where a motive sounds that is incomplete in three 
respects. Firstly, this motive, which Tawaststjema calls a “bucolic 
signal”, is first rhythmically syncopated and heard in a strange 12/8 
meter. Secondly, its verse structure is irregular, as Lorenz Luyken has 
remarked (1995: 42^43). Thirdly, it is based on an open fifth-fourth 
intervallic shape, which causes the listener to remain waiting for these 
gaps to be filled.
Harmonically the music hovers around the six-four chord of the E- 
flat major, a device similar to that which occurs at the beginning of 
Beethoven’s Sonata Op. 31 No. 3. Beethoven lets the phrase cadence 
on the tonic rather soon, however, whereas Sibelius delays it until the 
very end of the symphony. There we also hear the fifths and fourths 
lilled with a stepwise scale passage and leading tones: it is the great 
and relieving climax of the whole work, all the more since we have
been oscillating between various tragic alternatives just before it 
arrives. The extremely restless and ambiguous theme on the Neapoli­
tan chord ceases its wandering and is filled with u scale in E flat minor 
(which the sketches show to be one of the symphony’s founding 
ideas). But even at the end of the symphony, where the tonic is 
confirmed with a cadence, rhythmic balance is still not reached, since 
not all of the cadential chords are on strong beats. There is a particular 
irony in this, a musical pun, the wish to show that this is not altogether 
too serious — a rare moment in Sibelius! The situation recalls what 
happens in a play when the clown returns and addresses the audience 
directly to recite the final words, or as in the closing morality segment 
of Mozart’s Don Giovanni.
Music thus has its own telos, which sets energies in motion. They 
emerge from musical designs, gestalt qualities, of which we expect the 
completed form. According to Jan LaRue (1970), music has a special 
dimension of growth that binds all the other musical parameters 
together — this term in itself sounds rather “organic”.
Can “organicism” arise from some other quality of the musical 
texture? For instance, Sibelius’ music typically has fields that 
constitute the elements for the so-called “space dramaturgy” analyzed 
by Luyken (1995). Sibelius’ music often seems to be driven into a 
kind of fenced-in area, from which there is no exit. The formation of 
such fields was already evident in early Sibelius, for instance, in En 
Saga (in Finnish: Satu), realized by means of a simple repetitive form. 
That is to say, the same melody or theme recurs until, by repetition, it 
loses its character as a musical subject that distinguishes itself from its 
surroundings, its musical Umwelt. The music itself becomes a 
subjectless environment. This is a particularly Sibelian way of deacto- 
rializing the music, so as to make it an impersonal and vegetative 
natural process in which no thinking or feeling subject can be seen. In 
the Fifth Symphony, such a field is formed by the chromatic lament 
motives in the first movement (score numbers J-M ), which one hears 
for a very long time. (Such a situation is not far from Ligeti’s field 
technique, which in turn is not the same as the “sonoristic” fields of 
the Polish school; see Mirka 1997.) But this predominantly “static” 
field arises from a continuous, micro-organic process. How does one 
enter into such a field, and how does one get out of it? In the Fifth 
Symphony the field is simply exhausted: one does not leave it by 
means of a musically determined “escape route”, such as modulation 
(as occurs in the Second Symphony with the D-minor field in the 
Finale which leads into the parallel major).
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The question of the organic nature of music can also be interpreted 
as a question of the right method of analysis. One can imagine that 
methods based on musical “functions” would better take into account 
the organic quality than do tectonic, segmentational, mechanistic 
models (to which unfortunately the major part of music-semiotic 
analyses belong). The basic problem of organic music does not at all 
concern how music can be divided into smaller pieces but rather how 
the music coheres.
Boris Asafiev viewed music as consisting of three main functions: 
initium, motus, and terminus. In Greimassian semiotics these cor­
respond to the so-called aspectual semes: inchoativity, durativity, and 
terminativity. In Claude Bremond’s narratology, they parallel the three 
phases of storytelling: virtuality, passage/non-passage to action, 
achievement/inachievement. According to Asafiev the musical organic 
process always presupposes these three basic phases. Quite similar 
theories have been developed elsewhere.1
But there may be still other means by which music becomes 
organic. I have elsewhere introduced the biosemiotics and doctrine of 
Umwelt by Baltic biologist Jakob v. Uexktill, whose ideas have been 
provoking lively discussion among semioticians quite recently. What 
if we were to take his ideas seriously in music? As is known, his 
theory is based on the idea that every organism functions according to 
a preestablished “score” which determines the nature of its Umwelt. 
The organism connects to that world by two processes, Merken and 
Wirken. Every organism has its particular Ich-Топ which is determi­
nant of its being and acting. We can see in this concept an analogy to 
music, and say that every theme, every musical motive, every 
intonation lives in its own, characteristic musical Umwelt. An organic 
composer takes into account expressly the relationship of a musical 
event to its musical environment. A good example of the relationship 
of a theme to its Umwelt would be the variations of the Andante theme 
in Beethoven’s Fifth Symphony. There the main motive is continually 
shifted into new, interesting-sounding milieus; the listener pays more 
attention to these environments than to the theme itself.
In the classical tradition, melody and accompaniment are derived 
from the same material (as at the beginning of Schumann’s С major 
Fantasy, where the accompaniment figure is the same as the
1 Another, interesting “narratological” view of music can be found in the analysis 
manual of Ivanka Stoianova, used in her music courses at Paris University VIII. 
Stoianova takes her ideas mostly from her teachers in Moscow.
descending theme in the upper register), in which case the organic 
nature of music lies in the interaction of musical event and its environ­
ment. By contrast, the postmodern style — early examples of which 
are Poulenc’s Concerto fo r  Two Pianos and even Stravinsky’s 
neoclassicism — uses quotation techniques and avoids the aforemen­
tioned organic unity. The environment of the theme must be 
alienating. That is to say, if the context is tonal, then the citation has to 
distinguish itself as something dissonant. And if the context is atonal, 
the citation has to be distinguished by its tonality. In Sibelius’ Fifth 
Symphony, even in the earlier version of 1915, there is a strangely 
dissonant, piercing variant of the so-called Neapolitan theme which is 
superimposed on the “Swan theme” —  this is one of the rare futurist 
and fauvist moments in all of Sibelius’ output. There the theme really 
appears as if it were in a wrong isotopy or musical Umwelt.
Are there other means by which music can become organic? 
Wilhelm Furtwängler in his writings paid attention to the biological 
foundation of all music. However, the use of the term “biology” in 
music is metaphorical and thus as ambiguous as the concept of 
“nature” when applied to any art form. To Furtwängler, the so-called 
“absolute” music of the classical period was much more than functio­
nal, casual music. Dahlhaus remarks that Vienna’s musically rich and 
many-sided Umwelt enabled the emergence of the classical style. But 
Furtwängler believes that there was something else as well:
It is not only casual music bound with life [...] it is not directly connected with 
the ballet, play or drama, but can also well be so. What it touches, it changes. 
It gathers into it the fullness o f the entire organic life and reflects it there like 
in a mirror. It creates from itself the extremely broad world of independent 
musical forms —  lied form, fugue, sonata form are only its basic types. It is 
able to do so because it is enough for itself. It naturally corresponds to man’s 
biological presuppositions. (Furtwängler 1951: 27)
Furtwängler then asks, What are these biological presuppositions? 
They are based on the alternation of tension and relaxation:
The ascending and descending movement of tension and release reflects the 
rhythm of life: as long as we breathe, one activity is at rest, the other one in 
motion. The state of rest is more original and primal [...]. One o f the basic 
doctrines of modem biology is that in complicated bodily activities [...1 the 
relaxation of tension has a decisive meaning. (Furtwängler 1951: 27)
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This is certainly an acceptable view. In my own theory of semiotics I 
speak of two basic modalities, ‘being’ and ‘doing’, derived from 
Greimas’ model. But they also concern the definition of the organic in 
music (Tarasti 1994). What brings about being and doing in music? 
What gives us the impression that we either simply ‘are’ in music or 
that something is happening? These questions can be answered by 
observation of the temporal, spatial and actorial articulations in music. 
These articulations belong to the music of all cultures, not just to 
Western art music.
Furtwängler, however, relates ‘being’ (relaxation) and ‘doing’ 
(tension) strictly with tonality: “The state of rest in music in its full 
cogency is only produced by tonality. Only it is able to create an 
objectively existing state of rest (subjectively we can of course con­
sider any personal impression as rest)”. Furtwängler is thus bound to a 
certain musical ontology. The deepest level of music for him is always 
tonal, since it is based on the natural determining force given by the 
triad. It is the beginning and the end of everything.
Furtwängler’s tonal ontology is a long-abandoned position, but in 
the context of our essay it has a certain meaning. Even some semio- 
tically oriented scholars base their theories on a “biological” ontology, 
though without joining it any longer to tonality as a kind of ahistoric, 
universal principle. Ivanka Stoianova, for instance, thinks that musical 
form has two aspects: processual and architectonic. The processual 
aspect refers to musical enunciation, and the architectonic evokes the 
musical utterance as a ready-made text, as an art-work outside time. 
Thus we get two musical counterforces: the kinetic aspect, which is 
based on motion, change, process; and a static aspect, which is based 
on immobility, stability and architectonics. Musical form as a process, 
as aural manifestation, and the presence of an aural architecture are 
two sides of the same artistic activity.
Architectonic form — the external mould as described by Reti and 
Kandinsky — seems to be an effort to immobilize the stream of 
music. All musical style periods, from the classical to the romantic to 
the avant-garde, include such an immobilizing effect, which stems 
from architectonic form. The means of stopping the musical stream 
consist of hierarchic, historically determined formal schemes, whereas 
processuality appears in transformations and emergent contrasts, such 
as developing variation. For Stoianova, the ‘being’ of music is not 
precisely as it is for Furtwängler. It is not an ontological or teleolo- 
gical end-state of music toward which everything strives, but is rather 
the stopping of “normal”, and hence, “biological”, musical time.
In this sense, generative models are epistemologically contra­
dictory. The idea of a surface that is gradually generated from a deep 
structure is based on hierarchies, and thus on something static and 
architectonic, hence something which stops the musical movement. 
This has as its consequence the static, atemporal character and 
artificiality of generative analyses. They are mechanistic elucidations 
of musical grammars using hierarchic axiomatic rules. But at the same 
time, the idea of a generative course contains the thought of a process, 
in which the immanent is in the end made manifest. The generative 
course thus refers to a basic semiotic force of the whole universe: the 
movement from content to expression. Whether Greimas’ generative 
course or Chomskian schemes, generative models can make explicit 
the “organic” course of processes of meaning, but at the same time 
they contain an inorganic and architectonic aspect, which is a strange 
principle when applied to phenomenal musical experience and belongs 
in this sense to the project of the “modem”.
We can try to clarify further what the “organic” in music is, with a 
more detailed formal and style analysis. A good example is provided 
by Veijo Murtomäki’s (1993) study of organic unity in Sibelius’ 
symphonies. He confirms the importance of organic metaphors among 
all the representatives of the so-called “dynamic” form theory in 
German musicology. He mentions Kurth, Schenker, Halm and the 
continuation of their thought in Schoenberg and even Anton Webern. 
The musical views of the latter are permeated by the metaphor of a 
biological organism that develops from a single, initial idea. From it 
emerges the inner unity (zusammenhangen) of music. (It is interesting 
to note even here the contradictory tendency of these reformers of 
musical grammars and pioneers of the “modernist” project, who used 
models of thought inherited from romanticism. In addition, Schoen­
berg and Webern were certainly different persons as theoreticians and 
composers. How a serial piece can be organic remains in this context 
unanswered.) In any case, Murtomäki lists in his study five ways in 
which music can be organic, with special emphasis on how Stoiano­
va’s immobilizing forms — such as sonata, symphony, string quartet, 
and so on — become organic or processual by means of cyclic 
technique. For Murtomäki, organicity obtains when a composition 
with more than one movement is made to sound like a whole, and this 
in turn is the same as cyclicity. Cyclic procedures can be either 
external or internal; that is, they can either unify the materials or join 
parts together: (1) first, movements may be linked by similar thematic 
openings; (2) either thematic “germs” or cells are moved almost
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imperceptibly from one movement to another, or themes appear in an 
easily recognizable guise in the later movements; (3) a special motto 
or idee fixe may appear in every movement; (4) the principle may be 
one of family unity: the parts are connected with metamorphoses of 
the same theme; (5) the most sophisticated way is continuous 
variation, a method of metamorphosis in which new ideas result from 
a process of transformation.
The last-mentioned case is the most exciting one. When do we 
experience in music that some process “generates” or gives birth to 
another event? Put another way, when do we experience that some 
event T is the consequence of a former event PI Does event T serve as 
the telos of event PI What precisely does this mean? The finale of 
Sibelius’ Second Symphony is doubtless a good illustration of the idea 
of a telos, given the way that it is attained only after much struggle. 
But we can also imagine a process during which the listener does not 
know what will follow. Only when the result of T is heard after the 
process of P does one realize. Yes, this is exactly what everything 
prior to it was working toward. In such a case, one cannot say that T 
serves as a teleological goal of P, since it is perceived as such only 
after the fact.
How can we semiotically analyze and interpret such relationships? 
From a narratological perspective we can consider some event a 
subject and its goal to be the event, an object, that is searched for by 
the subject. At first the subject is disjuncted from the object, but then 
reaches or is conjuncted with it, taking it into possession. For instance, 
a theme in the dominant key “wants” to be united to the tonic. Yet this 
does not quite correspond to the truth, since the result of the meta­
morphosis can in fact be something which its preceding event is not 
aware of, so to say, or does not even “want”. Only the musical 
superenunciator — the composer — knows that event Г is a logical, 
organic result of process P. Or rather, the subject S is transformed into 
another subject 5] or Q or X, when the music steps, as it were, into 
"otherness”, when it shifts to some kind of non-being via the process 
of becoming. What is involved, then, is an organic, abruptly 
contrasting shift from a subject S to a subject Q. The subjects S and Q 
are felt to belong to the same musical Umwelt, in which we move 
from the Lebenswelt of subject S to that of subject Q.
To end this section on the metaphor of the “organic” as a music- 
theoretical episteme, we can note that the same thing happens with it 
as with the notion of “nature”, discussed above. As Lovejoy’s analysis 
and our cases show, nature” can mean almost anything, both order
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and disorder. In the same way, organic unity and growth can mean 
almost anything whatsoever. Why, then, do we examine a pheno­
menon about which we cannot only come to the same conclusion as 
did the first-year student mentioned by Umberto Eco, who modestly 
presented “a short comment on the universe”? It is because nature and 
organic growth have meant something to philosophers and to musical 
scholars, especially to those studying symphonic thought. They are 
notions loaded with strong ideological concepts, whose precise 
meaning can be obscure, but which have been and are still used when 
we speak about essential things in music. We cannot ignore these 
terms only because of the uncomfortable fact that their linguistic 
usage is not always logical and coherent. Next I shall ponder their 
relevance to Sibelius, particularly regarding his Fifth Symphony.
2. Sibelius and the idea of the “organic”
One could respond to the challenge posed by Adorno, by claiming that 
Sibelius’ music is “organic” whereas Mahler’s music is “inorganic”. 
In that case, the terms organic/inorganic would be primarily analytic 
concepts, such that “organic” music would be based on the following 
conditions: (1) All the musical actors live in their proper Umwelv, in 
semiotic terms, the themes move in their proper isotopies. (2) All the 
musical material stems from the same source; that is to say, 
thematicity, in semiotic terms, would be innerly iconic. (3) All the 
musical events follow each other coherently; this is LaRue’s principle 
of growth, or the inner indexicality of music. (4) The music strives for 
some goal; this has to do with temporality and the aspectual semes of 
beginning, continuing, and closing.
Sibelius’ music can be experienced in many ways as “organic”. 
First, many think that the category of Nature is present therein. As 
Lorenz Luyken has stated, Sibelius’ music refers to the pastoral 
quality, in the manner of Beethoven, Mendelssohn, and Wagner. 
There is much evidence, on the part of both Finnish and non-Finnish 
scholars, that the poiesis and aesthesis of his music is connected to 
Finland’s nature. When Leonard Bernstein introduces Sibelius’ 
mixolydian mode in the Sixth Symphony to an audience of young 
listeners in New York, he says that it evokes the lonely forests of 
Finland. When music semiotician Jean-Jacques Nattiez visited 
Helsinki in April of 1979, he spontaneously started to whistle the
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opening motive of the Violin Concerto when looking at the frozen sea 
from the bridge of Seurasaari in Helsinki. But closeness to nature does 
not make music innerly, analytically “organic”. It is only a category of 
reception.
What about the level of poiesis?  Erik Tawaststjema carefully 
studied the sketches of the Fifth Symphony and their elaboration. He 
connects the Fifth Symphony to Scriabin’s ecstatic-mystical view of 
art and to the Russian composer’s empathy with the cosmos. After 
quoting a poem by Scriabin, Tawaststjema (1978: 18) says, “But it is 
not erroneous to think what appealed to Sibelius in Scriabin was 
precisely the ‘cosmic’ dimension of his music, which is related also to 
his efforts to break through the boundaries of tonality”. This quotation 
has to be read in the light of our interpretation of the project of the 
“modem”, insofar as it represents the detachment of man from 
“cosmos” and insofar as “organic” music means a return to this 
cosmic unity. For Scriabin it meant going to the extreme limits of 
tonality (albeit Prometheus closes with an F-sharp major tonic). But in 
Sibelius the “cosmic” style and rejection of the modernist project 
meant expressly the acceptance of tonality. The ecstatic E-flat major at 
the end of the Fifth Symphony is related to the finale of Musorgsky’s 
Pictures at an Exhibition, which also cadences to a similar, waving, 
clock-like motive. From this we might infer that the organic style and 
the return to cosmic unity, in the philosophical sense advanced by 
Charles Taylor (1989) in his The Sources o f the Self is not always the 
same as the return to tonality. This engagement, this embrayage 
(Greimas’ semiotic term), can also take place on levels of the musical 
text other than spatial ones.
Tawaststjema’s study in fact seems to prove Sibelius’ organic 
symphonic logic is based upon composer’s way of elaborating the 
material; it is clearly the category of poiesis. Tawaststjema is more­
over inclined to think that the organic quality of Sibelius’ symphonies 
emerges as a result of a trance-like process guided by the unconscious 
inspiration of the composer. When discussing the creation of the Fifth 
Symphony he deals with many of the various ideas found in the 
sketches, which Sibelius used in his Fifth or Sixth Symphonies. He 
compares this process to a puzzle whose pieces are fragments of a 
mosaic “floor of the sky” (Tawaststjema 1978: 61). In this phase the 
symphony still essentially appears as a paradigmatic table, and its 
elaboration is a completely rational, non-organic occupation. But then 
Tawaststjema continues:
In the case of Sibelius I am inclined to consider his creative work an 
interaction of inspirational and intellectual components. Their relationship 
continuously varies. Basically he was dependent on his inspiration. He had his 
‘wonderful' trances [...]. The shaping of the themes seems to have happened 
intuitively. (Tawaststjema 1978: 65)
Nevertheless, if we think of our aforementioned criteria for organicity, 
one might state that on a paradigmatic level the organic trait stems 
from the inner similarity of the musical substance. Tawaststjema 
reduces all the motives of the Fifth Symphony to two: the so-called 
step motive and the swing motive. But even this is not enough: the 
material has to be put into a syntagmatically coherent order. Only then 
can we experience music as organic.
Erkki Salmenhaara, another Finnish Sibelius specialist, has a 
similar view of Sibelius’ organic techniques. Like Tawaststjema, he 
stresses that organicity emerges in the mind of the composer, who 
using musical criteria chooses from an endless group of paradigms 
those which are meaningful regarding the intended musical shape. In 
his study on the symphonic poem Tapiola Salmenhaara quotes the 
British scholar Cecil Gray: “The thematic materials in Sibelius [...J 
seem to regenerate in a way which the biologists call cell division: 
they are split and broken into seven theme units, when every bar of the 
original organism is subjected to a development” (Salmenhaara 1970: 
37). Therefore under the conventional formal outline of music there 
looms another shape which is dynamic, processual, or, in our termino­
logy, “organic”.2 In the chapter on “Sibelius’ Organic Principle of 
Variation”, Salmenhaara starts to deal with the organic nature of the 
composer’s logic: “By organic development it must be understood that 
various results of the development — different themes and motives — 
are in an ‘organic’ connection with each other” (Salmenhaara 1970: 
59). What is interesting here is Salmenhaara’s term “results”. Themes 
in organic music can be experienced as results of some process — 
which is not the same as the telos, the Kantian Zweck. There are of 
course processes that from the beginning aim for a certain goal, but 
there are also processes whose result is not known in advance. For 
instance, the transition to the Finale of Beethoven’s Fifth Symphony, 
the long pedal point on G, leads finally to the theme of victory, which 
is something like a product of this process: we know to expect 
something, but are not sure exactly what. The same thing occurs with
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the intermediate section of the Waldstein, which leads to the sunrise 
theme of the last movement. Sometimes the result of the process is 
quite amazing, as in Sibelius’ Karelia music, where a long transition 
takes place before the theme bursts out: the national anthem of 
Finland. The result does not grow organically from the previous 
material but is a quotation justified by an extramusical program.
Salmenhaara also defines what is nonorganic music, one example 
being the variation sets of the classical style. In them the gestalt of the 
theme remains the same; it is just ornamented — think of Unser 
dummer Pöbel meint or Ah vous dirai-je Maman by Mozart. On the 
other hand, Salmenhaara emphasizes that in an organic variation what 
is crucial is not the goal of the process but the metamorphosis itself. 
“It is like a self-reflecting process: the main thing is not that the 
development form bridges among architectonic climaxes, but the aim 
is for continuous transformation, the constant turning of the motives 
into new shapes” (Salmenhaara 1970: 60-61). This latter comment is 
of great interest since it excludes telos from organicity: the organic 
transformation does not have a goal to strive for; rather, the variation 
becomes self-reflexive. What kind of phenomenal experience would 
this evoke? Doubtless a kind of static, slowly changing sound field. 
Has Salmenhaara unknowingly projected the Ligetian field technique 
onto Sibelius in order to see him as a representative of a certain avant- 
garde movement? If organicity were the same as Ligeti’s field 
technique, that would place Sibelius within the panorama of the new 
music of the twentieth century. The listener easily experiences such 
fields as a kind of stasis, a limbo from which there is no exit. This 
situation undeniably occurs in Sibelius’ Fifth Symphony, especially at 
score letters J and K. The Allegro moderato section of К-P , and also 
the fluttering, Mendelssohnian figuration of the strings in the last 
movement, contain such self-reflexive organic transformation.
It is essential to this line of reasoning that we speak about music as 
shapes or Gestalts but not as grammar, recalling David Lidov’s two 
principles of “grammar” and “design”. There are composers, such as 
Arnold Schoenberg, who have concentrated on reforming musical 
grammars. Then there are composers whose main contribution is at 
the level of gestalt, who make innovations even when the grammar 
remains the same. Debussy, Stravinsky, Sibelius seem to belong to 
this line. Therefore Adorno could not appreciate them. His hyper- 
rational music philosophy is definitely bound with the project of the 
“modem” in the aforementioned philosophical sense. Music is gram­
mar, conventional, arbitrary, and it has to maintain this aura of artifi-
ciality in order to be progressive. Music which functions via iconic 
shapes would mean a rejection of the critical distance and conscious­
ness of the listener. Since over the course of time humankind has 
become disconnected from nature and cosmos, one must remain 
constantly aware of this primal negation and difference. The return to 
unity with the cosmos, with nature, would mean the return to a lawless 
and barbarous original state (the Germany of the 1930s is an 
example). It is always regression. The idea of organic music is pre­
cisely to return the listener to the cosmos, to natural principles which 
appear as the art of pre-linguistic gestalts. Organic music is pre- 
linguistic, non-verbal, in the profound sense of the word. It is im­
possible to reduce Sibelius’ music to the language-likeness of tropes 
or rhetorical figures.
There is, however, one difficulty in defining the organic, and it is 
clearly noticed by Salmenhaara when he says, “[...] organic transfor­
mation has one special feature which is difficult to analyze, namely, it 
is musical by nature. Precisely here we have the difference between 
the motivic techniques of Sibelius and Schoenberg. The music of the 
latter is theoretical and technical in nature rather than based on 
musical gestalts” (Salmenhaara 1970: 62). The twelve tones of a row 
can be manipulated in many ways which do not have a meaning- 
creating shape. Seen in this light, organic music is precisely music of 
design.
How, then, can we prove that music based on a complicated 
motivic technique is organic? Only a tiny part of all possible motivic 
transformations is really used. Only those motives which are musi­
cally meaningful are taken into account, and that is why the organic 
unity of these motives is also noticeable to the listener. The musical 
construction does not follow any external system — just purely 
musical logic.
Hence the term “organic” means the same as the “musically 
logical” which in turn means the “musically meaningful” . So we have 
fallen to a circle. What does it mean for something to be “very 
musical”? Sometimes it means the rendering of the emotional content 
of music, or that the musical performance in some way touches or 
speaks to us. But if we say that a musical text is “musical”, that 
reveals very little indeed. We cannot only look at the text, the score. 
We must consider the entire situation of musical communication, not 
only the utterance, but the utterer as well. Only the choice of the 
human “brain” or enunciator or composer can make any music 
organic. Thus, what is involved is a quality that is made manifest by
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the musical enunciator, in the dialogue between musical material and 
the persons who deal with it. Insofar as the musical mind intuitively 
filters and shapes musical materials into a certain gestalt quality, 
music becomes organic. Neither mere mathematical structure nor 
grammaticality suffice to make music organic. Although utterances 
may be “well-formed” or “grammatical”, we do not necessarily 
experience them as organic. Principles said to stem from the brain of 
the enunciator have been studied by statistic-mathematical methods in 
Russia, which methods are derived from the so-called “law of Z ipf’. 
The latter says that, when all the notes or words of an art work are 
counted, they can be shown to follow a certain distribution along the 
“Zipf curve”. Using this model, one can determine when a work is 
overwritten or underwritten, that is, when it has too many or too few 
notes. Works written by a great master in one breath, as it were, 
follow the Zipf law better than those written in episodically. Here the 
question of the organic is shifted from the textual level into a 
cognitive question: How does the enunciator pick those elements 
which on the textual level will become organic?
To begin to answer this question, one might try to apply Uexkiill’s 
biosemiotic theory to music. As discussed above, each organism has 
its own Ich-Топ, which determines the kinds of messages it receives 
from the outside, from the Umwelt that surrounds it. If this concept 
were applied to music, it would mean that every composition is a kind 
of “model” of a living organism, the latter understood in a certain “as 
i f ’ sense. The life of such an organism, its ‘being’ and ‘doing’, is 
guided by its view of itself, which helps the organism to choose 
according to its “inner” score those signs which it sends and receives. 
If a musical organism consists of motives, these motives constitute 
kinds of “cells” that communicate with each other, as happens in 
living organisms. This communication is completely determined by 
the inner organisation of the organism, its Ich-Ton.
Music is the symbolic description of this process. The musical 
organism that emerges from the brain of the composer somehow takes 
shape from a certain basic idea or isotopy, what Sibelius called an 
“atmosphere”, which determines which motives are accepted into this 
inner process and which ones are rejected. When we observe this 
microlevel of musical “cells” the life of the musical organism, we can 
follow what some cell or motive or “actor” is doing and how it does 
so, that is, how it influences other cells. Sometimes the “act” of a 
motive at first goes unnoticed, becoming influential only later. 
Sometimes the composer decides upon the Ich-Топ of the work as
early as in the opening bars. For instance, the core motive of Sibelius’ 
Fourth Symphony sounds at the very start of the work. In the same 
way, the “bucolic” horn signal at the opening of the Fifth Symphony 
is a “cell” which, in order to become a complete gestalt, needs to have 
its interval filled, and this is heard only at the end of the symphony. So 
we can say that, in music as in living organisms, one cell “calls out” 
for another. Precisely this type of inner process in a work makes it 
organic.
Organicity or organicism is therefore dependent on the enun- 
ciator’s — i.e., the composer’s — consciousness. In organic music, 
this consciousness in turn follows the biosemiotic principle by which 
motives communicate with each other according to a certain “inner” 
score. One may presume that the inner score is different in each work. 
But one may also claim that in certain respects it is always the same, 
as Schenker’s, Kurth’s, and Asafiev’s theories assert. Nevertheless, 
the idea of an organic composition cannot be limited to a single, 
universal principle. For nature’s scope of variation is unlimited, and 
thus always capable of producing new types of organisms. Basically, 
however, the organism always decides upon its own Umwelt or 
relationship to external reality. It is the organism that determines 
which signals, style influences, motivic borrowings, and so on that it 
accepts from the style of the time, from other composers, and even 
from itself. An instance of the latter occurs in Sibelius’ moving 
materials from the Sixth Symphony to the Fifth. That is to say, the 
Ich-Топ of the Fifth Symphony, its “inner score”, allowed certain 
signs to be shifted into its own “cells”, while rejecting others.
We can now return to the thesis presented above, namely, that 
Sibelius’ music is organic and Mahler’s is not. The lch-Ton of 
Sibelius’ symphonies determines precisely which musical cells are 
accepted and adopted into the inner network of musical commu­
nication, that is to say, into the “community” of its musical actors. In 
contrast, Mahler chooses very heterogenous elements; his music’s Ich- 
Ton is far more fragmentary than that of Sibelius — it is contradictory 
and “modem”. Mahler’s symphonies encompass everything, but do so 
without the aforementioned selection criteria of the Umwelt. His 
musical actors do not communicate with each other as intensively or 
as intimately as they do in Sibelius. Rather, Mahler’s work is ruled by 
“unit forms’”, by topics and musical cells articulated by social 
conventions. His music adapts itself more to structures of communi­
cation than to those of signification.
Metaphors o f nature and organicism in the epistemology o f music 675
676 Eero Tarasti
One of the best-known recent interpretations of Sibelius’ Fifth 
Symphony is the one by James Hepokoski (1993). His central concept 
for explaining formal issues in Sibelius is the so-called rotation 
principle. Hepokoski denies the relevance of traditional Formenlehre 
for Sibelius, since according to the composer his musical form grew 
from the inside out, as he said often to his secretary Santeri Levas (see 
Hepokoski 1993: 22). Hepokoski says that it is typical of Sibelius to 
use repetition to erase, so to speak, the linear time of a work; he does 
so by letting certain elements, motives, and entire sections recur 
cyclically again and again. Hepokoski thinks this phenomenon stems 
from the Finnish Kalevala recitation, as shown in the song lllalle (Op. 
17 No. 6). There a figure of 11 notes is repeated 16 times! Hepokoski 
notices that the rotation idea occurs not only Russian but also in 
Austrian-German music, such as that of Schubert and Bruckner. In 
Sibelius, however, the rotation is a process rather than an architectonic 
scheme or mould. In this sense, such rotation suits well as an example 
of organic music. In Hepokoski’s view, the rotational process starts 
with some musical statement that serves as the point of reference for 
later statements. The statement can be extensive at first hearing, 
containing various themes, motives, and figures which can even differ 
one from the other. It returns later, when it has been transformed a 
little, and it can return many times, such that it is heard each time 
more intensively.
In Hepokoski’s theory the rotation principle in Sibelius is con­
nected with the idea of a telos, that is, with the final climax of a piece 
as the goal of the musical process. Together, these two principles — 
rotation and telos — help explain the form of entire works, such as the 
Fifth Symphony. From the perspective of organicism, Hepokoski’s 
notion of rotation provides the inner iconicity of a work, and telos 
serves as the extreme point of maturation of the work, which, so to 
say, pulls earlier rotations toward itself, causing them to grow and 
transform. From the beginning, inner processes among musical signs 
aim for the climax. This view differs from Salmenhaara’s, which 
stresses the self-reflexivity of the transformation process. Hepokoski 
emphasizes more the syntagmatic nature of music, whereas Salmen­
haara adheres to the paradigmatic one. From a biosemiotic perspec­
tive, we can consider the telos of a symphony to be the same as its 
Ich-Топ, which is revealed only at the end. On this view, Sibelius’ 
symphonies constitute symbolic portrayals of his “wonderful ego”.
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3. Organic narrativity
The present study would not be complete with our relating the organic 
principle to an important species of musical semiosis: narrativity. 
Narratologists succeeded in demonstrating that very different texts — 
texts extremely varied as to their material and to their external 
shapes — can be based on just a few narrative categories. Here we 
speak of the narrativity of a symphony on the level of form, not of 
aesthetic style. If Richard Strauss’ Alpine Symphony and Heldenleben 
are narrative on the level of verbal reception, in Sibelius narrativity 
should be understood in a deeper sense, as a property of dynamic 
formal processes.
If music is organic, can it also be narrative? Is narrativity like 
language, rhetoric, grammar and other categories that separate the 
listener from the world of musical gestalts? Not at all — insofar as 
narrativity is understood in a broader sense, as conceptualized in 
Greimas’ school. Narrativity is a way of shaping the world in its 
temporal, spatial, and actorial course. Does “organic” narrativity thus 
mean that the text is articulated according to some primal narration ? 
That it is a story of man’s conjunction with or disjunction from nature 
and cosmos? Narrativity covers many of the sign processes discussed 
above. Further, one might assume that, in certain forms, it is precisely 
the way in which man’s Dasein imitates the cosmic principles of 
nature. Narration can of course focus on description and classification 
of the inner events of Dasein, but it can also be the way in which the 
world of transcendental ideas is concretized in temporality. As a 
temporal art, music is thus one of the best means of narrativizing 
transcendental ideas.
In closing, I return to Sibelius’ Fifth Symphony, in order to make a 
narratological interpretation that relates to the aforementioned ideas of 
nature, the project of the “modem”, and metaphors of organism. My 
interpretation stems from two listenings during which this narrative 
program was revealed to me. The first listening occurred at the 
beginning of the 1960s, probably at a concert given by the Radio 
Symphony Orchestra in Solemnity Hall of the University of Helsinki, 
under the direction of Jussi Jalas. Since I was a teenager at that time, 
my seat was quite near the front of the hall, on the right side, from 
which one could clearly see the conductor. Nothing remains in my 
mind from that performance except its climax: the Largamente assai 
at the end of the finale, the unison orchestral tutti on the note C. There
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the dissonance is at its sharpest, and the listener does not at all know 
where this tragic development might lead — until soon after it the 
whole symphony cadences and turns toward the tonic E-flat major as 
its final telos (compared to which the E-flat tonic at the end of the first 
movement was not a real return to home). At this crucial juncture, on 
the С and its leading tone, the conductor raised himself to full height 
and trembled all over (something Sibelius is also said to have done; 
see Tawaststjema 1978: 147). This corporeal sign has remained in my 
memory.
The second listening was in the summer of 1998 when Esapekka 
Salonen, visiting conductor of the Marinsky Theater in Mikkeli, 
including on his program the Fifth Symphony of Sibelius. By then I 
was already familiar with the piano score, which naturally deepened 
the experience. At that hearing, the true climax and solution of the 
work revealed itself as the events in score letter N, Un pochettino 
largamento, the E-flat minor section. The melody of that section is the 
first full theme-actor in the entire symphony, which is articulated in 
the manner of a lied, in periodic form and with a “normal” cadence. 
This theme is thus experienced as representing a kind of human 
subject that shows itself against the backdrop of “cosmic” views. As 
noted earlier, Sibelius’ music often gives the impression of a land­
scape without any human protagonist. Here the subject enters the 
stage, and it is the suffering, sentimental subject of Schiller (1978), a 
subject disjuncted from its object and given to resignation. It is a 
Tchaikovskian, resigned self, whose story has come to an end and 
whose speech is finally cut off (N: 16), as if by the dysphoric weight 
of its emotion. It is a subject who is detached from the cosmos, and 
yet it is basically the same subject which we heard as early as in the 
previous movement, where it hovered restlessly, not knowing its fate. 
Tawaststjema reduces it to another important theme grouping of the 
Fifth Symphony, the step-motive, which was one of the very first 
ideas in the work. Certainly these motives were earlier fragments of a 
subject, but here in the Un pochettino largamento section the subject 
steps into the foreground as a complete person who has suffered a 
catastrophe. At the end of the theme, the E-flat minor turns into major, 
which is like a deus ex machina solution to the threat of impending 
tragedy. The subject is rescued, so to speak, by being shifted to 
another cosmic level of nature. The latter is represented by the well- 
known swing-motive, which according to Tawaststjema belongs to the 
other central motivic group of the symphony. The association of this 
motive with nature is obvious already from the viewpoint of poiesis,
as evidenced by Sibelius’ diaries, in which he mentions swans in 
reference to this theme.
This theme thus symbolizes nature and cosmos for the whole 
symphony. But just when we have reached it, as a safe haven and 
salvation of the individual from tragedy, even this level falls into a 
crisis. The swing-theme is led into deeper and deeper dissonance via 
modulations that move still further away from the tonic. The theme- 
actor whose fate we were following was thus not safe, as we had 
thought. What is now involved is nature’s crisis, Sibelius’ Götter­
dämmerung. The crisis culminates in the above-mentioned C, after 
which the music leads to a cadence on the tonic of E-flat major with 
many ensuing chromatic tones — an answer to the gap opened by the 
“bucolic” motive of the first movement. Therefore the answer which 
has been kept secret is finally revealed in full light. Perhaps 
representing a kind of rescue on the cosmic level, it is impossible 
describe this moment verbally. In any case, there remains yet one 
more surprise: six sforzando chords punctuate the ending, played by 
tutti orchestra. These resume the problem of the horn signal and its 
solution, but the effect is very' surprising, lightening, consciously 
alienating — all is only play; we can sigh in relief.
Yet this description holds true only for the final version of the 
symphony. In the earlier version, from 1915, the subject-theme 
appears to the very end as detached, disjuncted from the cosmos, as an 
individual and alienated theme-actor who does not unite with the 
cosmic order. As a symbol of the modernist project, it constantly 
evokes it existence by means of dissonances. Its relation to the 
ambiguous Neapolitan motive is quite clear as early as in section D of 
the Finale, when the swing-theme bursts out and the subject-theme is 
heard as a savage, illogical, and dissonant counterpart, such as one 
hears in the riotous simultaneities of Charles Ives. There the subject- 
theme obviously belongs to the same family as the descending and 
ascending leaps of fourths in the Neapolitan motive in the first 
movement (see B: 5-6). The impression is even one of bitonality, and 
was noticed at the first performance of the work. Otto Kotilainen 
spoke of a “strange, piercing signal which [...] gives an upsetting 
impression” (Tawaststjema 1978: 141). The effect is completely 
modernistic, and it also represents, in the philosophical sense, the 
subject of the project of the “modem”, which is alienated by its 
separation from the cosmos.
The gradual unfolding of the subject-theme in its various 
“rotations” is indeed one of the most characteristic events of the whole
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symphony. It is the central narrative moment. In the 1915 version, the 
theme never seems to find its proper isotopy, its own Umwelt. It 
difference remains until the end, when it returns in the Un pochettino 
largamente, and even there it is still the tragic and isolated theme 
actor, who is destined for destruction. But in the Un pochettino larga­
mente section it takes on an extremely appealing sensual shape, as if a 
last gesture is made to serve as the counterpart of the swing-theme. 
This is related to the idea of the return to the cosmos. In the 1915 
version, this subject-theme does not merge with nature in the end, as it 
does in the final version of symphony. It remains as the pedal point of 
the strings, to remind one of its existence — even the six chords at the 
end are heard against this pedal. In the philosophical-semiotic sense, 
the 1915 version keeps to the modernist project in its narrative 
program. The separation of the subject from cosmos holds to the very 
end. By contrast, in the version of 1919 the subject fuses with the 
cosmic level. Thus, even in the narrative sense, this symphony 
represents the “organic” in music.
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Метафоры природы и органицизм в эпистемологии 
музыки: “биосемиотическое” введение в анализ 
симфонической мысли Яна Сибелиуса
Метафоры природы и организма играют центральную роль в западной  
культуре и искусстве. Весь проект “современности” означает отделение 
человека от космоса и его законов. Знаки и символы являются арбит- 
рарными и конвенциональными социальными конструкциями. Тем не 
менее, имеется и много возвращений к иконической имитации природы  
и биологических принципов —  даже в таком виде эзотерического  
искусства как музыка. Одной из высших эстетических категорий запад­
ного музыкального искусства является так наз. “органический рост”, 
который частично наблюдается в симфонии. Понятия “органическое/ 
неорганическое” использовали как аналитические термины при сравне­
нии творчества Яна Сибелиуса и Густава Малера. Музыку называют 
“органической”, если 1) ее тематические акторы пребывают в под­
ходящем Umwelt (или изотопии); 2) весь музыкальный матерьял восхо­
дит к одной основе (т.е. является внутренне иконичным); 3) все музы­
кальные события когерентно следуют один за другим (внутренняя 
индексальность или принцип роста); 4) музыка стремится к некоей цели
39
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(темпоральность). Так и идея Юкскюлля о частном Я-тоне (Ich-Ton) 
любого организма возвращается к нам в музыке. Итак, мы можем 
сказать, что каждое музыкальное произведение является будто бы “орга­
низмом'’, Я-тон которого определяется воспринимаемыми знаками и 
тем. как он соотносится со своим собственными музыкальными окруже­
нием и формируется другими музыкальными прозведениями.
Looduse metafoorid ja organitsism muusika epistemoloogias: 
“biosemiootiline” sissejuhatus Jean Sibeliuse sümfoonilise 
mõtte analüüsi
Looduse metafoorid ja organitsism on kesksel kohal läänemaises kunstis ja 
kultuuris. Kogu “modernsuse” projekt tähendab inim ese eristumist kosm osest 
ja selle seadustest. Kuigi märgid ja sümbolid on arbitraarsed ja konventsio­
naalsed sotsiaalsed konstruktsioonid, pöördutakse siiski sageli looduse ja  
bioloogiliste printsiipide ikoonilise imitatsiooni juurde, ka sellises esoteeri­
lises kunstiliigis nagu muusika. Üheks tähtsamaks esteetiliseks kategooriaks 
õhtumaises muusikakunstis on nn. “orgaaniline kasv”, mida võib tihti tähel­
dada sümfooniates. Mõisteid “orgaaniline/mitteorgaaniline” saab kasutada 
analüütiliste terminitena Jean Sibeliuse ja Gustav Mahleri loom ingu võrdle­
misel. Muusikat nimetatakse “orgaaniliseks”, kui (1) tema temaatilised 
aktorid elavad neile sobivas omailmas (või isotoopias); (2) kogu muusikaline 
materjal on pärit ühest allikast (st on seesm iselt ikooniline); (3) kõik muusika­
lised sündmused järgnevad koherentselt teineteisele (sisem ine indeksiaalsus 
või kasvu printsiip); (4) muusika püüdleb teatud eesmärgi poole (tempo­
raalsus). Nii tuleb ka Uexkülli idee iga organismi privaatsest mina-toonist 
meile muusikas tagasi. N iisiis võime väita, et iga muusikateos on kui “orga­
nism’ oma mina-tooniga, mis määrab, milliseid märke ta vastu võtab, ja 
kuidas ta toimib nii omaenda muusikalises ümbruses kui teiste muusikateoste 
poolt loodud keskkonnas.
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Outline of an Uexküllian bio-ontology
Morten T0nnessen
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Abstract. Traditionally, ontology, or at least western ontology, has been an 
anthropocentric enterprise, that takes only human experiences into account. In 
this paper I argue that a prolific biocentric ontology can be based on UexkülKs 
Umwelt theory. Uexküll offers the basis of an ontology according to which 
the study of experiences is a much wider field than it is as depicted by clas­
sical ontology and contemporary philosophy of consciousness. Based on the 
thoughts of the contemporary philosopher Thomas Nagel I claim that there 
might very well be lifeforms that are totally unimaginable to us. I argue that this 
view is compatible with the Umwelt theory, and that it should be adopted by 
biosemioticians. Furthermore, I argue that a biosemiotic possibilism should be 
implemented. Followingly, one should not claim to know which characteristics 
of living beings are universally and necessarily valid, but restrict oneself to 
statements about life as we know it.
If only people did not have to hear the 
eternal hyperbole o f all hyperboles, the 
word World, World, World, when really 
each person should speak in all honesty 
only o f Men, Men, Men.
Friedrich Nietzsche (1980: ix)
I will not, in this paper, give an account of Uexküll’s views on space 
and time and specific sensory qualities. His theory on these subjects is 
properly dealt with in his own writings. Instead, I will make some 
remarks on the prospects and limits of Umwelt research. In this 
connection I will make use of some views held by the contemporary 
philosopher Thomas Nagel.
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But let me start making some general remarks on how Uexküll 
could influence philosophy. As for ethics, the Umwelt theory could, 
through its description of the uniqueness of any given Umwelt, 
provide a justification of the intrinsic value of all sensing beings. 
Animal ethics as well as ethical theories of biodiversity could be 
enriched by adopting the Umwelt theory. The Umwelt theory could 
even give birth to a brand new field within philosophy, which could 
be framed “the philosophy of experiences”. The subject matter of this 
field would be all kinds of experiences that are present in the bio­
sphere; questions concerning what an experience is and how they can 
be classified. The philosophy of experiences would differ from onto­
logy in that its focus would be on the phenomenon of experiencing, 
not on what is experienced. Philosophy of consciousness, which deals 
only with conscious experiences, could be considered a special branch 
of this field.
Bio-ontology
I will use the notion bio-ontology for an ontology that takes not only 
human experiences into account, but non-human experiences as well. 
Bio-ontologists in general would probably claim that bio-ontology is 
the general field, whereas what is nowadays called “ontology” should 
in fact be considered to be a special branch of bio-ontology. Con­
sequently, one could claim that what I call “bio-ontology” should 
really be called “ontology”, whereas ontology that restricts itself to 
human experiences should be called “human ontology” or “anthropo- 
ontology”.
It should be pointed out that the Uexküllian bio-ontology as I 
depict it is limited to sensory experiences. I have chosen this stra- 
tegy— to give an outline of an ontology that is limited to sensory 
experiences — first of all because this is what is in line with Uexküll’s 
biological approach. Furthermore because such an ontology will 
contain all the sensory qualities that we use to cloth our ideas and 
conceptions. So a purely sensory ontology might not be that poor, 
after all.
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Uexküll and ontology
Plato, Descartes and Kant can be regarded as the chief proponents of 
the anthropocentric paradigm within classical ontology. According to 
them, the phenomena that are experienced by human beings are the 
only phenomena that are worth paying attention to. It is in one sense a 
striking paradox that Uexküll considered himself a follower of Kant. It 
must be stressed that Uexküll was only Kantian in his subjectivist 
approach, not in his biocentric approach. His theory of experiences is, 
with its reach, substantially different from Kant’s theory. He explicitly 
declares (in Uexküll 1928: 9) his departure from Kant’s conception. 
The crucial difference between Kant and Uexküll is that Uexküll 
regards non-humans as subjects, as well as objects, of ontology, while 
Kant merely regards them as objects of ontology. Kant held that only 
rational beings, that is, subjects of cognition, are subjects of ontology, 
and that human beings are the only organisms that are rational beings. 
Uexküll, on the other hand, held that all sensing creatures (perhaps 
including plants — see Kull 2000) are subjects of ontology because 
they are autonomous entities that perceive and act. As a result, Uex­
küllian ontology will depict a world that is much richer in experiences, 
and, possibly, in qualities, than the Kantian ontology. If Uexküll's 
personal inclinations, or strategy for approval, had been different, he 
might just as well have called himself a critic of Kant.
Uexkülls Kantian postulate that all experience is relative to the 
subject implies that it does not make sense to talk about the qualities 
of an object without taking into account the subject that perceives the 
object. According to Uexküll, it is impossible to construct meaningful 
concepts about an objective world, that is, a world consisting only of 
objects. Such a world — consisting of Dinge an sich] — is simply not 
possible to imagine. This does not necessarily imply that an objective 
world does not actually exist, but at least it implies that it cannot be 
perceived, or described in language. Followingly, the subject matter of 
an Uexküllian ontology is the subjective worlds2 of all sensing beings. 
The subject, rather than the object, is the starting point of ontology.
While traditionally the phenomenal world has been conceived of as 
one undivided world, with Uexküll, “the phenomenal world” only 
depicts the sum total of all the individual phenomenal worlds. He
' Things in themselves (Kant).
2 Uexküll: “Subjektive Welten”, “Erscheinungswelten”, “Eigenwelten”, “Umwel­
ten”.
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emphasizes that any given subject can only grasp, and indeed 
experience, a small part of the phenomenal world. Now, to what 
extent is it possible for a certain subject, say a scientist or a philo­
sopher, to grasp the phenomena that do not appear in his own 
subjective world, but in an alien Umwelt?
The privileged part in Umwelt research
I find it useful to distinguish between a direct experience of pheno­
mena and an indirect experience of phenomena. A direct experience of 
phenomena is what is present when the phenomenon in question is 
part of your own Umwelt. An indirect experience of phenomena takes 
place when you do not actually experience the phenomenon yourself, 
but only through a mediator, e.g. a concept or a model. I will argue 
that these two categories of experience are qualitatively different in all 
cases, even though, evidently, concepts can be more or less precise, 
and models can be more or less accurate. But even the most precise 
concept, and the most accurate model, is in a crucial sense completely 
different from the experience of the phenomenon itself (Uexküll 1910:
128). The qualities the scientist perceives are simply not the same as 
the qualities that the alien subject perceives. If the scientific concept 
or model is a good one, there will be a certain resemblance between 
the two, but they will never be identical. In this sense, the living 
being, the object of scientific inquiry, will always be the privileged 
part in Umwelt research, because it alone has direct access to the 
phenomenon.
To Uexküll, the statement that biology and other fields of scientific 
inquiry are human disciplines is non-trivial. A human discipline, in 
Uexküll's setting, is a discipline that is coloured and limited by the 
qualities of the human Umwelt. What biology reveals to us is the 
relationship between living beings and their related objects, not per se, 
but as they appear to human beings. Pobojewska (2001: 327) makes a 
similar point. However, one should keep in mind that the phenomenal 
sphere of science is much richer than the phenomenal sphere of any 
given human being (for a presentation of the idea of the Umwelten of 
species, see Uexküll 1928: 267). Its potential material includes all the 
functional cycles of all scientists. Consequently, a science aiming at 
widening its scope should recruit, or make use of, persons with abnor­
mal abilities, such as savants.
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The limits of Umwelt research
Umwelt research is based on three important assumptions that concern 
the relationship between the organism and its Umwelt:
(1) The Umwelt of an organism — or, what sensory qualities an 
organism is capable of perceiving — is directly dependent on the 
constitution3 of that organism.
(2) The Umwelt of an organism is just as complex as the constitution 
of that organism (Uexküll 1909: 249).
(3) The Umwelt of the observed organism differs just as much from
our own Umwelt as the constitution of that organism differs from 
our own constitution (Uexküll 1909: 248; 1928: 105). 
Followingly, the study of the constitution and environment of a spe­
cific organism can result in an outline of its Umwelt. Two kinds of 
Umwelten are particularly difficult to depict: Complex Umwelten and 
Umwelten that are substantially different from our own Umwelten. 
Since Uexküll considered the human Umwelt to be more complex 
than any animal Umwelt (Uexküll 1909: 248), he does not seem to 
have asked to what extent we can grasp non-human Umwelten that are 
as complex as or more complex than human Umwelten. This, on the 
other hand, is a question that is central to the contemporary philo­
sopher Thomas Nagel4.
Thomas Nagel is, unlike Uexküll, a realist, but he acknowledges 
that “[t]he way the world is includes appearances, and there is no 
single point of view from which they can all be fully grasped” (Nagel 
1986: 26). In What is it like to be a bat? he writes that “one might [...] 
believe that there are facts which could not ever be represented or 
comprehended by human beings, even if the species lasted forever — 
simply because our structure does not permit us to operate with 
concepts of the requisite type” (Nagel 1993: 171). Nagel (1993: 166) 
claims that conscious experience is a widespread phenomenon, and 
that it occurs in countless forms “totally unimaginable” to us through­
out the universe: “There is probably a great deal of life in the universe, 
and we may be in a position to identify only some of its forms, 
because we would simply be unable to read as behaviour the 
manifestations of creatures sufficiently unlike us” (Nagel 1986: 24). If 
Nagel is correct, the Umwelt scientist will have access only to a small
3 Uexküll: “Bauplan”, “Organisation”.
4 Nagel has read Uexküll, but not referred to him (e-mail to the author, from 
February 19, 2001), and, consequently, does not use the notion “Umwelt”.
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part of the existing Umwelten, and we will never be able to picture the 
real richness of the phenomenal world in an adequate way.
I would like to point out that Nagel’s statement that there are 
lifeforms that are totally unimaginable to us might be valid even if one 
does not suppose that there is extra-terrestrial life. At least there are 
experiences that in one sense are totally unimaginable to us, e.g., 
experiences related to the sonar sense of bats. Even though we can get 
a certain impression of the sonar sense through studies of the bats 
constitution and behaviour, our concepts about it might be doomed to 
be vague. Nagel concludes that reflection on what it is like to be a bat 
seems to lead us to the belief “that there are facts that do not consist in 
the truth of propositions expressible in a human language”. He holds 
that “[w]e can be compelled to recognize the existence of such facts 
without being able to state or comprehend them” (Nagel 1993: 171).
Now, is Nagel’s view in accordance with Uexküll’s Umwelt 
theory? Certainly it could be in accordance with the three basic as­
sumptions that Uexküll sets forth concerning the relationship between 
the organism and its Umwelt. Nagel’s view would imply that there are 
organisms that have constitutions that are so different from ours that 
their Umwelten are totally unimaginable to us. Uexküll himself does 
not, to my knowledge, make clear whether his assumptions are to hold 
for all life whatsoever, that is, whether they are to be regarded as 
universally valid. But let us assume that they are. Is the belief that 
there might be lifeforms totally unimaginable to us compatible with 
Umwelt theory? I think it is. At least, Uexküll does not explicitly state 
that there are no such lifeforms. But he does state that there are 
lifeforms of which our models will not be accurate.
According to Uexküll, the study of unicellular and other small 
organisms is relatively simple. The study of organisms with space- 
and time-schemas, on the other hand, is a different matter. Our con­
cepts about objects that such organisms relate to are necessarily 
vague5. One reason for this is that the only material that is available to 
the scientist is the phenomena in his own Umwelt. Any object that he 
observes is coloured by his own impression of it. The impression that
5 Uexküll 1910: 129: “Dann sind wir gezwungen, die Objekte, auf welche die Tiere 
mit Sicherheit reagieren, durch immer mehr und mehr vereinfachte Nachbildungen zu 
erfaßen [original: “erfeßen”], die in einfachster Weise die Bewegungen des Originals 
nachmachen”.
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the organism itself has of its Umwelt is out of his reach6. All the 
Umwelt scientist can do, when he observes an organism, is to try to 
make clear which of the elements in his own Umwelt are also present 
in the Umwelt of that organism (Uexküll 1910: 128). And there seems 
to be a lot of elements in non-human Umwelten that are not present in 
human Umwelten (Uexküll 1928: 232-233). Now, what if there were 
two Umwelten, one of them belonging to a scientist and the other to 
an alien creature, that had no common elements? Then we would 
simply be unable to read as behaviour the manifestations of those 
creatures. Nagel would be right.
Unfortunately, neither the belief that there might be lifeforms that 
are totally unimaginable to us, nor the belief that there cannot in 
principle be any lifeforms that are unimaginable to us, are falsifiable. 
If lifeforms that are totally unimaginable to us do in fact exist, we will 
never know. And if they do not exist, we would not be able to 
discover it, nor would we be able to prove that they could not possibly 
exist.
Consequences for biosemiotics
In “Biosemiotics and formal ontology”, Frederik Stjemfelt (1999) 
claims that certain characteristics of living beings are of universal 
validity. Even though I do find speculation about what characteristics 
of living beings, if any, are universal, interesting, I consider claims 
that certain characteristics are in fact universal to be unfounded, and 
impossible to justify. For practical purposes, however, one should 
presume that semiosis is a universal characteristic of living beings, 
because without semiosis, there can be no recognition.
Biosemioticians should adopt Nagel’s view (Nagel 1986: 92) that 
“[ajbout some of what we cannot conceive we are able to speak 
vaguely [...] but about some of it we may be unable to say anything at 
all, except that there might be such things” . The puzzles that result 
from Nagel’s view on creatures very unlike us call for a biosemiotic 
possibilism. A biosemiotic possibilism could be part of a progressive 
research programme, because it would not restrict biological inquiry 
to characteristics that we are already familiar with. Finally, rather than
6 Uexküll 1910: 128: “Wir wissen, daß diese Umwelt ihr eigentümliches Gepräge 
durch uns selbst erhält. Das Gepräge, das das fremde Subjekt seiner Umwelt gibt, 
können wir niemals kennen lernen”.
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c la im in g  that the characteristics o f  liv in g  b e in g s  that w e  are fam iliar  
w ith , or so m e o f  them , are u n iversa l and n ecessa ry  ch aracteristics o f  
life , w e  sh ou ld  s im p ly  state that th ese  are the characteristics o f  life  as 
w e k n ow  it.
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Границы Юкскюлловской биоонтологии
Традиционно онтология, по крайней мере на Западе, обладала антропо- 
центристским подходом, при котором учитывался только человеческий 
опыт. В данной статье доказывается, что продуктивная биоцентристская 
онтология может опираться на теорию U m welt Юксюолля. Юкскюлль 
предлагает исходные постулаты онтологии, согласно которым иссле­
дование опыта намного шире той сферы, которая описывалась до сих 
пор в классической онтологии и современной философии сознания. 
Основываясь на идеях современного философа Томаса Нагеля, автор 
статьи утверждает, что по всей вероятности могут существовать формы 
жизни, которые мы неспособны даже представить. Доказывается, что 
это утверждение находится в соответствии с теорией Umwelt, и биосе­
миотики должны бы ее принять. Более того, эту биосемиотическую
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возможность стоило бы и применить. Следовательно, никто не должен  
утверждать, что знает, какие свойства живых организмов являются 
универсальными и необходимыми, а должен скорее ограничивать себя в 
своих утверждениях о жизни в том виде, в каком она нам известна.
Uexkülli bio-ontoloogia piirjooni
Traditsiooniliselt on ontoloogia, vähemalt läänes, olnud inim esekeskne lähe­
nemine, mis võtab arvesse vaid inimkogemust. Käesolevas artiklis näitan ma, 
et viljakas biotsentristlik ontoloogia võiks põhineda U exkülli omailma 
teoorial. Uexküll pakub ontoloogia lähtekohad, m ille järgi kogem use uuri­
mine on märgatavalt laiem ala kui seda on kirjeldatud klassikalise ontoloogia  
ja kaasaegse teadvuse filosoofia poolt. Lähtudes tänapäeva filosoofi Thomas 
Nageli teostest, väidan, et vägagi tõenäoliselt võib olem as olla eluvorme, mis 
on meile täiesti kujutlematud. Ma näitan, et see vaade on kooskõlaline oma­
ilma teooriaga ning et biosemiootikud peaksid selle omaks võtma. Enamgi 
veel, arvan, et seda biosem iootilist võimalikkust tuleks ka rakendada. Järeli­
kult ei tohiks keegi väita teadvat, m illised elusorganism ide omadused on 
universaalsete ja möödapääsmatutena üldkehtivad, vaid peaks pigem kitsen­
dama oma formuleeringute kehtivuspiire elule säärasena nagu me seda 
tunneme.
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A note on biorhetorics
Kalevi Kull
Department of Semiotics, University of Tartu, 
Tiigi St. 78, Tartu, Estonia; 
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Abstract. This article analyses the possibility to look at living systems as 
biorhetorical systems. Rhetorics of biology, which studies the rhetoric of 
biological discourse, is distinguishable from biorhetorics, which attempts to 
analyse the expressive behaviour of organisms in terms of primordial (un­
conscious) rhetoric. The appearance of such a view is a logical consequence 
from recent developments in new (or general) rhetorics on the one hand (e.g., 
G. A. Kennedy’s claim that rhetoric exists among social animals), and from 
the biosemiotic approach to living systems on the other hand.
It is evident that forest peoples — such as Indians, or Finno- 
Ugrians — considered animals to be rhetorical. However, it has been 
unusual to describe the behaviour of organic beings in terms of 
rhetoric in recent biology. Thus, let us consider simple examples, e.g., 
in the form of the following questions: (a) does a cat, varying its 
meowing at the door, persuades its host to open it? (b) does an orchid, 
with the form and colour and fragrance of its flower, persuades a 
pollinator to approach and find it? A supposedly negative answer to 
the latter question, and a quite sceptical one to the former, both by a 
humanitarian and by a biologist, may refer to the absence of any effort 
by the plant, and a non-existence of free choice in animals. However, 
in order to be scientifically certain and precise in discussing questions 
of this type, one has to specify, on the or e hand, whether an organic 
form is indeed passive in its communication, without an ability to 
choose and search, and on the other hand, how to define ‘effort’, and 
further, ‘persuasion’. If so, according to the definitions obtained, 
living systems may be able to make an effort, and persuade, we may
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conclude that they are rhetorical systems, from the point of view of 
biology.1 Therefore, analysis of these concepts is required, before it 
will be possible to answer the above questions.
In addition, when speaking of biorhetorics, we need firstly to 
distinguish rhetoric of biology and biorhetoric. However, in order to 
define the latter, it is necessary to look at the meanings and boundaries 
of rhetoric itself.
Rhetorics of biology
Rhetorics2 of biology concern the ways biologists express their inten­
tions in their writings or presentations; it is a study of rhetoric in 
biology.
Rhetorics of biology is currently a rapidly developing field. We 
can see this, for instance, from a recent book by Leah Ceccarelli 
(2001), in which an ideological stance of formulations in the texts of 
such leading biologists as Dobzhansky and Wilson is analysed and 
compared. Another good example is a special issue of the online Poroi 
Journal3 (published in 2001 and edited by David Depew), which is 
topically devoted to rhetorics of biology.4 In addition, a recent 
meeting of the International Society for History, Philosophy, and 
Social Studies of Biology included a session Rhetoric and Biology: 
The Strategy o f Communication in Modern Biological Thought.5
The relationships between biological rhetoric and academic 
biology are controversial. On one hand, applied rhetorics is used in
1 At least three independent sources have led me to think about biorhetorics: 
firstly, conversations with Mihhail Lotman, my colleage at the Department of 
Semiotics in Tartu, who loves rhetoric and teaches a course on this subject; secondly, 
letters from Stephen Pain (now in Paris), who is enthusiastically interested in 
biorhetorics, being its proponent already for a few years. However, his texts on this 
issue are mostly epistolary. And the last impulsion was given by a book of Richard 
Doyle (1997) which I recently came across in a bookstore in Toronto. That rhetoric has 
already been extended to plants (by G. A. Kennedy), I found only when the first 
version of this brief paper had taken a shape.
2 I will distinguish here between rhetoric as a practice, and rhetorics as a study of 
this practice.
See http://inpress.lib.uiowa.edu/poroi/.
4 The contributors include David Depew, Celeste M. Condit, Richard Doyle, Leah 
Ceccarelli, Steve Fuller, Chuck Dyke, Cristina S. Lopez.
5 This ISHPSSB meeting was held in Quinnipiac University (USA), 2001, its 
session on Rhetoric and Biology being organised by Lilian Al-Chueyr Pereira Martins 
(from Pontificia Universidade Catölica de Säo Paulo).
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order to teach scientific writing to biology students. On the other 
hand, a knowledge of rhetorics is required in order to see behind the 
curtains set by the contemporary science writers, those who play a 
more important role in contemporary science than ever before. More 
generally, both green and gender studies include research on specific 
rhetoric. In addition, the growing interest in rhetoric of biology is an 
evident sign of a critique — often a hidden critique — of the 
contemporary views in biology.
A study of the role of metaphors in biological research (and in 
biology altogether) is one of the central issues for biorhetorics (e.g., 
Paton 1997). In many cases it has raised a set of questions of whether 
the use of metaphoric terms in a scientific discourse is just a literary 
method to add additional power to the statements via a more 
expressive language, or there is a deeper similarity on the object level. 
The role of metaphors has been particularly important, of course, in 
interdisciplinary approaches. Typical examples include the usage of 
the terms ‘organism’, or ‘natural selection’ in all possible fields from 
chemistry to sociology to study of literature. Throughout the history of 
biology there has also been another trend of applying humanitarian 
metaphors in biological realm.
The widespread use of linguistic metaphors in biological science, 
particularly in molecular genetics, has been noted (e.g., Emmeche, 
Hoffmeyer 1991; Hoffmeyer 1992: 108). However, the use of 
linguistic metaphors has been helpful to a certain in developing the 
understanding (and a theory) of semiosic processes in organisms and 
their communities already in an ontological sense. In this context (i.e., 
of both rhetorics of biology and of starting biorhetorics), the book by 
Richard Doyle (1997) is particularly noteworthy.
Doyle’s point of departure is not biology — rather the Department 
of Rhetoric at University of California Berkeley — but the biological 
culture he possesses is no doubt professional. Doyle does not 
emphasise the distinction of terms. His book speaks on both rhetorical 
aspects of biological research and rhetoric as a feature of life. The 
latter comes in when he focuses “on the ways in which implicit 
models of language and textuality helped constitute knowledge in 
molecular biology” (Doyle 1997: 86). Sometimes when speaking on 
rhetoric of life, he actually speaks of biosemiotics, the latter term 
being seemingly unknown to him.
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Rhetorics (or rhetoric)6 — the art of persuasion, of expression — is an 
old discipline, dealing with the intentional aspect of communication, 
the language force, the effort of a message, the work done by 
semiosis. Not just pragmatic — rhetoric can mean either. However, it 
is relative to semiotics:
According to its traditional definition as an art of persuasion, designed to 
capture the attention of an audience and to move it to pursue a particular 
course of action, rhetoric can be regarded as a precursor o f the more general 
theory of textual semiotics and subsumed under the categories of semiotic 
analysis. (Rupp 1992: 10).
Rhetoric belongs to the pragmatic dimension of semiotics (Nöth 2000: 
394). Indeed, if pragmatics is defined as broadly as Morris does (e.g., 
Nöth 1990: 52), then this relationship is evidently true. However, from 
a biological point of view, it is important to distinguish two 
approaches to pragmatics. These are the aspects of an attempt and of a 
result. One is originated by needs, by goals, by an organism that 
expresses signs. The other is dependent of what actually happens, of 
the results of expressive behaviour.
Persuasion is a communication intended to convince. Persuasion 
includes not only all arguments, but also refers to non-argumentative 
forms of communication, such as advertising, threats, appeals to the 
emotions, etc. Persuasion, according to its standard definition, is the 
process of consciously attempting to change attitudes through the 
transmission of some message. If to be conscious of it is an ultimate 
requirement for persuasion, then there will be no way and no sense to 
extend it toward a more biological field.
In this context it is interesting to see the developments in the study 
of metaphor. Initially treated as a restricted rhetorical trope, the 
concept of metaphor has been later extended into an extremely general 
figure of communication and knowledge (e.g., Ricoeur 1976, Eco 
1986; cf. Richards 1936). A somewhat analogical expansion of a term 
has taken place with ‘intentionality’ (Searle 1993) and almost in 
parallel to these, one may notice a recent trend in a very different 
area— a reintroduction of the discussion on teleological issues in 
biology.
Placing rhetorics
6 See footnote 2.
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Rhetoric extends far beyond speech. Rhetoric has been found in 
image (Barthes 1977: 33-37), in material culture (Grier 1997), in 
action (Peshkov 1998). In a way, rhetoric deals with innate needs or 
wants that are expressed with consideration of the audience.
Thus, asking about the limits of rhetoric, one may notice that 
rhetorical behaviour is possible also in non-linguistic sign systems. 
Furthermore, we may notice that rhetorical turns are not always 
consciously planned — they may appear on the basis of various 
desires, and the form they take at the level of linguistic expression 
may be entirely involuntary. To illustrate, we can speak about 
rhetorical aspects of a child’s language. If the rhetorical types take 
their origin on a prelinguistic level, then it infers that the language 
ability may not be required at all, at least for certain types of rhetorical 
behaviour. Consequently, a path is open towards zoorhetorics.
That human expressive behaviour includes ethological universals 
encompassing the figures of animal behaviour has been well 
demonstrated by many ethologists (e.g., Eibl-Eibesfeldt 1972; 1979). 
On the other hand, the audience effects have been described in 
expressive animal behaviour (Marler et al. 1990; Gouzoules et al. 
1985). Here we may see certain assumptions for the placement of a 
lower threshold of rhetoric toward more biological area.
Defining biorhetorics
Biorhetorics is a view on, and a study of, living systems as rhetoric 
devices. This means that living systems are interpreted as analogical 
to parole, and not so much as langue. If a living organism is an entity 
that expresses and intends, then rhetoric is due. Because living 
systems have needs,7 they cannot but express them, and accordingly 
affect the whole communication between organisms.
Although I know of no systematic work on this view — possibly 
because none exists — this field does not start with the definition 
here.
In order to discover the seeds of rhetoric in biology, new rhetorics 
had to arise. While classical rhetorics emphasised style, delivery, and 
arrangement, new rhetorics focuses on knowledge-making techniques. 
According to new rhetorics, or epistemic rhetorics, language is seen as
7 On the concept of biological need, see Kull 2000: 339-343.
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the medium for all knowledge-making. Correspondingly, if we assume 
that living organisms may possess knowledge-like qualities —  an 
experience, a habit —  then it should also require sign systems, a 
semiosphere. In this way we approach a topic analogous to rhetorics in 
the biological domain.
In comparative rhetorics, it has been possible to speak about 
rhetoric in animals, e.g., “the rhetoric of reed dear stags in seeking 
rights to mate with females — vocal encounters, stalking, and fights 
with their horns if one animal does not give way” (Kennedy 1998: 
77).8 According to George A. Kennedy’s (1998) approach to general 
rhetoric, rhetoric exists among social animals. Moreover, he states that 
humans and animals share a “ ‘deep universal rhetoric”, and he also 
argues that plants share a rhetoric (Kennedy 1992: 109, 112). How­
ever, he distinguishes between plant or animal rhetoric as purposive 
and unconscious, and the human one as purposeful and intentional. 
Therefore, biorhetoric — if it exists — works on the level of 
unconscious persuasion, although one may also notice that biosemio­
tics can be defined as the linguistics of unconscious.
The crucial question of biological sign systems — on which 
depends whether biosemiotics can be a true part of semiotics — deal 
with choosing between two alternatives: is biocommunication is 
nothing more than signals, releasers, etc., absolutely unintentionally 
released and transferred, or an active process — the process of inter­
pretation that transforms behaviour into signs. Since the latter has 
become a more viable view in current biosemiotics, it also opens a 
gate for the intentional aspects of biocommunication, i.e., to biorhe­
toric.
Indeed, much of animal communication does not seem as being 
simply information transfer. It is often very likely that animal beha­
viour is designed from itself to attract, to pay attention, to deceive. 
A recent analysis of deception in animals has been provided by 
M. Hauser (1996: 57Iff).
In the framework of the semiotic turn in biology currently taking 
place, the birth of subfields (such as biosemantics, biopragmatics, 
etc.), and among them biorhetorics, is logical, predictable, and even 
inevitable. How this niche becomes filled is interesting to see. Thus, 
moving further from zoorhetoric, we may think, e.g., about endorhe- 
torics, and on several other branches, likewise or analogically, to how 
these subfields have been established in biosemiotics. If a system has
8 See also Lyons 2000: 460.
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desires, these may have a reflection in the signs evoked, and rhetoric 
begins.
If rhetorics has some relevance to biology, one may also ask about 
the situation with its sister discipline — stylistics. Indeed, the 
possibility and role of stylistics in biological systems has been pointed 
out by Sergey Meyen, for instance when he wrote about refrains in 
biological taxa. Thus, it may become possible to speak on an area that 
should be called biostylistics.
Few notions for biorhetorics
Taking into account the sharp difference between rhetoric and 
biorhetoric, it is quite improbable that the classical notions of rhetorics 
are of much use in a biological realm. However, it is reasonable to 
assume that there exists certain diversity among biorhetorical figures, 
or biotropes.
Biotropes can be defined as trope-like figures used in biological 
communication. In order to emphasise the fundamental differences 
between the biological and human communication, I prefer not to 
neglect the prefix ‘bio-’ when speaking on animal communication. 
The biometaphors should be distinguished from the metaphors used in 
human speech.
We may hypothesize that one can find and define among the 
biotropes: biohyperbole (as an example it may be proposed the body 
enlargement effects through the ruffled up plumage during courtship 
displays of some birds, e.g., Philomachus pugnax, or Lyrurus tetrix), 
bio-onomatopoeia (perhaps when Sturnus vulgaris is using the 
strophes from other species’ songs), handicap traits as described by 
Zahavi (still alternatively interpreted), or threatening poses, warning 
coloration, and alarm signals as used by many animals. It is also 
known that intention movements — the incomplete initial phases of 
behaviour patterns — can be recognised by conspecifics and used in 
communication (McFarland 1987: 317-318). However, a much more 
proper candidate for a type of biotrope can be found in mimicry — 
mimicry sensu stricto, or Bates’ mimicry. A semiotic classification of 
mimicry types (see Maran 2000) may thus serve as a more detailed 
distinction of biotropes.
The same biological phenomena can be interpreted, of course, in a 
more traditional neodarwinian way, without any assumption about the
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subjective or inner activity of the organisms, and thus, without 
biorhetoric. The distinction line has a relationship to biological 
need s —  whether these are considered secondary traits that have 
developed in order to increase fitness, or if these belong to the primary 
features of organisms responsible essentially for all their behaviour. 
Biological needs start from the recognition of absence. A result of the 
recognition of absence is expressed in searching behaviour. The ways 
an organism expresses its needs (and desires) can be turned into signs 
recognisable by other organisms of the community. It is very unlikely 
that there will be no feedback if the other organisms’ behaviour in any 
way affects the appeasing of the needs.
Thus, we may consider evolution as the history of inventing new 
(bio)rhetoric figures, in order to persuade the surroundings to fulfil the 
organism’s needs. The latter being able to grow in a semiosic chain, 
maintaining certain relationships to the biological needs without even 
knowing of them — as in the series of need, desire, craving, want, 
wish.9
A characteristic feature of any rhetoric figure is the effect on the 
audience, due to the effort expressed by a rhetorical subject. The effort 
means a semiosic effort here. Douglas (2000: 270) has written about 
semiotic work and proposed a definition: “semantic work is done 
whenever the extension of a concept is expanded”. What rhetoric does 
is namely semiotic work.
Where is the difference?
Rhetoric is an aspect of social semiosic behaviour. Thus, the problem 
raised here has a direct bearing on the relationship between anthropo- 
semiotics and biosemiotics, or in contrast, between human culture and 
endosemiosis.
Language is a social phenomenon. Indeed, this clear and evident 
statement claims that there would not be any language without a social 
system with members who communicate; outside of society, no one 
can ever invent a language. This is a statement hold by many semioti­
cians (Saussure, Greimas, Eco, Bachtin, Sonesson, i.e., by the 
representatives of anthroposemiotics, and also cultural semiotics) who 
put the semiotic threshold somewhere at the place and time of the
9 CL Young 1936: 25Iff.
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appearance of humans, with an assumption of the existence of 
consciousness.
However, what does it actually means? The question is important, 
since from this it is often concluded that there can be no language or 
language-like system outside human society, e.g., in simple orga­
nisms, not speaking about the semiotic processes inside organisms. In 
other words, endosemiosis must be impossible.
Thus, what does the social determination and social origin of 
language mean, i.e., what is the statement about? Most evidently, the 
proponents of this view emphasise that there should be a higher-level 
holistic system actually responsible for the behaviour of its elements. 
This system is usually called culture. Without culture, regardless of 
how one defines it, it is probably impossible for semiosis to exist.
Therefore, for biosemioticians to approve their statement on the 
origin of semiosis together with the origin of life, or first cells, 
requires proof that culture or something isomorphic to it exists in 
cellular non-human systems, and that there is a culture (or at least 
anything culture-like) inside organisms as well.
The view of biosemioticians (who usually have biological 
background) is backed by their knowledge of the vast complexity and 
individuality of so-called primitive or simple living systems, about the 
immenseness of the cell, applying W. Elsasser’s term. The mechanism 
of semiosis, as described in the works of anthroposemioticians, is 
recognised by biosemioticians as something for which an almost exact 
correspondence can be found in the mechanisms of life of the cell.
The definitions and descriptions of semiotic figures are, as a rule, 
quite simple from the point of view of their logical structure. This 
makes these inherently suitable for extension towards more biological 
application. An assumption of consciousness often becomes 
declarative, rather than built in into the structure of conceptions. 
However, the extended semiotics, as well as the extended rhetoric, 
cannot really erase the difference between the anthropological and 
biological spheres. After mapping the territory with these extended 
terms, the distinction has to be built again. The rhetoric as an elite art 
has little in common with the biorhetoric of an orchid flower.
Therefore, a possible reason for this controversy comes from the 
oversimplification of models applied and of descriptions made about 
human semiosis. The solution to this problem requires a task to 
improve and sophisticate these descriptions, so that the isomorphism 
with biosemiosis would to a large extent disappear.
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My guess is that this is just what will happen. And it means that it 
will be an improvement in the theory of semiotics as generated by a 
more biological approach, biosemiotics, from outside of the main field 
of the science of signs. If this happens, the acceptance of semiosis of 
living cells will be obvious.
As much as rhetoric is unavoidable for us, there is apparently no 
life in which biorhetoric is absent.
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Замечание по поводу биориторики
В статье анализируется возможность рассмотрения живых систем в 
качестве риторических. Риторику биологии, которая рассматривает 
риторику биологического дискурса, отличают от биориторики, как от 
взгляда, согласно которому экспрессивное поведение организмов можно 
описать как первичную (бессознательную) риторику. Появление биори- 
торической точки зрения —  логический шаг, вытекающий, с одной 
стороны, из развития общ ей риторики (напр. Д . А. Кеннеди утверждает, 
что риторика свойственна социальным животным) и, с другой стороны, 
из биосемиотического подхода к живым системам.
Märge bioretoorika kohta
Artiklis analüüsitakse võimalust vaadelda elussüsteem e kui retoorilisi süs­
teeme. B ioloogia retoorikat, mis käsitleb bioloogilise diskursuse retoorikat, 
eristatakse bioretoorikast kui vaatest, mille kohaselt organismide väljendavat 
käitumist saab kirjeldada kui esmast (mitteteadvuslikku) retoorikat. Bioretoo- 
rilise vaate ilmumine on loogiline samm, mis tuleneb üheltpoolt üldise retoo­
rika arengust (nt. G. A. Kennedy väidab, et retoorika on omane sotsiaalsetele 
loom adele) ja  teiseltpoolt biosem iootilisest lähenem isest elussüsteemidele.
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A sign is whafi
A dialogue between a semiotician and a would-be realist
John Deely]
Everyone knows that some days are better than others. I was having one o f 
those, “other” days, when a colleague approached me to express interest in 
the forthcoming Annual M eeting —  the 26th, as it happened —  o f the 
Semiotic Society o f America.
“Come on” , said the colleague. “Tell me something about this sem iotics 
business.”
“What’s there to say?” I said, not in the mood for this at the moment. 
“Semiotics is the study o f the action o f signs, signs and sign system s.” I knew  
it would not help to say that sem iotics is the study o f sem iosis. So I let it go at 
that. But inwardly I cringed, for I could see the question com ing like an 
offshore tidal wave.
“W ell, what do you mean by a sign?” my colleague pressed.
Who in sem iotics has not gotten this question from colleagues a hundred 
times? In a way it is an easy question, for “everyone knows” what a sign is. 
How else would they know what to look for when driving to Austin? All you 
have to do is play on that, and tum the conversation elsewhere.
Maybe it was a change in mood. Maybe it was the fact that I liked this 
particular colleague. Or maybe I wanted to play advocatus d iaboli. Whatever 
the reason, I decided not to take the easy way out, not to play on the 
“common sense” understanding o f  sign which, useful as it is and not exactly 
wrong, nonetheless obscures more than it reveals, and likely as not makes the 
inquirer cynical (if  he or she is not such already) about this “new science” o f  
signs.
You know the routine. Som eone asks you what a sign is. You respond, 
“You know. Anything that draws your attention to something else. Something 
that represents another.” And they say, “You mean like a traffic sign?” And
1 Presidential Address to the Semiotic Society of America delivered at the Friday, 
October 19, 2001, luncheon of 26th Annual Meeting held at Victoria University, 
Toronto, Ontario, Canada.
Author’s address: John Deely, University of St. Thomas, 3800 Montrose 
Boulevard, Houston, Texas 77006, USA; e-mail: deelyj@stthom.edu.
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you say “Sure. Or a word. Or a billboard. Anything.” And they say, “Oh. I 
think I get it.” And life goes on.
But this time I decided to go against the grain, and to actually say what I 
thought a sign was. So I looked my colleague in the eye for a few  moments, 
and finally said, not averting my gaze in the least, “OK. I’ll tell you what a 
sign is. A  sign is what every object presupposes” .
My colleague’s eyes w idened a bit, the face took on a slightly taken-aback 
expression, and my ears detected an incredulous tone in the words o f reply: 
“A  sign is w h a tl”
“What every object presupposes. Something presupposed by every 
object” , I said again.
“WTiat do you mean? Could you explain that?” The colleague seemed 
serious, and I had no pressing obligations or plans for the moment, so I said 
“Sure, but let’s go outside.” I opened my office door and indicated the stone 
table and bench at my disposal in the private fenced area at the end o f the 
driveway that com es to the outer door o f my office.
My colleague had no way o f  knowing, but in my private sem iosis o f that 
moment I could only recall the SSA  Presidential Address given some 
seventeen years previously by Thomas A. Sebeok, wherein he compared the 
relations o f sem iotics to the idealist movement with the case o f the giant rat of 
Sumatra,2 “a story for which, as Sherlock Holmes announced, the world is not 
yet prepared.”
In that memorable speech, Sebeok had taken the occasion “to indulge in 
personal rem iniscences, comm ent on the institutionalization o f our common 
cultural concerns, and then to prognosticate about the direction toward which 
w e may be headed.” 3 N ow , som e seventeen years later, this mantle o f  SSA  
President had fallen to me; and the institutional status o f  sem iotics in the 
university world, healthy and promising as Sebeok then spoke, had in 
American academe becom e somewhat unhealthy and parlous in the suc­
ceeding years, even as the interest in and promise o f the intellectual enterprise 
o f sem iotics had succeeded beyond what any o f us in the 80s could have 
predicted in the matter o f the contest as to whether the general conception  of 
sign study should be conceived on the model o f  Saussurean sem iology or 
(picking up the threads and pieces in this matter left by the teachers common 
to Peirce and Poinsot4) Peircean sem iotics.5
It is true enough that I was in a position, as an associate o f Sebeok’s since 
the late 60s, and particularly as the only living SSA member who had
2 Sebeok 1984a: 18.
3 Sebeok 1984a: 3.
4 Beuchot and Deely 1995; Deely 1995.
5 See Petrilli and Ponzio 2001: 4-11, esp. 6 & 10. The mistaking of “a part (that is, 
human signs and in particular verbal signs) for the whole (that is, all possible signs, 
human and non-human)” that lay at the heart of this contest had already been identified 
as a pars pro toto fallacy and made the subject of a landmark anthology of the period: 
see Deely 1986; Deely, Williams, and Kruse eds. 1986.
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personally attended every Executive Board meeting since the founding o f the 
Society in 1976 (and before that in the 1975 preparatory meeting6), to indulge 
in personal rem iniscences illuminating how this passage from promising to 
parlous had been wrought, but the exercise would only be for my expectant 
colleague across the stone table hugely beside the point o f  anything 
reasonably to be expected in the present discussion. Far better, I thought, to 
imitate the example set by Phaedrus the Myrrhinusian in responding to 
Eryximachus the Physician at the symposium in the H ouse o f  Agathon. The 
present occasion called for nothing less than a furthering o f the abductive 
assignment that our then-elected medicine man proposed as the main m ission  
of semiotics: to mediate between reality and illusion.7 Such was my private 
sem iosis o f the moment.
I needed no further inducement. For the public sem iosis o f  the occasion in 
which I found m yself I decided then and there to test the interest, intelligence, 
and patience o f my inquiring colleague, and to plunge us together at once into 
the “illimitable array o f  concordant illusions” sem iotics is centrally 
preoccupied in bringing to light.
The first illusion under which I was sure my colleague suffered, and 
which every standard loose answer to the question o f what a sign is serves 
only to further, is the impression that som e things are signs w hile others are 
not —  in other words, that the world o f experience can be adequately divided  
among particulars which are signs and particulars which are not signs. Right 
away, the situation called for an exorcist rather than a shaman. The ghost of 
William o f  Ockham is always present at the outset o f these discussions, and, 
not to under-rate his importance or power, at the outset, at least, it is best to 
exorcise him. Later on, he can be recalled to further the spirit o f  the 
discussion and, indeed, w ill be essential therefor; but at the outset he mostly 
causes trouble.
“Look around you” , I urged my colleague, “and, like a good  
phenomenologist, give me a brief inventory o f the main types o f  object that 
fall under your gaze.” O f course, I had already taken into account my co l­
league’s angle o f  vision, and knew that it fell directly on something that I 
could see only by turning, something that would be a key to the course o f our 
conversation.
“W ell” , the colleague noted, “o f course there is this side o f  the building 
itself whence we exited with its doors and windows; and there is the portico 
of the driveway with its pillars, the driveway itself, this marvellous tree which
6 The First North American Semiotics Colloquium, convened July 28-30, 1975, 
“at the University of South Florida for the purpose of founding a Semiotic Society of 
America”, as the jacket of the volume memorializing the colloquium (Sebeok ed. 
1977) announces.
7 Sebeok 1984a: 21: “the central preoccupation of semiotics, I now hold, is ... to 
reveal the substratal illusion underlying reality and to search for the reality that may, 
after all, lurk behind that illusion.”
s as Sebeok put it in 1984a: 21.
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gives us shade, and this fence which gives us privacy. H ow  did you get such a 
setup for your office?”
“Stick to the point” , I said, “and tell me if you see for your inventory 
anything which could be called a sign.”
“O f course. Out there, beyond the driveway and over toward the sidewalk, 
is the sign that identifies this building as Monaghan H ouse.”
“Y es” , I said, “there is so-located a sign. But” , I counseled, “you should 
read it more with your eyes than with your memory, my friend. Take a closer 
look.”
“O f course” , my colleague said, hand to forehead, squinting and abashed. 
“The sign has been changed to say ‘Sullivan H all’ .”
“Indeed it has” , I agreed. “Are there any other signs in your inventory?” 
“N o” , the colleague said. “From here, that is the only sign as such that 
appears.”
“Ah so” , I said, “but in your preliminary inventory you concluded by 
asking how I had managed such a setup for my office. So what you saw 
around you, even before you misidentified the sign for the building, led you 
to think o f  som ething not actually present in our perception here, namely, my 
o ffice .”
“What do you mean? Your office is right there” , said the colleague, 
pointing to the nearest door.
‘T o  be sure. But for that door to appear to you as ‘D eely’s office door’ 
presupposes that you know about my office; and it is that knowledge, inside 
your very head, I dare say, that presents to you a particular door, which could 
in fact lead to most anything, as leading in fact to my office. So one door at 
least, among those you noted in this side o f the building, even though you did 
not inventory it as a sign, nonetheless, functioned for you as a sign o f my 
office” (the office, after all, which cannot be perceived from here, being an 
object which is other than the door which indeed is here perceived).
“I see what you mean” , the colleague said. “So any particular thing which 
leads to thought o f  another may be called a sign.”
“Perhaps” , I said, “but not so fast. Tell me first what is the difference 
between that former Monaghan House sign and my office door, insofar as 
both o f  them function in your sem iosis as representations o f what is other 
than them selves?”
“Function in my sem iosis?”
“Forgive my presumption in bringing in so novel a term. ‘Sem iosis’ is a 
word Peirce was inspired to coin in the context o f work connected with his 
Johns Hopkins logic seminar o f  1883,9 from his reading in particular o f  the 
1st century вс  Herculanean papyrus surviving from the hand (or at least the 
mind) o f Philodemus the Epicurean.10 Cognizant no doubt o f  the reliable
9 Cf. Peirce (ed.) 1883.
10 Philodemus i.54—40BC.
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scholastic adage that action is coextensive with bein g ,11 in the sense that a 
being must act in order to develop or even maintain its being, with the 
consequent that we are able to know any being only as and insofar as we  
becom e aware o f its activity, Peirce considered that we need a term to 
designate the activity distinctive o f the sign in its proper being as sign, and for 
this he suggested the coinage ‘sem iosis’. So whenever in your own mind one 
thought leads to another, it is proper to speak o f an action o f  signs, that is to 
say, o f a function o f sem iosis private to you, o f  the way signs work, the 
associations that occur, if  you like, in ‘your particular sem iosis’. In fact, the 
whole o f your experiential life can be represented as a spiral o f  sem iosis, 
wherein through the action o f  signs you make a guess (or ‘abduction’), 
develop its consequences ( ‘deduction’), and test it in interactions ( ‘retro- 
duction’), leading to further guesses, consequences, and tests, and so on, until 
your particular sem iosis com es to an end. So” —  and here I sketched for him  
on a scrap o f paper a Semiotic Spiral representing our conscious life as 
animals.12
N ow my colleague is remarkable in a number o f ways, one o f  which is in 
possessing an excellent knowledge o f Greek. So I was horrified but not 
surprised when my colleague expostulated: “Aha! An excellent coinage, this 
‘sem iosis’, though perhaps it should include an ‘e ’ between ‘m ’ and ‘i ’ ! For 
probably you know that the ancient Greek term for ‘sign’ is precisely
0V||HSU)V.”
Horrified, for I had not expected to be confronted so soon with what is 
surely one o f the most incredible tales the contemporary developm ent of  
sem iotics has had to tell. It was my turn to deal with the tangled web o f a 
private sem iosis, my experience in particular on learning through my 
assignment to team-teach a course with Umberto E co ,13 that there in fact was 
no term for a general notion o f sign among the Greeks. I remember vividly 
my own incredulity on first hearing this claim. On the face o f it, the claim is 
incredible, as any reader o f translations of ancient Greek writings from the 
Renaissance on can testify. At the same time, the credibility o f Eco as a 
speaker on the subject equalled or surpassed the incredibility o f the claim. 
The evidence for the claim has since been developed considerably,14 and I
11 “Agere sequitur esse”, in the original. Extended commentary in Deely 1994.
12 Cf. Figure 1 in Sign Systems Studies 29(1): 28 — the semiotic spiral, where A = 
abduction, В = deduction, С = retroduction.
13 Eco and Deely 1983.
14 At the time, the main evidence in the p.iblic record (at least within the 
intellectual community of semioticians) traced back to 1983, as summarized in the 
“Description of Contributions” for Reading 6 in Deely, Williams and Kruse 1986: xix. 
Since then, the substantial work of Manetti 1987 has been added from within 
semiotics, and the earlier independent confirmation of the original point by Markus 
1972 bears consultation A survey of the point both in its evidence in the ancient Greek 
context and in its more general import for the Latin Age and for the understanding of
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have been forced to deem it now more true than incredible. But how  should 
such a conviction be briefly communicated to a colleague, particularly one 
more knowledgeable o f Greek than I?
There was nothing for it. “N ot exactly so. In truth the term or^ etav  in the 
Greek age does not translate into ‘sign’ as that term functions in semiotics, 
even though the m odem  translations o f Greek into, say, English, obscure the 
point. For actually the term ог|Це*0У in ancient Greek names only one species 
of the things w e would single out today as ‘signs’, the species o f  what has 
been called, after Augustine, signa naturalia, natural signs.” 15
Looking perplexed, my colleague avowed “I am not so sure that is true. 
Are you trying to tell me that the word ‘sign’ as sem ioticians commonly 
employ it has a direct etym ology, philosophically speaking, that goes back 
only to the the 4 in or 5th century AD? And to Latin, at that, rather than to 
Greek? To A ugustine’s signum  rather than to the CTT^ pslov o f  ancient Greece? 
Surely you jest?”
“The situation is worse than that” , I admitted. “I am trying to tell you that 
the term ‘sign ’, as it has com e to signify in sem iotics, strictly speaking does 
not refer to or designate anything o f the sort that you can perceive sensibly or 
point out with your finger, even w hile saying ‘There is a sign’.”
Flashing me a glance in equal proportions vexed and incredulous, my 
colleague said: “Look. I w asn’t bom  yesterday. W e point out signs all the 
time, and we specifically look for them. Driving to Austin, I watch for signs 
that tell me I am on the right road, and what exit I should take. Surely you 
don't gainsay that?”
“Surely not” , I sighed. “Surely not. But sem ioticians, follow ing first 
P oinsot1* and, more recently, Peirce,1' are becom ing accustomed to a hard 
distinction,18 that between signs in the strict or technical sense and signs 
loosely or com m only speaking, which are not signs but elem ents so related to 
at least two other elem ents that the unreflecting observer can hardly help but 
take them as signs among other objects which, at least comparatively 
speaking, are not signs. Let me explain the distinction.”
“Please.”
The giant rat o f Sumatra was veritably on the table, a problem in a culture 
for which rats are not considered palatable; a problem compounded by my 
own situation in a subculture about as not yet prepared to entertain
sem iotics today is found in Deely 2001, referred to throughout notes to this dialogue as 
the Four A ges.
1 See the Index entries for mmdov and for N ATURAL SIGN in the Four Ases 
(Deely 2001: 838 & 939).
Poinsot 1632: Book I, Questions 1 and 3. Commentary in the Four Ages (Deelv 
2001: 432-33, 433n58). y
Cf. Peirce 1897 and after; commentary in the Four Ages (Deely 2001: 433n58 
639-40, 641 n90.
'* See the Index entry SIGN in the Four Ages (Deely 2001: 9 9 3 -9 4 ) , esp. the 
subentry “strict sense o f  being o f sign ... distinguished from loose sense”, p. 99 4
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considerations of idealism as the world was in the time o f Sherlock Holmes to 
consider the case o f  the very giant rat now' sitting, beady-eyed, on the table 
between me and my colleague. Fortunately for me, or unfortunately for my 
colleague, it happened that the stare o f those beady eyes was not fixed upon 
me, so it could not unnerve me so long as I kept control o f my imagination.
N ow  you must consider, in order to appreciate the turn our conversation 
takes at this point, that the department in which I teach is affiliated with a 
Center for Thomistic Studies, and probably you know that the late modem  
followers o f Thomas Aquinas pride them selves on “realism” , a philosophical 
position that holds for the ability o f  the human mind to know things as they 
are in them selves, prior to or apart from any relation they may have to us. To 
refute idealism, these fellow s generally deem it sufficient to affirm their own  
position, and let it go at that, their puzzlement being confined to under­
standing how anyone could think otherw ise.19
But sem iotics cannot be reduced to any such position as a traditional 
philosophical realism, even if Peirce be right in holding (as I think he is 
right20) that scholastic realism is essential to if  not sufficient for under­
standing the action o f signs. In other words, the conversation had com e to 
such a pass that, in order to enable my companion to understand why every 
object o f experience as such presupposes the sign, I had to bring him to 
understand the postmodern point enunciated by H eidegger to the effect that21 
“as compared with realism, idealism, no matter how contrary and untenable it 
may be in its results, has an advantage in principle, provided that it does not 
misunderstand itself as ‘psychological’ idealism ” . Best, I thought, to begin at 
the beginning.
“You would agree, would you not” —  I put forward my initial tenta­
tiv e—  “that we can take it as reliable knowledge that the universe is older 
than our earth, and our earth older than the life upon it?”
“So?” my colleague reasonably inquired.
“So w e need to consider that consciousness, human consciousness in 
particular, is not an initial datum but one that needs to be regarded as som e­
thing that emerged in time, time being understood22 simply as the measure o f  
the motions o f the interacting bodies in space that enables us to say, for 
example, that som e fourteen billion years ago there was an initial explosion  
out o f which came the w hole o f  the universe as we know it, though initially 
bereft o f life, indeed, o f stars and o f planets on which life could exist.”
“Surely you’re not just going to give me that evolution stuff? And what 
has that got to do with signs being something that objects presuppose, a
14 See the Four Ages (Deely 2001), pp. 740-41, text and note 9.
2(1 Peirce 1905: CP 5.423, and c.1905: CP 8.208; commentary in Deely 2001: 616—
628.
21 Heidegger 1927: 207.
22 See the re-definition of “The Boundary of Time” and “Time and Space” in the 
Four Ages (Deely 2001: xxix-xxxiii, 70-72).
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proposition that doesn’t exactly leap out at you as true, or even as particularly 
sensible?”
“Actually it is not evolution, but som ething more basic that I have in 
mind. 1 want to suggest that sem iosis is more basic than evolution, and 
perhaps explains better  what has heretofore been termed evolution.' But, I 
admit, that is a bit much to ask at this point. Perhaps indeed I cast my net too 
wide. Let me trim my sails a bit, and ask you to agree only to this much: there 
is a difference in principle between som ething that exists in our awareness 
and something that exists whether or not we are aware o f it?”
“What are you getting at?”
“A distinction between objects and things, wherein by ‘object’ I mean 
som ething existing as known, som ething existing in my awareness, and by 
‘thing’ rather som ething that exists whether or not I have any awareness of 
it.”
“But surely you do not deny that one and the same thing may be one time 
unknown and another time known? This is merely an accident o f time, an 
occurrence o f chance, hardly a distinction in principle.”
“Ah so. But surely you do not deny that an object o f experience as such 
necessarily involves a relation to me in experiencing it, whereas a thing in the 
environment o f which I have no awareness lacks such a relation?”
“W ell anyone can see that.”
“And surely you concede that an object o f experience need not be a thing 
in the same sense that it is an object?”
“What do you mean in saying that?”
“Consider the w itches24 o f Salem .”
“There were no w itches at Salem .”
“Then what did we bum?”
“Innocent w om en.”
“Innocent o f  what?”
“O f being w itches.”
“But the people at Salem who burned these w om en25 thought they were 
burning w itches.”
“They were wrong.”
“So you say. But surely you see that, if  the burners were wrong, som e­
thing that did exist was burned because o f  som ething that did not exist? 
Surely you see that som ething public, som ething objective in my sense —  the
23 Deely 1996, in finem.
Witches, women (usually women) who (according to the official views 
promulgated in medieval and renaissance church documents), in exchange for their 
worship, were endowed by Satan with supernatural powers. To paradigmize a huge 
literature: see the gloss on Kramer and Sprenger 1487 in the References.
Actually, the witches at Salem were hung rather than burned, I am told, “death 
tor witchcratt being the result in either case. My colleague apparently was familiar, as 
1 at the time, only with the more ‘colorful’ version of the Salem trials.
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being o f  a witch —  was confused with something that did exist —  the being 
o f a fem ale human organism —  and that something existing was burned 
precisely because it was objectively identified with som ething that did not 
exist?”
“I think I am beginning to see what you are getting at”, my colleague said; 
“but what does this have to do with signs?”
“Every mistake involves taking something that is not for som ething that 
is” , I said.
‘True enough” , said my colleague.
“So every mistake involves an action o f  signs.”
“Y es” , said my colleague. “I see that to see a witch you have to be 
mistaken; but to see a woman you only need eyes, not signs. It is the truth I 
am interested in. By your account, all that signs account for is the possibility  
o f being mistaken. What about the possibility o f being right? Are you a realist 
or aren’t you?”
“If you grant me that an object necessarily, whereas a thing only 
contingently, involves a relation to me as cognizant, then, in order to advance 
my argument that every object presupposes sign, I need to ask you to consider 
the further distinction between sensation and perception, where by the former 
I understand the stimulation o f  my nervous system by the physical sur­
roundings and by the latter I understand the interpretation o f  those stimuli 
according to which they present to me something to be sought (+), som ething  
to be avoided (-), or something about which I am indifferent (0).”
“I see no problem with that.”
“Then perhaps you will grant further that, whereas sensation so construed  
always and necessarily involves me in physical relations that are also 
objective in their termini, perception, by contrast, insofar as it assimilates 
sensation to itself, necessarily involves physical relations that are also 
objective, but further involves me in objective relations that may or may not 
be physical, especially insofar as I may be mistaken about what I perceive. In 
other words, sensations give me the raw material out o f which perception 
constructs what are for me objects o f experience, such that these objects have 
their being precisely as a network o f relations only som e o f  which are 
relations independently o f the workings o f my mind •—  and which relations 
are which is not something self-evident, but something that needs to be sorted 
out over the course o f  experience insofar as experience becom es human 
experience.”
“Why do you say insofar as it becom es human experience?”
“Because, for reasons we can go into but which here I may perhaps ask 
you to assume for purposes o f advancing the point under discussion, the 
notion o f  a difference between objects and things never occurs to any other 
animal except those o f our own species.”
“Huh?”
“W ell, you’re a ‘realist’, aren’t you?”
“O f course.”
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“What do you mean by that?”
“Simple. That the objects we experience have a being independent о our 
experience o f them.”
“But you just admitted that w e experience objects which are not things.
“Yeah, when we make mistakes.”
“But not only when we make m istakes.”
“H ow  do you figure?”
“Is there a boundary between Texas and Oklahoma?”
“Is the Pope Catholic?”
“I take that to be a ‘Y es’ .” I let pass that the Pope at the moment is Polish: 
transeat majorem .
“O f course there is a boundary between Texas and Oklahoma. I’m no 
Okie.”
“But look at the satellite photographs. N o such boundary shows up there, 
W ould you say that the boundary exists objectively rather than physically, but 
nonetheless really?”
“That’s a funny way o f  talking.”
“N ot as funny as thinking that social or cultural realities, whether 
involving error or not, exist inside your head as mere psychological states. 
Consider that what sensations you have depends not only on your physical 
surroundings but just as much upon your bodily type. Consider further that 
how you organize your sensations depends even more upon your biological 
heredity than it does upon the physical surroundings. If you see that, then you 
should be able to realize that the world o f experience, not the physical 
environment as such, is what is properly called ‘the objective world’; and you 
cannot avoid further realizing that the objective world o f  every species is 
species-specific.”
“Species-specific objective worlds? I thought the objective world was the 
world that is the same for everybody and everything, the world o f  what really
is.”
“On the contrary, the world that is ‘the same regardless o f your species’ is 
merely the physical environment, and it is, moreover, a species-specifically  
human hypothesis rather than anything directly perceived. Because sensation 
directly and necessarily puts us in contact with the surroundings in precisely 
something o f  their physical aspect o f  things obtaining independently o f us, we 
can from within experience conduct experiments which enable us to 
distinguish within our experience between aspects o f  the world which exist 
physically as well as objectively and aspects which exist only objectively. 
That, my friend, is why ‘realism’ is a philosophical problem, not a self- 
evident truth. After all, reality’ is a word, and needs to be learned like any 
other. You need to read som ething26 o f  Peirce.”
lhe 7 * m between pnmary and secondary qualit.es of
ensation, and the very different ways in which the scholastic realists of Latin times 
and Peirce at the end of modern times himself resolved the distinction to the common
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“You seem  to be veering into idealism .” My colleague frowned mightily, 
hardly in sign o f  approval.
“Not at all. I thought you liked to acknowledge what is? And certainly an 
objective world shot through with em otions and the possibilities o f  error, 
which is specific to humans and even subspecific to different populations o f  
humans is the reality we experience, not just som e physical environment 
indifferent to our feelings about it? The indifferent physical environment is a 
hypothetical construct, a well-founded guess, which science confirms in som e 
particulars and disproves in others. For surely you don’t think it was science 
or philosophy that disproved witches, do you? H aven’t you read the old papal 
decrees on the subject, or the theological treatises on how to discriminate 
between ordinary women and women who are w itches?2' It behooves you to 
do so if  you are married or even have a girlfriend.”
“But all you are talking about is mistakes we have made, psychological 
states disconnected from objectivity.”
“On the contrary, there are no such thing as psychological states 
disconnected from objectivity. Objectivity precisely depends upon psycho­
logical states which give the subjective foundation or ground for the relations 
which terminate in the publically experienced interpretations that are preci­
sely what we call objects. The key to the whole thing is relation in its unique 
being as irreducible to its subjective source always terminating at som ething 
over and above the being in which the relation is grounded.” I could not help 
but think o f the two main texts in Poinsot28 which had so long ago first 
directed my attention to this simple point made quasi-occult over the course 
of philosophy’s history by the obtuse discussions o f relation after A ristotle.29
“But I thought knowledge consisted in our assimilation o f the form o f  
things without their matter.”
N ow I knew for sure my colleague was indeed a closet Thomist at least, 
versed in the more common Neothom ist version o f ideogenesis, or theory o f  
the formation o f ideas through a process o f abstraction.
“W ell” , I ventured, “in the first place, that is not a self-evident proposi­
tion, but one highly specific medieval theory o f the process o f abstraction; 
and further, absent the context o f  a full-blown theory o f  relations as
end of vindicating the transcendental equivalence of truth with being — that “com­
munication and being coincide”, as Petrilli and Ponzio (2001: 54) put it. See the Index 
entries QUALITIES GIVEN IN s e n s a t i o n ,  and TRANSCENDENTALS, in the Four Ages 
(Deely 2001: 973, 1005^6).
27 See Kramer and Sprenger 1486.
28 Poinsot 1632: Treatise on Signs, Second Preamble, Article 2, 93/17-96/36; and 
Book I, Question 1, 117/18-118/18.
24 See the summaries of the matter essayed by Grote 1872, as learned as the 
confusion gets. Cf. the discussion in the Four Ages (Deely 2001), pp. 72-78, 226-231, 
and 423-427.
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suprasubjective links30 to what is objectively other than ourselves with all our 
psychological states, affective as w ell as cognitive, such a theory is finally 
incoherent. For any ‘form ’, with or without ‘matter’, if  and insofar as it is ‘in 
m e’, is part and parcel o f my subjectivity, except and insofar as it mayhap 
give rise to a relation to som ething over and above my subjectivity, which is 
by definition what is meant by ‘terminating objectively’.”
“Could you state clearly your meaning o f  ‘subjectivity’ here” , asked my 
colleague.
“Indeed. Subjectivity is the sum total o f everything that distinguishes me 
from the rest o f  the universe,31 and relations are whatever ties over and above 
my subjectivity link me to anything other than m yself, be that other physical 
as w ell as objective or merely objective.”
“M erely  objective?” my colleague queried with eyebrows raised.
“M erely objective: existing as known and insofar publically accessible but 
not as such existing physically in the environment32, like the border o f  Texas 
with M exico or the office o f President o f the United States, and so on. 
Subjective existence is physical existence, including the whole o f  one’s 
private psychological states. Objective existence, by contrast, is public in 
principle, in the way that any two otherwise isolated subjectivities can yet be 
in relation to a com m on third.”
“But this ‘comm on third’, as you put it, surely must be something real?” 
“Not at all, if  by ‘real’ you mean existing independently o f the workings 
o f mind, som ething subjective, a physical entity. It suffices that it ‘exist’ as 
the terminus opposed to the foundation or ground in subjectivity o f some 
relation, which relation as a relation exceeds the subjectivity in which it is 
grounded by terminating at som ething over and above subjectivity as such, 
som ething ‘other’ than that subjectivity. This ‘other’ may indeed also exist 
independently o f  the cognitive or affective relation terminating thereat, in 
which case it w ill be a thing as w ell as an object. Subjectivity, you can see, is 
what defines things as things. Objectivity, by contrast, obtains only in and 
through relations, normally a w hole network o f  relations, which give even the 
things o f  the physical environment their status as experienced and whatever 
meaning they have for the lifeform experiencing them. Since objectivity 
always includes (through sensation) something o f the subjectivity o f  things in 
the environment, this objective meaning is normally never w holly divorced 
from the subjective reality o f  the physical world, but it is never reducible to 
that reality either.”
SIGN “ d SUPRASUBJECTIVDE BEINC “  lhe Four Ages
2 0 01 S|omumnn e"try SUB,ECT,VE BE,NG- SUBJECTIVITY in the F o u r A g e s  (D eely  
INTERSUBJECTIVTTY W" h lh°  еП,ГУ f0r 'NTERSUBJECTIVE BEING,
944-45)“  ‘hC lndeX entry OBJtCT’ 0BJECT,VE BEIN°  to toe F ou r A g e s  (D ee ly  2001:
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"Surely you are not saying that every object is merely the terminus o f  
som e relation?”
“Exactly so —  som e relation or com plex o f relations, a ‘sem iotic w eb’, as 
we like to say in sem iotics. Except your use o f ‘m erely’ here seem s hardly 
appropriate, when one considers that the terminus o f cognitive and affective 
relations normally involves something o f  the subjectivity o f  things in their 
aspects as known, even though the terminus o f  every relation as terminus 
ow es its being as correlate to the fundament to the suprasubjectivity 
distinctive o f the being peculiar to and definitive o f  relation.”
“And where does sign com e in?”
“At the foundation, my friend; but not as the foundation. That was the 
mistake the scholastics made33 in trying to divide signs into ‘form al’ and 
‘instrumental’ signs without realizing that our psychological states are no less 
particulars than are physical objects we point to when w e single som ething  
out as a ‘sign’.”
“You are losing m e.”
“Go back to the oripetov. Consider the howl o f  a w olf. Would that be a
crripetov?”
My colleague pondered, consulting within the privacy o f  self-sem iosis a 
knowledge o f ancient Greek. I awaited the result o f this consultation.
“I am not so sure. The aripeia were always sensible events, to be sure, and 
ones deemed natural at that. But they were primarily associated, as I 
remember, with divination, wherein the natural event manifested a w ill o f  the 
gods or a destined fate, or with medicine, wherein the natural event is a 
symptom enabling prognosis or diagnosis o f health or sickness. N o, I am not 
so sure the howl o f  a w o lf would fall under oripeiov, or at least I don’t see 
how it would.”
“A ll right then”, I suggested, “let us consider the how l o f  a w olf first just 
as a physical event in the environment, a sound or set o f vibrations o f  a 
certain wavelength propagating over a finite distance from its source within 
the physical surroundings.”
“I see no difficulty in that”, my colleague allowed agreeably.
“N ow let us suppose two organisms endowed with appropriate organs o f  
what we call hearing, situated within the range o f propagation o f that sound. 
What would you suppose?”
“I would suppose they would hear the sound, if  they are not asleep or too  
distracted.”
“Let us suppose they hear the sound, the one organism being a sheep and 
the other another w olf. Now the sound occurring physically and subjectively  
in the environment independently o f our organisms’ hearing o f  it enters into a 
relation with each o f the two organisms. The sound not only exists physically, 
it now exists also objectively, for it is heard, it is som ething o f which the 
organisms are respectively aware. It is a kind o f object, but what kind? For
33 See Chapter 8 of the Four Ages (Deely 2001: esp. 388-391)
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the sheep it is an object o f  repulsion (-) , som ething inspiring fear and an urge 
to hide or flee. For the other w olf, a male w olf, it happens heeding the 
advice o f St. Thomas to use sexual exam ples to make som ething memor-
a5 je __ [et us say that the how l reveals a fem ale in heat. Such a sound, no
different in its physical subjectivity from the vibrations reaching the 
frightened sheep, inspires in the male an attraction, as it were (+), what 
former President Carter might call ‘lust in the heart’.”
“What are you saying?”
“That one and the same thing occurring in the environment gives rise in 
awareness to quite different objects for different organisms, depending on 
their b iological types. Sensations becom e incorporated into perceptions of 
objects not merely according to what things are in the surroundings but 
especially according to how the sensations are interrelated within the 
experience o f  the perceiving animal as part o f  its total objective world.”
“So this is what you meant when you said that objective worlds are 
species-specific?”
“Exactly so. Every organism in its body is one subjectivity among others,
a thing interacting physically with other things in the environment. But if the
organism is a cognitive organism, its body has specialized parts suited to a
psychological as w ell as a physiological response to those physical
environmental aspects proportioned to the organ o f  sense. The psychological
response in those cases is no less ‘subjective’, no less ‘inside the organism’,
than the physical effects o f  the interaction; but the psychological effect gives
rise to a cognitive relation, a relation o f aw areness  o f  something in the
environment. But what is that ‘som ething’? The organism, according to its
own nature and past experiences, attaches a value to the stimulus and relates
that stimulus to its own needs and desires. In other words, the mere stimulus
o f sensation becom es incorporated objectively into a w hole network of
experience wherein it acquires a meaning.”
“But that is subjectivism ”, my colleague blustered indignantly. “Values
are real, objective, not subjective. You are making them subjective.”
“Pay attention”, I pleaded. “O f course the values are objective. Anything
existing within awareness is objective. They are also bound up with the
subjectivity o f the physical environment, both in the being proper to whatever
is the source o f the stimulus and in the being o f the cognizing organism.
Insofar as the subjectivity o f the physical world bespeaks a being
independently o f whatever I may know, feel, or believe, the values partake  o f
that being. But, as values, they reveal m ore  the being o f the organism
evaluating than the subjective nature o f the stimulus in the environment. They
belong as values to the species-specific objective world o f  the experiencing  
organism.”
“This is troubling”, my colleague alleged.
Let me put you at ease”, I offered. “In order for an organism to be aware 
of something outs.de itself, there must be inside itself a disposition or state on
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the basis of" which it is related cognitively (and, I would add, affectively34) to 
that outside other. If the outside other has an existence o f its own quite 
independent o f  the cognition o f the cognizing organism, then it is a thing, 
indeed. But insofar as it becom es known it is an object, the terminus o f a 
relation founded upon the psychological states inside the organism. Neither 
the relation nor the thing becom e object are inside the knower. All that is 
inside the knower is the disposition or state presupposed for the thing to exist 
as known. ' And the relation is inside neither the knower nor the known but is 
over and above both o f  them. Compared to the subjectivity o f  either the 
knower or the known the relation as such is suprasubjective. But as related 
cognitively to the knower the thing known is the terminus o f  a relation 
founded in the knower’s ow n subjectivity. A s terminating the relation it is an 
object. That same object if  and insofar as it has a subjective being o f  its own 
is not merely an object but also a thing.”
“But what if  the object has no subjectivity proper to it?” my colleague 
probed, thinking, as I suspected from his nonverbal signs, o f Salem and 
witches.
“Then it is only an object, what the scholastic realists used to call a ‘mind- 
dependent being’.36 So do pay attention: every mind-dependent being is an 
objective reality or being, but not every objective reality is a mind-dependent 
being. Some objects are also things, in which case they are mind-independent 
beings3' as well as objective realities.”
“But I thought an ens rationis, what you call a mind-dependent being, was 
a mere mental reality, a psychological state like error or delusion.”
“Hardly. Surely you recall that, according to the scholastic realists so 
beloved o f Peirce, logical entities all are entia ra tion isl And the relations of 
logic are supremely public, binding upon all? N ow  it is true that logic reveals 
to us only the consequences o f our beliefs, o f  our thinking that things are this 
way or that, not necessarily how things are in their independent being. But the 
fact that logical relations are public realities, not private ones, that logical 
relations reveal inescapable consequences o f this or that belief, not private 
whims, already tells you that they belong to the Um welt, not to the Innenwelt, 
and to the Um welt as species-specifically human at that.”
“Umwelt? Innenwelt? Where does that com e from?”
“Sorry. Um welt is shorthand for objective world. In the case o f  the 
species-specifically human objective world it is often called rather a 
Lebenswelt; but please”, I pleaded, “let us not get into that particular right 
now or we will never get to the bottom o f the question you have raised as to
34 See the discussion below of “cathexis” and “cathecting”: p. 28, n. 63; and p. 32, 
n 82.
35 See the Index entry FORMAL SIGN in the Four Ages (Deely 2001: 893-894).
36 Ens rationis. See the Index entries ENS RATIONIS and M IND-DEPENDENT BEING 
in the Four Ages (Deely 2001: 883-884 and 934-935, respectively).
37 Entia re alia. See the Index entries ENS REALE and M IND-INDEPENDENT OR 
PHYSICAL in the Four Ages (Deely 2001: 884-885 and 935-937, respectively).
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why a sign is best defined at this stage o f  history as what every object 
presupposes.”
“But”, my colleague interjected, “why in the world do you speak or the 
definition w e are seeking to plumb as best ‘at this stage o f history’? Surely 
you know that a real definition tells what som ething is, and is not subject to 
time? Are species not eternal?”
“Surely you w ill allow for more subtlety than that as regards definitions?” 
I replied hopefully. “After all, even when w e try to express in words what a 
thing is, it is our understanding o f  the thing that w e express, not purely and 
simply the thing itself? And this is true even when and to the extent that our 
understanding actually has som e overlap, identity, or coincidence with the 
being o f  the thing —  even when, that is to say, our definition partially 
expresses a thing objectified, a thing made object or known?”
“I see what you mean. Even a definition supposed real expresses only our 
best understanding o f  som e aspect o f real being, and insofar as this 
understanding is not exhaustive it may admit o f revision or o f being 
supplanted through subsequent advances or alterations o f understanding”, my 
colleague allowed.
“I am glad you see that”, I breathed aloud, “for, in the case o f the sign, 
there have been at least three, or even more (depending on how you parse the
38history) revisions o f  the defmitory formula generally accepted, and I expect 
more to com e.”
“D on’t discourage m e”, my colleague pleaded. “Let us at least get clear 
for now about this new formula you deem best at ‘our present historical 
m om ent’. I get your meaning o f  Um welt. What about this Innenwelt
business?”
“Innenwelt is merely shorthand for the com plexus o f psychological 
powers and states whereby an organism represents to itself or ‘m odels’ the 
environment insofar as it experiences the world. So Innenwelt is the 
subjective or private counterpart to the objective world o f public experience 
comprising for any species its U m w elt.”
“That helps, but I fail to see what all this new terminology and 
idiosyncratic way o f looking at things has to do with signs, let alone with 
signs being presupposed to objects.”
‘‘Then let me introduce at this point the great discovery o f semiotics, 
actually first made in the 16th century, or early in the 17th at the latest,39 
although never fully marked term inologically until Peirce resumed the Latin 
discussion around the dawn o f  the 20th century.40 Signs are not particular 
things of any kind but strictly and essentially relations o f  a certain kind, 
specifically, relations irreducibly triadic in character.”
^  Sec the Index entry for DEFINITION o f  s i g n  in the Four Ages (Deely 2001: 874-
t Z  f° .nimbncenses 1607- especially in the bilingual edition by Doyle 2001
See the Index entry INTERFRONT in the Four Ages (Deely 2001: 914-915). '
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But surely you are not denying that that”, my colleague said, pointing to 
the physical structure renaming the building beside us as Sullivan rather than 
Monaghan, “is a sign?”
“N o, I am not exactly denying that; what I am denying is that what makes 
what you are pointing to a sign is anything about it that you can point to and 
directly see with your eyes or touch with your hands. What makes it a sign is 
that, within your Um welt, it stands for som ething other than itself; and 
because it succeeds  (in your U m welt) in so standing it is for you a sign. But 
what makes it thus succeed  is the position it occupies in a triadic relation; and, 
strictly speaking, it is that relation as a whole that is the being o f sign, not 
any one element, subjective or objective, within the relation.”
“I don’t understand”, the colleague confessed. But there was interest in 
the voice, not impatience or indifference. So I was encouraged to continue.
“I suppose we usually think o f  a relationship dyadically, as a link between 
two things”, I ventured.
“Sure”, my colleague interjected, “like the relation between a sign and 
what it signifies. Why don’t you just accept Jakobson’s famous formula for 
defining sign,41 aliquid sta t pro  aliquo, one thing standing for another?”
“I am delighted you are familiar with that essay by Jakobson, which has 
become a classic,42 one o f  the landmarks in the sem iotic developm ent o f the 
last century”, I said, pleasantly surprised again by my colleague’s learning. “It 
took me almost nineteen years to realize a major flaw in that formula, in that 
the aliquo  allows for a misunderstanding along Cartesian lines, wherein 
objects are reduced to ideas in the subjective or psychological sense. I made a 
major address to the Semiotic Society o f  America on this point in 1993,43 
showing, or attempting to show, that this classic formula should be revised to 
read rather aliquid  sta t p ro  a lio , in order to leave no doubt that the sign, 
unlike an object,44 stands never for itself but always for another than itself.” 
“But since you have brought up Jakobson’s formula”, I continued, “let me 
remind you that he intended the formula to express the relation distinctive or 
constitutive o f sign, a relation Jakobson felicitously characterized as renvoi.” 
“I had forgotten that expression renvoi”, my colleague admitted, “but I 
don’t see how it helps us here.”
“W ell”, I said, “I am slow, proof o f humanity. Since my initial proposal 
for revision o f Jakobson’s formula eight more years have passed before a 
second revision occurred to me as necessary.”
“A second revision?” queried my colleague.
“Yes. If you w ill recall, renvoi for Jakobson was not merely the relation 
o f sign to signified, insofar dyadic, as you have suggested. R envoi was a
41 Jakobson 1979.
42 See Eco 1987.
43 Deely 1993, the SSA Thomas A. Sebeok Fellowship Inaugural Lecture.
44 Poinsot 1632: Tractatus de Signis, Book I, Question 1, 116/14-117/17; Deely 
1986a.
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relationship wherein the so-called sign m anifested its sigm ficate to or for 
som eone or something. So the formula in fact not only needs to be so revised  
as to preclude the typically modern epistem ological paradigm wherein signs 
as olher-representations can be confused with objects as self-representations, 
as I manifested in my 1993 Sebeok Fellowship inaugural address, it needs 
also to be revised to include a Latin dative expressing the indirect reference to 
the effect wherein an action o f signs achieves it distinctive outcom e.”
“You raise two questions in my mind”, my colleague said with some 
agitation. “You say that the sign manifests ‘to or for som eone or som ething’. 
How  is ‘to’ equivalent with ‘for’? And how  is ‘som eone’ equivalent with 
‘som ething’? But before you respond to these two queries, please,” my 
colleague requested, “tell me how w ould you have the classic formula finally 
read.”
“A liqu id  alicuique stans p ro  alio , one thing representing another than 
itself to y e t another”, I suggested, “although the impersonal verb form stat 
w ould work as w ell as the participial stans. Only with a final revision like this 
could it be said finally, as Sebeok said (as I now  see) a little prematurely,45 
that by the term renvoi Jakobson had ‘deftly captured and transfixed each and 
every sign process conform ing to the classic formula’; for if  a relation is not 
triadic, it is not a sign relation. W hence the truly classic formula: A liquid stat 
alicuique p ro  a lio .”
“Very interesting”, my colleague allowed. “N ow  could you answer my 
two questions?”
“Your questions cut to the heart o f the matter. Consider the bone o f a 
dinosaur, which is known as such. It functions in the awareness o f  the 
paleontologist as a sign. He recognizes it, let us say, as the bone o f an 
Apatosaurus. Consider that same bone chanced upon by a Roman soldier in 
the last century вс. Whatever it signified, if  anything, to the soldier, it did not 
signify an Apatosaurus. Agreed?”
“Agreed”, my colleague allowed. “In those circumstances it was more an 
object than a sign, not a fossil at all, so  to speak.”
“And yet it w as a fossil, waiting to be seen through the right eyes. It was 
not an Apatosaurus sign to  som eone there and then, in that last century, but it 
remained that it was prospectively such a sign for a fumre observer.”
“Y es”, the colleague conceded, “but that prospective signification was to 
som eone , not to something.'”
You raise the difficult question of whether the ‘to or for w hich’ o f  a sign 
need always be a cognitive organism or not. Let me acknowledge the 
difficulty o f the question, but not try to answer it now. Suffice it to say, for 
the moment at least, that when an organism interprets som ething as a sign, 
that interpretation is required to com plete the sign ’s signification as 
something actual here and now .”
45 Sebeok 1984: 9.
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I can see that. A sign requires an interpretation if  it is to succeed as a 
sign and not just be som e dumb object. But I don’t see how an inorganic 
substance can provide an interpretation. Come on!”
“So’ , I continued, proposing to steer the discussion more directly to the 
point at hand, “pay attention: what you call a sign, which I w ill shortly 
manifest is a loose rather than a strict way o f speaking, doesn’t just 
(dyadically) relate to what it signifies, it signifies what it signifies (triadically) 
to or fo r  something else. A lw ays hidden in the sign-signified dyad is a third 
element, the reason why or ground upon which the ‘sign’, as you call it, 
signifies whatever it does signify and not som ething else .” I didn’t not see the 
point, unless my colleague fastened upon it, which happily did not happen, in 
pointing out here the important distinction between “ground” in the technical 
Peircean sense redolent o f the old objectum  form ale  o f  scholastic realism and 
“ground” in the scholastic realist sense o f fundam entum  relationis 46 Instead, 
my colleague called for a concrete illustration, much simpler to provide. I 
secretly breathed a sigh o f relief.
“Give me an exam ple”, demanded the colleague.
I hastened to comply, before the absolute point so pertinent here might 
occur to my interlocutor (inexplicably, my friend Joe Pentony cam e into my 
mind).
“I make a noise: ‘elephant’. It is not just a noise, but a word. Why, 
hearing the noise ‘elephant’ do you not think o f  a thin-legged, long-necked, 
brown-spotted animal that nibbles leaves instead o f  a thick-legged, large gray 
animal with a prehensile proboscis?” Since my colleague fancied to be a 
‘realist’, it was not difficult to anticipate the reply about to com e. Nor was I 
disappointed.
“Obviously because ‘elephant’ means elephant and not giraffe”, the 
colleague said, this time a touch impatiently.
“Yes, o f course”, I granted, “but is that not only because o f  the habit 
structures internalized in your Innenwelt which make the noise ‘elephant’ a 
linguistic element in our Lebenswelt on the basis o f which we are habituated 
to think first, on hearing the noise, o f  one particular animal rather than 
another? So in the experience o f any signification is there not only the ‘sign’ 
loosely so-called and the signified object, but also the matter o f  the basis upon 
which the sign signifies this object rather than or before som e other object? 
You see that?”
“I do.”
“Then you see that the relation making what you with your finger point 
out as a ‘sign’ to be a sign is nothing intrinsic to the so-called sign, but rather 
something over and above that subjective structure; to wit, a relationship, 
which has not one term but two terms, to wit, the signified object for one and,
46 See the Index entry for GROUND, senses A & B, in the Four Ages (Deely 2001: 
900-903).
for the other, the reason why that rather than som e other is the object 
signified?”
“I think I do see that. 1 think. But please explain further, so I can be sure.” 
Realists like to be ‘sure’. Infallibility is their ideal goal, as it were, the modem  
variety at least (rather more naive in this than their Latin scholastic forebears, 
I might add), ironically the final heirs o f Descartes, who prized certainty, in 
the end, above ‘realism’.
“W ell, here, history can be a great help. Animals, including human 
animals, begin with an experience o f  objects, and objects normally given as 
outside o f  or other than them selves. In order to mature and survive, every 
animal has to form an interior map, an Innenwelt, which enables it suf­
ficiently to navigate its surroundings to find food, shelter, etc. This ‘suffi­
ciently’ is what we call an Um welt, and it contrasts in principle with, even  
though it partially includes something of, the things o f  the physical environ­
ment.”
“I think”, my colleague marvelled, “I begin to understand your ironic 
manner whenever the subject o f  ‘realism’ in philosophy arises. Realists 
assume our experience begins with things as such, whereas now  I see that our 
experience directly is only o f things as subsumed within objects and the 
species-specific structure o f an objective world! If entia realia  and entia 
rationis are equally objective within our experience, then the sorting out of  
w hich-is-w hich is a problem rather than a given!”
“Exactly so”, I answered, delighted at this sudden burst o f  light from my 
colleague. “N ow  if  only I can get you to see how object presupposes sign, 
perhaps w e can get som e lunch.”
“Please do so”, the colleague said, “and, now  that you mention it, the 
quicker the better, for I am getting hungry.”
“Permit me an ob iter dictum, nonetheless”, I pleaded, “for I think it will 
facilitate our progress to a successful outcom e o f  the main point before us.” 
“By all means”, the colleague allowed, drawing an apple from a bag and 
taking a bite.
“Even though you have heretofore deemed yourself a ‘realist’,” I 
ventured, “I have noticed from earlier conversations that you have a definite 
partiality to phenom enology, even though Husserl him self conceded that his 
position in the end proved but one more variant in the characteristically 
modem developm ent o f philosophy as idealism .47
‘So notice two points. First, the phenom enological idea o f the 
intentionality o f consciousness48 reduces, within sem iotics, to the theory o f  
relations, and expresses nothing more than the distinctive characteristic of 
psychological states o f subjectivity whereby they give rise necessarily to
724 John Deely
47 See Husserl 1929; Spiegelberg 1965: I, 155.
sai . J ™  B"en,tano 1874 Brief notice in ^ e  Four Ages (Deely 2001: 404 and 
jo in ts); extended comment in Deely 1978
44 Deely 1971, 1975, 1978
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relations triadic rather than dyadic in character. But second, and more 
fundamentally, recall the question with which (among others) Heidegger 
concluded his original publication o f Being and Time:50
Why does Being get ‘conceived’ ‘proximally’ in terms of the present-at-hand 
and not in terms of the ready-to-hand, which indeed lies closer to us? Why 
does this reifying always keep coming back to exercise its dominion?
Within sem iotics we can now give an answer to this question.”
“W e can?”
“Indeed. Ready-to-hand is the manner in which objects exist within an 
animal Umwelt. Human beings are animals first o f  all, but they have one 
species-specifically distinct feature o f their Innenwelt or m odeling system, a 
feature which was first brought to light in the postmodern context of 
semiotics, so far as I know, by Professor Sebeok,5' namely, the ability to 
model objects as things. That is to say, the human m odeling system or 
Innenwelt includes the ability to undertake the discrimination within objects 
of the difference between what o f the objects belongs to the order o f  physical 
subjectivity52 and what belongs w holly to the order o f objects simply as 
terminating our awareness o f them.53 Perhaps you recall from your reading of  
Thomas Aquinas that he identified the origin o f human experience in an 
awareness o f being prior to the discrimination o f  the difference between ens 
reale and ens rationis?”
“Actually I don’t recall any such discussion in St. Thom as.”
“Fair enough, and we don’t want to get com pletely o ff  the track. Later on 
you might want to look up the point in Aquinas and give som e consideration  
to its implications; for it seem s to me that what he is saying is that our 
original experience includes something o f the world o f  things but definitively  
cannot be reduced to the order o f ens reale. Comparative realities and 
unrealities alike are discovered from within, not prior to, objectivity.54 The 
experience o f that contrast, indeed, is what transforms the generically animal 
Umwelt into a species-specifically human L ebensw elt55 wherein even witches 
can be mistaken for realities o f a definite type, and wherein it may be hard to 
realize that the mind-independent revolution o f  the earth around the sun is not
50 Heidegger 1927: 437.
51 See, inter alia, Sebeok 1984.
52 Entia realia.
53 Entia rationis.
54 In the Four Ages (Deely 2001), see the whole of Chapter 7, but esp. pp. 341 — 
357, and the Table on p. 354.
55 This term is from Husserl 1936 in particular; in Aquinas’s own manner of 
speaking, he calls the focus or “starting point” of species-specifically human awareness 
ens primum cognitum. which then subdivides over the course of experience into ens 
reale and ens rationis. See the Four Ages (Deely 2001), Chap. 7.
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unreal whereas the mind-dependent revolution o f the sun around the earth is 
not real.”
‘•What about H eidegger's objective distinction between the ready-to-hand 
and the present-at-hand?”, my colleague pressed.
“Simple. This is a distinction that does not arise for any animal except an 
animal with a m odeling system capable o f representing objects (as such 
necessarily related to us) according to a being or features not necessarily 
related to us but obtaining subjectively in the objects them selves (mistakenly 
or not, according to the particular case) —  an animal, in short, capable of  
wondering about things-in-them selves and conducting itself accordingly. 
N ow , since a modeling system so capacitated is, according to Sebeok. what is 
meant by language in the root sense, whereas the exaptation o f such a 
modeling in action gives rise not to language but to linguistic commu­
nication,56 and since ‘language’ in this derivative sense o f linguistic commu­
nication is the species-specifically distinctive and dominant modality of 
comm unication among humans, we have a difficulty inverse to that o f the 
nonlinguistic animals, although we, unlike they, can overcom e the difficulty.”
“And what difficulty is that?”
"Within an Um welt, objects are  reality so far as the organism is 
concerned. But without language, the animals have no way to go beyond the 
objective world as such to inquire into the physical environment in its 
difference from the objective world. Within a Lebenswelt, by contrast, that is 
to say, within an Umwelt internally transformed by language, the reality so 
far as the organism is concerned is confused with and mistaken for the world 
o f things. Objects appear not as mixtures o f entia rationis v/ith entia realia , 
but simply as ‘what is ’, ‘real being’, ‘a world o f things’.”
'That is the general assertion o f ‘realists’” , my colleague mused. “It also 
reminds me o f R eid’s ‘philosophy o f comm on sense’.”
“As well it might”, I said.57 “Descartes and Locke confused objects as 
suprasubjectively terminating relations with their counterposed subjective 
foundations or bases in the cognitive aspect o f subjectivity, thereby reducing 
Um welt to Innenwelt; Reid, in seeking to counter them and. especially, Hume 
alter them, confused public objects with things, ens prim um  cognituni with 
ens reale  (in the earlier terms o f  Aquinas), thereby reducing Um welt to 
physical environment. But the physical universe o f things is distinguished 
Irom within the world o f  objects as the sense o f that dim ension o f objective 
experience which reveals roots in objects that do not reduce to our experience 
of the objects. Reality in this hard-core sense o f som ething existing  
independently o f our beliefs, opinions, and feelings is not ‘g iven ’ to some 
magical faculty o f common sense’. There is no ‘gift o f heaven’ facilely 
discriminating the real for our otherwise animal minds —  a gift such as
This distinction, taken from Sebeok. is one of the bases upon which the history 
ot philosophy as a whole needs to be rewritten: see the Four Ages, Chapter 1.
See "What to do with common sense?” in the Four Ages (Deely 2001: 547-48)
A sign is what? 121
Reid avers' which only bias or ‘some mistaken religious principle’ can 
mislead.”
So you are saying that the reality o f objects within experience, for any 
animal, is a confused mixture o f  entia realia  and entia rationis, but that this 
confusion only com es to light in the experience o f human animals by means 
of a species-specific modeling o f the world which you call language?”
“That is what I am saying.”
“W ell, it makes sense, I think; but it is a strange way o f speaking. I need 
to digest this a bit before I can decide where to agree and where to differ. 
Enough o f your obiter dictum. I want to get to the bottom o f this objects 
presupposing signs business, and get som e lunch.”
“Back, then, to history”, I urged. “You can see right o ff  that every animal 
will use what it senses perceptually to orientate itself in the environment. 
Among these elements sensed som e therefore w ill com e to stand for 
something other than them selves. The most im pressive o f  such sensory 
elements would be those manifesting the powers that hold sway over human 
existence, nature, on the one hand, and gods, on the other. So in the ancient 
consciousness arose the idea o f  ar|pdov, a natural event which generates in us 
the expectation o f something else, an elem ent o f divination in the case o f  the 
gods, a symptom in the case o f m edicine.59 This idea permeates the ancient 
Greek writings. But, at the beginning o f the Latin Age, A ugustine unwittingly  
introduces a radical variant upon the ancient notion. I say ‘unw ittingly’, not at 
all to disparage Augustine, but to mark the fact important in this connection  
that his ignorance o f Greek prevented him from realizing what was novel 
about his proposal, and how much it stood in need o f som e explanation 
regarding its possibility.
“Augustine spoke not o f  ar||ieiov but rather o f  signum. And instead of 
conceiving o f it as a natural sensory occurrence or event, he conceived o f  it 
simply as a sensible event whether natural or artificial. At a stroke, by putting 
the word ‘natural’ under erasure, Augustine introduced the idea o f sign as 
general mode o f being overcoming or transcending the division between  
nature and culture. Specifically (and incredibly60), for the first time and ever 
after, human language (more precisely, the elem ents and m odalities o f  
linguistic communication) and culture generally came to be regarded as a 
system of signs (signa ad placita) interwoven with the signs o f nature, the 
a r is ta  or, in Augustine’s parlance, signa naturalia.
“To a man the Latins follow ed Augustine in this way o f view ing the sign. 
But, gradually, problems came to light. In particular, at least by the time o f
58 Reid 1785: 604-5. A useful — if still presemiotic — discussion of “Thomas 
Reid and the Signs of the Times” is essayed in Mclnerny 2001: 52-56.
59 See Sebeok 1984b on the latter point, Manetti 1987 on the former.
60 See the discussion of Markus 1972 in the Four Ages (Deely 2001: 218-20, and 
esp. 406n95).
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Aquinas, if  not a century earlier in Abaelard,6' question arose as to which is 
the primary elem ent in the being o f sign: being sensible, or being in relation 
to another? For, the Latins noticed, all o f our psychological states, the 
passiones anim ae , put us into a relation to what they them selves are not, and 
present this ‘other’ objectively in experience.6" Is not this relation o f one thing 
presenting another than itself in fact more fundamental to being a sign than 
being a sensible element, whether natural or cultural? And if  so, should not 
the passions o f the soul, which, as effects o f  things necessarily provenate 
relations to what is objectively experienced, be regarded veritably as signs, 
even though they are not them selves directly sensible or, indeed, even outside 
o f ourselves, outside o f  our subjectivity?
“So at another stroke was overcom e the distinction between inner and 
outer as regards the means o f  signification, a landmark event paralleling 
Augustine’s overcom ing o f the divide between nature and culture. The states
63o f subjectivity whereby w e cathect ' and cognize objects, the scholastics 
proposed, are them selves a type o f sign, even though we do not access them 
by external sensation. Call them ‘formal signs’, they proposed, in contrast to
ftl See “The So-Called Dark Ages”, Chapter 6 of the Four Ages (Deely 2001: esp. 
243-247).
62 See the Index entries PASSIONS OF THE SOUL an d  FORMAL SIGN in the Four Ages 
(Deely 2001: 950 and 893-94, respectively).
w Though my interlocutor raised no question about this term, and later in our 
discussion (see p. 32 toward bottom, below) manifested a thorough mastery of its 
usage as pertaining to semiotics, nevertheless, the term is important to the future of 
semiotics and sufficiently unfamiliar to most readers at the time this transcript was 
made to warrant a note of explication. An organism responds to an object not only by cog­
nizing it but, at the same time, by cathecting that object as desirable, undesirable, or 
‘neutral’, as we have said. The former relation arises from the cognitive representations (or 
‘ideas’), the latter from the emotional representations (or ‘feelings’) accompanying or 
evoked by the ideas. Thus cognition and cathexis are twin processes within zoö- and 
anthropo-semiosis, “simultaneously given and only analytically separable”, as Parsons, 
Shils, and Olds best noted (1951: 68-69; see also their 1951a: 110).
The centrality of this idea for semiotics, particularly as regards the concept of 
Umwelt, appears from the following (Parsons, Shils, et al. 1951: 10nl3): “A 
distinction between affect and cathexis is desirable for present purposes. Affect refers to 
a state of an organism — a state of euphoria or dysphoria or qualitative variants 
thereof. Cathexis refers to a state of an organism — a state of euphoria or dysphoria — 
in relation to some object. Thus the term cathexis is broader in its reference than the 
term affect; it is affect plus object. It is object-oriented affect. It involves attaching 
affective significance to an object; although it involves attachment to one or more 
properties of the object, as used here it does not itself refer to a property of the object, 
but to a relation between actor and object. Furthermore, there is no connotation either 
of activity or passivity in the actor’s relation to the object implied in the concept.” On 
the specifically Innenwelt side, see Murray 1951: 453n. (The distinction Kluckhohn 
|t)S| 395 attemPts t0 draw between cathexis and valuation amounts to no more than 
the difference between cathexis within a generically animal Umwelt and a species- 
specifically human Lebenswelt.)
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the signs o f  which Augustine spoke, which they now proposed to call rather64 
‘instrumental’ signs.
“But by now the discussion was no longer exclusively in the hands o f the 
scholastic realists. The key distinction this time came rather from the 
nominalists after Ockham; and they were thinking exclusively o f particular 
things, alone, according to their doctrine, belonging to the order o f  ens reale , 
in contrast to every relation which is as such an ens rationis ,65 Out o f some 
two centuries o f  obscurity in which other issues held the center stage,66 the 
Latin discussion o f  the 16th century took a turn in Iberia which was richly to 
vindicate Peirce’s later thesis that an essential difference separated his Prag- 
maticism from the varieties springing up under his earlier label o f  
Pragmatism, in that to the former scholastic realism is essential, w hile the 
latter remains compatible with nominalism.
“The decisive realization came cumulatively in the 16th and 17th 
centuries through the work o f  Soto (1529), Fonseca (1564), the Conimbri- 
censes (1607), Araujo (1617), and finally Poinsot (1632), in w hose writing 
the decisive realization approximates unmistakable clarity.67 This realization 
was twofold. One part68 lay in the insight that not relation as such, but relation 
as triadic, constituted the being o f  the sign, w hile the sensible elem ent (or, in 
the case o f the formal sign, the psychological elem ent) that occupied the role 
of other-representation is what we call a ‘sign’ in the comm on, loose way o f  
speaking.69 The other part70 lay in the insight that it is not anything about 
relation as suprasubjective that determines whether it belongs to the order o f  
ens reale or ens rationis, but w holly and solely the circumstances o f  the 
relation.71 W hence one and the same relation, under one set o f  circumstances 
ens reale, by change o f  those circumstances alone could pass into an ens 
rationis without any detectable objective difference in the direct experience o f  
the animal.
“Then came the virtual extinction o f sem iotic consciousness that w e call 
modernity, a dark age that did not really end until Peirce returned to the late 
Latin writings and resumed the thread o f their developing sem iotic
64 See the discussion of this terminology in the Four Ages (Deely 2001: 390n71).
65 See Chapter 8 of the Four Ages (Deely 2001: esp. 385-393).
66 “The Thicket”, in the Four Ages (Deely 2001), pp. 394-408).
67 The Four Ages, Chapters 9 & 10. In particular, see the Index entry SEMIOTIC 
CONSCIOUSNESS (Deely 2001: 988-89).
68 Poinsot 1632: Treatise on Signs, Book I, Question 3 (that the relation of sign to 
signified and the relation of sign to power are one single relation, thus irreducibly 
triadic).
69 See note 18, p. 7 above.
70 Poinsot 1632: Treatise on Signs, Book I, Question 2 (that the physical status of 
the sign to signified component of sign relations is determined by the context in which 
the sign functions).
71 See “The Problem of the Nose of Wax” in the Four Ages (Deely 2001), Chapter 
8, esp. 369-372 text, and note 24 to p. 370.
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consciousness, first by explicitly naming the three elem ents or terms 
grounding the triadic sign relation, and then by shifting the emphasis from 
being to action with the identification o f sem iosis. The foreground elem ent o f  
representation in the sign relation Peirce termed the represen tam en 12 This is 
what is loosely called a sign, but in reality is a sign-vehicle conveying what is 
signified to some individual or community, actual or prospective. The other 
represented or conveyed by the sign-vehicle Peirce traditionally termed the 
significate or object signified  (in this two-word expression, to tell the truth, 
the first word is redundant). Whereas the prospective other to which 
representation is made (emphatically not necessarily a person, as Peirce was 
the first to emphasize73 and later sem iotic analysis was to prove'4) Peirce 
termed75 the interpretant, ‘the proper significate outcom e’ o f  the action o f  
signs.”
My colleague interrupted my historical excursus at this point.
“Do you really mean to call the period between Descartes and Peirce the 
semiotic dark ages?” he queried. “Isn’t that a little strong?”
“W ell”, I half apologized, “the shoe fits. Nor do the sem iotic dark ages 
simply end with Peirce, I am afraid. They extend into the dawn o f our own  
century, though I am confident we are seeing their final hours. After all, a 
darkness precedes every full dawn.”
“I saw an ad for a new book o f yours comparing today’s philosophical 
establishment with the judges o f Galileo. That’s not likely to get you job  
offers at the top”, my colleague admonished.
“Y es”, I sighed; “the ad drew on the A viso  prefacing my history o f  
philosophy.'6 It was calculated, w ell or ill, to sell the book to those 
disaffected from the philosophical side o f  modernity, its ‘dark side’,77 as 
distinguished from the glorious development o f  ideoscopic78 know ledge that 
we call science.”
“Ideoscopic?”
“Knowledge that cannot be arrived at or verified without experimentation 
and, often, the help o f mathematical formulae”, I explained.
“As opposed to what? Common sense?”
Latin derived, this term should be pronounced “rep-re-sen-ta-men”, not “rep-re- 
s6nt-a-men”, as the Anglophile Peirceans would have it.
73 Peirce 1904.
74 Krampen 1981; Deely 1987, 1989, 1993.
1S Peirce c. 1907: CP 5.473.
fi “Aviso”, pp. vii-viii of the Four Ages (Deely 2001).
77 See “Synthesis and Successors: The Strange Case of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde”, 
Chapter 13 in the Four Ages (Deely 2001: 540-589, esp. 565-572).
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“N o”, I explained further, “as opposed to coenoscopic 4 knowledge, the 
systematic realization of consequences implied by the way we take ‘reality’ to 
be in those aspects wherein direct experimentation, and still less 
mathematization, isn’t o f much avail. In sem iotics,80 this distinction has been 
explained as the distinction between doctrina  and scientia  as the scholastics 
understood the point prior to the rise o f science in the modem sense. Peirce 
him self*1 characterized the distinction as ‘cenoscopic’ vs. ‘id ioscopic’, 
borrowing these terms from Jeremy Bentham.”
“More strange terminology. Why can’t sem ioticians talk like normal 
people? And by the way, is Peirce’s usage faithful to that o f  Bentham, and is 
Bentham actually the originator, the coiner, o f these terms?”
“Normal is as normal does”, I said with mild exasperation. “How can you 
develop new ideas without new words to convey them? O f course old words 
used in unfamiliar ways can also serve, but tend to mislead in any case. 
Surely you w on’t deny that new insights require new ways o f  speaking? 
Perhaps you’ve been an undergraduate teacher too long.
“Point taken”, my colleague allowed ruefully. “But what about the 
reliability o f  Peirce’s usage vis-ä-vis Bentham’s coinage o f these terms, if he 
did coin them?”
“As to the exact relation o f  Peirce’s appropriation to the sense o f  
Bentham’s original coinage”, I said, “I can’t help you there. I have never 
looked into Bentham directly. But I find the distinction in Peirce useful, even 
crucial, to understanding the postmodern development o f  sem iotics.”
“You said just now ”, my colleague said, returning at this point to my 
interrupted historical excursus, “that what I would call the ‘comm on sense’ 
notion o f sign, a particular thing representing something other than itself, 
Peirce called technically a representam en, and that this is not the sign itself 
technically speaking but what you rather termed a ‘sign-vehicle’, functioning 
as such only because it is the foreground element in the three elem ents whose 
linkage or bonding makes up the sign technically or strictly speaking.”
“Y es”, I allowed, “you have follow ed me well. What makes something 
appear within sense-perception as a sign in the common or loose sense is not 
anything intrinsic to the physical subjectivity o f the sensed object as a thing 
but rather the fact that the objectified thing in question stands in the position  
o f representamen within a triadic relation constituting a sign in its proper 
being technically and strictly. So that physical structure before the building in 
your line o f  vision that tells you this is no longer Monaghan House is a sign
74 Also spelled “cenoscopic”. See the Index entry in the Four Ages (Deely 2001:
865).
so The discussion began with Sebeok 1976, and was picked up in Deely 1976 and
1978a (the former an essay review of Eco 1976, the latter an essay review of Sebeok
1976). The point became an Appendix in Deely 1982: 127-130, an encyclopedia entry
in Sebeok et al. 1986: I, 214, and is hardly regarded as controversial any longer among
those cognizant of the discussion, as Petrilli and Ponzio have remarked (2001: passim).
81 Peirce c. 1902: CP 5.424.
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not strictly but loosely. Strictly it is the elem ent o f  other-representation within  
a triadic relation having you with your sem iotic web o f  experience and private 
sem iosis as a partial interpretant, and this building here housing my office  
among other things as its signified object. M oreover, note that the physical 
structure o f the particular thing appearing in your U m w elt as a sign may be 
subjected to ideoscopic analysis, but that that analysis w ill never reveal its 
sign-status as such. The recognition o f  signs as triadic relations in contrast to 
related things as subjective structures is a strictly coenoscopic achievement, 
although of course the sem iosis o f such things can w ell be developed ideosco- 
pically by the social sciences, and philosophy will then be obliged to take 
such ideoscopic developments into account if  it w ishes to keep up with the 
reality o f human experience as a w hole.”
“Now that is amazing.” My colleague seem ed delighted.
“What is amazing?”
“That I now see what you mean in saying that a sign is what every object 
presupposes. You mean that every object as an object depends upon a 
network o f triadic relations, and that precisely these relations constitute the 
being o f a sign strictly speaking. Hence without objects there w ould be 
isolated sensory stimuli, but no cathexis,82 no cognition, establishing a world 
o f objects wherein some appear desirable (+), others undesirable (- ) , with still 
others as matters o f indifference (0).”
“That is only part o f it.”
“Part o f it?”
“Yes. Every sign acting as such gives rise to further signs. Sem iosis is an 
open process, open to the world o f things on the side o f  physical interactions 
and open to the future on the side o f objects. Thus you need to consider 
further that sign-vehicles or representamens, objects signified or significates, 
and interpretants can change places within sem iosis. What is one time an 
object becomes another time primarily sign-vehicle, what is one time 
interpretant becomes another time object signified, and what is one time 
object signified becomes another time interpretant, and so on, in an unending 
spiral of sem iosis, the very process through which, as Peirce again put it, 
‘symbols grow’.”
“So signs have a kind o f life within experience, indeed provide experience 
almost with its ‘soul' in the Aristotelian sense o f  an internal principle o f  
growth and development! One man’s object is another m an’s sign, and an 
object one time can be an interpretant the next.”
“Now you're getting the idea. Be careful. Next thing you know you’ll 
claim to be a semiotician.”
“So signs strictly speaking are invisible.”
In connection with our earner note on this term (note 63, p. 28 above), we may 
add here that the importance of introducing this term into semiotics is to provide a 
marker tor Peirce s seminal idea (c.1907: 00035-36) that, within the life of animals, 
every sign whatever that functions as such must have an emotional interpretant”.
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“Y es, and inaudible and intactile, for that matter. By contrast, a sign 
loosely speaking, an element occupying the position o f  representamen in a 
renvoi relation vis-ä-vis significate and interpretant, can indeed be seen and 
pointed to or heard. A  great thinker o f the 20 lh century once remarked,83 
perhaps without realizing the full depth o f what he was saying, that animals 
other than humans make use o f signs, but those animals do not know that 
there are signs. The vehicles o f  signs can normally be perceived (as long as 
they are ‘instrumental’ rather than ‘formal’) and can becom e rather inter- 
pretants or signifieds; but the signs them selves are relations, like all relations 
irreducibly suprasubjective, but unique too in being irreducibly triadic. Signs, 
in short, strictly speaking can be understood  but not perceived', while ‘signs’ 
loosely speaking can be both  perceived and  understood, but when they are 
fully understood it is seen that what we call signs loosely are strictly 
representamens, the foreground elem ent in a given triadic relation through 
which alone som e object is represented to som e mind, actually or only 
prospectively.”
“What do you mean ‘prospectively’?”
I sighed. “You bring up another story for which the world is not yet 
prepared.”
“I do?” My colleague looked worried, perhaps seeing lunch disappearing 
in a cloud o f verbiage, and having had enough o f the case o f the giant rat of 
Sumatra on the table between us, still staring beady-eyed his way.
“Indeed you do. Remember a little w hile ago when the subject of 
evolution came up?”
“Indeed I do, and I can tell you that I am happy you didn’t insist on going  
into it.”
“Nor w ill I now, except to say this. Up to the present evolution has been 
understood mainly as a vis a ter go, building up from below through 
individual interactions structures increasingly com plex and far-flung.841 have 
a suspicion that this picture is incom plete in just the way that requires 
sem iosis. For the action o f  signs is distinctive as compared with the action o f  
things in that the action o f things takes place only among actual physical 
existents, whereas sem iosis requires at any given time only that two out o f the 
three related elem ents actually exist. In physical interactions always the past 
shapes the future, but in sem iosic interactions there is an influence o f the 
future upon the present and even upon the past as bearing on the present, so to 
speak . My suspicion is that wherever you have evidence o f such an influence 
you have sem iosis, an action o f  signs. And since we can see from the sem iosis
8~ Maritain 1957: 55: “So far we have spoken of genuine language. Let us point out 
that the word ‘language’, when referring to animals, is equivocal. Animals possess a 
variety of means of communication but no genuine language. I have observed that 
animals use signs. But, as I also pointed out, no animal knows the relation of 
signification or uses signs as involving and manifesting an awareness of this relation.” 
See this important article on the point passim.
84 Dennett 1995.
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of animal life that the very possibility o f sem iosis in general is rooted in the 
indifference o f relation to its subjective ground on the one side and to the 
physical unreality o f its object on the other side,85 I venture to guess that a 
physiosem iosis, prior to and surrounding even the b iosem iosis o f which 
Sebeok speaks,86 with its phytosemiosis, zoösem iosis, and anthroposemiosis 
as parts, will prove to be at the heart o f what has heretofore been called, faut 
de mieux, evolution."
“Sebeok?” my colleague queried. “This is the second time you have 
spoken his name in this discussion. W ho is he? And is he important for 
semiotics?”
I could not but chuckle at the relativity o f fame. “O f the three most 
important figures in the later twentieth century developm ent o f  sem iotics”, I 
averred, “Sebeok is the second most famous and the first in importance. He is 
to semiotics today what Mersenne was and more to philosophy in the time o f  
Descartes. I am astonished you have not yourself heard o f him or read 
something of his work, if  not in sem iotics then at least in linguistics, 
anthropology, or folklore.”
“Does he accept your notion o f  sign as presupposed to object?”
“Well, I am reasonably confident that he would, although I have never put 
the question to him in just that way. After all, it is a formula I have stumbled 
upon only recently,87 and have not had a chance for extended discussions with 
Sebeok in quite some time, although I had hoped to arrange a visit this past 
summer. My main disagreement, if  it can be called that, with Sebeok  
concerns not so much the question o f objects in the sense we have discussed 
but concerns rather the bearing o f sem iosis upon the very idea o f things in the 
universe. Over the last decade o f the twentieth century and into this one,88 
Sebeok has envisioned a ‘cosm os before sem iosis’. In this way o f thinking, 
the idea of ‘nonbiological atomic interactions' as well as ‘those o f inorganic 
m olecules’ prior to the origin o f life being ‘sem iosic’ appears as ‘surely 
metaphorical’, as Sebeok puts it.”89
My colleague frowned. “Surely this Sebeok is right. Inorganic substances 
do not interpret signs, or involve them selves in renvoiV ’
It was my turn to frown. “I am not so sure. I think that here Sebeok has 
been uncharacteristically hasty in his dism issal o f a sem iosis virtually active 
in the world o f things. The whole question o f the ‘anthropic principle’ is one 
that implies sem iosis from the very beginning o f the universe.”
x5 Poinsot 1632: Second Preamble, Article 2, esp. 95/18-96/36; and Book I, 
Question l,esp. 117/28-118/18.
Sebeok 2001a. But see also Sebeok and Umiker-Sebeok 1992, Hoffmeyer and 
Emmeche 1999, and Hoffmeyer 1996.
A New Definition of Signum” in the Four Ages (Deely 2001: 434-435). But cf. 
Deely 1996.
XK “The Evolution of Semiosis”, in Sebeok 1991: 83-96; reprinted in Sebeok 2001:
17-30.
84 Sebeok 1991:84, 2001: 18.
A sign is what? 735
“An action o f signs in the universe prio r even to the advent o f  life7 If 
that’s not to indulge in metaphor I don’t know what is”, my colleague 
ventured.
“There is another alternative”, I said, “a third way between metaphor and 
organic sem iosis, a way suggested, in fact, by the father o f systematic 
sem iotics, if  we may so speak o f the first thinker theoretically to unify the 
notion o f sign under the rubric o f triadic relation or, as we are now inclined to 
say, ‘renvoi’ . According to Poinsot,90 it suffices to be a sign virtually in order 
to actually signify. By this formula, even in the prima facie dyadic 
interactions o f  things relations are bom  sufficient to constitute a sem iosis at 
work in the inorganic no less than organic layers o f nature, and prior even to 
the advent o f the organic layers —  indeed anticipatory o f that advent. This is 
an argument I began in 199091 and have continued to develop since under the 
rubric ‘physiosem iosis’.”92
“Sem iosis, signs at work in physical nature as such? That sounds crazy. 
No wonder some people regard sem iotics as an imperialistic developm ent!” 
“W ell, it is only a guess. But others besides m e,93 to say nothing o f  Peirce 
before me,94 have made analogous suggestions. Time will tell!”
“A  discussion for another time. I hate to end a good discussion on a note 
o f shibboleth, but let us go to eat.”
I nodded in agreement and started to rise, when my friend raised his hand 
to stay me.
“One last question, to be answered in the briefest o f terms.”
“Go ahead.”
“Are you saying that to know signs in the strict sense, to thematize sign, 
as it were, requires a species-specifically human Innenwelt?”
“Just so. For the imperceptible distinction between subjectivity and 
suprasubjectivity, between relations and related things, is at the heart of 
linguistic communication so far as it does not reduce to perceptible 
elements.95 And it is the point o f departure for anthroposemiosis in its 
difference from all zoösem iosis.96 A ll animals are sem iosic beings, but only
90 Poinsot 1632: Tractatus de Signis, Book I, Question 1, “Resolution of Counter- 
Arguments”, esp. 126/3-4, and 126/ 9-22.
91 Deely, Basics of Semiotics, Chapter 5.
92 On the term physiosemiois, then, see Deely 1990, 1991, 1993, 1998, 1999, and 
2001b.
41 E.g., Prodi 1977; Koch 1987; Kruse 1994; Corrington 2001. See the umbrella 
symposium convened by Nöth 2001 to open the new century.
M Besides my own analysis of what I termed “Peirce’s Grand Vision” (Deely 
1989), Nöth 2001: 16, observes that “renowned Peircean scholars, such as Helmut 
Pape (1989), Klaus Oehler (1993), and Lucia Santaella-Braga (1994, 1996, 1999), 
affirm that the origins of semiosis, according to Peirce, begin before life.”
95 Deely 1980, 2001a.
% Such was the argument of Deely 1994, sharply focused in Deely 2001a.
736 John Deely
human beings can becom e sem iotic animals —  animals, that is to say, that 
both use signs and know that there are signs ”
“I like that. ‘The sem eiotic a n i m a l a new definition for humanity as the 
postmodern age opens. Let us say goodbye to the res cogitans, even as 
Descartes said goodbye to the anim al rationale; and, like good semiotic 
animals, let us set out in search o f  sign-vehicles which can lead us to 
objectified things pleasant to eat. How about the Black Lab?” N ow  my 
colleague rose.
I rose with him and together we set out in search o f food. W e had not far 
to go, for the Black Labrador is a rather good restaurant not two full blocks 
from the place o f our discussion where my colleague’s initial incredulity gave 
way to the conviction that, while there is yet more to be said, yet at least this 
much is certain even now: the sign is what every object presupposes.
Since what is last in discovery becom es first in exposition, the last 
discovery o f the m odem s in the person o f  Peirce has becom e the first theme 
postmodern philosophy and intellectual culture must com e to terms with 
(since it defines them). It is not a bad discovery, even if compared to the late 
Latins it was only a rediscovery. Small wonder that, all thought being in 
signs, the objective universe is perfused with them. It remains to see if  even  
the physical universe may not as giving rise to us consist exclusively o f  signs. 
But after lunch ...
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Lotman in an interdisciplinary context: 
A symposium held 
at the University of Michigan
Andreas Schönte1
A symposium The Works o f  Iurii Lotman in an In terdisciplinary Context: 
Impact and A pplicability  has been held at the University o f Michigan, USA, 
on October 29, 1999.
The premise o f the conference was to bring together scholars from a 
variety o f disciplines who have used Lotman in their work and who could 
reflect on the ways in which Lotman enriches (or, som etim es, fails to enrich) 
their discipline, as currently practiced in the United States. The conference 
organizers, Jeremy Shine and the author o f these lines, deliberately sought to 
invite scholars who had had no personal contact with Lotman, be it as 
colleagues or students. The emphasis was placed on the late works o f Lotman, 
such as Universe o f  the M ind and Culture and Explosion, those in which 
Lotman attempts to go beyond the de Saussurian foundations o f his sem iotics. 
The implicit agenda o f the conference, ultimately, was to reclaim som e parts 
of Lotman’s works that had not been sufficiently heeded in American 
academia and that could contribute to a kind o f  mapping out o f  the field o f 
post-structuralist Cultural Studies and its various sub-branches.
In a paper called “Bipolar disorders: The sem iotics o f asymmetry in 
Lotman, Bakhtin, and Levinas”, Amy Mandelker proposed a reading o f  
Lotman’s Culture and Explosion  in the context o f theories o f otherness 
inspired by neo-Kantianism and twentieth-century Jewish philosophy (Franz 
Rosenzweig, Walter Benjamin, and Emmanuel Levinas). Mandelker drew a 
parallel between Lotman’s concept o f explosion and Benjamin’s messianic 
idea o f the “angel o f history” and interpreted the notion o f self-giving  
(vruchenie sebya) as a reformulation o f Kant’s categorical imperative and as a 
reference to the Jewish practice o f  estrangement exem plified in Levinas’s
' Author’s address: Andreas Schönle, Department of Slavic Languages and 
Literatures, MLB 3040, The University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Ml 48109-1275, 
USA; e-mail: aschonle@umich.edu.
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emphasis on the self-inflicted violence involved in the response to the 
suffering o f the other, Altogether, Mandelker demonstrated how Jewish 
metaphysics were inscribed into Lotman’s secular post-structuralist sem iotics.
In “Lotman, film theory and verse theory”, Herbert Eagle analyzed the 
cross-fertilization between film and verse theory in Lotman’s works. Verse 
theory, as adapted from Iurii Tynianov, provided Lotman with the fruitful 
concept o f double asymmetric encoding, which, when applied to film, yielded  
the notion o f an interweaving o f conventional and iconic codes as the 
underlying principle o f cinema. Eagle showed how Lotman’s key concepts o f  
indeterminacy, asymmetry, and, ultimately, creativity, emerged out o f  his 
analysis o f cinema,
Andrei Zorin approached Lotman from the vantage point o f the history of 
mentality and ideology. “Lotman’s Karamzin myth and the mentality o f  the 
intelligentsia in the late Soviet period” traced how Lotman contributed to 
elaborate the ethos o f late Soviet intelligentsia, which sought a way out o f an 
unbearable alternative between risky dissident activity and self-com prom ising  
attempts to bring about reforms within the Communist party. The intelli­
gentsia found a third way in a kind o f stoic everyday work ethic and sought to 
identify in Russian history analogies for its current position. Zorin 
demonstrated that Lotman projected his behavorial stance onto Karamzin, 
turning the historiographer into a kind o f mirror of, and paradigm for, his own 
existential choices, which led him to misread key elem ents o f his historio­
graphic writings.
Andreas Schönle analyzed the typological parallels between Lotman’s and 
Stephen Greenblatt’s cultural poetics. Both writers attempt to delineate a 
theory o f the relationship between culture and the social sphere that does not 
fold the cultural into the social and remains sensitive to the intrinsic vigor o f 
culture, to individual agency and creativity. “Social power and individual 
agency: The self in Greenblatt and Lotman” articulates the differences 
between Lotman’s biochem ical and Greenblatt’s econom ic metaphors of 
cultural exchange. Both authors analyze the hom ogenizing strategies of 
power, but Green-blatt’s sense for diffuse, plural sources o f power contrasts 
with Lotman’s idea o f a centralized, unique source. These notions o f power 
determine varying ideas o f selfhood. If for Greenblatt cultural life is fluid and 
complex enough to enable the self to negotiate som e degree o f  autonomy, if 
only an illusory one, for Lotman, the further withdrawn from the center o f  
culture, the freer one is.
A series o f papers addressed Lotman’s relevance for historians. In 
“Lotman for historians: Reading the potentials” James von Geldern pointed to 
several gaps in Lotman’s approach to culture, notably his canon-centered  
neglect of popular culture, o f gender issues, and o f  the experience o f certain 
social classes. On the example o f the urban romance, Geldern tried to 
illustrate how the opposition between high and popular culture would  
complicate Lotman’s main articulation between center and periphery. Kristi 
Groberg used Lotman’s ideas o f the semiosphere to analyze the case o f  a
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multi-lingual ethnic community. In “Lotman as key to understanding Russian- 
Jewish trilingualism” she discussed the applicability o f Lotman’s sem iotics to 
ethnic studies.
Finally. Kathryn Babayan was primarily concerned with conceptualizing 
historical change. She began by observing that theorists such as Levi-Strauss, 
Geertz, Barthes, Bourdieu, and Foucault have not developed a framework that 
could explicate the dynamics o f historical change. Lotman’s binary model o f 
cultural change, enhanced by the theory o f the semiosphere as a site o f  
interaction between multiple languages, offers a way to conceptualize such a 
process, without loosing a sense o f com plexity and heterogeneity. Her paper 
analyzed a case study o f  conflict in sixteenth-century Iran between Islamic 
culture and the Nuqtavi messianic movement, which sought a return to 
Zoroastrianism and championed the Persian past. Lotman’s framework 
enabled her to explain the astonishing endurance o f cultural memory in Iran 
and the syncretic phenomenon o f change amidst underlying continuities.
The last group o f  papers was devoted to attempts to model culture in 
cybernetics, anthropology, and political theory. To set the stage, Kelly 
M iller’s “D efining the ‘thinking brain’: Lotman’s response to Turing” offered 
a reading o f  Lotman’s Universe o f  the M ind  as a manifesto on artificial 
intelligence. She placed Lotman’s proposal to view culture as collective 
intellect and to model artificial intelligence thereafter in the context o f  pole­
m ics on the proper modeling o f intelligence. Referring at once to analytical 
philosophy, cybernetics, and sem iotics, she analyzed both the advantages and 
pitfalls o f his paradigm, which essentially finds in artistic texts and their 
asymmetric bi-polar mechanism an externalized isomorph o f intelligence. In 
“Lotman and absent Lotman in ethnography in the U.S. and U .S .S .R .” Alaina 
Lemon com piled references to Lotman in several major American and Soviet 
ethnographic journals, noting the scarcity o f such references, and discussing 
the reasons for such apparent neglect o f Lotman’s paradigm in ethnographic 
scholarship.
From the vantage point o f linguistic anthropology, Bruce Mannheim made 
the case that Lotman’s sem iotics enabled an understanding o f post-colonial 
culture more adequate than that proposed by neo-marxist approaches. Ana­
lyzing a Quechua ritual text, “Lotman, culture, and metalanguage” illustrated 
how the Indians embedded Christian hymnology into their religious practices 
and how enigmatic metalinguistic phrases served as keys to submerged pagan 
codes that endured despite the dominance o f Catholic colonial discourse. In 
so doing, Mannheim demonstrated the existence o f a cultural metalanguage 
despite the absence o f  explicit metalinguistic lexical registers in the Quechua 
language.
Finally, M ichael Urban analyzed the ways in which political rhetoric in 
post-Soviet Russia seeks to create political communities by using patently 
non-sensical discourse to strengthen the identity o f a political group. Urban 
demonstrated how binary oppositions, autocommunication, and non-referen- 
tial discourse reinforce one another in the production o f a discourse aimed
748 Andreas Schönle
more at creating internal cohesion within a group than communicating any 
information to an outsider. The paper thus evoked the advantages to be 
derived from Lotman’s analysis o f the semiosphere over positivistic political 
theory, which takes at face value the denotative value o f political discourse, 
and over Habermas’ notion o f “distorted communication”, which mistakes 
self-directed discourse for communication with the other. The paper thus 
developed a theory o f political culture that refines the simple ‘us-them’ 
dichotomy assumed by theorists o f inter-group relations.
A lively round-table discussion follow ed the presentation o f these papers. 
The discussion centered first on Lotman’s concept o f  power, which was 
contrasted with that by Gramsci and Foucault. Two issues seem ed o f para­
mount importance, the correlation between sem iotic power and raw 
disciplinary practices that Lotman fails to address, partly, to be sure, because 
in the context o f  Soviet repression, state violence was too conspicuous to 
need elaboration; and the question o f whether power is wedded to unity or 
not. The ethical im plications that emerge from Lotman’s works were noted 
with surprise. Indeed, echoes between the papers by Mandelker, Schönle, and 
Zorin suggest the degree to which Lotman’s stoic existential stance shines 
through his sem iotics and history o f  culture. Lotman’s concept o f the semio­
sphere was again taken up. Participants debated the extent to which the 
biological metaphors used by Lotman implied an essentialism . M ost agreed 
that the organicist paradigm serves not to essentialize discourse, but to restore 
to it a sense o f the unceasing life, the continuous metabolic exchanges dis­
courses undergo when they are thrown into the world. The round-table also 
revisited the important idea that Lotman offers a means to conceptualize 
historical change distinct from, say, Hegelian dialectics or Foucaultian 
archeological shifts.
Given its broad interdisciplinary basis, the cohesion o f  the conference was 
so remarkable that it prompted the organizers to prepare a collective volume 
based on a selection o f papers presented at the conference and augmented by 
articles solicited specifically for this volume. Provisionally entitled Lotman 
and Cultural Studies: Encounters and Extensions, this collection is now  
almost ready to be submitted to a publisher. It engages a broad range of  
theories and disciplines, including literary criticism, the history o f mentalities, 
the history o f philosophy and religions, cultural theory, cinema, political 
science, anthropology, and the history and theory o f everyday life. Its 
contributors hope that it has the potential o f  making a definite impact on a 
variety o f fields in the humanities and social sciences, extending thereby 
Lotman’s efforts to break disciplinary boundaries.
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